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FROM HOMER TO THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA

A COLLECTION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE SOURCES

BY

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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN VASSAR COLLEGE

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Greece - History

TO
G. L. T. AND J. T.

1849

PREFACE

This book was begun in answer to a definite need for a selection from the sources to be used in ancient-history classes, many of whose members had already been accustomed to using source books in medieval and modern history. For such students there was only one source book of ancient history and it was designed especially for secondary schools. The present book was practically completed before the appearance of one or two other source books, which cover a considerably longer period than that included here. It is hoped that the present work will furnish the student with fuller material in a more restricted field — from Homer to the battle of Chæronea. The aim has been to make these selections comprehensive enough to be of use in secondary schools as well as for undergraduate work in college. The attempt to make the book of service to many will doubtless result in the failure to satisfy the specialist, — the Greek scholar on the one hand, the historian on the other, — but these selections may help to bridge over the wide gulf between the pleasing narrative for children and the exhaustive work for the advanced student.

Almost any book dealing with Greek history needs a few words of explanation about the spelling of proper names. Consistency is of course impossible in a book made up of selected passages, the translators of which have their own preferences; and I have been perhaps unduly conscientious about tampering with the spelling of others, even to the extent of leaving some personal idiosyncrasies of hybrid Græco-Latin forms. In my own translations or commentary, names have generally been Latinized despite the fact that some unusual names, especially in inscriptions, have perhaps never before been transliterated, and therefore present a strange appearance.

The circumstances under which this book has been written have undoubtedly permitted errors to occur. It has been done in whatever time could be spared from my academic work, and for all mistakes I alone am responsible.

A list of translations is given at the end of the volume. Where no translator's name follows that of the author, the version has been made by myself. Publishers and translators have been most generous in allowing me to make use of these translations; and it is my pleasant duty to thank Mr. George Allen, Messrs. George Bell and Sons, The Cambridge University Press, Mr. J. S. Easby-Smith, the editors of Everyman's Library, Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co., The Macmillan Company, The Oxford University Press, Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons, Messrs. Seeley and Company, and Professor Paul Shorey for their kind permission to quote from works published or translated by them.

To Messrs. Ginn and Company I wish to express my heartiest thanks for having reduced the author's difficulties to a minimum through the accuracy and judgment of their readers and for their constant courtesy and consideration.

My personal debt to those friends who have given me assistance is very great. Professor Perry of Columbia was good enough to read the translations of the inscriptions, and Professor Macurdy of Vassar those of some of the poets and orators. Both have given generously of their time, and have made many improvements in the versions. Professor Salmon of Vassar has found time to read the whole manuscript, to talk over many passages, to make many valuable suggestions, and to act as a constant inspiration. It is fitting that my last word should be an expression of deepest gratitude for her sympathetic encouragement.

I. C. T.

Vassar College

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INTRODUCTION

Happily the time has gone by when it is necessary to make an apology for introducing source books in history. The use of such material in the secondary schools is more or less generally accepted and tends to become the rule rather than the exception.

The material in this book which has hitherto been unavailable to the English reader consists chiefly of selections from the orators, especially Lysias and Andocides, and inscriptions. No effort has been made to present a continuous narrative.

The dramatists have been used when the direct bearing on history is evident; the same is true of the lyric and elegiac poets. It is tempting to include more excerpts of a purely literary or philosophical character, for they reflect the thought of the time as truly as the historians; but it is no easy task to draw the line, and the suggestion now and then of how the Greek spirit expressed itself in forms other than prose narrative is all that has been possible. Pausanias has been frequently used. His description of Greece brings many scenes vividly before us, and his interest in myths and old legends has preserved many traditions of remote antiquity.

It seemed very desirable to include a fairly large number of inscriptions. The average student knows vaguely in a general way that these form one of the most important classes of sources, but he seldom or never sees either an inscription or any book about inscriptions which will be of use without a reading knowledge of Greek. Those included have been chosen from Hicks and Hill's "Greek Historical Inscriptions" in the hope that the student might become acquainted with the phraseology and subject matter of certain kinds of historical records. The use of inscriptions by those unfamiliar with Greek will always be limited and to a certain extent

unsatisfactory because of the fragmentary condition of many inscriptions, yet a far wider use of them could be made if some of the most valuable and complete examples were translated and edited with adequate notes. They afford insight into conditions social, political, religious, and economic which would otherwise be unexplored ground. The student who sees to what an extent modern works are based on inscriptional evidence cannot afford to remain totally ignorant of this field.

It may seem that a large proportion of the selections in this book is devoted to political, constitutional, and military affairs rather than to the economic matters which so greatly occupy the interests of the modern historian. The tendency of the present time is to view history from the economic point of view, to find therein the explanation of many inconsistencies in foreign policy or in treatment of neighbors, of domestic legislation, and of granting political rights. Two of the most striking and valuable books on Greek history which have recently appeared, those by Grundy and Zimmern, bring these points out with great emphasis, and they are not alone in noting the importance of this angle of vision. The data on which such books are based and from which general conclusions are drawn have been collected from innumerable scattered sources, incidental references, or chance hints let slip. There is little consecutive material from which to make suitable selections for a source book. The scientific study of economics, particularly from the practical point of view, is of recent growth. The Greeks were not in the habit of recording the everyday trivial things with which their whole world was familiar. The modern scholar must look below the surface, must delve into countless inscriptions, must with infinite pains piece together into a coherent whole the scattered bits from here and there. Finance and scientific housekeeping are dealt with by Xenophon, but there is little else available. Some of the passages selected from Homer, Hesiod, Lysias, and Aristophanes will possibly offer suggestions. Many private orations of Demosthenes which are full of valuable information on trade and banking are rather too technical to interest the general reader. The

infinite labor and research which the courageous author of an economic history of Greece is bound to put into its composition should be amply repaid by the warm welcome such a book is sure to receive.

Any book on Greek history is but half complete without the so-called "prehistoric" period, but it is obviously impossible to include it in readings until the *scripta Minoa* shall have been deciphered and become available as written records. One chapter on the Homeric period has been included, and a few works on the Minoan age have been suggested in the bibliography. The difficulties in making a suitable selection from the Homeric poems need no explanation. Few things are more discouraging than the attempt to turn poetry into statistics, and a great defect in many books on Homer is that the spirit of the poems has been lost in the attempt to classify the incidental information. Invaluable as these works are for reference, they give the non-Homeric student merely a one-sided view. It has therefore seemed wiser to make a few longer quotations which reveal the spirit of the times.

The period covered extends from Homer to the battle of Chæronea. As the material accumulated it was found impossible to include more within the compass of a single volume. The Hellenistic and Græco-Roman periods, rich in papyri and inscriptions, have therefore been omitted.

It is hoped, however, that these selections, inadequate though they are, may serve to bring the life of the Greeks more vividly before the student, to stimulate him to read more widely in the fields of literature and history to which they serve as an introduction, to realize how closely akin the Greeks were to modern times, and to show the unity of history.

READINGS IN GREEK HISTORY

CHAPTER I

THE HEROIC AGE

The assemblies of the Achæans — Homeric hospitality — The house of Odysseus — The palace of Menelaus — The palace of Alcinous — Art and its reflection of daily life — The shield of Achilles

I. The Assemblies of the Achæans

The scene is laid in the Greek camp before Troy during the long-continued siege.

The quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles had brought action to a standstill, and most were in favor of returning home when Hera sent Athene to dissuade them.

Iliad, II, 155–210

Then would the Argives have accomplished their return against the will of fate, but that Hera spake a word to Athene: "Out on it, daughter of ægis-bearing Zeus, unwearied maiden! Shall the Argives thus indeed flee homeward to their dear native land over the sea's broad back? But they would leave to Priam and the Trojans their boast, even Helen of Argos, for whose sake many an Achaian hath perished in Troy, far away from his dear native land. But go thou now amid the host of the mail-clad Achaians; with thy gentle words refrain thou every man, neither suffer them to draw their curved ships down to the salt sea."

So spake she, and the bright-eyed goddess Athene disregarded not; but went darting down from the peaks of Olympus, and came with speed to the fleet ships of the Achaians. There found she Odysseus standing, peer of Zeus in counsel, neither laid he any hand upon his decked black ship, because grief had entered into his heart and soul. And bright-eyed Athene stood by him and

said: "Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices, will ye indeed fling yourselves upon your benched ships to flee homeward to your dear native land? But ye would leave to Priam and the Trojans their boast, even Helen of Argos, for whose sake many an Achaian hath perished in Troy, far from his dear native land. But go thou now amid the host of the Achaians, and tarry not; and with thy gentle words refrain every man, neither suffer them to draw their curved ships down to the salt sea."

So said she, and he knew the voice of the goddess speaking to him, and set him to run, and cast away his mantle, the which his herald gathered up, even Eurybates of Ithaca, that waited on him. And himself he went to meet Agamemnon son of Atreus, and at his hand received the sceptre of his sires, imperishable for ever, wherewith he took his way amid the ships of the mail-clad Achaians.

Whenever he found one that was a captain and a man of mark, he stood by his side, and refrained him with gentle words: "Good sir, it is not seemly to affright thee like a coward, but do thou sit thyself and make all thy folk sit down. For thou knowest not yet clearly what is the purpose of Atreus' son; now is he but making trial, and soon he will afflict the sons of the Achaians. And heard we not all of us what he spake in the council? Beware lest in his anger he evilly entreat the sons of the Achaians. For proud is the soul of heaven-fostered kings; because their honour is of Zeus, and the god of counsel loveth them."

But whatever man of the people he saw and found him shouting, him he drave with his sceptre and chode him with loud words: "Good sir, sit still and hearken to the words of others that are thy betters; but thou art no warrior, and a weakling, never reckoned whether in battle or in council. In no wise can we Achaians all be kings here. A multitude of masters is no good thing; let there be one master, one king, to whom the son of crooked-counselling Kronos hath granted it, [even the sceptre and judgments, that he may rule among you]."

So masterfully ranged he the host; and they hasted back to the assembly from ships and huts, with noise as when a wave of the loud-sounding sea roareth on the long beach and the main resoundeth.

Thersites and others of the baser sort aimed to cast discredit on the leaders and to persuade the Greeks to stay no longer, but the aged Nestor bade them not act like silly boys, and addressed Agamemnon thus:

Iliad, II, 360–368

"But do thou, my king, take good counsel thyself, and hearken to another that shall give it; the word that I speak, whate'er it be, shall not be cast away. Separate thy warriors by tribes and by clans, Agamemnon, that clan may give aid to clan and tribe to tribe. If thou do thus and the Achaians hearken to thee, then wilt thou know who among thy captains and who of the common sort is a coward, and who too is brave; for they will fight each after their sort. So wilt thou know whether it is by divine command that thou shalt not take the city, or by the baseness of thy warriors and their ill skill in battle."

Iliad, II, 369–483

And lord Agamemnon answered and said to him: "Verily hast thou again outdone the sons of the Achaians in speech, old man. Ah, father Zeus and Athene and Apollo, would that among the Achaians I had ten such councillors; then would the city of king Priam soon bow beneath our hands, captive and wasted. But ægis-bearing Zeus, the son of Kronos, hath brought sorrows upon me, in that he casteth my lot amid fruitless wranglings and strifes. For in truth I and Achilles fought about a damsel with violent words, and I was first to be angry; but if we can only be at one in council, then will there no more be any putting off the day of evil for the Trojans, no not for an instant. But now go ye to your meal that we may join battle. Let each man sharpen well his spear and bestow well his shield, and let him well give his fleet-footed steeds their meal, and look well to his chariot on every side and take thought for battle, that all day long we may contend in hateful war. For of respite there shall intervene no, not a whit, only that the coming of night shall part the fury of warriors. On each man's breast shall the baldrick of his covering shield be wet with sweat, and his hand shall grow faint about the spear, and each man's horse shall sweat

as he draweth the polished chariot. And whomsoever I perceive minded to tarry far from the fight beside the beaked ships, for him shall there be no hope hereafter to escape the dogs and birds of prey."

So spake he, and the Argives shouted aloud, like to a wave on a steep shore, when the south wind cometh and stirreth it; even on a jutting rock, that is never left at peace by the waves of all winds that rise from this side and from that. And they stood up and scattered in haste throughout the ships, and made fires in the huts and took their meal. And they did sacrifice each man to one of the everlasting gods, praying for escape from death and the tumult of battle. But Agamemnon king of men slew a fat bull of five years to most mighty Kronion, and called the elders, the princes of the Achaian host, Nestor first and king Idomeneus, and then the two Aiantes and Tydeus' son, and sixthly Odysseus peer of Zeus in counsel. And Menelaus of the loud war-cry came to him unbidden, for he knew in his heart how his brother toiled. Then stood they around the bull and took the barley-meal. And Agamemnon made his prayer in their midst and said: "Zeus, most glorious, most great, god of the storm-cloud, that dwellest in the heaven, vouchsafe that the sun set not upon us nor the darkness come near, till I have laid low upon the earth Priam's palace smirched with smoke, and burnt the doorways thereof with consuming fire, and rent on Hector's breast his doublet cleft with the blade; and about him may full many of his comrades prone in the dust bite the earth."

So spake he, but not as yet would Kronion grant him fulfilment; he accepted the sacrifice, but made toil to wax unceasingly.

Now when they had prayed and sprinkled the barley-meal they first drew back the bull's head and cut his throat and flayed him, and cut slices from the thighs and wrapped them in fat, making a double fold, and laid raw collops thereon. And these they burnt on cleft wood stript of leaves, and spitted the vitals and held them over Hephaistos' flame. Now when the thighs were burnt and they had tasted the vitals, then sliced they all the rest and pierced it through with spits, and roasted it carefully and drew all off again. So when they had rest from the task and had made ready the banquet, they feasted, nor was their heart aught stinted

of the fair banquet. But when they had put away from them the desire of meat and drink, then did knightly Nestor of Gerenia open his saying to them: "Most noble son of Atreus, Agamemnon king of men, let us not any more hold long converse here, nor for long delay the work that god putteth in our hands; but come, let the heralds of the mail-clad Achaians make proclamation to the folk and gather them throughout the ships; and let us go thus in concert through the wide host of the Achaians, that the speedier we may arouse keen war."

So spake he and Agamemnon king of men disregarded not. Straightway he bade the clear-voiced heralds summon to battle the flowing-haired Achaians. So those summoned and these gathered with all speed. And the kings, the fosterlings of Zeus that were about Atreus' son, eagerly marshalled them, and bright-eyed Athene in the midst, bearing the holy ægis that knoweth neither age nor death, whereon wave an hundred tassels of pure gold, all deftly woven and each one an hundred oxen worth. Therewith she passed dazzling through the Achaian folk, urging them forth; and in every man's heart she roused strength to battle without ceasing and to fight. So was war made sweeter to them than to depart in their hollow ships to their dear native land. Even as ravaging fire kindleth a boundless forest on a mountain's peaks, and the blaze is seen from afar, even so as they marched went the dazzling gleam from the innumerable bronze through the sky even unto the heavens.

And as the many tribes of feathered birds, wild geese or cranes or long-necked swans, on the Asian mead by Kaystrios' stream, fly hither and thither, joying in their plumage, and with loud cries settle ever onwards, and the mead resounds; even so poured forth the many tribes of warriors from ships and huts into the Skamandrian plain. And the earth echoed terribly beneath the tread of men and horses. So stood they in the flowery Skamandrian plain, unnumbered as are leaves and flowers in their season. Even as the many tribes of thick flies that hover about a herdsman's steading in the spring season, when milk drencheth the pails, even in like number stood the flowing-haired Achaians upon the plain in face of the Trojans, eager to rend them asunder. And even as the

goatherds easily divide the ranging flocks of goats when they mingle in the pasture, so did their captains marshal them on this side and on that, to enter into the fray, and in their midst lord Agamemnon, his head and eyes like unto Zeus whose joy is in the thunder, and his waist like unto Ares and his breast unto Poseidon. Even as a bull standeth out far foremost amid the herd, for he is pre-eminent amid the pasturing kine, even such did Zeus make Atreides on that day, pre-eminent among many and chief amid heroes.

Odyssey, II, 1–14

Now so soon as early Dawn shone forth, the rosy-fingered, the dear son of Odysseus gat him up from his bed, and put on his raiment and cast his sharp sword about his shoulder, and beneath his smooth feet he bound his goodly sandals, and stept forth from his chamber in presence like a god. And straightway he bade the clear-voiced heralds to call the long-haired Achæans to the assembly. And the heralds called the gathering, and the Achæans were assembled quickly. Now when they were gathered and come together, he went on his way to the assembly holding in his hand a spear of bronze, — not alone he went, for two swift hounds bare him company. Then Athene shed on him a wondrous grace, and all the people marvelled at him as he came. And he sat him in his father's seat and the elders gave place to him.

Odyssey, II, 224–241

Then in the midst uprose Mentor, the companion of noble Odysseus. He it was to whom Odysseus, as he departed in the fleet, had given the charge over all his house, that it should obey the old man, and that he should keep all things safe. With good will he now made harangue and spake among them:

"Hearken to me now, ye men of Ithaca, to the word that I shall say. Henceforth let not any sceptred king be kind and gentle with all his heart, nor minded to do righteously, but let him alway be a hard man and work unrighteousness: for behold, there is none that remembereth divine Odysseus of the people whose lord he was, and was gentle as a father. Howsoever, it is not that I grudge the lordly wooers their deeds of violence in the evil devices of their heart. For at the hazard of their own heads they violently devour

the household of Odysseus, and say of him that he will come no more again. But I am indeed wroth with the rest of the people, to see how ye all sit thus speechless, and do not cry shame upon the wooers, and put them down, ye that are so many and they so few."

II. Homeric Hospitality

"The *ordained* time has now arrived, when by the counsels of the Gods, Odysseus is to be brought home to free his house, to avenge himself on the wooers, and to recover his kingdom. The chief agent in his restoration is Pallas Athene; the first book opens with her prayer to Zeus that Odysseus may be delivered. For this purpose Hermes is to be sent to Calypso to bid her release Odysseus, while Pallas Athene in the shape of Mentor, a friend of Odysseus, visits Telemachus in Ithaca." (Butcher and Lang, *Odyssey*, pp. xvii–xviii)

1. THE HOUSE OF ODYSSEUS

Odyssey, I, 96–154

She spake and bound beneath her feet her lovely golden sandals, that wax not old, and bare her alike over the wet sea and over the limitless land, swift as the breath of the wind. And she seized her doughty spear, shod with sharp bronze, weighty and huge and strong, wherewith she quells the ranks of heroes with whomsoever she is wroth, the daughter of the mighty sire. Then from the heights of Olympus she came glancing down, and she stood in the land of Ithaca, at the entry of the gate of Odysseus, on the threshold of the courtyard, holding in her hand the spear of bronze, in the semblance of a stranger, Mentes the captain of the Taphians. And there she found the lordly wooers: now they were taking their pleasure at draughts in front of the doors, sitting on hides of oxen, which themselves had slain. And of the henchmen and the ready squires, some were mixing for them wine and water in bowls, and some again were washing the tables with porous sponges and were setting them forth, and others were carving flesh in plenty.

And godlike Telemachus was far the first to descry her, for he was sitting with a heavy heart among the wooers dreaming on his good father, if haply he might come some-whence, and make a scattering of the wooers there throughout the palace, and himself get honour and bear rule among his own possessions. Thinking thereupon, as he sat among wooers, he saw Athene — and he went straight to the outer porch, for he thought it blame in his heart that a stranger should stand long at the gates: and halting nigh her he clasped her right hand and took from her the spear of bronze, and uttered his voice, and spake unto her winged words:

"Hail, stranger, with us thou shalt be kindly entreated, and thereafter, when thou hast tasted meat, thou shalt tell us that whereof thou hast need."

Therewith he led the way, and Pallas Athene followed. And when they were now within the lofty house, he set her spear that he bore against a tall pillar, within the polished spear-stand, where stood many spears besides, even those of Odysseus of the hardy heart; and he led the goddess and seated her on a goodly carven chair, and spread a linen cloth thereunder, and beneath was a foot-stool for the feet. For himself he placed an inlaid seat hard by, apart from the company of the wooers, lest the stranger should be disquieted by the noise and should have a loathing for the meal, being come among overweening men, and also that he might ask him about his father that was gone from his home.

Then a handmaid bare water for the washing of hands in a goodly golden ewer, and poured it forth over a silver basin to wash withal, and drew to their side a polished table. And a grave dame bare wheaten bread and set it by them, and laid on the board many dainties, giving freely of such things as she had by her. And a carver lifted and placed by them platters of divers kinds of flesh, and nigh them he set golden bowls, and a henchman walked to and fro pouring out to them the wine.

Then in came the lordly wooers; and they sat them down in rows on chairs and on high seats, and henchmen poured water on their hands, and maidservants piled wheaten bread by them in baskets, and pages crowned the bowls with drink; and they stretched

forth their hands upon the good cheer spread before them. Now when the wooers had put from them the desire of meat and drink, they minded them of other things, even of the song and dance: for these are the crown of the feast. And a henchman placed a beauteous lyre in the hands of Phemius, who was minstrel to the wooers despite his will. Yea and as he touched the lyre he lifted up his voice in sweet song.

Telemachus then asks the stranger why he has come to Ithaca, and he laments the death of his father. Athene answers that Odysseus is not dead but is kept against his will from his return, but that he will come back. She then asks him if he is the son of Odysseus, as the resemblance is so strong.

Odyssey, I, 213–364

Then wise Telemachus answered her, and said: "Yea, sir, now will I plainly tell thee all. My mother verily saith that I am his; for myself I know not, for never man yet knew of himself his own descent. O that I had been the son of some blessed man, whom old age overtook among his own possessions! But now of him that is the most hapless of mortal men, his son they say that I am, since thou dost question me hereof."

Then the goddess, grey-eyed Athene, spake unto him, and said: "Surely no nameless lineage have the gods ordained for thee in days to come, since Penelope bore thee so goodly a man. But come, declare me this, and tell it all plainly. What feast, nay, what rout is this? What hast thou to do therewith? Is it a clan drinking, or a wedding feast, for here we have no banquet where each man brings his share? In such wise, flown with insolence, do they seem to me to revel wantonly through the house: and well might any man be wroth to see so many deeds of shame, whatso wise man came among them."

Then wise Telemachus answered her, and said: "Sir, forasmuch as thou questionest me of these things and inquirest thereof, our house was once like to have been rich and honourable, while yet that man was among his people. But now the gods willed it otherwise, in evil purpose, who have made him pass utterly out of sight

as no man ever before. Truly I would not even for his death make so great sorrow, had he fallen among his fellows in the land of the Trojans, or in the arms of his friends when he had wound up the clew of war. Then would the whole Achæan host have builded him a barrow, and even for his son would he have won great glory in the after days. But now the spirits of the storm have swept him away inglorious. He is gone, lost to sight and hearsay, but for me hath he left anguish and lamentation; nor henceforth is it for him alone that I mourn and weep, since the gods have wrought for me other sore distress. For all the noblest that are princes in the isles, in Dulichium and Same and wooded Zacynthus, and as many as lord it in rocky Ithaca, all these woo my mother and waste my house. But as for her she neither refuseth the hated bridal, nor hath the heart to make an end: so they devour and minish my house, and ere long they make havoc likewise of myself."

Then in heavy displeasure spake unto him Pallas Athene: "God help thee! thou art surely sore in need of Odysseus that is afar, to stretch forth his hands upon the shameless wooers. If he could but come now and stand at the entering in of the gate, with helmet and shield and lances twain, as mighty a man as when first I marked him in our house drinking and making merry what time he came up out of Ephyra from Ilus son of Mermerus! For even thither had Odysseus gone on his swift ship to seek a deadly drug, that he might have wherewithal to smear his bronze-shod arrows: but Ilus would in nowise give it him, for he had in awe the ever-living gods. But my father gave it him, for he bare him wondrous love. O that Odysseus might in such strength consort with the wooers: so should they all have swift fate and bitter wedlock! Howbeit these things surely lie on the knees of the gods, whether he shall return or not, and take vengeance in his halls. But I charge thee to take counsel how thou mayest thrust forth the wooers from the hall. Come now, mark and take heed unto my words. On the morrow call the Achæan lords to the assembly, and declare thy saying to all, and take the gods to witness. As for the wooers bid them scatter them each one to his own, and for thy mother, if her heart is moved to marriage, let her go back to the hall of that mighty man her father, and her kinsfolk will furnish a wedding

NO.
ZEELAND HIGH SCHOOL

feast, and array the gifts of wooing exceeding many, all that should go back with a daughter dearly beloved. And to thyself I will give a word of wise counsel, if perchance thou wilt hearken. Fit out a ship, the best thou hast, with twenty oarsmen, and go to inquire concerning thy father that is long afar, if perchance any man shall tell thee aught, or if thou mayest hear the voice from Zeus, which chiefly brings tidings to men. Get thee first to Pylos and inquire of goodly Nestor, and from thence to Sparta to Menelaus of the fair hair, for he came home the last of the mail-coated Achæans. If thou shalt hear news of the life and the returning of thy father, then verily thou mayest endure the wasting for yet a year. But if thou shalt hear that he is dead and gone, return then to thine own dear country and pile his mound, and over it pay burial rites, full many as is due, and give thy mother to a husband. But when thou hast done this and made an end, thereafter take counsel in thy mind and heart, how thou mayest slay the wooers in thy halls, whether by guile or openly; for thou shouldest not carry childish thoughts, being no longer of years thereto. Or hast thou not heard what renown the goodly Orestes gat him among all men in that he slew the slayer of his father, guileful Ægisthus, who killed his famous sire? And thou, too, my friend, for I see that thou art very comely and tall, be valiant, that even men unborn may praise thee. But I will now go down to the swift ship and to my men, who methinks chafe much at tarrying for me; and do thou thyself take heed and give ear unto my words."

Then wise Telemachus answered her, saying: "Sir, verily thou speakest these things out of a friendly heart, as a father to his son, and never will I forget them. But now I pray thee abide here, though eager to be gone, to the end that after thou hast bathed and had all thy heart's desire, thou mayst wend to the ship joyful in spirit, with a costly gift and very goodly, to be an heirloom of my giving, such as dear friends give to friends."

Then the goddess, grey-eyed Athene, answered him: "Hold me now no longer, that am eager for the way. But whatsoever gift thine heart shall bid thee give me, when I am on my way back let it be mine to carry home: bear from thy stores a gift right goodly, and it shall bring thee the worth thereof in return."

So spake she and departed, the grey-eyed Athene, and like an eagle of the sea she flew away, but in his spirit she planted might and courage, and put him in mind of his father yet more than heretofore. And he marked the thing and was amazed, for he deemed that it was a god; and anon he went among the wooers, a godlike man.

Now the renowned minstrel was singing to the wooers, and they sat listening in silence; and his song was of the pitiful return of the Achæans, that Pallas Athene laid on them as they came forth from Troy. And from her upper chamber the daughter of Icarius, wise Penelope, caught the glorious strain, and she went down the high stairs from her chamber, not alone, for two of her handmaids bare her company. Now when the fair lady had come unto the wooers, she stood by the door-post of the well-builded roof holding up her glistening tire before her face; and a faithful maiden stood on either side of her. Then she fell a weeping, and spake unto the divine minstrel:

"Phemius, since thou knowest many other charms for mortals, deeds of men and gods, which bards rehearse, some one of these do thou sing as thou sittest by them, and let them drink their wine in silence; but cease from this pitiful strain, that ever wastes my heart within my breast, since to me above all women hath come a sorrow comfortless. So dear a head do I long for in constant memory, namely, that man whose fame is noised abroad from Hellas to mid Argos."

Then wise Telemachus answered her, and said: "O my mother, why then dost thou grudge the sweet minstrel to gladden us as his spirit moves him? It is not minstrels who are in fault, but Zeus, methinks, is in fault, who gives to men, that live by bread, to each one as he will. As for him, it is no blame if he sings the ill-faring of the Danaans; for men always prize that song the most, which rings newest in their ears. But let thy heart and mind endure to listen, for not Odysseus only lost in Troy the day of his returning, but many another likewise perished. Howbeit go to thy chamber and mind thine own housewiferies, the loom and distaff, and bid thy handmaids ply their tasks. But speech shall be for men, for all, but for me in chief; for mine is the lordship in the house."

Then in amaze she went back to her chamber, for she laid up the wise saying of her son in her heart. She ascended to her upper chamber with the women her handmaids, and then was bewailing Odysseus, her dear lord, till grey-eyed Athene cast sweet sleep upon her eyelids.

2. THE PALACE OF MENELAUS

Odyssey, IV, 19–182

Meanwhile those twain, the hero Telemachus and the splendid son of Nestor, made halt at the entry of the gate, they and their horses. And the lord Eteoneus came forth and saw them, the ready squire of renowned Menelaus; and he went through the palace to bear the tidings to the shepherd of the people, and standing near spake to him winged words:

"Menelaus, fosterling of Zeus, here are two strangers, whosoever they be, two men like to the lineage of great Zeus. Say, shall we loose their swift horses from under the yoke, or send them onward to some other host who shall receive them kindly?"

Then in sore displeasure spake to him Menelaus of the fair hair: "Eteoneus son of Boethous, truly thou wert not a fool aforetime, but now for this once, like a child thou talkest folly. Surely ourselves ate much hospitable cheer of other men, ere we twain came hither, even if in time to come Zeus haply give us rest from affliction. Nay go, unyoke the horses of the strangers, and as for the men, lead them forward to the house to feast with us."

So spake he, and Eteoneus hasted from the hall, and called the other ready squires to follow with him. So they loosed the sweating horses from beneath the yoke, and fastened them at the stalls of the horses, and threw beside them spelt, and therewith mixed white barley, and tilted the chariot against the shining faces of the gateway, and led the men into the hall divine. And they beheld and marvelled as they gazed throughout the palace of the king, the fosterling of Zeus; for there was a gleam as it were of sun or moon through the lofty palace of renowned Menelaus. But after they had gazed their fill, they went to the polished baths and bathed them. Now when the maidens had bathed them and anointed them with olive oil, and cast about them thick cloaks and

doublets, they sat on chairs by Menelaus, son of Atreus. And a handmaid bare water for the hands in a goodly golden ewer, and poured it forth over a silver basin to wash withal; and to their side she drew a polished table, and a grave dame bare food and set it by them, and laid upon the board many dainties, giving freely of such things as she had by her, and a carver lifted and placed by them platters of divers kinds of flesh, and nigh them he set golden bowls. So Menelaus of the fair hair greeted the twain and spake:

"Taste ye food and be glad, and thereafter when ye have supped, we will ask what men ye are; for the blood of your parents is not lost in you, but ye are of the line of men that are sceptred kings, the fosterlings of Zeus; for no churls could beget sons like you."

So spake he, and took and set before them the fat ox-chine roasted, which they had given him as his own mess by way of honour. And they stretched forth their hands upon the good cheer set before them. Now when they had put from them the desire of meat and drink Telemachus spake to the son of Nestor, holding his head close to him, that those others might not hear:

"Son of Nestor, delight of my heart, mark the flashing of bronze through the echoing halls, and the flashing of gold and of amber and of silver and of ivory. Such like, methinks, is the court of Olympian Zeus within, for the world of things that are here; wonder comes over me as I look thereon."

And as he spake Menelaus of the fair hair was ware of him, and uttering his voice spake to them winged words:

"Children dear, of a truth no one of mortal men may contend with Zeus, for his mansions and his treasures are everlasting: but of men there may be who will vie with me in treasure, or there may be none. Yea, for after many a woe and wanderings manifold, I brought my wealth home in ships, and in the eighth year came hither. I roamed over Cyprus and Phœnicia and Egypt, and reached the Æthiopians and Sidonians and Erembi and Libya, where lambs are horned from the birth. For there the ewes yean thrice within the full circle of a year; there neither lord nor shepherd lacketh aught of cheese or flesh or of sweet milk, but ever the flocks yield store of milk continual. While I was yet roaming

in those lands, gathering much livelihood, meantime another slew my brother privily, at unawares, by the guile of his accursed wife. Thus, look you, I have no joy of my lordship among these my possessions: and ye are like to have heard hereof from your fathers, whosoever they be, for I have suffered much and let a house go to ruin that was stablished fair, and had in it much choice substance. I would that I had but a third part of those my riches, and dwelt in my halls and that those men were yet safe, who perished of old in the wide land of Troy, far from Argos, the pastureland of horses. Howbeit, though I bewail them all and sorrow oftentimes as I sit in our halls, — awhile indeed I satisfy my soul with lamentation, and then again I cease; for soon hath man enough of chill lamentation — yet for them all I make no such dole, despite my grief, as for one only, who causes me to loathe both sleep and meat, when I think upon him. For no one of the Achæans toiled so greatly as Odysseus toiled and adventured himself: but to him it was to be but labour and trouble, and to me grief ever comfortless for his sake, so long he is afar, nor know we aught, whether he be alive or dead. Yea methinks they lament him, even that old Laertes and the constant Penelope and Telemachus, whom he left a child new-born in his house."

So spake he, and in the heart of Telemachus he stirred a yearning to lament his father; and at his father's name he let a tear fall from his eyelids to the ground, and held up his purple mantle with both his hands before his eyes. And Menelaus marked him and mused in his mind and his heart whether he should leave him to speak of his father, or first question him and prove him in every word.

While yet he pondered these things in his mind and in his heart, Helen came forth from her fragrant vaulted chamber, like Artemis of the golden arrows; and with her came Adraste and set for her the well-wrought chair, and Alcippe bare a rug of soft wool, and Phylo bare a silver basket which Alcandre gave her, the wife of Polybus, who dwelt in Thebes of Egypt, where is the chiefest store of wealth in the houses. He gave two silver baths to Menelaus, and tripods twain, and ten talents of gold. And besides all this, his wife bestowed on Helen lovely gifts; a golden distaff did

she give, and a silver basket with wheels beneath, and the rims thereof were finished with gold. This it was that the handmaid Phylo bare and set beside her, filled with dressed yarn, and across it was laid a distaff charged with wool of violet blue. So Helen sat her down in the chair, and beneath was a footstool for the feet. And anon she spake to her lord and questioned him of each thing:

"Menelaus, fosterling of Zeus, know we now who these men avow themselves to be that have come under our roof? Shall I dissemble or shall I speak the truth? Nay, I am minded to tell it. None, I say, have I ever yet seen so like another, man or woman — wonder comes over me as I look on him — as this man is like the son of great-hearted Odysseus, Telemachus, whom he left a new-born child in his house, when for the sake of me, shameless woman that I was, ye Achæans came up under Troy with bold war in your hearts."

And Menelaus of the fair hair answered her, saying: "Now I too, lady, mark the likeness even as thou tracest it. For such as these were his feet, such his hands, and the glances of his eyes, and his head, and his hair withal. Yea, and even now I was speaking of Odysseus, as I remembered him, of all his woeful travail for my sake; when, lo, he let fall a bitter tear beneath his brows, and held his purple cloak up before his eyes."

And Peisistratus, son of Nestor, answered him, saying: "Menelaus, son of Atreus, fosterling of Zeus, leader of the host, assuredly this is the son of that very man, even as thou sayest. But he is of a sober wit, and thinketh it shame in his heart as on this his first coming to make show of presumptuous words in the presence of thee, in whose voice we twain delight as in the voice of a god. Now Nestor of Gerenia, lord of chariots, sent me forth to be his guide on the way: for he desired to see thee that thou mightest put into his heart some word or work. For a son hath many griefs in his halls when his father is away, if perchance he hath none to stand by him. Even so it is now with Telemachus; his father is away, nor hath he others in the township to defend him from distress."

And Menelaus of the fair hair answered him, and said: "Lo now, in good truth there has come unto my house the son of a

friend indeed, who for my sake endured many adventures. And I thought to welcome him on his coming more nobly than all the other Argives, if but Olympian Zeus, of the far-borne voice, had vouchsafed us a return over the sea in our swift ships, — that such a thing should be. And in Argos I would have given him a city to dwell in, and stablished for him a house, and brought him forth from Ithaca with his substance and his son and all his people, making one city desolate of those that lie around, and are in mine own domain. Then ofttimes would we have held converse here, and nought would have parted us, the welcoming and the welcomed, ere the black cloud of death overshadowed us. Howsoever, the god himself, methinks, must have been jealous hereof, who from that hapless man alone cut off his returning."

3. THE PALACE OF ALCINOUS

The shipwrecked Odysseus is discovered by Nausicaa, the daughter of Alcinous, and her companions who have been to the river with their washing.

Odyssey, VI, 247–315

Thus she spake, and they gave ready ear and hearkened, and set beside Odysseus meat and drink, and the steadfast goodly Odysseus did eat and drink eagerly, for it was long since he had tasted food.

Now Nausicaa of the white arms had another thought. She folded the raiment and stored it in the goodly wain, and yoked the mules strong of hoof, and herself climbed into the car. Then she called on Odysseus, and spake and hailed him: "Up now, stranger, and rouse thee to go to the city, that I may convey thee to the house of my wise father, where, I promise thee, thou shalt get knowledge of all the noblest of the Phæacians. But do thou even as I tell thee, and thou seemest a discreet man enough. So long as we are passing along the fields and farms of men, do thou fare quickly with the maidens behind the mules and the chariot, and I will lead the way. But when we set foot within the city, — whereby goes a high wall with towers, and there is a fair haven on either side of the town, and narrow is the entrance, and curved

ships are drawn up on either hand of the mole, for all the folk have stations for their vessels, each man one for himself. And there is the place of assembly about the goodly temple of Poseidon, furnished with heavy stones, deep bedded in the earth. There men look to the gear of the black ships, hawsers and sails, and there they fine down the oars. For the Phæacians care not for bow nor quiver, but for masts, and oars of ships, and gallant barques, wherein rejoicing they cross the grey sea. Their ungracious speech it is that I would avoid lest some man afterward rebuke me, and there are but too many insolent folk among the people. And some one of the baser sort might meet me and say: 'Who is this that goes with Nausicaa, this tall and goodly stranger? Where found she him? Her husband he will be, her very own. Either she has taken in some shipwrecked wanderer of strange men, — for no men dwell near us; or some god has come in answer to her instant prayer; from heaven has he descended, and will have her to wife for evermore. Better so, if herself she has ranged abroad and found a lord from a strange land, for verily she holds in no regard the Phæacians here in this country, the many men and noble who are her wooers.' So will they speak, and this would turn to my reproach. Yea, and I myself would think it blame of another maiden who did such things in despite of her friends, her father and mother being still alive, and was conversant with men before the day of open wedlock. But, stranger, heed well what I say, that as soon as may be thou mayest gain at my father's hands an escort and a safe return. Thou shalt find a fair grove of Athene, a poplar grove near the road, and a spring wells forth therein, and a meadow lies all around. There is my father's demesne, and his fruitful close, within the sound of a man's shout from the city. Sit thee down there and wait until such time as we may have come into the city, and reached the house of my father. But when thou deemest that we are got to the palace, then go up to the city of the Phæacians, and ask for the house of my father Alcinous, high of heart. It is easily known, and a young child could be thy guide, for nowise like it are builded the houses of the Phæacians, so goodly is the palace of the hero Alcinous. But when thou art within the shadow of the halls and the court, pass quickly through

the great chamber, till thou comest to my mother, who sits at the hearth in the light of the fire, weaving yarn of sea-purple stain, a wonder to behold. Her chair is leaned against a pillar, and her maidens sit behind her. And there my father's throne leans close to hers, wherein he sits and drinks his wine like an immortal. Pass thou by him, and cast thy hands about my mother's knees, that thou mayest see quickly and with joy the day of thy returning, even if thou art from a very far country. If but her heart be kindly disposed toward thee, then is there hope that thou shalt see thy friends, and come to thy well-builded house, and to thine own country."

Athene, in the fashion of a young maiden carrying a pitcher, meets Odysseus and guides him to the house of Alcinous.

Odyssey, VII, 78–181

Therewith grey-eyed Athene departed over the unharvested seas, and left pleasant Scheria, and came to Marathon and wide-wayed Athens, and entered the good house of Erechtheus. Meanwhile Odysseus went to the famous palace of Alcinous, and his heart was full of many thoughts as he stood there or ever he had reached the threshold of bronze. For there was gleam as it were of sun or moon through the high-roofed hall of great-hearted Alcinous. Brazen were the walls which ran this way and that from the threshold to the inmost chamber, and round them was a frieze of blue, and golden were the doors that closed in the good house. Silver were the door-posts that were set on the brazen threshold, and silver the lintel thereupon, and the hook of the door was of gold. And on either side stood golden hounds and silver, which Hephæstus wrought by his cunning, to guard the palace of great-hearted Alcinous, being free from death and age all their days. And within were seats arrayed against the wall this way and that, from the threshold even to the inmost chamber, and thereon were spread light coverings finely woven, the handiwork of women. There the Phæacian chieftains were wont to sit eating and drinking, for they had continual store. Yea, and there were youths fashioned in gold, standing on firm-set bases, with flaming torches in their hands, giving light through the night to the feasters in the palace. And he had fifty handmaids in the house, and some grind the yellow grain

on the millstone, and others weave webs and turn the yarn as they sit, restless as the leaves of the tall poplar tree: and the soft olive oil drops off that linen, so closely is it woven. For as the Phæacian men are skilled beyond all others in driving a swift ship upon the deep, even so are the women the most cunning at the loom, for Athene hath given them notable wisdom in all fair handiwork and cunning wit. And without the courtyard hard by the door is a great garden, of four ploughgates, and a hedge runs round on either side. And there grow tall trees blossoming, pear-trees and pomegranates, and apple-trees with bright fruit, and sweet figs, and olives in their bloom. The fruit of these trees never perisheth neither faileth, winter nor summer, enduring through all the year. Evermore the West Wind blowing brings some fruits to birth and ripens others. Pear upon pear waxes old, and apple on apple, yea and cluster ripens upon cluster of the grape, and fig upon fig. There too hath he a fruitful vineyard planted, whereof the one part is being dried by the heat, a sunny plot on level ground, while other grapes men are gathering, and yet others they are treading in the wine-press. In the foremost row are unripe grapes that cast the blossom, and others there be that are growing black to vintaging. There too, skirting the furthest line, are all manner of garden beds, planted trimly, that are perpetually fresh, and therein are two fountains of water, whereof one scatters his streams all about the garden, and the other runs over against it beneath the threshold of the court-yard, and issues by the lofty house, and thence did the townsfolk draw water. These were the splendid gifts of the gods in the palace of Alcinous.

There the steadfast goodly Odysseus stood and gazed. But when he had gazed at all and wondered, he passed quickly over the threshold within the house. And he found the captains and the counsellors of the Phæacians pouring forth wine to the keen-sighted god, the slayer of Argos; for to him they poured the last cup when they were minded to take rest. Now the steadfast goodly Odysseus went through the house, clad in a thick mist, which Athene shed around him, till he came to Arete and the king Alcinous. And Odysseus cast his hands about the knees of Arete, and then it was that the wondrous mist melted from off him, and a silence fell on

them that were within the house at the sight of him, and they marvelled as they beheld him. Then Odysseus began his prayer:

"Arete, daughter of god-like Rhexenor, after many toils am I come to thy husband and to thy knees and to these guests, and may the gods vouchsafe them a happy life, and may each one leave to his children after him his substance in his halls and whatever dues of honour the people have rendered unto him. But speed, I pray you, my parting, that I may come the more quickly to mine own country, for already too long do I suffer affliction far from my friends."

Therewith he sat him down by the hearth in the ashes at the fire, and behold, a dead silence fell on all. And at the last the ancient lord Echeneus spake among them, an elder of the Phæacians, excellent in speech and skilled in much wisdom of old time. With good will he made harangue and spake among them:

"Alcinous, this truly is not the more seemly way, nor is it fitting that the stranger should sit upon the ground in the ashes by the hearth, while these men refrain them, waiting thy word. Nay come, bid the stranger arise, and set him on a chair inlaid with silver, and command the henchmen to mix the wine, that we may pour forth likewise before Zeus, whose joy is in the thunder, who attendeth upon reverend suppliants. And let the housewife give supper to the stranger out of such stores as be within."

Now when the mighty king Alcinous heard this saying, he took Odysseus, the wise and crafty, by the hand, and raised him from the hearth, and set him on a shining chair, whence he bade his son give place, valiant Laodamas, who sat next him and was his dearest. And a handmaid bare water for the hands in a goodly golden ewer, and poured it forth over a silver basin to wash withal, and drew to his side a polished table. And a grave dame bare wheaten bread and set it by him and laid upon the board many dainties, giving freely of such things as she had by her. So the steadfast goodly Odysseus did eat and drink; and then the mighty Alcinous spake unto the henchman:

"Pontonous, mix the bowl and serve out the wine to all in the hall, that we may pour forth likewise before Zeus, whose joy is in the thunder, who attendeth upon reverend suppliants."

III. The Shield of Achilles

Iliad, XVIII, 468–617

Thus saying he left her there and went unto his bellows and turned them upon the fire and bade them work. And the bellows, twenty in all, blew on the crucibles, sending deft blasts on every side, now to aid his labour and now anon howsoever Hephaistos willed and the work went on. And he threw bronze that weareth not into the fire, and tin and precious gold and silver, and next he set on an anvil-stand a great anvil, and took in his hand a sturdy hammer, and in the other he took the tongs.

First fashioned he a shield great and strong, adorning it all over, and set thereto a shining rim, triple, bright-glancing, and therefrom a silver baldrick. Five were the folds of the shield itself; and therein fashioned he much cunning work from his wise heart.

There wrought he the earth, and the heavens, and the sea, and the unwearying sun, and the moon waxing to the full, and the signs every one wherewith the heavens are crowned, Pleiads and Hyads and Orion's might, and the Bear that men call also the Wain, her that turneth in her place and watcheth Orion, and alone hath no part in the baths of Ocean.

Also he fashioned therein two fair cities of mortal men. In the one were espousals and marriage feasts, and beneath the blaze of torches they were leading the brides from their chambers through the city, and loud arose the bridal song. And young men were whirling in the dance, and among them flutes and viols sounded high; and the women standing each at her door were marvelling. But the folk were gathered in the assembly place; for there a strife was arisen, two men striving about the blood-price of a man slain; the one claimed to pay full atonement, expounding to the people, but the other denied him and would take naught; and both were fain to receive arbitrament at the hand of a daysman. And the folk were cheering both, as they took part on either side. And heralds kept order among the folk, while the elders on polished stones were sitting in the sacred circle, and holding in their hands staves from the loud-voiced heralds. Then before the people they

rose up and gave judgment each in turn. And in the midst lay two talents of gold, to be given unto him who should plead among them most righteously.

But around the other city were two armies in siege with glittering arms. And two counsels found favour among them, either to sack the town or to share all with the townsfolk even whatsoever substance the fair city held within. But the besieged were not yet yielding, but arming for an ambushment. On the wall there stood to guard it their dear wives and infant children, and with these the old men; but the rest went forth, and their leaders were Ares and Pallas Athene, both wrought in gold, and golden was the vesture they had on. Goodly and great were they in their armour, even as gods, far seen around, and the folk at their feet were smaller. And when they came where it seemed good to them to lay ambush, in a river bed where there was a common watering-place of herds, there they set them, clad in glittering bronze. And two scouts were posted by them afar off to spy the coming of flocks and of oxen with crooked horns. And presently came the cattle, and with them two herdsmen playing on pipes, that took no thought of the guile. Then the others when they beheld these ran upon them and quickly cut off the herds of oxen and fair flocks of white sheep, and slew the shepherds withal. But the besiegers, as they sat before the speech-places and heard much din among the oxen, mounted forthwith behind their high-stepping horses, and came up with speed. Then they arrayed their battle and fought beside the river banks, and smote one another with bronze-shod spears. And among them mingled Strife and Tumult, and fell Death, grasping one man alive fresh-wounded, another without wound, and dragging another dead through the mellay by the feet; and the raiment on her shoulders was red with the blood of men. Like living mortals they hurled together and fought, and haled the corpses each of the other's slain.

Furthermore he set in the shield a soft fresh-ploughed field, rich tilth and wide, the third time ploughed; and many ploughers therein drave their yokes to and fro as they wheeled about. Whensoever they came to the boundary of the field and turned, then would a man come to each and give into his hands a goblet of

sweet wine, while others would be turning back along the furrows, fain to reach the boundary of the deep tilth. And the field grew black behind and seemed as it were a-ploughing, albeit of gold, for this was the great marvel of the work.

Furthermore he set therein the demesne-land of a king, where hinds were reaping with sharp sickles in their hands. Some armfuls along the swathe were falling in rows to the earth, whilst others the sheaf-binders were binding in twisted bands of straw. Three sheaf-binders stood over them, while behind boys gathering corn and bearing it in their arms gave it constantly to the binders; and among them the king in silence was standing at the swathe with his staff, rejoicing in his heart. And henchmen apart beneath an oak were making ready a feast, and preparing a great ox they had sacrificed; while the women were strewing much white barley to be a supper for the hinds.

Also he set therein a vineyard teeming plenteously with clusters, wrought fair in gold; black were the grapes, but the vines hung throughout on silver poles. And around it he ran a ditch of cyanus, and round that a fence of tin; and one single pathway led to it, whereby the vintagers might go when they should gather the vintage. And maidens and striplings in childish glee bare the sweet fruit in plaited baskets. And in the midst of them a boy made pleasant music on a clear-toned viol, and sang thereto a sweet Linos-song with delicate voice; while the rest with feet falling together kept time with the music and song.

Also he wrought therein a herd of kine with upright horns, and the kine were fashioned of gold and tin, and with lowing they hurried from the byre to pasture beside a murmuring river, beside the waving reed. And herdsmen of gold were following with the kine, four of them, and nine dogs fleet of foot came after them. But two terrible lions among the foremost kine had seized a loud-roaring bull that bellowed mightily as they haled him, and the dogs and the young men sped after him. The lions rending the great bull's hide were devouring his vitals and his black blood; while the herdsmen in vain tarred on their fleet dogs to set on, for they shrank from biting the lions but stood hard by and barked and swerved away.

Also the glorious lame god wrought therein a pasture in a fair glen, a great pasture of white sheep, and a steading, and roofed huts, and folds.

Also did the glorious lame god devise a dancing-place like unto that which once in wide Knosos Daidalos wrought for Ariadne of the lovely tresses. There were youths dancing and maidens of costly wooing, their hands upon one another's wrists. Fine linen the maidens had on, and the youths well-woven doublets faintly glistening with oil. Fair wreaths had the maidens, and the youths daggers of gold hanging from silver baldricks. And now would they run round with deft feet exceeding lightly, as when a potter sitting by his wheel that fitteth between his hands maketh trial of it whether it run: and now anon they would run in lines to meet each other. And a great company stood round the lovely dance in joy; (and among them a divine minstrel was making music on his lyre), and through the midst of them, leading the measure, two tumblers whirled.

Also he set therein the great might of the River of Ocean around the uttermost rim of the cunningly-fashioned shield.

Now when he had wrought the shield great and strong, then wrought he him a corslet brighter than a flame of fire, and he wrought him a massive helmet to fit his brows, goodly and graven, and set thereon a crest of gold, and he wrought him greaves of pliant tin.

So when the renowned lame god had finished all the armour, he took and laid it before the mother of Achilles. Then she like a falcon sprang down from snowy Olympus, bearing from Hephaistos the glittering arms.

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CHAPTER II

THE EXPANSION OF GREECE

The colonies in the east — Miletus and her colonies — Byzantium — Eubœan colonies — The colonies in the west — Cumæ — Naples — Sybaris and Croton — Marseilles — Sicily — The importance of Corinth — The colonies in North Africa — Naucratis — Libyan colonies — Founding a colony, and its relation to the mother city — Gyges and Colophon; Asia Minor — Trade and travel; naval power — The farmer's life

I. The Colonies in the East

The spread of Greek civilization was due largely to the coast cities of Asia Minor with whom the colonizing movement began, probably during the latter part of the eighth century B.C. It was not long, however, before the cities of Greece played an active part.

Unfortunately the contemporary records are very scanty, but we have in the work of Strabo, who lived in the Augustan age, a description which combines geographical features and history.

The selections show the wide extent of the movement for expansion.

1. MILETUS AND HER COLONIES

Strabo, XIV, i, 6

Ephorus relates that Miletus was first founded and fortified by the Cretans on the spot above the sea-coast where at present the ancient Miletus is situated, and that Sarpedon conducted thither settlers from the Miletus in Crete, and gave it the same name; that Leleges were the former occupiers of the country, and that afterwards Neleus built the present city.

The present city has four harbours, one of which will admit a fleet of ships. The citizens have achieved many great deeds, but the most important is the number of colonies which they established. The whole Euxine, for instance, and the Propontis, and many other places, are peopled with their settlers.

Anacreon, Frag. 85

Once upon a time the Milesians were vigorous.

Strabo, XII, iii, 11

Next is Sinope itself, distant from Armene 50 stadia, the most considerable of all the cities in that quarter. It was founded by Milesians, and when the inhabitants had established a naval force they commanded the sea within the Cyanean rocks, and were allies of the Greeks in many naval battles beyond these limits. . . . It has received advantages from nature which have been improved by art. It is built upon the neck of a peninsula; on each side of the isthmus are harbours, stations for vessels, and fisheries worthy of admiration for the capture of the pelamydes. Of these fisheries we have said that the people of Sinope have the second, and the Byzantines the third, in point of excellence.

The peninsula projects in a circular form; the shores are surrounded by a chain of rocks, and in some parts there are cavities, like rocky pits, which are called Chœnicides. These are filled when the sea is high. For the above reason, the place is not easily approached; besides which, along the whole surface of rock the road is covered with sharp-pointed stones, and persons cannot walk upon it with naked feet. The lands in the higher parts and above the city have a good soil, and are adorned with fields dressed as gardens, and this is the case in a still greater degree in the suburbs. The city itself is well secured with walls, and magnificently ornamented with a gymnasium, forum, and porticos.

Strabo, XII, viii, 11

Cyzicus is an island in the Propontis, joined to the continent by two bridges. It is exceedingly fertile. It is about 500 stadia in circumference. There is a city of the same name near the bridges, with two close harbours, and more than two hundred docks for vessels. One part of the city is in a plain, the other near the mountain which is called Arcton-oros (or Bear-mountain). Above this is another mountain, the Dindymus, with one peak, having on it a temple founded by the Argonauts in honour of Dindymene, mother of the gods. This city rivals in size, beauty, and in the

excellent administration of affairs, both in peace and war, the cities which hold the first rank in Asia. It appears to be embellished in a manner similar to Rhodes, Massalia, and ancient Carthage.

2. BYZANTIUM

Strabo, VII, vi, 2

After the foundation of Chalcedon, Apollo is said to have enjoined the founders of Byzantium, in answer to their inquiries, to build their city opposite to the Blind, applying this name to the Chalcedonians, who, although they were the first persons to arrive in these parts, had omitted to take possession of the opposite side, which afforded such great resources of wealth, and chose the barren coast.

3. EUBŒAN COLONIES

Strabo, X, i, 8

These cities, Eretria and Chalcis, when their population was greatly augmented, sent out considerable colonies to Macedonia, for Eretria founded cities about Pallene and Mount Athos; Chalcis founded some near Olynthus, which Philip destroyed. There are also many settlements in Italy and Sicily, founded by Chalcidians. These colonies were sent out, according to Aristotle, when the government of the Hippobatæ, (or Knights,) as it is called, was established; it was an aristocratical government, the heads of which held their office by virtue of the amount of their property.

Strabo, Frag. 11

The Chalcidenses came from Eubœa into the territory of the Sithones, and there founded about thirty cities. They were subsequently driven out by the Sithones, but the greater part of them collected together into a single city, namely, Olynthus. They had the name of Chalcidenses-in-Thrace.

II. The Colonies in the West

1. CUMÆ

Strabo, V, iv, 4

After these (cities) comes Cumæ, the most ancient settlement of the Chalcidenses and Cumæans, for it is the oldest of all (the Greek cities) in Sicily or Italy. The leaders of the expedition,

Hippocles the Cumæan and Megasthenes of Chalcis, having mutually agreed that one of the nations should have the management of the colony, and the other the honour of conferring upon it its own name. Hence at the present day it is named Cumæ, while at the same time it is said to have been founded by the Chalcidenses.

2. NAPLES

Strabo, V, iv, 7

After Dicæarchia is Neapolis, (founded originally) by the Cumæi, but afterwards being peopled by Chalcidians, and certain Pithecussæans and Athenians, it was on this account denominated Naples. . . . There is here a subterranean passage, similar to that at Cumæ, . . . Naples also has hot springs and baths not at all inferior in quality to those at Baiæ, but much less frequented, for another city has arisen there, not less than Dicæarchia, one palace after another having been built. Naples still preserves the Grecian mode of life. . . .

3. SYBARIS AND CROTON

Strabo, VI, i, 12–13

But Antiochus relates that an oracle having commanded the Greeks to found Crotona, Myscellus went forth to view the place, and having seen Sybaris already built on a neighbouring river of the same name, thought it better, and returned to the god to ask if he might be permitted to settle in that, instead of the other; but that the oracle answered, applying to him an epithet noticing his defective stature, (for Myscellus was somewhat crook-backed,)

> "O short-backed Myscellus, whilst seeking somewhat else of thyself,
> Thou pursuest only misfortune: it is right to accept that which
> is proffered to thee:"

and that he returned and built Crotona, wherein he was assisted by Archias, the founder of Syracuse, who happened to touch at Crotona by chance, as he was proceeding to the colony of the Syracusans. The Iapyges possessed Crotona before this time, as Ephorus relates. The city cultivated martial discipline and athletic exercises to a great extent, and in one of the Olympic games all the seven wrestlers, who obtained the palm in the stadium, were

Crotoniatæ; . . . Its celebrity too was not a little spread by the number of Pythagoreans who resided there, and Milo, who was the most renowned of wrestlers, and lived in terms of intimacy with Pythagoras, who abode long in this city. . . .

Beyond this, at the distance of 200 stadia, is situated Sybaris, a colony settled by the Achæans, between the two rivers Crati and Sybaris. Its founder was Is . . . the Helicean. So great was the prosperity enjoyed by this city anciently, that it held dominion over four neighbouring people and twenty-five towns; in the war with the Crotoniatæ it brought into the field 300,000 men, and occupied a circuit of 50 stadia on the Crati. But on account of the arrogance and turbulence of its citizens, it was deprived of all its prosperity by the Crotoniatæ in 70 days, who took the city, and turning the waters of the river (Crati), overwhelmed it with an inundation. Some time after, a few who had escaped came together and inhabited the site of their former city, but in time they were dispossessed by the Athenians and other Greeks, who came and settled amongst them, but they despised and subjugated them, and removed the city to a neighbouring place, calling its name Thurii, from a fountain of that name.

4. MARSEILLES

Strabo, IV, i, 4–5

Marseilles, founded by the Phocæans, is built in a stony region. Its harbour lies beneath a rock, which is shaped like a theatre, and looks towards the south. It is well surrounded with walls, as well as the whole city, which is of considerable size. Within the citadel are placed the Ephesium and the temple of the Delphian Apollo. This latter temple is common to all the Ionians; the Ephesium is the temple consecrated to Artemis of Ephesus. They say that when the Phocæans were about to quit their country, an oracle commanded them to take from Artemis of Ephesus a conductor for their voyage. On arriving at Ephesus they therefore inquired how they might be able to obtain from the goddess what was enjoined them. The goddess appeared in a dream to Aristarcha, one of the most honourable women of the city, and commanded her to accompany the Phocæans, and to take with her a plan of the temple

and statues. These things being performed, and the colony being settled, the Phocæans built a temple, and evinced their great respect for Aristarcha by making her priestess. All the colonies (sent out from Marseilles) hold this goddess in peculiar reverence, preserving both the shape of the image (of the goddess), and also every rite observed in the metropolis.

The Massilians live under a well-regulated aristocracy. They have a council composed of 600 persons called timuchi, who enjoy this dignity for life. Fifteen of these preside over the council, and have the management of current affairs; these fifteen are in their turn presided over by three of their number, in whom rests the principal authority; and these again by one. No one can become a timuchus who has not children, and who has not been a citizen for three generations. Their laws, which are the same as those of the Ionians, they expound in public. Their country abounds in olives and vines, but on account of its ruggedness the wheat is poor. Consequently they trust more to the resources of the sea than of the land, and avail themselves in preference of their excellent position for commerce.

5. COLONIES IN SICILY

Thucydides, VI, 3

Of the Hellenes, the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Eubœa with Thucles, their founder. They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from Sicily. Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and afterwards Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder.

About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving it and for a short while joining

the Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thapsus. After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus, and founded a place called the Hyblæan Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and forty-five years; after which they were expelled from the city and the country by the Syracusan tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after they had settled there, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother country Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas, the place where the citadel now stands, and which was first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders; giving their own institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa, and helped to people the place; the founders being Perieres and Cratæmenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively. It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped like a sickle, which the Sicels call *Zanclon;* but upon the original settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes, and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him colonised with a mixed population, and its name changed to Messina, after his old country.

Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those who went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the Myletidæ. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian. Acræ and Casmenæ were founded by the Syracusans; Acræ seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenæ nearly twenty

after Acræ. Camarina was first founded by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse; its founders being Daxon and Menecolus. But the Camarinæans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more for the third time by the Geloans.

III. The Importance of Corinth

The natural advantages of the situation of Corinth lead one to believe that it must have been an important place in very early times though little of great antiquity has as yet been found there.

Excavations have been carried on for several years by the American School at Athens, and much belonging to the Greek and Roman periods has been uncovered. (See *American Journal of Archæology*, 1897 ff.)

Strabo, VIII, vi, 20

Corinth is said to be opulent from its mart. It is situated upon the isthmus. It commands two harbours, one near Asia, the other near Italy, and facilitates, by reason of so short a distance between them, an exchange of commodities on each side.

As the Sicilian strait, so formerly these seas were of difficult navigation, and particularly the sea above Maleæ, on account of the prevalence of contrary winds; whence the common proverb,

When you double Maleæ forget your home.

It was a desirable thing for the merchants coming from Asia, and from Italy, to discharge their lading at Corinth without being obliged to double Cape Maleæ. For goods exported from Peloponnesus, or imported by land, a toll was paid to those who had the keys of the country. This continued afterwards for ever. In after-times they enjoyed even additional advantages, for the Isthmian games, which were celebrated there, brought thither great multitudes

of people. The Bacchiadæ,[1] a rich and numerous family, and of illustrious descent, were their rulers, governed the state for nearly two hundred years, and peaceably enjoyed the profits of the mart. Their power was destroyed by Cypselus, who became king himself, and his descendants continued to exist for three generations. A proof of the wealth of this family is the offering which Cypselus dedicated at Olympia, a statue of Zeus of beaten gold.

Demaratus,[2] one of those who had been tyrant at Corinth, flying from the seditions which prevailed there, carried with him from his home to Tyrrhenia so much wealth, that he became sovereign of the city which had received him, and his son became even king of the Romans.

IV. The Colonies in North Africa

1. NAUCRATIS

The extent, wealth, and Greek influence in the city have been well shown by excavations carried on by the Egypt Exploration Fund.[3] That Egypt was to a certain extent opened up to the Greeks is seen by the inscription from Abusimbel in Nubia which was scratched by soldier-tourists on the legs of a statue still *in situ*.

Herodotus, II, 178–179

Amasis was partial to the Greeks, and, among other favours which he granted them, gave to such as liked to settle in Egypt the city of Naucratis for their residence. To those who only wished to trade upon the coast, and did not want to fix their abode in the country, he granted certain lands where they might set up altars and erect temples to the gods. Of these temples the grandest and most famous, which is also the most frequented, is that called "the Hellenium." It was built conjointly by the Ionians, Dorians, and Æolians, the following cities taking part in the work: — the Ionian states of Chios, Teos, Phocæa, and Clazomenæ; Rhodes, Cnidus, Halicarnassus, and Phaselis of the Dorians; and Mytilene of the Æolians. These are the states to whom the temple belongs, and

1 On the Bacchiadæ and Cypselus see below, pp. 76–79.
2 On Demaratus see Pliny, "Natural History," XXXV, 152.
3 See "Egypt Exploration Fund," Parts I–II.

they have the right of appointing the governors of the factory; the other cities which claim a share in the building, claim what in no sense belongs to them. Three nations, however, consecrated for themselves separate temples — the Eginetans one to Zeus, the Samians to Hera, and the Milesians to Apollo.

In ancient times there was no factory but Naucratis in the whole of Egypt; and if a person entered one of the other mouths of the Nile, he was obliged to swear that he had not come there of his own free will. Having so done, he was bound to sail in his ship to the Canobic mouth, or, were that impossible owing to contrary winds, he must take his wares by boat all round the Delta, and so bring them to Naucratis, which had an exclusive privilege.

Hicks and Hill, 3

PSAMMETICHUS II AND HIS GREEK MERCENARIES, B.C. 594–589

When King Psammetichus went to Elephantine, those who sailed with Psammetichus the son of Theocles wrote this, and they went above Kerti as far as the river let them go up, and Potasimto led the men of other languages (i.e. Ionian and Carian mercenaries), and Amasis the Egyptians.

Archon the son of Amœbichus and Pelecus son of Oudamus wrote me.

Elasibys (?) from Teos
Telephus of Ialysus wrote me
Python son of Amœbichus
Pabis from Colophon . . . with Psammetichus
Hagesermus
Pasiphon son of Hippus
Crithis wrote
When the king led the first army . . . came with Psammetichus

2. LIBYAN COLONIES

Herodotus, IV, 150–153, tells the circumstances which led to the foundation of colonies in Libya.

Cyrene became very prosperous, due partly to the export of the silphium plant of which it seems to have had a monopoly.

A famous representation — the Arcesilas vase — shows the weighing of silphium in the presence of the king who is surrounded by his slaves.[1]

Pindar in one of his most splendid odes celebrates the house of the king of Cyrene, one of whom, Arcesilas by name, had won a victory in the chariot race at Delphi.

Herodotus, IV, 156–159

After a while, everything began to go wrong both with Battus and with the rest of the Theræans, whereupon these last, ignorant of the cause of their sufferings, sent to Delphi to inquire for what reason they were afflicted. The Pythoness in reply told them, "that if they and Battus would make a settlement at Cyrene in Libya, things would go better with them." Upon this the Theræans sent out Battus with two penteconters, and with these he proceeded to Libya, but within a little time, not knowing what else to do, the men returned and arrived off Thera. The Theræans, when they saw the vessels approaching, received them with showers of missiles, would not allow them to come near the shore, and ordered the men to sail back from whence they came. Thus compelled to return, they settled on an island near the Libyan coast, which (as I have already said) was called Platea. In size it is reported to have been about equal to the city of Cyrene, as it now stands.

In this place they continued two years, but at the end of that time, as their ill luck still followed them, they left the island to the care of one of their number, and went in a body to Delphi, where they made complaint at the shrine, to the effect that, notwithstanding they had colonised Libya, they prospered as poorly as before. Hereon the Pythoness made them the following answer:—

> "Knowest thou better than I, fair Libya abounding in fleeces?
> Better the stranger than he who has trod it? Oh! clever Theræans!"

Battus and his friends, when they heard this, sailed back to Platea: it was plain the god would not hold them acquitted of the colony till they were absolutely in Libya. So, taking with them the man

[1] See Bury, "History of Greece," Fig. 46.

whom they had left upon the island, they made a settlement on the mainland directly opposite Platea, fixing themselves at a place called Aziris, which is closed in on both sides by the most beautiful hills, and on one side is washed by a river.

Here they remained six years, at the end of which time the Libyans induced them to move, promising that they would lead them to a better situation. So the Greeks left Aziris and were conducted by the Libyans towards the west, their journey being so arranged, by the calculation of their guides, that they passed in the night the most beautiful district of that whole country, which is the region called Irasa. The Libyans brought them to a spring, which goes by the name of Apollo's fountain, and told them — "Here, Grecians, is the proper place for you to settle; for here the sky leaks."

During the lifetime of Battus, the founder of the colony, who reigned forty years, and during that of his son Arcesilaus, who reigned sixteen, the Cyrenæans continued at the same level, neither more nor fewer in number than they were at the first. But in the reign of the third king, Battus, surnamed the Happy, the advice of the Pythoness brought Greeks from every quarter into Libya, to join the settlement. The Cyrenæans had offered to all comers a share in their lands; and the oracle had spoken as follows: —

> "He that is backward to share in the pleasant Libyan acres,
> Sooner or later, I warn him, will feel regret at his folly."

PINDAR, *Pyth.*, IV, 1–12

This day O Muse must thou tarry in a friend's house, the house of the king of Kyrene of goodly horses, that with Arkesilas at his triumph thou mayst swell the favourable gale of song, the due of Leto's children, and of Pytho. For at Pytho of old she who sitteth beside the eagles of Zeus — nor was Apollo absent then — the priestess, spake this oracle, that Battos should found a power in fruitful Libya, that straightway departing from the holy isle he might lay the foundations of a city of goodly chariots upon a white breast of the swelling earth, and might fulfil in the seventeenth generation the word of Medea spoken at Thera, which of old the passionate child of Aietes, queen of Colchians, breathed from immortal lips.

PINDAR, *Pyth.*, IV, 59–67

Thee, happy son of Polymnestos, did the oracle of the Delphian bee approve with call unasked to be the man whereof the word was spoken, for thrice she bid thee hail and declared thee by decree of fate Kyrene's king, what time thou enquiredst what help should be from heaven for thy labouring speech. And verily even now long afterward, as in the bloom of rosy-blossomed spring, in the eighth descent from Battos the leaf of Arkesilas is green.

V. Founding a Colony, and its Relation to the Mother-City

There were few matters about which the Greeks were more particular than in establishing relations between a colony and its mother-city. Often when the former grew more powerful, their interests clashed and the exact status towards each other was a matter of dispute, though legally the colony was quite independent. One of the most striking illustrations of the international reputation of the oracles is the fact that so many offerings were dedicated by foreign rulers. (See also Chapter III.)

Thucydides, I, 24–25, 34

The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people. The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it is said, from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the Epidamnians finding themselves hard

pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and made the above requests to the Corcyræans. But the Corcyræans refused to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having effected anything.

When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra, they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god, whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians, and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city, and place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the Corcyræans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyræans for their contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt by a power, which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great military strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the high naval position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the Phæacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished on their fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys. . . .

"If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be their equals."

VI. Gyges and Colophon; Asia Minor

There is an interesting terra-cotta sarcophagus of the sixth century in the British Museum on which is painted an invasion of the Cimmerians.[1] Gyges asked for help against them from Assyria. An inscription of Assurbanipal, their king, is quoted in Bury, "History of Greece," p. 857.

Herodotus, I, 14

When Gyges was established on the throne, he sent no small presents to Delphi, as his many silver offerings at the Delphic shrine testify. Besides this silver he gave a vast number of vessels of gold, among which the most worthy of mention are the goblets, six in number, and weighing altogether thirty talents, which stand in the Corinthian treasury, dedicated by him. I call it the Corinthian treasury, though in strictness of speech it is the treasury not of the whole Corinthian people, but of Cypselus, son of Aëtion. Excepting Midas, son of Gordias, king of Phrygia, Gyges was the first of the barbarians whom we know to have sent offerings to Delphi. Midas dedicated the royal throne whereon he was accustomed to sit and administer justice, an object well worth looking at. It lies in the same place as the goblets presented by Gyges. The Delphians call the whole of the silver and the gold which Gyges dedicated, after the name of the donor, Gygian.

As soon as Gyges was king he made an inroad on Miletus and Smyrna, and took the city of Colophon. Afterwards, however, though he reigned eight and thirty years, he did not perform a single noble exploit. I shall therefore make no further mention of him, but pass on to his son and successor in the kingdom, Ardys.

Strabo, XIV, i, 4

The Smyrnæans, upon quitting the Ephesians, marched to the place where Smyrna now stood, and which was in the possession of Leleges. They expelled these people and founded the ancient Smyrna, which is distant from the present city about 20 stadia. They were themselves afterwards expelled by Æolians, and took

[1] See Bury, "History of Greece," Fig. 42.

refuge at Colophon; they then returned with a body of men from the latter place, and recovered their own city, Smyrna. Mimnermus relates this in his poem of Nanno, and says of Smyrna, that it was always a subject of contention; "after leaving Pylus, the lofty city of Neleus, we came in our voyage to the long wished-for Asia, and settled at Colophon, and hastening thence from the river Asteeis, by the will of the gods we took Æolian Smyrna."

Callinus, Frag. 1

How long will ye lie supine? When, young men, will ye have stout courage? Have ye no shame before your neighbors that ye give way so utterly? Ye think that ye are sitting in the midst of peace, but war fills the land throughout its borders. Let every man, even in the pang of death, hurl his spear in a last effort.

It is an honor and a glory for a man to fight for his country and his children, and the wife he has wedded, against his country's foes. Death will come at that time which the fates shall allot, but let each man go forward, — brandishing his spear, and with a brave heart under his shield, when the tumult of battle begins.

For man cannot escape his destined death, no, not even if he be child of immortals. Often, having escaped from the press of battle and the thud of spears, he returns and the fate of death overtakes him in his house. The coward has not the love of his people, nor do they mourn for him, but humble men and those of high estate lament the brave man if he suffer aught.

For the whole people grieve when a brave-hearted man is dying, and during his life he is deemed a demi-god. For they see him like a tower of strength before their eyes; though only one, he does the deeds of many.

Herodotus, I, 15

Ardys took Priene and made war upon Miletus. In his reign the Cimmerians, driven from their homes by the nomades of Scythia, entered Asia and captured Sardis, all but the citadel.

Callinus, Frag. 3

Now the army of the doughty Cimmerians advances.

The elegiac poets encouraged their countrymen to brave deeds and shared in them as well. Of Callinus we know little, but Archilochus is an early instance of a soldier of fortune who had seen many men and many cities.

This eclipse of the sun is the first date in Greek history described in a contemporary document (April 6, B.C. 648).

Archilochus, Frags.

"I am a servant of the lord god of war, and I know the lovely gift of the Muses." — MURRAY.

"In my spear is kneaded bread, in my spear is wine of Ismarus, and I lie upon my spear as I drink." — MURRAY.

"A wretched island, bare and rough as a hog's back in the sea." — MURRAY.

"All the misery of the Greeks met together at Thasos." — WRIGHT.

"Some Thracian strutteth with my shield,
For being somewhat flurried,
I left it in a wayside bush
When from the field I hurried;
A right good targe, but I got off,
The deuce may take the shield;
I 'll get another just as good
When next I go afield." — SHOREY.

I care not for the wealth of golden Gyges, I never yet felt envy, nor am I jealous of the deeds of the divine ones, nor do I covet mighty power. These things are far from my eyes.

The bow will not be bent, nor will the sling-stones fly thick when Ares joins the war-tug in the plain, but the sword shall strike mid many a groan. In this fighting are they skilled — the lords of Eubœa, famous for the spear.

Nothing is unexpected or impossible or wonderful, since Zeus, father of Olympians, hid away the light of the shining sun and made night out of noonday, and pale fear came upon men.

Henceforth everything becomes credible and to be expected by man, and let no one of you wonder as he beholds, not even if

beasts exchange with dolphins the life in the deep, and the echoing waves of the sea become dearer than the shore to those who loved the mountains.

VII. Trade and Travel; Naval Power

Another indication of the expansion of Hellas is to be seen in the development of trade and travel and the origin and growth of navies. Corinth seems to have taken the lead in this and began at an early date to come into conflict with her colony Corcyra.

Arniadas of the following inscription doubtless fell in some such struggle.

Thucydides, I, 13

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere, — the old form of government being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives, — and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and Corcyræans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources, as is shown by the epithet "wealthy" bestowed by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords.

Hicks and Hill, 2

This is the monument of Arniadas, whom cruel Ares destroyed as he was fighting by the ships at the mouth of the Arachthos, by far the best in bravery.

Among the best sources for this time are the coins now coming into general use. (See Hill, "Historical Greek Coins.") They, as well as pottery and other wares, are of the greatest value in indicating trade routes and the development of commerce, but a careful study of them would take the reader too far afield.

VIII. The Farmer's Life

As a contrast to stirring deeds of adventure and discovery we have Hesiod's "Works and Days," a didactic poem which combines moral advice with practical hints for the farmer. As Bury says, he is "the first spokesman of the common folk."

This poem, which was addressed to the poet's brother Perses, served as a model for Vergil's "Georgics."

Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 298–316

Do thou then, ever mindful of my precept, work on, Perses, of stock divine, that so famine may hate, and fair-chapleted Demeter love thee, august as she is, and fill thy garner with substance. For famine, look you, is ever the sluggard's companion.

And with him gods and men are indignant, who lives a sluggard's life, like in temper to stingless drones, which lazily consume the labour of bees, by devouring it: but to thee let it be a pleasure to set in order seemly works, that so thy garners may be full of seasonable substance. From works men become both rich in flocks and wealthy: by working too, thou wilt be dearer far to immortals and to mortals. For greatly do they hate sluggards. Now work is no disgrace, but sloth is a disgrace. And if thou shouldst work, quickly will the sluggard envy thee growing rich; for esteem and glory accompany wealth. So to a sensible man, such as thou wert, to labour is best, if having turned a witless mind from the possessions of others towards work, thou wouldst study thy subsistence, as I recommend thee.

HESIOD, *Works and Days*, 383–395

When the Pleiads, born of Atlas, rise, begin thy harvest; but thy ploughing, when they set. Now these, look you, are hidden for forty nights and days; and again in revolving years they appear when first the sickle is sharpened. This truly is the law of fields, as well for them who dwell near the sea, as for those who inhabit wooded valleys, a fertile soil afar from the swelling sea: sow stript, plough stript, and reap stript, if thou shouldst wish to gather the works of Demeter, all in their seasons, that so each may grow for thee in due time, lest in anywise, being in need meanwhile, thou shouldst go begging to other people's houses, and accomplish nothing.

HESIOD, *Works and Days*, 448–463

Mark, too, when from on high out of the clouds you shall have heard the voice of the crane uttering its yearly cry, which both brings the signal for ploughing, and points the season of rainy winter, but gnaws the heart of the man that hath no oxen: then truly feed the crumpled-horned oxen remaining within their stalls: for it is easy to say the word, "Lend me a yoke of oxen, and a wain"; but easy is it to refuse, saying, "There is work for my oxen." Then thinks the man, rich in his own conceit, to build a wain, fool as he is, nor knows he this, "but there are also a hundred planks to a waggon," for which it is meet first to take thought, to get them without the house.

But when first the season of ploughing has appeared to mortals, even then rouse thyself, thy servants alike and thyself, ploughing during the season of ploughing, whether dry or wet, hasting very early, that so thy corn-lands may be full. In spring turn up the soil; and the ground tilled afresh in summer will not mock thy hopes: and sow thy fallow-land while yet light.

HESIOD, *Works and Days*, 493–503

But duly observe all things in your mind, nor let either the spring becoming white with blossoms, or the showers returning at set seasons, escape your notice. But pass by the seat at the brazier's forge, and the warm lodging-house in the winter season, when cold keeps men from toils; at which time an active man

would greatly improve his household matters; lest the hardship of baneful winter along with poverty catch thee, and with lean hand thou press a swollen foot. But many ill designs hath the idler, waiting for a vain hope, and in need of subsistence, spoken in his spirit. And 't is no good hope that sustains a needy man, sitting at a lodging-house, and who hath not means of life sufficient. Point out, then, to thy servants, when it is still mid-summer, "It will not be summer alway: make you cabins."

HESIOD, *Works and Days*, 641–653

But thou, Perses, be thou mindful of all works in their seasons, and most of all about navigation. Commend a small vessel: in a large one stow thy freight. Greater will be thy cargo, and greater thy gain upon gain, that is to say, if the winds keep off evil blasts. When thou shalt have turned thy silly mind towards merchandise, and desired to escape debts and unpleasant hunger, then will I show thee the courses of the loud-roaring sea, though neither at all clever in navigation, nor in ships. For never yet have I sailed in ship, at least across the broad deep, save to Eubœa from Aulis, where formerly the Greeks, having waited through the winter, collected together a vast host from sacred Greece for Troy with its beauteous women.

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CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS LEAGUES AND FESTIVALS

Asia Minor — Panionium — Branchidæ — Delos — Dodona — Delphi — Olympia

In lands where there were so many small independent political units the festivals and games served as the chief bond for all Hellenes. Besides the great national festivals some local leagues were important.

I. Asia Minor

1. PANIONIUM

Herodotus, I, 142–143

Now the Ionians of Asia, who meet at the Panionium, have built their cities in a region where the air and climate are the most beautiful in the whole world: for no other region is equally blessed with Ionia, neither above it nor below it, nor east nor west of it. For in other countries either the climate is over cold and damp, or else the heat and drought are sorely oppressive. The Ionians do not all speak the same language, but use in different places four different dialects. Towards the south their first city is Miletus, next to which lie Myus and Priene; all these three are in Caria and have the same dialect. Their cities in Lydia are the following: Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenæ, and Phocæa. The inhabitants of these towns have none of the peculiarities of speech which belong to the three first-named cities, but use a dialect of their own. There remain three other Ionian towns, two situate in isles, namely, Samos and Chios; and one upon the mainland, which is Erythræ. Of these Chios and Erythræ have the same dialect, while Samos possesses a language peculiar to itself. Such are the four varieties of which I spoke.

Of the Ionians at this period, one people, the Milesians, were in no danger of attack, as Cyrus had received them into alliance.

The islanders also had as yet nothing to fear, since Phœnicia was still independent of Persia, and the Persians themselves were not a seafaring people. The Milesians had separated from the common cause solely on account of the extreme weakness of the Ionians: for, feeble as the power of the entire Hellenic race was at that time, of all its tribes the Ionic was by far the feeblest and least esteemed, not possessing a single State of any mark excepting Athens. The Athenians and most of the other Ionic States over the world, went so far in their dislike of the name as actually to lay it aside; and even at the present day the greater number of them seem to me to be ashamed of it. But the twelve cities in Asia have always gloried in the appellation; they gave the temple which they built for themselves the name of the Panionium, and decreed that it should not be open to any of the other Ionic States; no State, however, except Smyrna, has craved admission to it.

Herodotus, I, 148–149

The Panionium is a place in Mycale, facing the north, which was chosen by the common voice of the Ionians and made sacred to Heliconian Poseidon. Mycale itself is a promontory of the mainland, stretching out westward towards Samos, in which the Ionians assemble from all their States to keep the feast of the Panionia. The names of festivals, not only among the Ionians but among all the Greeks, end, like the Persian proper names, in one and the same letter.

The above-mentioned, then, are the twelve towns of the Ionians. The Æolic cities are the following: — Cyme, called also Phriconis, Larissa, Neonteichus, Temnus, Cilla, Notium, Ægiroessa, Pitane, Ægææ, Myrina, and Gryneia. These are the eleven ancient cities of the Æolians. Originally, indeed, they had twelve cities upon the mainland, like the Ionians, but the Ionians deprived them of Smyrna, one of the number. The soil of Æolis is better than that of Ionia, but the climate is less agreeable.

2. BRANCHIDÆ

Several archaic seated figures were found along the Sacred Way leading from the temple to the harbor. They are now in the British Museum.[1]

[1] See British Museum *Catalogue of Sculpture, Archaic Period*, for details.

Two of them bear the following inscriptions:

Hicks and Hill, 6, 7

"Histæus dedicated me to Apollo."

"I am Chares, son of Kleisias, ruler of Teichioussa. The statue is the property of Apollo."

Herodotus, I, 157

Branchidæ is situated in the territory of Miletus, above the port of Panormus. There was an oracle there, established in very ancient times, which both the Ionians and Æolians were wont often to consult.

Herodotus, V, 36

Miletus was, he knew, a weak state — but if the treasures in the temple at Branchidæ, which Crœsus the Lydian gave to it, were seized, he had strong hopes that the mastery of the sea might be thereby gained; at least it would give them money to begin the war, and would save the treasures from falling into the hands of the enemy. Now these treasures were of very great value, as I showed in the first part of my history.

II. Delos

No spot in Greek lands was more famous than sea-girt Delos, the sacred birthplace of Apollo.

This little island was a religious center for many generations.[1]

Thucydides, III, 104

The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it appears, with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by Pisistratus the tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it as could be seen from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified in the following way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in Delos were taken up, and for the future it was commanded that no one should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a child in the island: but that they should be carried over

[1] In recent years excavations by the French School at Athens have unearthed many remains of the precinct.

to Rhenea, which is so near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to his other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain.

The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first time, the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time, indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival, as the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers. Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo: —

> Phœbus, where'er thou strayest, far or near,
> Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.
> Thither the robed Ionians take their way
> With wife and child to keep thy holiday,
> Invoke thy favour on each manly game,
> And dance and sing in honour of thy name.

That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went to contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn. After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself: —

> Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,
> Sweethearts, good-bye — yet tell me not I go
> Out from your hearts; and if in after hours
> Some other wanderer in this world of ours
> Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here
> Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,
> Think of me then, and answer with a smile,
> "A blind old man of Scio's rocky isle."

Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion with the novelty of horse-races.

III. Dodona

The Greeks agreed in attributing a great antiquity to the oracle at Dodona, "The Talking Oak."

Whoever the Pelasgians were they surely belong to a very early period. The people of Epirus were still uncivilized in the days of Philip of Macedon.

Strabo, VII, vii, 10

This oracle, according to Ephorus, was established by Pelasgi, who are said to be the most ancient people that were sovereigns in Greece. Thus the poet speaks,

> O great Pelasgic Dodonæan Zeus;

and Hesiod,

> He went to Dodona, the dwelling of the Pelasgi, and to the beech tree.

I have spoken of the Pelasgi in the account of Tyrrhenia.

With respect to Dodona, Homer clearly intimates that the people who lived about the temple were barbarians, from their mode of life, describing them as persons who do not wash their feet, and who sleep on the ground.

IV. Delphi

Strabo, IX, iii, 4–5

The temple at Delphi is now much neglected, although formerly it was held in the greatest veneration. Proofs of the respect which was paid to it are, the treasuries constructed at the expense of communities and princes, where was deposited the wealth dedicated to sacred uses, the works of the most eminent artists, the Pythian games, and a multitude of celebrated oracles.

The place where the oracle is delivered, is said to be a deep hollow cavern, the entrance to which is not very wide. From it rises up an exhalation which inspires a divine frenzy: over the mouth is placed a lofty tripod on which the Pythian priestess ascends to receive the exhalation, after which she gives the prophetic response in verse or prose.

Strabo, IX, iii, 6

Although the highest honour was paid to this temple on account of the oracle, (for it was the most exempt of any from deception,) yet its reputation was owing in part to its situation in the centre of all Greece, both within and without the isthmus. It was also supposed to be the centre of the habitable earth, and was called the Navel of the earth. A fable, referred to by Pindar, was invented, according to which two eagles, (or, as others say, two crows,) set free by Zeus, one from the east, the other from the west, alighted together at Delphi. In the temple is seen a sort of navel wrapped in bands, and surmounted by figures representing the birds of the fable.

As the situation of Delphi is convenient, persons easily assembled there, particularly those from the neighbourhood, of whom the Amphictyonic body is composed.

Strabo, XVI, ii, 38–39

The ancients regarded and respected divine, in preference to human, law; in those times, therefore, the number of persons was very great who consulted oracles, and, being desirous of obtaining the advice of Zeus, hurried to Dodona, "to hear the answer of Zeus from the lofty oak." The parent went to Delphi, "anxious to learn whether the child which had been exposed (to die) was still living"; while the child itself "was gone to the temple of Apollo, with the hope of discovering its parents." And Minos among the Cretans, "the king who in the ninth year enjoyed converse with Great Zeus," every nine years, as Plato says, ascended to the cave of Zeus, received ordinances from him, and conveyed them to men. Lycurgus, his imitator, acted in a similar manner; for he was often accustomed, as it seemed, to leave his own country to inquire of the Pythian goddess what ordinances he was to promulgate to the Lacedæmonians.

What truth there may be in these things I cannot say; they have at least been regarded and believed as true by mankind. Hence prophets received so much honour as to be thought worthy even of thrones, because they were supposed to communicate ordinances and precepts from the gods, both during their lifetime and

after their death; as for example Teiresias, "to whom alone Proserpine gave wisdom and understanding after death: the others flit about as shadows."

EURIPIDES, *Ion*, 91–111 (tr. Verrall)

The priestess waits Apollo's sign,
On the tripod waits Apollo,
There to hear his voice and follow
Forth in public chant his secret sense.
Go, his Delphian servants, ye
To the silver eddies of Castaly,
And bathe yourselves, and come again,
Clean and made holy, to the fane.
Guard your speech, that never word
On your noble lips be heard
To mar their purpose, who resort
For question to this sacred court.
I the while the task fulfil
Which is mine from childhood still,
With laurel bough in mystic tie
The portal here to purify,
To sprinkle o'er
The holy floor,
And banish far the feathered race,
That do our beauteous gifts disgrace,
With arrows. Father had I none,
Mother none, and thus alone
Love and service all I give
To Phœbus' house, whereby I live.

Pausanias, X, v, 5

They say that the most ancient temple of Apollo was made of laurel, and that the boughs were brought from the laurel in Tempe. This temple must have been in the shape of a shanty. The Delphians say that the second temple was made by bees out of wax and feathers, and that it was sent to the Hyperboreans by Apollo. . . . Touching the third temple, it is no marvel that it was made of bronze, since Acrisius made a bronze chamber for his daughter;

and the Lacedæmonians have a sanctuary of Athena of the Bronze House to this day; and the Forum at Rome, a miracle of size and style, has a roof of bronze. . . . The fourth temple was built by Trophonius and Agamedes, and tradition says that it was made of stone. But it was burnt down when Erxiclides was archon at Athens. . . . The present temple was built for the god by the Amphictyons out of the sacred treasures: the architect was Spintharus of Corinth.

Herodotus, I, 50–52

After this Crœsus, having resolved to propitiate the Delphic god with a magnificent sacrifice, offered up three thousand of every kind of sacrificial beast, and besides made a huge pile, and placed upon it couches coated with silver and with gold, and golden goblets, and robes and vests of purple; all which he burnt in the hope of thereby making himself more secure of the favour of the god. Further he issued his orders to all the people of the land to offer a sacrifice according to their means. When the sacrifice was ended, the king melted down a vast quantity of gold, and ran it into ingots, making them six palms long, three palms broad, and one palm in thickness. The number of ingots was a hundred and seventeen, four being of refined gold, in weight two talents and a half; the others of pale gold, and in weight two talents. He also caused a statue of a lion to be made in refined gold, the weight of which was ten talents. At the time when the temple of Delphi was burnt to the ground, this lion fell from the ingots on which it was placed; it now stands in the Corinthian treasury, and weighs only six talents and a half, having lost three talents and a half by the fire.

On the completion of these works Crœsus sent them away to Delphi, and with them two bowls of an enormous size, one of gold, the other of silver, which used to stand, the latter upon the right, the former upon the left, as one entered the temple. They too were moved at the time of the fire; and now the golden one is in the Clazomenian treasury, and weighs eight talents and forty-two minæ; the silver one stands in the corner of the ante-chapel, and holds six hundred amphoræ. This is known, because the

Delphians fill it at the time of the Theophania. It is said by the Delphians to be a work of Theodore the Samian, and I think that they say true, for assuredly it is the work of no common artist. Crœsus sent also four silver casks, which are in the Corinthian treasury, and two lustral vases, a golden and a silver one. On the former is inscribed the name of the Lacedæmonians, and they claim it as a gift of theirs, but wrongly, since it was really given by Crœsus. The inscription upon it was cut by a Delphian, who wished to pleasure the Lacedæmonians. His name is known to me, but I forbear to mention it. The boy, through whose hand the water runs, is (I confess) a Lacedæmonian gift, but they did not give either of the lustral vases. Besides these various offerings, Crœsus sent to Delphi many others of less account, among the rest a number of round silver basins. Also he dedicated a female figure in gold, three cubits high, which is said by the Delphians to be the statue of his baking-woman; and further, he presented the necklace and the girdles of his wife.

These were the offerings sent by Crœsus to Delphi. To the shrine of Amphiaraus, with whose valour and misfortune he was acquainted, he sent a shield entirely of gold, and a spear, also of solid gold, both head and shaft. They were still existing in my day at Thebes, laid up in the temple of Ismenian Apollo.

Herodotus, I, 92

Besides the offerings which have been already mentioned, there are many others in various parts of Greece presented by Crœsus; as at Thebes in Bœotia, where there is a golden tripod, dedicated by him to Ismenian Apollo; at Ephesus, where the golden heifers, and most of the columns are his gift; and at Delphi, in the temple of Pronaia, where there is a huge shield in gold, which he gave. All these offerings were still in existence in my day; many others have perished: among them those which he dedicated at Branchidæ in Milesia, equal in weight, as I am informed, and in all respects like to those at Delphi. The Delphian presents, and those sent to Amphiaraus, came from his own private property, being the first-fruits of the fortune which he inherited from his father; his other offerings came from the riches of an enemy, who, before he

mounted the throne, headed a party against him, with the view of obtaining the crown of Lydia for Pantaleon.

Hicks and Hill, 5

"King Crœsus dedicated [the column]." (At Ephesus)[1]

Herodotus, II, 180

It happened in the reign of Amasis that the temple of Delphi had been accidentally burnt, and the Amphictyons had contracted to have it rebuilt for three hundred talents, of which sum one-fourth was to be furnished by the Delphians. Under these circumstances the Delphians went from city to city begging contributions, and among their other wanderings came to Egypt and asked for help. From few other places did they obtain so much — Amasis gave them a thousand talents of alum, and the Greek settlers twenty minæ.[2]

On the Pythian games, see Pausanias, X, vii, 2 ff.

V. Olympia

Pausanias, V, vii, 4

With regard to the Olympic games, the Elean antiquaries say that Cronus first reigned in heaven, and that a temple was made for him at Olympia by the men of that age, who were named the Golden Race; that when Zeus was born, Rhea committed the safe-keeping of the child to the Idæan Dactyls or Curetes, as they are also called; that the Dactyls came from Ida in Crete, and their names were Hercules, Pæonæus, Epimedes, Iasius, and Idas; and that in sport Hercules, as the eldest, set his brethren to run a race, and crowned the victor with a branch of wild olive, of which they had such an abundance that they slept on heaps of its fresh green leaves. They say that the wild olive was brought to Greece by Hercules from the land of the Hyperboreans. . . . The Idæan Hercules is therefore reputed to have been the first to arrange the games, and to have given them the name Olympic. He made the rule that they should be celebrated every fourth year, because he

[1] Now in the British Museum.

[2] Results of the work of the French School are embodied in the elaborate publication by Homolle, "Fouilles de Delphes." The precinct itself, with its manifold buildings as well as the individual remains of sculpture, rivals that of Olympia.

and his brothers were five in number. Some say that Zeus here wrestled with Cronus himself for the kingdom; others that he held the games in honour of his victory over Cronus. Amongst those who are said to have gained victories is Apollo, who is related to have outrun Hermes in a race, and to have vanquished Ares in boxing. They say that is why the flutes play the Pythian air, while the competitors in the pentathlum are leaping, because that air is sacred to Apollo, and the god himself had won Olympic crowns.

Pausanias, V, ix, 3

The present order of the games, according to which the sacrifices for the pentathlum and the chariot-race are offered to the god after ‹the other› contests, was first instituted in the seventy-seventh Olympiad. Previously the contests for men and chariots had both been held on the same day. On that occasion the pancratiasts had to prolong their contest into the night because they had not been called on early enough. The cause of the delay was the chariot-race, and still more the contest in the pentathlum. Callias of Athens was victorious in the pancratium; but for the future neither the pentathlum nor the chariot-race was to interfere with the pancratium. The present rules as to the presidents of the games are not what they were originally. Iphitus presided alone over the games, and after Iphitus the descendants of Oxylus did likewise. But in the fiftieth Olympiad two men, selected by lot from the whole body of the Eleans, were entrusted with the presidency of the festival, and for a long time afterwards the number of the presidents continued to be two. But in the twenty-fifth Olympiad nine umpires were appointed, of whom three were entrusted with the chariot-race, three were to watch the pentathlum, and the rest were to take charge of the other contests. In the next Olympiad but one a tenth umpire was added. In the hundred and third Olympiad the Eleans were divided into twelve tribes, and one umpire was taken from each tribe. But being hard put to it by the Arcadians in war, they lost a piece of their territory, together with all the townships which were contained in the district thus severed from Elis, and so in the hundred and fourth Olympiad they were reduced to the number of eight tribes, and the number

of the umpires chosen corresponded to the number of the tribes. But in the hundred and eighth Olympiad they reverted to the number of ten, which has remained unaltered from that day to this.

Pausanias, V, xxi, 2

On the way from the Metroum to the stadium there is on the left, at the foot of Mount Cronius, a terrace of stone close to the mountain, and steps lead up through the terrace. At the terrace stand bronze images of Zeus. These images were made from the fines imposed on athletes who wantonly violated the rules of the games: they are called Zanes (Zeuses) by the natives. At first six were set up in the ninety-eighth Olympiad; for Eupolus, a Thessalian, bribed the boxers who presented themselves, to wit, Agetor, an Arcadian, Prytanis of Cyzicus, and Phormio of Halicarnassus, the last of whom had been victorious in the preceding Olympiad. They say that this was the first offence committed by athletes against the rules of the games, and Eupolus and the men he bribed were the first who were fined by the Eleans. Two of the images are by Cleon of Sicyon: I do not know who made the next four. These images, with the exception of the third and fourth, bear inscriptions in elegiac verse. The purport of the verses on the first is that an Olympic victory is to be gained, not by money, but by fleetness of foot and strength of body. The verses on the second declare that the image has been set up in honour of the deity and by the piety of the Eleans, and to be a terror to athletes who transgress. The sense of the inscription on the fifth image is a general praise of the Eleans, with a particular reference to the punishment of the boxers; and on the sixth and last it is stated that the images are a warning to all the Greeks not to give money for the purpose of gaining an Olympic victory.

Herodotus, II, 160

In the reign of Psammis, ambassadors from Elis[1] arrived in Egypt, boasting that their arrangements for the conduct of the

[1] "Records of the Olympian victors seem to have been kept by the Eleans since the early part of the sixth century; but the Olympian list, as a whole, with the dates of the eighth and seventh centuries, seems to have been first worked out by Hippias of Elis at the very end of the fifth century." (Bury, p. 861)

Mahaffy, "Problems," pp. 217 ff., regards these dates as untrustworthy.

Olympic games were the best and fairest that could be devised, and fancying that not even the Egyptians, who surpassed all other nations in wisdom, could add anything to their perfection. When these persons reached Egypt, and explained the reason of their visit, the king summoned an assembly of all the wisest of the Egyptians. They met, and the Eleans having given them a full account of all their rules and regulations with respect to the contests, said that they had come to Egypt for the express purpose of learning whether the Egyptians could improve the fairness of their regulations in any particular. The Egyptians considered awhile, and then made inquiry, "If they allowed their own citizens to enter the lists?" The Eleans answered, "That the lists were open to all Greeks, whether they belonged to Elis or to any other state." Hereupon the Egyptians observed, "That if this were so, they departed from justice very widely, since it was impossible but that they would favour their own countrymen, and deal unfairly by foreigners. If therefore they really wished to manage the games with fairness, and if this was the object of their coming to Egypt, they advised them to confine the contests to strangers, and allow no native of Elis to be a candidate." Such was the advice which the Egyptians gave to the Eleans.

Some of these lists are contained in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, a series of valuable documents recently found in Egypt. (See Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Vol. II, p. 85, no. ccxxii.)

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NOTE. For accounts of excavations the reader is referred generally to the official publication and is then advised, whenever possible, to consult Frazer, "Pausanias," where full references are given. More general or popular accounts are included for those who have not access to Frazer.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY TYRANNY

General discussion — In Asia Minor and the Islands — Polycrates of Samos — Teos — Mitylene — Sigeum — On the Greek mainland — Corinth, the Bacchiadæ, and the Cypselids — Sicyon, Cleisthenes — Megara, political revolution

It has often been pointed out that the phrase "Age of Tyrants" is misleading as regards the Greeks, that tyranny was always likely to appear among them, and that it was not confined to a single age or period. It is, however, true that it was rather generally prevalent in the seventh and sixth centuries. The whole matter was of interest to all, whether they lived under it and saw its practical workings or whether they looked at the institution from a more theoretical point of view.

Aristotle discusses it among other forms of political organization.

I. General Discussion

Aristotle, *Politics*, VI, 10 (tr. Welldon)

There are two species of Tyranny which we distinguished in our investigation of Kingship; for their character in a certain sense approximates to Kingship and overlaps it, inasmuch as both these forms of rule are regulated by law. I refer to the absolute monarchs elected among some non-Greek peoples and to the corresponding monarchs who were formerly created among the ancient Greeks and were known as Æsymnetes. No doubt there are certain points of difference between these two forms; but they both approximate to Kingship in their constitutional character and the voluntary obedience of the subjects, while they resemble a Tyranny in the despotic and wholly arbitrary nature of the rule. There is a third species of Tyranny which may be regarded as Tyranny in the strictest sense, being the counterpart of the absolute Kingship.

A Tyranny of this kind is necessarily realized in the form of Monarchy which is an irresponsible exercise of rule over subjects, all of whom are the equals or superiors of the ruler, for the personal advantage of the ruler and not of the subjects. And hence the obedience is in this case involuntary; for no free person submits willingly to such rule.

ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, VIII, 12

Still there are no polities which have so short a duration as Oligarchy and Tyranny. The Tyranny of Orthagoras and his descendants at Sicyon, which had the longest existence, lasted only a hundred years. The explanation of its permanence is that they treated their subjects with moderation and submitted themselves in many instances to the laws, that the military genius of Cleisthenes prevented him from becoming an object of contempt and that they won the hearts of the commons as much as any demagogues could have done by the constant attention which they devoted to their interests. It is said at least that Cleisthenes, *when he was a competitor for a prize*, bestowed a crown upon the judge who had refused him the victory; and there are some authorities who assert that the sitting statue in the market is the effigy of the judge who pronounced this decision. It is said too that Pisistratus himself submitted on one occasion to appear in answer to a summons before the Areopagus. Next to the Sicyonian Tyranny the most permanent was that of the Cypselidæ at Corinth which lasted seventy-three years and six months. For Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years, Periander for forty years and six months and Psammitichus the son of Gordias for three years. The causes of permanence were the same in this case as in the last, viz. that Cypselus played the part of a demagogue and never employed a bodyguard during the whole period of his rule, while Periander with the character of a tyrant had also the genius of a general. The third longest Tyranny was that of the Pisistratidæ at Athens, although it did not continue without intermission, as Pisistratus was twice banished during his Tyranny and consequently in a period of three and thirty years was not tyrant for more than seventeen. These with the eighteen years' Tyranny of his sons make a total of thirty-five.

The longest Tyranny with these exceptions was that of Hieron and Gelon at Syracuse, although it too did not last a great number of years, only eighteen in all. For Gelon died after seven years of tyrannical power, Hieron enjoyed it for ten years and Thrasybulus was expelled in the eleventh month of his rule. The majority of Tyrannies have not lasted more than a very short time.

II. In Asia Minor and the Islands

1. POLYCRATES OF SAMOS

Herodotus, III, 39

While Cambyses was carrying on this war in Egypt, the Lacedæmonians likewise sent a force to Samos against Polycrates, the son of Æaces, who had by insurrection made himself master of that island. At the outset he divided the state into three parts, and shared the kingdom with his brothers, Pantagnotus and Syloson; but later, having killed the former and banished the latter, who was the younger of the two, he held the whole island. Hereupon he made a contract of friendship with Amasis the Egyptian king, sending him gifts, and receiving from him others in return. In a little while his power so greatly increased, that the fame of it went abroad throughout Ionia and the rest of Greece. Wherever he turned his arms, success waited on him. He had a fleet of a hundred penteconters, and bowmen to the number of a thousand. Herewith he plundered all, without distinction of friend or foe; for he argued that a friend was better pleased if you gave him back what you had taken from him, than if you spared him at the first. He captured many of the islands, and several towns upon the mainland. Among his other doings he overcame the Lesbians in a sea-fight, when they came with all their forces to the help of Miletus, and made a number of them prisoners. These persons, laden with fetters, dug the moat which surrounds the castle at Samos.

Herodotus, III, 54–56

The Lacedæmonians arrived before Samos with a mighty armament, and forthwith laid siege to the place. In one of the assaults upon the walls, they forced their way to the top of the tower which

stands by the sea on the side where the suburb is, but Polycrates came in person to the rescue with a strong force, and beat them back. Meanwhile at the upper tower, which stood on the ridge of the hill, the besieged, both mercenaries and Samians, made a sally; but after they had withstood the Lacedæmonians a short time, they fled backwards, and the Lacedæmonians, pressing upon them, slew numbers.

If now all who were present had behaved that day like Archias and Lycopas, two of the Lacedæmonians, Samos might have been taken. For these two heroes, following hard upon the flying Samians, entered the city along with them, and, being all alone, and their retreat cut off, were slain within the walls of the place. I myself once fell in with the grandson of this Archias, a man named Archias like his grandsire, and the son of Samius, whom I met at Pitana, to which canton he belonged. He respected the Samians beyond all other foreigners, and he told me that his father was called Samius, because his grandfather Archias died in Samos so gloriously, and that the reason why he respected the Samians so greatly was, that his grandsire was buried with public honours by the Samian people.

The Lacedæmonians besieged Samos during forty days, but not making any progress before the place, they raised the siege at the end of that time, and returned home to the Peloponnese.

Herodotus, III, 60, 122, 125

I have dwelt the longer on the affairs of the Samians, because three of the greatest works in all Greece were made by them. One is a tunnel, under a hill one hundred and fifty fathoms high, carried entirely through the base of the hill, with a mouth at either end. The length of the cutting is seven furlongs — the height and width are each eight feet. Along the whole course there is a second cutting, twenty cubits deep and three feet broad, whereby water is brought, through pipes, from an abundant source into the city. The architect of this tunnel was Eupalinus, son of Naustrophus, a Megarian. Such is the first of their great works; the second is a mole in the sea, which goes all round the harbour, near twenty fathoms deep, and in length above two furlongs. The third is a

temple; the largest of all the temples known to us, whereof Rhœcus, son of Phileus, a Samian, was first architect. Because of these works I have dwelt the longer on the affairs of Samos. . . .

For Polycrates entertained a design which no other Greek, so far as we know, ever formed before him, unless it were Minos the Cnossian, and those (if there were any such) who had the mastery of the Egæan at an earlier time — Polycrates, I say, was the first of mere human birth who conceived the design of gaining the empire of the sea, and aspired to rule over Ionia and the islands.[1] . . .

For, if we except the Syracusans, there has never been one of the Greek tyrants who was to be compared with Polycrates for magnificence.

Thucydides, I, 13

Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses with which he reduced many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo.

Strabo, XIV, i, 16

The tyrannies were at their height in the time of Polycrates and his brother Syloson. The former was distinguished for his good fortune, and the possession of such a degree of power as made him master of the sea. It is related as an instance of his good fortune, that having purposely thrown into the sea his ring, which was of great value both on account of the stone and the engraving, a short time afterwards a fisherman caught the fish which had swallowed it, and on cutting the fish open, the ring was discovered. When the king of Egypt was informed of this, he declared, it is said, with a prophetic spirit, that Polycrates, who had been elevated to such a height of prosperity, would soon end his life unfortunately; and this was actually the case, for he was taken by the Persian satrap by stratagem, and crucified. Anacreon, the lyric poet, was his contemporary, and all his poetry abounds with the praise of Polycrates.

1 On sea power in the Ægean, see J. L. Myres, "On the 'List of Thalassocracies' in Eusebius," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1906, pp. 84–130; J. R. Fotheringham, in *J. H. S.*, 1907, pp. 75–89; Myres, in *J. H. S.*, 1907, pp. 123–130.

It is said that in his time Pythagoras, observing the growing tyranny, left the city, and travelled to Egypt and Babylon, with a view to acquire knowledge. On his return from his travels, perceiving that the tyranny still prevailed, he set sail for Italy, and there passed the remainder of his life.

So much respecting Polycrates.

2. TEOS

Strabo, XIV, i, 30

Teos is situated upon a peninsula, and has a port. Anacreon, the lyric poet, was a native of this place; in his time, the Teians, unable to endure the insults and injuries of the Persians, abandoned Teos, and removed to Abdera, whence orignated the verse —

Abdera, the beautiful colony of the Teians.

Some of them returned in after-times to their own country.

Anacreon, Frag. 28

Having thrown away my shield by the banks of a fair-flowing river.

3. MITYLENE

The following passages will indicate some of Mitylene's claims to fame. Among the poems or fragments of Sappho there is none of political interest, so that Alcæus is our chief source for conditions at that time.

These passages show his sober reflections on conditions, the Ship of State having served as a literary figure continuously ever since; his unbridled enthusiasm at a tyrant's death; his scathing criticism of those he dislikes; his appreciative admiration for a valiant adventurer.

Strabo, XIII, ii, 2

Mitylene has two harbours; of which the southern is a closed harbour for triremes, and capable of holding 50 vessels. The northern harbour is large, and deep, and protected by a mole. In

front of both lies a small island, which contains a part of the city. Mitylene is well provided with everything.

It formerly produced celebrated men, as Pittacus, one of the Seven Wise Men; Alcæus the poet, and his brother Antimenidas, who, according to Alcæus, when fighting on the side of the Babylonians, achieved a great exploit, and extricated them from their danger by killing

A valiant warrior, the king's wrestler, who was four cubits in height.

Contemporary with these persons flourished Sappho, an extraordinary woman; for at no period within memory has any woman been known at all to be compared to her in poetry.

At this period Mitylene was ruled by many tyrants, in consequence of the dissensions among the citizens. These dissensions are the subject of the poems of Alcæus called Stasiotica (the Seditions). One of these tyrants was Pittacus: Alcæus inveighed against him as well as against Myrsilus, Melanchrus, the Cleanactidæ, and some others; nor was he himself clear from the imputation of favouring these political changes. Pittacus himself employed monarchical power to dissolve the despotism of the many, but, having done this, he restored the independence of the city.

Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Pittacus*, I–II

Pittacus was a native of Mitylene, and son of Hyrradius. But Duris says, that his father was a Thracian. He, in union with the brothers of Alcæus, put down Melanchrus the tyrant of Lesbos. And in the battle which took place between the Athenians and Mitylenæans on the subject of the district of Achilis, he was the Mitylenæan general; the Athenian commander being Phrynon, a Pancratiast, who had gained the victory at Olympia. Pittacus agreed to meet him in single combat, and having a net under his shield, he entangled Phrynon without his being aware of it beforehand, and so, having killed him, he preserved the district in dispute to his countrymen. But Apollodorus, in his Chronicles, says, that subsequently, the Athenians had a trial with the Mitylenæans about the district, and that the cause was submitted to Periander, who decided it in favour of the Athenians.

In consequence of this victory the Mitylenæans held Pittacus in the greatest honour, and committed the supreme power into his hands. And he held it for ten years, and then, when he had brought the city and constitution into good order, he resigned the government. And he lived ten years after that, and the Mitylenæans assigned him an estate, which he consecrated to the God, and to this day it is called the Pittacian land.

Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Pittacus*, X

There is a letter of his extant, which runs thus: —

Pittacus to Crœsus

You invite me to come to Lydia in order that I may see your riches; but I, even without seeing them, do not doubt that the son of Alyattes is the richest of monarchs. But I should get no good by going to Sardis; for I do not want gold myself, but what I have is sufficient for myself and my companions. Still, I will come, in order to become acquainted with you as a hospitable man.

Carmina popularia, 43

"Grind, mill, grind; even Pittacus grinds, the king of great Mitylene" (tr. Wright, *Greek Literature*, p. 138).

Alcæus, XX

The Ship of State

I know not how to meet the tempest's rage!
Now here, now there the furious billows form
And compass us. We in the good black ship
Between the opposing waves are hurled, and wage
A desperate struggle with the darkling storm.
The straining sails grow clamorous; they rip,
And fly in rags. The foaming waters burst
Into the hold. The anchors loose their grip.
And now a billow, greater than the first,
Rushes upon us, fraught with perils grave,
While the ship plunges deep into the wave.

Alcæus, XXII

THE BULWARK OF THE STATE

Not in hewn stones, nor in well-fashioned beams,
Not in the noblest of the builder's dreams,
But in courageous men, of purpose great,
There is the fortress, there the living State.

Alcæus, XIX

THE ARMOURY

The spacious hall in brazen splendour gleams,
And all the house in Ares' honour beams.
The helmets glitter; high upon the wall
The nodding plumes of snowy horse's hair,
Man's noblest ornaments, wave over all;
And brightly gleaming brazen greaves are there,
Each hanging safe upon its hidden nail,
A sure defence against the arrowy hail.
And many coats of mail, and doublets stout,
Breast-plates of new-spun linen, hollow shields,
Well-worn and brought from foe-abandoned fields,
And broad Chalcidian swords are stacked about.
Bear well in mind these tools of war, they make
Easy and sure the work we undertake.

Alcæus, XXVI

THE DEATH OF MYRSILUS

Now for wine and joy divine,
Myrsilus is dead!
Now 't is meet the earth to beat
With quick and happy tread.
For Myrsilus is dead!
Myrsilus is dead!

Alcæus, XXV

AGAINST MYRSILUS

This man, this raving idiot here,
With rank supreme and power great,
Will quickly overthrow the state,
Already is the crisis near.

Alcæus, XXIV

AGAINST PITTACUS

This upstart Pittacus, this base-born fool,
They greet with joy, and acclamations great,
And set the willing tyrant up to rule
The strife-torn city, most unfortunate.

Alcæus, XVIII

TO ANTIMENIDAS

From ends of earth thou comest home,
Bearing a glittering blade,
Whose hilt of precious ivory
With gold is overlaid.

For thou hast aided Babylon,
Achieved a glorious deed,
And been a bulwark of defence
In hour of sorest need.

Yea, thou hast fought a goodly fight,
Slaying a mighty man
Who lacked of royal cubits five
Only a single span.

4. SIGEUM

Strabo, XIII, i, 38

Sigeium was taken possession of by the Athenians, who sent Phryno, the victor in the Olympic games, at the time the Lesbians advanced a claim to nearly the whole Troad. They had indeed founded most of the settlements, some of which exist at present, and others have disappeared. Pittacus of Mitylene, one of the seven wise men, sailed to the Troad against Phryno, the Athenian general, and was defeated in a pitched battle. (It was at this time that the poet Alcæus, as he himself says, when in danger in some battle, threw away his arms and fled. He charged a messenger with injunctions to inform those at home that Alcæus was safe, but that he did not bring away his arms. These were dedicated by

the Athenians as an offering in the temple of Athena Glaucopis.) Upon Phryno's proposal to meet in single combat, Pittacus advanced with his fishing gear, enclosed his adversary in a net, pierced him with his three-pronged spear, and despatched him with a short sword. The war however still continuing, Periander was chosen arbitrator by both parties, and put an end to it.

Alcæus, XXIII

On his Escape from Sigeum

Alcæus hath escaped the hand
Of Ares on the battle-field;
He fled unto his native land,
But left behind his sword and shield.
The Attics held the spoils divine,
And hung them in Athena's shrine.

This inscription is particularly interesting, as part *a* is written in the Ionic, part *b* in the Attic dialect, indicating that Sigeum had enough Athenian inhabitants among its Ionian population to make it worth while to record the dedication in their language.

Hicks and Hill, 8

Inscription on a Statue-Base

a. I am the portrait of Phanodicus of Proconnesus, son of Hermocrates. He gave a crater and tripod-stand and wine-strainer to the Sigean prytaneum.

b. I am the portrait of Phanodicus of Proconnesus, son of Hermocrates. I gave a crater and tripod-stand and wine-strainer to the Sigean prytaneum as a remembrance. And if I am receiving injury, take care of me, Sigeans. Now Æsopus made me, and his brethren.

Herodotus, V, 95

In a battle which was gained by the Athenians, the poet Alcæus took to flight, and saved himself, but lost his arms, which fell into the hands of the conquerors. They hung them up in the temple of Athena at Sigeum; and Alcæus made a poem, describing his

misadventure to his friend Melanippus, and sent it to him at Mytilene. The Mytilenæans and Athenians were reconciled by Periander, the son of Cypselus, who was chosen by both parties as arbiter — he decided that they should each retain that of which they were at the time possessed; and Sigeum passed in this way under the dominion of Athens.

Herodotus, V, 94

Hippias hereupon withdrew; and Amyntas the Macedonian offered him the city of Anthemus, while the Thessalians were willing to give him Iolcos: but he would accept neither the one nor the other, preferring to go back to Sigeum, which city Pisistratus had taken by force of arms from the Mytilenæans. Pisistratus, when he became master of the place, established there as tyrant his own natural son, Hegesistratus, whose mother was an Argive woman. But this prince was not allowed to enjoy peaceably what his father had made over to him; for during very many years there had been war between the Athenians of Sigeum and the Mytilenæans of the city called Achilleum.

III. On the Greek Mainland

1. CORINTH

Herodotus, V, 92

The government at Corinth was once an oligarchy — a single race, called Bacchiadæ, who intermarried only among themselves, held the management of affairs. Now it happened that Amphion, one of these, had a daughter, named Labda, who was lame, and whom therefore none of the Bacchiadæ would consent to marry; so she was taken to wife by Aëtion, son of Echecrates, a man of the township of Petra, who was, however, by descent of the race of the Lapithæ, and of the house of Cæneus. Aëtion, as he had no child, either by this wife or by any other, went to Delphi to consult the oracle concerning the matter. Scarcely had he entered the temple when the Pythoness saluted him in these words —

"No one honours thee now, Aëtion, worthy of honour; —
Labda shall soon be a mother — her offspring a rock, that will one day
Fall on the kingly race, and right the city of Corinth."

By some chance this address of the oracle to Aëtion came to the ears of the Bacchiadæ, who till then had been unable to perceive the meaning of another earlier prophecy which likewise bore upon Corinth, and pointed to the same event as Aëtion's prediction. It was the following: —

> "When mid the rocks an eagle shall bear a carnivorous lion,
> Mighty and fierce, he shall loosen the limbs of many beneath them —
> Brood ye well upon this, all ye Corinthian people,
> Ye who dwell by fair Peirene, and beetling Corinth."

The Bacchiadæ had possessed this oracle for some time; but they were quite at a loss to know what it meant until they heard the response given to Aëtion; then however they at once perceived its meaning, since the two agreed so well together. Nevertheless, though the bearing of the first prophecy was now clear to them, they remained quiet, being minded to put to death the child which Aëtion was expecting. As soon, therefore, as his wife was delivered, they sent ten of their number to the township where Aëtion lived, with orders to make away with the baby. So the men came to Petra, and went into Aëtion's house, and there asked if they might see the child; and Labda, who knew nothing of their purpose, but thought their inquiries arose from a kindly feeling towards her husband, brought the child, and laid him in the arms of one of them. Now they had agreed by the way that whoever first got hold of the child should dash it against the ground. It happened, however, by a providential chance, that the babe, just as Labda put him into the man's arms, smiled in his face. The man saw the smile, and was touched with pity, so that he could not kill it; he therefore passed it on to his next neighbour, who gave it to a third; and so it went through all the ten without any one choosing to be the murderer. The mother received her child back; and the men went out of the house, and stood near the door, and there blamed and reproached one another; chiefly however accusing the man who had first had the child in his arms, because he had not done as had been agreed upon. At last, after much time had been thus spent, they resolved to go into the house again and all take part in the murder. But it was fated that evil

should come upon Corinth from the progeny of Aëtion; and so it chanced that Labda, as she stood near the door, heard all that the men said to one another, and fearful of their changing their mind, and returning to destroy her baby, she carried him off and hid him in what seemed to her the most unlikely place to be suspected, viz., a "cypsel" or corn-bin. She knew that if they came back to look for the child, they would search all her house; and so indeed they did, but not finding the child after looking everywhere, they thought it best to go away, and declare to those by whom they had been sent that they had done their bidding. And thus they reported on their return home. Aëtion's son grew up, and, in remembrance of the danger from which he had escaped, was named Cypselus, after the corn-bin. When he reached to man's estate, he went to Delphi, and on consulting the oracle, received a response which was two-sided. It was the following: —

> "See there comes to my dwelling a man much favour'd of fortune,
> Cypselus, son of Aëtion, and king of the glorious Corinth, —
> He and his children too, but not his children's children."

Such was the oracle; and Cypselus put so much faith in it that he forthwith made his attempt, and thereby became master of Corinth. Having thus got the tyranny, he showed himself a harsh ruler — many of the Corinthians he drove into banishment, many he deprived of their fortunes, and a still greater number of their lives. His reign lasted thirty years, and was prosperous to its close; insomuch that he left the government to Periander, his son. This prince at the beginning of his reign was of a milder temper than his father; but after he corresponded by means of messengers with Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, he became even more sanguinary. On one occasion he sent a herald to ask Thrasybulus what mode of government it was safest to set up in order to rule with honour. Thrasybulus led the messenger without the city, and took him into a field of corn, through which he began to walk, while he asked him again and again concerning his coming from Corinth, ever as he went breaking off and throwing away all such ears of corn as overtopped the rest. In this way he went through the whole field, and destroyed all the best and richest part of the

crop; then, without a word, he sent the messenger back. On the return of the man to Corinth, Periander was eager to know what Thrasybulus had counselled, but the messenger reported that he had said nothing; and he wondered that Periander had sent him to so strange a man, who seemed to have lost his senses, since he did nothing but destroy his own property. And upon this he told how Thrasybulus had behaved at the interview. Periander, perceiving what the action meant, and knowing that Thrasybulus advised the destruction of all the leading citizens, treated his subjects from this time forward with the very greatest cruelty. Where Cypselus had spared any, and had neither put them to death nor banished them, Periander completed what his father had left unfinished.

Herodotus, III, 49

If now, after the death of Periander, the Corinthians and Corcyræans had been good friends, it is not to be imagined that the former would ever have taken part in the expedition against Samos for such a reason as this; but as, in fact, the two peoples have always, ever since the first settlement of the island, been enemies to one another, this outrage was remembered, and the Corinthians bore the Samians a grudge for it. Periander had chosen the youths from among the first families in Corcyra, and sent them a present to Alyattes, to revenge a wrong which he had received. For it was the Corcyræans who began the quarrel and injured Periander by an outrage of a horrid nature.

Corinth was frequently in conflict with her colonies and with her neighbors. We have already seen trouble between Corinth and Corcyra (see above, pp. 41–42), and Megara was too near a rival to be neglected. The following inscription shows that the Megarians had the best of the struggle at this time.

The date referred to is B.C. 720, when the Bacchiadæ claimed suzerainty over Megara, but the epigram is attributed to Simonides (B.C. 556–467). As it is written in the Megarian dialect the form Orripus is used for the more familiar Orsippus.

Hicks and Hill, 1

EARLY STRUGGLES BETWEEN MEGARA AND CORINTH, B.C. 720

In obedience to a Delphic oracle the Megarians set me up here, a conspicuous monument to the warlike Orripus, who delivered and restored to his fatherland a long line of boundaries, at a time when foes were annexing much land, and who was the first Greek to be crowned at Olympia naked, whereas former competitors wore girdles in the race (tr. Frazer, *Paus.*, Vol. II, p. 538).

2. SICYON, CLEISTHENES

Herodotus, VI, 126, 128–131

Afterwards, in the generation which followed, Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, raised the family to still greater eminence among the Greeks than even that to which it had attained before. For this Clisthenes, who was the son of Aristonymus, the grandson of Myron, and the great-grandson of Andreas, had a daughter, called Agarista, whom he wished to marry to the best husband that he could find in the whole of Greece. At the Olympic games, therefore, having gained the prize in the chariot-race, he caused public proclamation to be made to the following effect: — "Whoever among the Greeks deems himself worthy to become the son-in-law of Clisthenes, let him come, sixty days hence, or, if he will, sooner, to Sicyon; for within a year's time, counting from the end of the sixty days, Clisthenes will decide on the man to whom he shall contract his daughter." So all the Greeks who were proud of their own merit or of their country flocked to Sicyon as suitors; and Clisthenes had a foot-course and a wrestling-ground made ready, to try their powers. . . .

Now when they were all come, and the day appointed had arrived, Clisthenes first of all inquired of each concerning his country and his family; after which he kept them with him a year, and made trial of their manly bearing, their temper, their accomplishments, and their disposition, sometimes drawing them apart for converse, sometimes bringing them all together. Such as were still youths he took with him from time to time to the gymnasia; but the greatest trial of all was at the banquet-table. During the whole

period of their stay he lived with them as I have said; and, further, from first to last he entertained them sumptuously. Somehow or other the suitors who came from Athens pleased him the best of all; and of these Hippoclides, Tisander's son, was specially in favour, partly on account of his manly bearing, and partly also because his ancestors were of kin to the Corinthian Cypselids.

When at length the day arrived which had been fixed for the espousals, and Clisthenes had to speak out and declare his choice, he first of all made a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, and held a banquet, whereat he entertained all the suitors and the whole people of Sicyon. After the feast was ended, the suitors vied with each other in music and in speaking on a given subject. Presently, as the drinking advanced, Hippoclides, who quite dumbfoundered the rest, called aloud to the flute-player, and bade him strike up a dance; which the man did, and Hippoclides danced to it. And he fancied that he was dancing excellently well; but Clisthenes, who was observing him, began to misdoubt the whole business. Then Hippoclides, after a pause, told an attendant to bring in a table; and when it was brought, he mounted upon it and danced first of all some Laconian figures, then some Attic ones; after which he stood on his head upon the table, and began to toss his legs about. Clisthenes, notwithstanding that he now loathed Hippoclides for a son-in-law, by reason of his dancing and his shamelessness, still, as he wished to avoid an outbreak, had restrained himself during the first and likewise during the second dance; when, however, he saw him tossing his legs in the air, he could no longer contain himself, but cried out, "Son of Tisander, thou hast danced thy wife away!" "What does Hippoclides care?" was the other's answer. And hence the proverb arose.

Then Clisthenes commanded silence, and spake thus before the assembled company:—

"Suitors of my daughter, well pleased am I with you all; and right willingly, if it were possible, would I content you all, and not by making choice of one appear to put a slight upon the rest. But as it is out of my power, seeing that I have but one daughter, to grant to all their wishes, I will present to each of you whom I must needs dismiss a talent of silver, for the honour that you have done me in seeking to ally yourselves with my house, and for your

long absence from your homes. But my daughter, Agarista, I betroth to Megacles, the son of Alcmæon, to be his wife, according to the usage and wont of Athens."

Then Megacles expressed his readiness; and Clisthenes had the marriage solemnized.

Thus ended the affair of the suitors; and thus the Alcmæonidæ came to be famous throughout the whole of Greece.

Herodotus, V, 67–68

This king, when he was at war with Argos, put an end to the contests of the rhapsodists at Sicyon, because in the Homeric poems Argos and the Argives were so constantly the theme of song. He likewise conceived the wish to drive Adrastus, the son of Talaus, out of his country, seeing that he was an Argive hero. For Adrastus had a shrine at Sicyon, which yet stands in the market-place of the town. Clisthenes therefore went to Delphi, and asked the oracle if he might expel Adrastus. To this the Pythoness is reported to have answered — "Adrastus is the Sicyonians' king, but thou art only a robber." So when the god would not grant his request, he went home and began to think how he might contrive to make Adrastus withdraw of his own accord. . . .

Such were his doings in the matter of Adrastus. With respect to the Dorian tribes, not choosing the Sicyonians to have the same tribes as the Argives, he changed all the old names for new ones; and here he took special occasion to mock the Sicyonians, for he drew his new names from the words "pig," and "ass," adding thereto the usual tribe-endings; only in the case of his own tribe he did nothing of the sort, but gave them a name drawn from his own kingly office. For he called his own tribe the Archelai, or Rulers, while the others he named Hyatæ, or Pig-folk, Oneatæ, or Ass-folk, and Chœreatæ, or Swine-folk. The Sicyonians kept these names, not only during the reign of Clisthenes, but even after his death, by the space of sixty years: then, however, they took counsel together, and changed to the well-known names of Hyllæans, Pamphylians, and Dymanatæ, taking at the same time, as a fourth name, the title of Ægialeans, from Ægialeus the son of Adrastus.

Pausanias, X, xxxvii, 4

So the Amphictyons resolved to make war on the Cirrhæans, and they appointed Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, to the command, and fetched Solon from Athens to give them his advice. When they inquired how the victory would go, the Pythian priestess gave them this answer: —

> "Ye shall not take and cast down the towers of this city,
> Till on my precinct blue-eyed Amphitrite's
> Wave, plashing o'er the darkling deep, shall break."

Hence Solon persuaded them to consecrate the territory of Cirrha to the god, in order that Apollo's precinct might be bounded by the sea.

3. MEGARA, POLITICAL REVOLUTION

ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, VIII, 5

It was much in the same way that the Democracy at Megara was overthrown. The demagogues in order to have an opportunity of confiscation ejected large numbers of the nobles from the State, until they had swelled the ranks of the exiles to such an extent that they returned home, conquered the Democrats in a pitched battle and established the Oligarchy.

More than one revolution seems to have occurred here. Theognis (whose date is a disputed one, but who appears to be a contemporary source) moralizes at length in a communication to his young friend, Cyrnus.

He had evidently been exiled and deprived of his property, and was thus embittered against the whole body of his fellow-citizens, nobles and base-born alike.

Maxims of Theognis, 39–68

Cyrnus, this city is pregnant: but I fear that it will bring forth a man *to be* a chastiser of our evil violence. For the citizens here on their part are as yet sober-minded: but the leaders, have turned themselves *so as to* fall into much worthlessness. No city yet, Cyrnus, have good men ruined; but when it pleases the bad to

be insolent, and they corrupt the commons, and give judgments in favour of the unjust, for the sake of private gains and power, expect that that city will not long be kept tranquil, even though now it is settled in much calm, when these gains shall have become dear to the ignoble men, coming along with public hurt. For from these is sedition, and civil bloodshed of men, and to a state such as this a monarch would never be pleasing.

Cyrnus, this state is still a state indeed: but its people truly are other, who aforetime knew nor rights nor laws, but were wont to wear out goat-skins about their sides, and to inhabit this city, like stags, without the walls. And now, son of Polypas, they are noble: but they who were bettermost of yore, now are of low degree: who can endure to look on these things? They deceive also one another, laughing one at the other, conscious of the sentiments neither of bad nor good. Son of Polypas, get none of these citizens as a friend, with thine whole heart, for the sake of any advantage: but seem indeed to be friend to all in tongue, yet associate with none of them in any serious matter at all. For you will learn the minds of wretched men, that in their deeds there is no reliance. But they have loved tricks, and deceits, and crafts in suchwise as men no longer in a sound condition.

Maxims of Theognis, 283–292

Relying on none of the citizens, advance one step, trusting neither oath nor covenant, not even if a man, wishing to give pledges, chooses to give Zeus, the supreme king of immortals, as his surety. For verily in a city so malignantly blaming *as this*, nothing pleases, and according as any one *does*, so they are called far the more senseless. But now the ills of the well-born are good things to the mean of men, and become a law to the devious. For a sense of shame hath perished: impudence and insolence, having mastered justice, possess the whole earth.

Maxims of Theognis, 337–350

May Zeus grant me both requital of my friends, who love me, and that I may be more powerful than my foes. And so should I have the character of being a god among men, if the fate of death should overtake me, when I had recompensed them. But, O Zeus,

accomplish me, thou Olympian god, a seasonable prayer, grant me to experience in return for ills some good also. But oh might I die, unless I find some cessation from evil cares, and if thou givest *but* sorrows in return for sorrows. For thus is my lot; and there does not appear to me a means of vengeance on the men who perforce have plundered and possess my property; but *like* a dog I have crossed a mountain-torrent, having shaken off everything in the rain-swollen stream. Whose black blood may it be mine to drink: and oh might the good Genius aid me, who would accomplish these things to my mind.

Maxims of Theognis, 367–370

I cannot understand the mind of the citizens, which they entertain: for neither if I do them good, nor ill, do I please them: and many blame me, alike the base-born and the well-born: but none of the unwise can imitate me.

Maxims of Theognis, 667–680

If I had wealth, Simonides, even such as I was acquainted with, I should not be vexed at associating with the noble. But now they (riches) pass me by, though I knew them, and I am mute through poverty, though still knowing better than many. Wherefore we are borne on now, having pulled down our white sails, from the Melian Sea, through murky gloom: but they do not choose to bale the ship, and the sea surmounts both the vessel's sides, whereby with great difficulty any one saves himself: yet the *sailors* are slumbering, and have made the pilot, good though he was, cease *from his work*, the *pilot* who used to watch over it understandingly. By force they plunder property, order is upset, and no longer is there an equal distribution in common: but the porters bear rule, and the mean are above the noble. I fear lest haply the waves should ingulf the ship.

Maxims of Theognis, 885–894

May peace and wealth possess the state, that I may revel with others, for I love not baneful war. Neither do thou too much lend an ear, when the herald shouts loud and far: for we are not

fighting for our fatherland. Yet 't is disgraceful, when present and mounted on fleet-footed steeds, not to look upon tearful war.

Alas me, for our cowardice! Cerinthus is undone, and the goodly vineyard of Lelantum is stript. The noble flee: the mean administer the state: would Zeus might destroy the Cypselizing race!

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CHAPTER V

EARLY HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESUS

Argos — Early power under Pheidon — Troubles with Sparta — Olympia — Struggle between Elis and Pisa — Sparta — Messenian wars — Wars against Argos and Tegea — The Spartan constitution — Population — Lycurgus and his work — The senate — The ephors — The kings — The people, property, and discipline — Education — Common mess

I. Argos

According to literary accounts Argos played the leading part in Peloponnesus before Sparta reached a prominent position. The constant rivalry between the two is well marked throughout their history.

1. EARLY POWER UNDER PHEIDON

Strabo, VIII, iii, 33

Pheidon the Argive was the tenth in descent from Temenus, and the most powerful prince of his age; he was the inventor of the weights and measures called Pheidonian, and stamped money, silver in particular. He recovered the whole inheritance of Temenus, which had been severed into many portions. He attacked also the cities which Hercules had formerly taken, and claimed the privilege of celebrating the games which Hercules had established, and among these the Olympian games. He entered their country by force and celebrated the games, for the Eleians had no army to prevent it, as they were in a state of peace, and the rest were oppressed by his power. The Eleians however did not solemnly inscribe in their records this celebration of the games, but on this occasion procured arms, and began to defend themselves. The Lacedæmonians also afforded assistance, either because they were jealous of the prosperity, which was the effect of the peaceful state of the Eleians, or because they supposed that they should have

the aid of the Eleians in destroying the power of Pheidon, who had deprived them of the sovereignty (ἡγεμονίαν) of Peloponnesus, which they before possessed. They succeeded in their joint attempt to overthrow Pheidon, and the Eleians with this assistance obtained possession of Pisatis and Triphylia.[1]

Herodotus, VI, 127

From the Peloponnese came several — Leocedes, son of that Pheidon, king of the Argives, who established weights and measures throughout the Peloponnese, and was the most insolent of all the Grecians — the same who drove out the Elean directors of the games, and himself presided over the contests at Olympia . . .

2. TROUBLES WITH SPARTA

Pausanias, II, xx, 1

From the time that the Lacedæmonians first turned their arms against the Argives, there was no cessation of hostilities till Philip, the son of Amyntas, compelled them to stay within their original boundaries. Before that time, if the Lacedæmonians were not meddling outside Peloponnese, they were sure to be encroaching on the Argive territory; and on the other hand, when the Lacedæmonians were occupied with a foreign war, it was the turn of the Argives to retaliate on them.

Strabo, VIII, vi, 18

Among the cities of the Peloponnesus, the most celebrated were, and are at this time, Argos and Sparta, and as their renown is spread everywhere, it is not necessary to describe them at length, for if we did so, we should seem to repeat what is said by all writers.

Anciently, Argos was the most celebrated, but afterwards the Lacedæmonians obtained the superiority, and continued to maintain their independence, except during some short interval, when they experienced a reverse of fortune.

[1] The date of Pheidon has given rise to much discussion. (See Bury, History, p. 860.) He is generally credited with the establishment of weights and measures. (See Hill, "Historical Greek Coins," p. 4, on the origin of the mistaken idea that Pheidon invented coinage.)

II. Olympia

STRUGGLE BETWEEN ELIS AND PISA

Pausanias, VI, xxii, 2–4

They say that the founder of Pisa was Pisus, son of Perieres, son of Æolus. The people of Pisa brought disaster on themselves by their enmity to the Eleans, and by seeking to wrest the presidency of the Olympic games from the latter. For in the eighth Olympiad they called in the Argive Phidon, the most high-handed of Greek tyrants, and held the games jointly with him. In the thirty-fourth Olympiad, the people of Pisa under their king Pantaleon, son of Omphalion, collected an army from the neighbouring districts, and held the Olympic festival instead of the Eleans. These Olympiads, together with the hundred and fourth (in which the festival was held by the Arcadians) are called Non-Olympiads by the Eleans, who do not register them in the list of Olympiads. In the forty-eighth Olympiad, Damophon, son of Pantaleon, gave the Eleans ground to suspect that he was plotting against them, so they invaded the territory of Pisa, but by prayers and oaths he persuaded them to return home without doing anything. When Pyrrhus, son of Pantaleon, succeeded his brother Damophon on the throne, the people of Pisa voluntarily declared war on the Eleans. In this revolt they were joined by the people of Macistus and Scillus (both towns in Triphylia), and by the people of Dyspontium, another vassal state. The Dyspontians had been on very friendly terms with the Pisans, and had a tradition that their founder Dysponteus was a son of Œnomaus. But Pisa and all the towns that sided with it in the war were destroyed by the Eleans.

The following treaty is the earliest extant document of this class between Greek communities.

Hicks and Hill, 9

Treaty beween Eleians and Heraians, b.c. 550–500

This is the covenant between the Eleians and the Heraians. There shall be alliance for a hundred years: and this (year) shall begin (it): and if either need help, whether of word or deed, they

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shall stand by one another, in all other affairs, and in respect of warfare: and if they stand not by each other, they who have so offended (Zeus) shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus, to be confiscated to him. And if any one shall injure this inscription, whether private man, or magistrate, or community, (the offender) shall be liable to the sacred fine here written. (Tr. Hicks and Hill, p. 11)

III. Sparta

1. MESSENIAN WARS

After the decline of Argos, Sparta was free to attack her neighbors the Messenians. This struggle lasted for many years, breaking forth at intervals into war, and the Messenians were treated with the utmost severity by their victorious foes. The exact dates of the wars have been the subject of much controversy.[1]

Pausanias, IV, iv, 4

In the next generation the mutual hatred of Lacedæmon and Messenia came to a head. At Lacedæmon the king of the one house was Alcamenes, son of Teleclus, and the king of the other was Theopompus, son of Nicander, son of Charillus, son of Polydectes, son of Eunomus, son of Prytanis, son of Eurypon; while the kings of Messenia were Antiochus and Androcles, sons of Phintas. The Lacedæmonians began the war, for which, bent as they were on picking a quarrel, and resolved on war in any case, the occasion that offered itself was not only sufficient, but in the highest degree specious, although, if their temper had been more pacific, it might have been removed by arbitration.

Pausanias, IV, vi, 5

. . . we know that Theopompus did not die before the conclusion of the war, neither in battle nor in his bed. In fact, it

[1] See Frazer's notes on Pausanias, IV, xv, 1, and V, xxiv, 3, the latter of which concerns an inscription on the basis of a statue of Zeus at Olympia dedicated by the Lacedæmonians after a victory over the Messenians:

"Receive, O prince, son of Cronus, Olympian Zeus, a fair image,
And be propitious to the Lacedæmonians."

was this very Theopompus who put an end to the war, as is proved by the elegiacs of Tyrtæus: —

> To our God-beloved king Theopompus,
> Through whom we took spacious Messene.

Pausanias, IV, xiii, 4

After that they held out for about five months, but towards the end of the year they abandoned Ithome, having maintained the war for twenty years, as the poet Tyrtæus says: —

> But in the twentieth left they the fat fields,
> And fled from the mighty Ithomian mountains.

Pausanias, IV, xiv, 4

What they did to the Messenian people was this. In the first place, they made them swear that they would never revolt nor commit any other seditious act. In the second place, though no fixed tax was laid on them, they had to bring to Sparta the half of the produce of their farms. It was also stipulated that at the funerals of the Spartan kings and nobles, men and women should come from Messenia dressed in black; and a penalty was imposed for transgressions of the rule. Tyrtæus refers in some verses to the despiteful punishments which the Lacedæmonians inflicted on the Messenians: —

> Like asses galled with heavy loads,
> To their masters bringing by doleful necessity
> Half of all the fruit that the tilled land yields.

That they were also obliged to join in mourning is shown by the following passage: —

> Themselves and their wives alike bewailing their masters,
> Whene'er death's baneful lot has fallen on any.

Pausanias, IV, xv, 1

When all the preparations for the war were made, and the allies showed themselves heartier than had been expected, for the hatred of the Argives and Arcadians for the Lacedæmonians was now kindled into a flame, the Messenians revolted in the thirty-eighth year after the taking of Ithome, it being the fourth year of the

twenty-third Olympiad, in which Icarus of Hyperesia won the foot-race. At Athens the annual archons were already instituted, and Tlesias was the archon. As to the Lacedæmonian kings at the time, Tyrtæus does not mention their names, but Rhianus in his epic represents Leotychides as king at the time of this war. In this I cannot possibly agree with him. And though Tyrtæus does not name, yet he may be supposed to indicate the kings in the following passage. He has these verses on the former war: —

> About it they fought nineteen years
> Ceaselessly, ever keeping up a patient spirit,
> They the spearmen, our fathers' fathers.

Pausanias, IV, xvi, 3

But Tyrtæus did what he could to change their resolution by singing his verses, and he enrolled Helots in the regiments to replace the fallen.

Pausanias, IV, xxiii, 2

Ira was taken and the second war between the Lacedæmonians and the Messenians was concluded when Autosthenes was archon at Athens, in the first year of the twenty-eighth Olympiad, in which Chionis the Laconian was victorious.

Pausanias IV, xxiv, 2

When the Lacedæmonians had made themselves masters of Messenia they divided it all, except the territory of Asine, amongst themselves; only they gave Mothone to the Nauplians, who had lately been expelled from Nauplia by the Argives.

Pausanias, IV, v, 2

A Lacedæmonian embassy now repaired to Messenia and demanded the surrender of Polychares. The Messenian kings answered the ambassadors that they would consult with the people and report their decision to Sparta. So when the embassy had taken its leave the kings convened an assembly of the burghers. Opinions were very much divided. Androcles was for surrendering Polychares as a criminal of the deepest dye. He was opposed by Antiochus, who insisted especially how pitiful it would be if Polychares should have to suffer under the eyes of Euæphnus, and he

detailed all the torments he would have to endure. At last the debate waxed so hot that both sides flew to arms. But the fight did not last long, for Antiochus' side far outnumbered Androcles' side, and soon knocked him and his chief supporters on the head. Antiochus now reigned alone, and sent to Sparta offering to leave the case to the courts I have mentioned. To the bearers of this letter the Lacedæmonians are said to have vouchsafed no reply.

Strabo, VIII, iv, 10

There were frequent wars (between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians) on account of the revolts of the Messenians. Tyrtæus mentions, in his poems, that their first subjugation was in the time of their grandfathers; the second, when in conjunction with their allies the Eleians (Arcadians), Argives, and Pisatæ, they revolted; the leader of the Arcadians was Aristocrates, king of Orchomenus, and of the Pisatæ, Pantaleon, son of Omphalion. In this war, Tyrtæus says, he himself commanded the Lacedæmonian army, for in his elegiac poem, entitled Eunomia, he says he came from Erineum; "for Zeus himself, the son of Cronus, and husband of Hera with the beautiful crown, gave this city to the Heracleidæ, with whom we left the windy Erineum, and arrived at the spacious island of Pelops." Wherefore we must either invalidate the authority of the elegiac verses, or we must disbelieve Philochorus, and Callisthenes, and many other writers, who say that he came from Athens, or Aphidnæ, at the request of the Lacedæmonians, whom an oracle had enjoined to receive a commander from the Athenians.

The second war then occurred in the time of Tyrtæus. But they mention a third, and even a fourth war, in which the Messenians were destroyed.

Like Callinus and Archilochus, Tyrtæus inspired his countrymen to valorous deeds in war. The following is a fragment of what was probably a marching song when going into battle.

Tyrtæus, Frag. 15 (tr. Wright, *Greek Literature*, p. 76)

Come, sons of Sparta, mother of heroes, come, sons of Sparta's men; forward with your shield on the left; be brave and cast your spear; take no thought for your life; that is not the way of Sparta.

2. WARS AGAINST ARGOS AND TEGEA

Herodotus, I, 82

It chanced, however, that the Spartans were themselves just at this time engaged in a quarrel with the Argives about a place called Thyrea, which was within the limits of Argolis, but had been seized on by the Lacedæmonians. Indeed, the whole country westward, as far as Cape Malea, belonged once to the Argives, and not only that entire tract upon the mainland, but also Cythera, and the other islands. The Argives collected troops to resist the seizure of Thyrea, but before any battle was fought, the two parties came to terms, and it was agreed that three hundred Spartans and three hundred Argives should meet and fight for the place, which should belong to the nation with whom the victory rested. It was stipulated also that the other troops on each side should return home to their respective countries, and not remain to witness the combat, as there was danger, if the armies stayed, that either the one or the other, on seeing their countrymen undergoing defeat, might hasten to their assistance. These terms being agreed on, the two armies marched off, leaving three hundred picked men on each side to fight for the territory. The battle began, and so equal were the combatants, that at the close of the day, when night put a stop to the fight, of the whole six hundred only three men remained alive, two Argives, Alcanor and Chromius, and a single Spartan, Othryadas. The two Argives, regarding themselves as the victors, hurried to Argos. Othryadas, the Spartan, remained upon the field, and, stripping the bodies of the Argives who had fallen, carried their armour to the Spartan camp. Next day the two armies returned to learn the result. At first they disputed, both parties claiming the victory, the one, because they had the greater number of survivors; the other, because their man remained on the field, and stripped the bodies of the slain, whereas the two men of the other side ran away; but at last they fell from words to blows, and a battle was fought, in which both parties suffered great loss, but at the end the Lacedæmonians gained the victory. Upon this the Argives, who up to that time had worn their hair long, cut it off close, and made a law, to which they attached a curse, binding themselves never more to let their hair grow, and never to allow their women to wear gold, until they should

recover Thyrea. At the same time the Lacedæmonians made a law the very reverse of this, namely, to wear their hair long, though they had always before cut it close. Othryadas himself, it is said, the sole survivor of the three hundred, prevented by a sense of shame from returning to Sparta after all his comrades had fallen, laid violent hands upon himself in Thyrea.

After Sparta had once adopted a policy of aggressive expansion, she had to dispose of all possible rivals in her vicinity. The ascendancy over the Tegeans was gained only after a long effort during which the Lacedæmonians often fared worse than their opponents.

Herodotus, I, 66–68

Regarding the Arcadians as very much their inferiors, they sent to consult the oracle about conquering the whole of Arcadia. The Pythoness thus answered them:

> "Cravest thou Arcady? Bold is thy craving. I shall not content it.
> Many the men that in Arcady dwell, whose food is the acorn —
> They will never allow thee. It is not I that am niggard.
> I will give thee to dance in Tegea, with noisy foot-fall,
> And with the measuring line mete out the glorious champaign."

When the Lacedæmonians received this reply, leaving the rest of Arcadia untouched, they marched against the Tegeans, carrying with them fetters, so confident had this oracle (which was, in truth, but of base metal) made them that they would enslave the Tegeans. The battle, however, went against them, and many fell into the enemy's hands. Then these persons, wearing the fetters which they had themselves brought, and fastened together in a string, measured the Tegean plain as they executed their labours. The fetters in which they worked were still, in my day, preserved at Tegea where they hung round the walls of the temple of Athena Alea.

Throughout the whole of this early contest with the Tegeans, the Lacedæmonians met with nothing but defeats; . . . Crœsus, proceeding to seek information concerning the Lacedæmonians, learnt that, after passing through a period of great depression, they had lately been victorious in a war with the people of Tegea; for, during the joint reign of Leo and Agasicles, kings of Sparta, the

Lacedæmonians, successful in all their other wars, suffered continual defeat at the hands of the Tegeans. . . . Lichas betook himself to Tegea, and on his arrival acquainted the smith with his misfortune, and proposed to rent his room of him. The smith refused for some time; but at last Lichas persuaded him, and took up his abode in it. Then he opened the grave, and collecting the bones [of Orestes], returned with them to Sparta. From henceforth, whenever the Spartans and the Tegeans made trial of each other's skill in arms, the Spartans always had greatly the advantage; and by the time to which we are now come they were masters of most of the Peloponnese.

IV. The Spartan Constitution

Even within the limits of her own domain Spartan ascendancy was the price of constant vigilance. The disproportionate number of subjects within her boundaries necessitated the perfecting of a military machine composed of her own citizens. Just who the Helots were was never agreed on in antiquity, nor is it now, but they were a source of constant anxiety to their masters.

1. POPULATION

Thucydides, I, 101

Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old Messenians that were enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them came to be called Messenians.

Thucydides, IV, 80

The Lacedæmonians were also glad to have an excuse for sending some of the Helots out of the country, for fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation of Pylos might encourage them to move. Indeed fear of their numbers and obstinacy even persuaded the Lacedæmonians to the action which I shall now relate, their policy at all times having been governed by the necessity of taking precautions against them. The Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who claimed to have most distinguished themselves against the enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to test

them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did away with them, and no one ever knew how each of them perished. The Spartans now therefore gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with Brasidas, who recruited the rest of his force by means of money in Peloponnese.

The conservatism and stability of the Spartan constitution was often a subject of comment by writers familiar with the changes and experiments of many of the other Greek states. In fact it was generally explained as the result of divine intervention either in the person of an inspired legislator or of the gods themselves. The balance, the combination of various forms of government, — monarchy, aristocracy, democracy,— the subtle series of checks and counterchecks, indicate that such a constitution must have been deliberately formulated by a single legislator or a legislative commission. The formality and the jealous guarding of varied interests, the lack of spontaneity, recall Roman rather than Greek constitutions.

This impression of a deliberate effort on the part of Sparta to sacrifice all individual freedom, to restrain natural instincts, for the sake of the efficient fighting machine, has been well supplemented by the results of the recent excavations in Lacedæmon by the British School at Athens. They have shown clearly that at one time — say from the ninth to the seventh century — the Spartans were not very different from the other Greeks, and that the stiffness, priggishness, lack of interest in art which we are accustomed to associate with them were probably the result of a conscious effort on their part. The fine work of that period in metal, pottery, and carved ivory shows great artistic ability which was nipped in the bud.[1]

[1] For an interesting theory of the reason for the change, see Dickins, "The Growth of Spartan Policy," in *J. H. S.*, 1912, pp. 1–42. Grundy, in *J. H. S.*, 1912, pp. 261–269, opposes the theory.

Thucydides, I, 18

For this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states.

2. LYCURGUS AND HIS WORK

Xenophon, *The Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, I, 1–2

I recall the astonishment with which I first noted the unique position of Sparta amongst the states of Hellas, the relatively sparse population, and at the same time the extraordinary power and prestige of the community. I was puzzled to account for the fact. It was only when I came to consider the peculiar institutions of the Spartans that my wonderment ceased. Or rather, it is transferred to the legislator who gave them those laws, obedience to which has been the secret of their prosperity. This legislator, Lycurgus, I must needs admire, and hold him to have been one of the wisest of mankind. Certainly he was no servile imitator of other states. It was by a stroke of invention rather, and on a pattern much in opposition to the commonly accepted one, that he brought his fatherland to this pinnacle of prosperity.

Plato, *Laws*, III, 691–692 (tr. Jowett, p. 73)

A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes with age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb upon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of magistrates

elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest.

3. THE SENATE

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 6–7

Amongst the many changes and alterations which Lycurgus made, the first and of greatest importance was the establishment of the senate, which having a power equal to the kings' in matters of great consequence, and, as Plato expresses it, allaying and qualifying the fiery genius of the royal office, gave steadiness and safety to the commonwealth. For the state, which before had no firm basis to stand upon, but leaned one while towards an absolute monarchy, when the kings had the upper hand, and another while towards a pure democracy, when the people had the better, found in this establishment of the senate a central weight, like ballast in a ship, which always kept things in a just equilibrium; the twenty-eight always adhering to the kings so far as to resist democracy, and on the other hand, supporting the people against the establishment of absolute monarchy. As for the determinate number of twenty-eight, Aristotle states, that it so fell out because two of the original associates, for want of courage, fell off from the enterprise; but Sphærus assures us that there were but twenty-eight of the confederates at first; perhaps there is some mystery in the number, which consists of seven multiplied by four, and is the first of perfect numbers after six, being, as that is, equal to all its parts. For my part, I believe Lycurgus fixed upon the number of twenty-eight, that, the two kings being reckoned amongst them, they might be thirty in all. So eagerly set was he upon this establishment, that he took the trouble to obtain an oracle about it from Delphi, the Rhetra, which runs thus: "After that you have built a temple to Zeus Hellanius, and to Athene Hellania, and after that you have *phyle'd* the people into *phyles*, and *obe'd* them into *obes*, you shall establish a council of thirty elders, the leaders included, and shall, from time to time, *apellazein* the people betwixt Babyca and Cnacion, there propound and put to the vote. The commons have the final voice and decision." By *phyles* and *obes* are meant

the divisions of the people; by the *leaders*, the two kings; *apellazein*, referring to the Pythian Apollo, signifies to assemble; Babyca and Cnacion they now call Œnus; Aristotle says Cnacion is a river, and Babyca a bridge. Betwixt this Babyca and Cnacion, their assemblies were held, for they had no council-house or building to meet in.

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 26

The senate, as I said before, consisted of those who were Lycurgus's chief aiders and assistants in his plans. The vacancies he ordered to be supplied out of the best and most deserving men past sixty years old, and we need not wonder if there was much striving for it; for what more glorious competition could there be amongst men, than one in which it was not contested who was swiftest among the swift or strongest of the strong, but who of many wise and good was wisest and best, and fittest to be intrusted for ever after, as the reward of his merits, with the supreme authority of the commonwealth, and with power over the lives, franchises, and highest interests of all his countrymen? The manner of their election was as follows: the people being called together, some selected persons were locked up in a room near the place of election, so contrived that they could neither see nor be seen, but could only hear the noise of the assembly without; for they decided this, as most other affairs of moment, by the shouts of the people. This done, the competitors were not brought in and presented all together, but one after another by lot, and passed in order through the assembly without speaking a word. Those who were locked up had writing-tables with them, in which they recorded and marked each shout by its loudness, without knowing in favor of which candidate each of them was made, but merely that they came first, second, third, and so forth. He who was found to have the most and loudest acclamations was declared senator duly elected.

4. THE EPHORS

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 7

Although Lycurgus had, in this manner, used all the qualifications possible in the constitution of his commonwealth, yet those who succeeded him found the oligarchical element still too strong

and dominant, and to check its high temper and its violence, put, as Plato says, a bit in its mouth, which was the power of the ephori, established an hundred and thirty years after the death of Lycurgus.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, VIII

Accordingly the ephors are competent to punish whomsoever they choose; they have power to exact fines on the spur of the moment; they have power to depose magistrates in mid career, — nay, actually to imprison and bring them to trial on the capital charge. Entrusted with these vast powers, they do not, as do the rest of states, allow the magistrates elected to exercise authority as they like, right through the year of office; but, in the style rather of despotic monarchs, or presidents of the games, at the first symptom of an offence against the law they inflict chastisement without warning and without hesitation.

5. THE KINGS

As has often been remarked, the Spartan rulers kept the name of kings but lost most of the functions of the Homeric monarchs, which were taken over by other branches of the government, leaving to them chiefly religious headship and prestige.

Herodotus, VI, 56–59

The prerogatives which the Spartans have allowed their kings are the following. In the first place, two priesthoods, those (namely) of Lacedæmonian and of Celestial Zeus; also the right of making war on what country soever they please, without hindrance from any of the other Spartans, under pain of outlawry; on service the privilege of marching first in the advance and last in the retreat, and of having a hundred picked men for their body-guard while with the army; likewise the liberty of sacrificing as many cattle in their expeditions as seems to them good, and the right of having the skins and the chines of the slaughtered animals for their own use.

Such are their privileges in war; in peace their rights are as follows. When a citizen makes a public sacrifice the kings are given the first seats at the banquet; they are served before any of the other guests, and have a double portion of everything;

they take the lead in the libations; and the hides of the sacrificed beasts belong to them. Every month, on the first day, and again on the seventh of the first decade, each king receives a beast without blemish at the public cost, which he offers up to Apollo; likewise a medimnus of meal, and of wine a Laconian quart. In the contests of the games they have always the seat of honour; they appoint the citizens who have to entertain foreigners; they also nominate, each of them, two of the Pythians, officers whose business it is to consult the oracle at Delphi, who eat with the kings, and, like them, live at the public charge. If the kings do not come to the public supper, each of them must have two chœnixes of meal and a cotyle of wine sent home to him at his house; if they come, they are given a double quantity of each, and the same when any private man invites them to his table. They have the custody of all the oracles which are pronounced; but the Pythians must likewise have knowledge of them. They have the whole decision of certain causes, which are these, and these only: — When a maiden is left the heiress of her father's estate, and has not been betrothed by him to any one, they decide who is to marry her; in all matters concerning the public highways they judge; and if a person wants to adopt a child, he must do it before the kings. They likewise have the right of sitting in council with the eight-and-twenty senators; and if they are not present, then the senators nearest of kin to them have their privileges, and give two votes as the royal proxies, besides a third vote, which is their own.

Such are the honours which the Spartan people have allowed their kings during their lifetime; after they are dead other honours await them. Horsemen carry the news of their death through all Laconia, while in the city the women go hither and thither drumming upon a kettle. At this signal, in every house two free persons, a man and a woman, must put on mourning, or else be subject to a heavy fine. The Lacedæmonians have likewise a custom at the demise of their kings which is common to them with the barbarians of Asia — indeed with the greater number of the barbarians everywhere — namely, that when one of their kings dies, not only the Spartans, but a certain number of the country people from every part of Laconia are forced, whether they will or no, to attend

the funeral. So these persons and the Helots, and likewise the Spartans themselves, flock together to the number of several thousands, men and women intermingled; and all of them smite their foreheads violently, and weep and wail without stint, saying always that their last king was the best. If a king dies in battle, then they make a statue of him, and placing it upon a couch right bravely decked, so carry it to the grave. After the burial, by the space of ten days there is no assembly, nor do they elect magistrates, but continue mourning the whole time.

They hold with the Persians also in another custom. When a king dies, and another comes to the throne, the newly-made monarch forgives all the Spartans the debts which they owe either to the king or to the public treasury. And in like manner among the Persians each king when he begins to reign remits the tribute due from the provinces.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, XIII

I will now give a detailed account of the power and privilege assigned by Lycurgus to the king during a campaign. To begin with, so long as he is on active service, the state maintains the king and those with him. The polemarchs mess with him and share his quarters, so that by dint of constant intercourse they may be all the better able to consult in common in case of need. Besides the polemarch three other members of the peers share the royal quarters, mess, etc. The duty of these is to attend to all matters of commissariat, in order that the king and the rest may have unbroken leisure to attend to affairs of actual warfare.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, XV

Lycurgus laid it down as law that the king shall offer in behalf of the state all public sacrifices, as being himself of divine descent, and whithersoever the state shall despatch her armies the king shall take the lead. He granted him to receive honorary gifts of the things offered in sacrifice, and he appointed him choice land in many of the provincial cities, enough to satisfy moderate needs without excess of wealth. And in order that the kings also might camp and mess in public he appointed them public quarters; and

he honoured them with a double portion each at the evening meal, not in order that they might actually eat twice as much as others, but that the king might have wherewithal to honour whomsoever he desired. He also granted as a gift to each of the two kings to choose two mess-fellows, which same are called Puthioi. He also granted them to receive out of every litter of swine one pig, so that the king might never be at a loss for victims if in aught he wished to consult the gods.

Close by the palace a lake affords an unrestricted supply of water; and how useful that is for various purposes they best can tell who lack the luxury. Moreover, all rise from their seats to give place to the king, save only that the ephors rise not from their thrones of office. Monthly they exchange oaths, the ephors in behalf of the state, the king himself in his own behalf. And this is the oath on the king's part: "I will exercise my kingship in accordance with the established laws of the state." And on the part of the state the oath runs: "So long as he (who exercises kingship) shall abide by his oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken."

These then are the honours bestowed upon the king during his lifetime (at home), — honours by no means much exceeding those of private citizens, since the lawgiver was minded neither to suggest to the kings the pride of the despotic monarch, nor, on the other hand, to engender in the heart of the citizen envy of their power. As to those other honours which are given to the king at his death, the laws of Lycurgus would seem plainly to signify hereby that these kings of Lacedæmon are not mere mortals but heroic beings, and that is why they are preferred in honour.

ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, III, 14

But the kings at Lacedæmon are not supreme in all matters, they are merely military commanders in expeditions beyond the frontiers and enjoy also as their prerogative the superintendence of religious observances. This form of Kingship may be described as nothing more than an absolute and perpetual generalship; for it does not convey the power of life and death except in certain cases, as in the heroic times by martial law during military expeditions.

6. THE PEOPLE, PROPERTY, AND DISCIPLINE

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 8

After the creation of the thirty senators, his next task, and, indeed, the most hazardous he ever undertook, was the making a new division of their lands. For there was an extreme inequality amongst them, and their state was overloaded with a multitude of indigent and necessitous persons, while its whole wealth had centred upon a very few. To the end, therefore, that he might expel from the state arrogance and envy, luxury and crime, and those yet more inveterate diseases of want and superfluity, he obtained of them to renounce their properties, and to consent to a new division of the land, and that they should live all together on an equal footing; merit to be their only road to eminence, and the disgrace of evil, and credit of worthy acts, their one measure of difference between man and man.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, VI

There are other points in which this legislator's views run counter to those commonly accepted. Thus: in other states the individual citizen is master over his own children, domestics, goods and chattels, and belongings generally; but Lycurgus, whose aim was to secure to all the citizens a considerable share in one another's goods without mutual injury, enacted that each one should have an equal power over his neighbour's children as over his own.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, IX

The following too may well excite our admiration for Lycurgus. I speak of the consummate skill with which he induced the whole state of Sparta to regard an honourable death as preferable to an ignoble life.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, X

And yet another point may well excite our admiration for Lycurgus largely. It had not escaped his observation that communities exist where those who are willing to make virtue their study and delight fail somehow in ability to add to the glory of their fatherland. That lesson the legislator laid to heart, and in Sparta he enforced, as a matter of public duty, the practice of every virtue by every citizen. And so it is that, just as man differs

from man in some excellence, according as he cultivates or neglects to cultivate it, this city of Sparta, with good reason, outshines all other states in virtue; since she, and she alone, has made the attainment of a high standard of noble living a public duty.

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 24

Their discipline continued still after they were full-grown men. No one was allowed to live after his own fancy; but the city was a sort of camp, in which every man had his share of provisions and business set out, and looked upon himself not so much born to serve his own ends as the interest of his country. Therefore if they were commanded nothing else, they went to see the boys perform their exercises, to teach them something useful or to learn it themselves of those who knew better. And indeed one of the greatest and highest blessings Lycurgus procured his people was the abundance of leisure which proceeded from his forbidding to them the exercise of any mean and mechanical trade. Of the money-making that depends on troublesome going about and seeing people and doing business, they had no need at all in a state where wealth obtained no honour or respect. The Helots tilled their ground for them, and paid them yearly in kind the appointed quantity, without any trouble of theirs. To this purpose there goes a story of a Lacedæmonian who, happening to be at Athens when the courts were sitting, was told of a citizen that had been fined for living an idle life, and was being escorted home in much distress of mind by his condoling friends; the Lacedæmonian was much surprised at it and desired his friend to show him the man who was condemned for living like a freeman. So much beneath them did they esteem the frivolous devotion of time and attention to the mechanical arts and to money-making.

7. EDUCATION

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, II, 2–7

But when we turn to Lycurgus, instead of leaving it to each member of the state privately to appoint a slave to be his son's tutor, he set over the young Spartans a public guardian, the Paidonomos or "pastor," to give him his proper title, with complete

authority over them. This guardian was selected from those who filled the highest magistracies. He had authority to hold musters of the boys, and as their overseer, in case of any misbehaviour, to chastise severely. The legislator further provided the pastor with a body of youths in the prime of life, and bearing whips, to inflict punishment when necessary, with this happy result that in Sparta modesty and obedience ever go hand in hand, nor is there lack of either.

Instead of softening their feet with shoe or sandal, his rule was to make them hardy through going barefoot. . . .

Instead of making them effeminate with a variety of clothes, his rule was to habituate them to a single garment the whole year through, thinking that so they would be better prepared to withstand the variations of heat and cold.

Again, as regards food, according to his regulation the Eiren, or head of the flock, must see that his messmates gathered to the club meal, with such moderate food as to avoid that heaviness which is engendered by repletion, and yet not to remain altogether unacquainted with the pains of penurious living. . . .

On the other hand, in order to guard against a too great pinch of starvation, though he did not actually allow the boys to help themselves without further trouble to what they needed more, he did give them permission to steal this thing or that in the effort to alleviate their hunger. . . .

It is obvious, I say, that the whole of this education tended, and was intended, to make the boys craftier and more inventive in getting in supplies, whilst at the same time it cultivated their warlike instincts. . . .

Furthermore, and in order that the boys should not want a ruler, even in case the pastor himself were absent, he gave to any citizen who chanced to be present authority to lay upon them injunctions for their good, and to chastise them for any trespass committed. By so doing he created in the boys of Sparta a most rare modesty and reverence.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, III

Coming to the critical period at which a boy ceases to be a boy and becomes a youth, we find that it is just then that the rest of

the world proceed to emancipate their children from the private tutor and the schoolmaster, and, without substituting any further ruler, are content to launch them into absolute independence.

Here, again, Lycurgus took an entirely opposite view of the matter. . . . This, then, was the right moment at which to impose tenfold labours upon the growing youth, and to devise for him a subtle system of absorbing occupation. And by a crowning enactment, which said that "he who shrank from the duties imposed on him would forfeit henceforth all claim to the glorious honours of the state," he caused, not only the public authorities, but those personally interested in the several companies of youths to take serious pains so that no single individual of them should by an act of craven cowardice find himself utterly rejected and reprobate within the body politic.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, IV

But if he was thus careful in the education of the stripling, the Spartan lawgiver showed a still greater anxiety in dealing with those who had reached the prime of opening manhood; considering their immense importance to the city in the scale of good, if only they proved themselves the men they should be. He had only to look around to see that wherever the spirit of emulation is most deeply seated, there, too, their choruses and gymnastic contests will present alike a far higher charm to eye and ear. And on the same principle he persuaded himself that he needed only to confront his youthful warriors in the strife of valour, and with like result. They also, in their degree, might be expected to attain to some unknown height of manly virtue.

What method he adopted to engage these combatants I will now explain. It is on this wise. Their ephors select three men out of the whole body of the citizens in the prime of life. These three are named Hippagretai, or masters of the horse. Each of these selects one hundred others, being bound to explain for what reason he prefers in honour these and disapproves of those. The result is that those who fail to obtain the distinction are now at open war, not only with those who rejected them, but with those who were chosen in their stead; and they keep ever a jealous eye

on one another to detect some slip of conduct contrary to the high code of honour there held customary.

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 21

Nor was their instruction in music and verse less carefully attended to than their habits of grace and good-breeding in conversation. And their very songs had a life and spirit in them that inflamed and possessed men's minds with an enthusiasm and ardor for action; the style of them was plain and without affectation; the subject always serious and moral; most usually, it was in praise of such men as had died in defence of their country, or in derision of those that had been cowards; the former they declared happy and glorified; the life of the latter they described as most miserable and abject. There were also vaunts of what they would do, and boasts of what they had done, varying with the various ages, as, for example, they had three choirs in their solemn festivals, the first of the old men, the second of the young men, and the last of the children; the old men began thus: —

"We once were young, and brave, and strong";

the young men answered them, singing: —

"And we 're so now, come on and try";

the children came last and said: —

"But we 'll be strongest by and by."

Indeed, if we will take the pains to consider their compositions, some of which were still extant in our days, and the airs on the flute to which they marched when going to battle, we shall find that Terpander and Pindar had reason to say that music and valour were allied. The first says of Lacedæmon —

The spear and song in her do meet,
And Justice walks about her street;

and Pindar —

Councils of wise elders here,
And the young men's conquering spear,
And dance, and song, and joy appear;

both describing the Spartans as no less musical than warlike; in the words of one of their own poets —

> With the iron stern and sharp,
> Comes the playing on the harp.

For, indeed, before they engaged in battle, the king first did sacrifice to the Muses, in all likelihood to put them in mind of the manner of their education, and of the judgment that would be passed upon their actions, and thereby to animate them to the performance of exploits that should deserve a record. At such times, too, the Lacedæmonians abated a little the severity of their manners in favor of their young men, suffering them to curl and adorn their hair, and to have costly arms, and fine clothes; and were well pleased to see them, like proud horses, neighing and pressing to the course. And, therefore, as soon as they came to be well-grown, they took a great deal of care of their hair, to have it parted and trimmed, especially against a day of battle, pursuant to a saying recorded of their lawgiver, that a large head of hair added beauty to a good face, and terror to an ugly one.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, I

And, believing that the highest function of a free woman was the bearing of children, in the first place he insisted on the training of the body as incumbent no less on the female than the male; and in pursuit of the same idea instituted rival contests in running and feats of strength for women as for men. His belief was that where both parents were strong their progeny would be found to be more vigorous.

8. COMMON MESS

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*, V

He invented the public mess-rooms. Whereby he expected at any rate to minimize the transgression of orders.

As to food, his ordinance allowed them so much as, while not inducing repletion, should guard them from actual want. And, in fact, there are many exceptional dishes in the shape of game supplied from the hunting field. Or, as a substitute for these, rich

men will occasionally garnish the feast with wheaten loaves. So that from beginning to end, till the mess breaks up, the common board is never stinted for viands, nor yet extravagantly furnished.

So also in the matter of drink. Whilst putting a stop to all unnecessary potations, detrimental alike to a firm brain and a steady gait, he left them free to quench thirst when nature dictated; a method which would at once add to the pleasure whilst it diminished the danger of drinking.

PLUTARCH, *Lycurgus*, 12

They met by companies of fifteen, more or less, and each of them stood bound to bring in monthly a bushel of meal, eight gallons of wine, five pounds of cheese, two pounds and a half of figs, and some very small sum of money to buy flesh or fish with. Besides this, when any of them made sacrifice to the gods, they always sent a dole to the common hall; and, likewise, when any of them had been a hunting, he sent thither a part of the venison he had killed; for these two occasions were the only excuses allowed for supping at home. The custom of eating together was observed strictly for a great while afterwards; insomuch that king Agis himself, after having vanquished the Athenians, sending for his commons at his return home, because he desired to eat privately with his queen, was refused them by the polemarchs; which refusal when he resented so much as to omit next day the sacrifice due for a war happily ended, they made him pay a fine.

They used to send their children to these tables as to schools of temperance; here they were instructed in state affairs by listening to experienced statesmen; here they learned to converse with pleasantry, to make jests without scurrility and take them without ill humor. In this point of good breeding, the Lacedæmonians excelled particularly, but if any man were uneasy under it, upon the least hint given, there was no more to be said to him. It was customary also for the eldest man in the company to say to each of them, as they came in, "Through this" (pointing to the door), "no words go out." When any one had a desire to be admitted into any of these little societies, he was to go through the following probation: each man in the company took a little ball of soft

bread, which they were to throw into a deep basin, which a waiter carried round upon his head; those that liked the person to be chosen dropped their ball into the basin without altering its figure, and those who disliked him pressed it betwixt their fingers, and made it flat; and this signified as much as a negative voice. And if there were but one of these flattened pieces in the basin, the suitor was rejected, so desirous were they that all the members of the company should be agreeable to each other. The basin was called *caddichus*, and the rejected candidate had a name thence derived. Their most famous dish was the black broth, which was so much valued that the elderly men fed only upon that, leaving what flesh there was to the younger.

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CHAPTER VI

ATHENS THROUGH THE SIXTH CENTURY

Early Attica and union under Theseus — The early constitution — Draco's legislation — Solon — His character and political poems — Conditions in Athens — Solon's economic reforms as archon — Solon's constitutional reforms — Summary of his work — Strife after his magistracy ended — Conquest of Eleusis and Salamis — Pisistratus and his family — Pisistratus — Miltiades in the North — The Pisistratidæ — The Alcmæonidæ, "The Accursed" — The conspiracy of Cylon — Cleisthenes and his reforms — Further Athenian conquests — Chalcis and Bœotia — Ægina

I. Early Attica and Union under Theseus

The long continuity of occupation of Attica was a generally accepted view among the ancients, and archæological discoveries have gone far toward showing that there was never a distinct break from the earliest times. Thucydides is inclined to attribute it to the character of the country. Many little settlements of remote antiquity existed throughout Attica before the traditional time of the union under Theseus. The great number of representations of Theseus and his exploits on the pottery of Attica shows how truly he was regarded as a national hero by the Athenians. No semi-mythical, semi-historical figure appears with greater frequency.

Thucydides, I, 2

The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandisement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion, that the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at

an early period, becoming naturalised, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia.

Herodotus, I, 56

His inquiries pointed out to him two states as pre-eminent above the rest. These were the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, the former of Doric the latter of Ionic blood. And indeed these two nations had held from very early times the most distinguished place in Greece, the one being a Pelasgic the other a Hellenic people, and the one having never quitted its original seats, while the other had been excessively migratory.

Thucydides, II, 14–15

But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent townships, each with its own town-hall and magistrates. Except in times of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus, however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of the chief features in his organisation of the country was to abolish the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge them in the single council-chamber and town-hall of the present capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as before, but they were henceforth compelled to have only one political centre, viz. Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synœcia, or Feast of Union; which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in honour of the goddess.

PLUTARCH, *Theseus*, 25

Farther yet designing to enlarge his city, he invited all strangers to come and enjoy equal privileges with the natives, and it is said that the common form, *Come hither, all ye people*, was the words that Theseus proclaimed when he thus set up a commonwealth, in a manner, for all nations. Yet he did not suffer his state, by the promiscuous multitude that flowed in, to be turned into confusion and be left without any order or degree, but was the first that divided the Commonwealth into three distinct ranks, the noblemen, the husbandmen, and artificers. To the nobility he committed the care of religion, the choice of magistrates, the teaching and dispensing of the laws, and interpretation and direction in all sacred matters; the whole city being, as it were, reduced to an exact equality, the nobles excelling the rest in honour, the husbandmen in profit, and the artificers in number. And that Theseus was the first, who, as Aristotle says, out of an inclination to popular government, parted with the regal power, Homer also seems to testify, in his catalogue of the ships, where he gives the name of *People* to the Athenians only.

He also coined money, and stamped it with the image of an ox, either in memory of the Marathonian bull, or of Taurus, whom he vanquished, or else to put his people in mind to follow husbandry; and from this coin came the expression so frequent among the Greeks, of a thing being worth ten or a hundred oxen. After this he joined Megara to Attica, and erected that famous pillar on the Isthmus, which bears an inscription of two lines, showing the bounds of the two countries that meet there. On the east side the inscription is, —

Peloponnesus there, Ionia here,

and on the west side, —

Peloponnesus here, Ionia there.

He also instituted the games, in emulation of Hercules, being ambitious that as the Greeks, by that hero's appointment, celebrated the Olympian games to the honor of Zeus, so by his institution, they should celebrate the Isthmian to the honor of Poseidon.

The pillar on the Isthmus with the inscription on each side indicating Peloponnesus and Ionia, respectively, undoubtedly suggested to Hadrian the adoption of similar inscriptions on his arch, which stood near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

On the northwest front the inscription reads, "This is Athens, the ancient city of Theseus"; on the southeast front, "This is the city of Hadrian, and not of Theseus."[1]

II. The Early Constitution

The discovery of the manuscript of the "Constitution of Athens" (first published in 1891) was of the greatest value to historical students. Whether or not it was written by Aristotle himself makes little difference; it is certainly a contemporary description of Athens in the fourth century, with an interesting sketch of the development of the constitution up to that time. As might be expected, the evidence for the early period is very scanty.

Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, III

Now, the form of the old government before the time of Draco was of this kind. Officers of state were appointed on the basis of merit and wealth, and at first remained in office for life, but afterwards for a period of ten years. And the greatest and earliest of the officers of state were the king, and commander-in-chief, and archon; and earliest of these was the office of king, for this was established at the beginning; next followed that of commander-in-chief, owing to some of the kings proving unwarlike, and it was for this reason that they sent for Ion when the need arose; and last (of the three) was the archonship — for most authorities say it was established in the time of Medon, but some in the time of Acastus; and they adduce as evidence the fact that the nine archons swear to exercise their office just as they did in the time of Acastus — as presumably the Codridæ retired in the time of his kingship. . . . Now, which of the two accounts is correct is

[1] See Frazer, "Pausanias," Vol. II, p. 188.

of little importance, but there is no doubt of the fact having actually occurred in these times: and that it was the last of these offices that was established, there is further evidence . . . for which reason it is only recently that the office has become important, its dignity having been increased by the privileges that have been added to it. Thesmothetæ were appointed many years afterwards, being elected to their offices from the first for a year, for the purpose of recording the enactments in writing, and preserving them against the trial of such as transgressed the law; for which reason it was the sole office that was not established for more than a year. So far, therefore, these take precedence of others. The nine archons did not all live together, but the king occupied what is now called the Boukolium, near the Prytaneum (in confirmation of which even to this day the marriage of the king's wife with Dionysus takes place here), and the archon resides in the Prytaneum, and the commander-in-chief in the Epilyceum. This was formerly called the Polemarcheum, but from the time that Epilycus, when polemarch, rebuilt and furnished it, it was called Epilyceum: and the Thesmothetæ occupied the Thesmotheteum.[1] But in the time of Solon they all lived together in the Thesmotheteum. And they had power to decide law-suits finally, and not as now merely to hold a preliminary inquiry. Such, then, were the arrangements in respect of the officers of state. The duty of the council of the Areopagitæ was to jealously guard the laws, and it administered most of the affairs of state, and those the most important, both by punishing and fining all offenders with authority; for the election of the archons was on the basis of merit and wealth, and of them the Areopagitæ were composed; this is the reason why it is the only office that continues to be held for life up to the present time.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, VIII

For in old days the council on Mars' Hill decided, after citation, on its own authority who was the proper man for each of the offices of state, and invested him accordingly, making the appointment for a year.

1 Most of these public buildings were in the northwestern or northern part of Athens in the neighborhood of the *agora*, or market place. For description, see "Pausanias," I, xviii, 3, and Frazer's note.

DRACO'S LEGISLATION

A distinct advance was made at this period. Draco was appointed a special commissioner to revise and codify the laws and have them properly written down. We see in his constitution indications of a democratic assembly of four hundred and one, but very few of his laws survive. They were proverbially severe, and it seems probable that the laws did not originate with Draco himself but were made more generally known through his efforts.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, IV

Now, this is a sketch of the first form of government. And after this, at no long interval, when Aristæchmus was archon, Draco made his laws; and this constitution was as follows. Share in the government was assigned to those who provided themselves with arms; and they chose for the nine archons and the treasurers such as were possessed of property to the value of not less than ten minæ free of all encumbrances, and for the other minor offices such as provided themselves with arms, and for generals and commanders of cavalry such as could show property of not less than a hundred minæ free of all encumbrances, and children born in lawful wedlock above ten years of age; these were to be the presidents of the council and generals and commanders of cavalry . . . up to the time of the audit of their accounts . . . and receiving from the same rating as the generals and commanders of cavalry. The Council was to consist of four hundred and one, selected by lot from the whole body of citizens; such as were over thirty years of age were to obtain this and the other offices by lot, and the same man was not to hold office twice before all had had their turn; and then appointment was to be made afresh by lot. If any member of the Council, when there was a sitting of the Council or Assembly, was absent from the meeting, he had to pay a fine, the Pentakosiomedimnus (the possessor of land which produced five hundred medimni yearly) three drachmæ, the Knight two, and the Zeugitæ (those who possessed a team of oxen) one. And the council of Areopagus was the guardian of the laws, and jealously watched the magistrates to see that they administered their offices according to

the laws. And an injured party had the right of bringing his indictment before the council of the Areopagitæ, on showing in contravention of what law he had sustained his injury. (But all this was of no avail, because) the lower classes were bound on the security of their persons, as has been said, and the land was in the hands of a few.

III. Solon

Although the legislation of Draco had been a step in advance, much remained to be done, particularly in economic reforms.

Solon devoted his poetic gifts to the criticism and encouragement of his fellow-citizens and, as verse rather than prose was still the usual vehicle of expression, we find that many of his poems read like political pamphlets. His own statements regarding conditions in Athens show that the city was in a bad way, due to faction, class feeling, and other evils.

1. His Character and Political Poems

Plutarch, *Solon*, 2

In his time, as Hesiod says, — "Work was a shame to none," nor was distinction made with respect to trade, but merchandise was a noble calling, which brought home the good things which the barbarous nations enjoyed, was the occasion of friendship with their kings, and a great source of experience. Some merchants have built great cities, as Protis, the founder of Massilia, to whom the Gauls, near the Rhone, were much attached. Some report, also, that Thales and Hippocrates the mathematician traded; and that Plato defrayed the charges of his travels by selling oil in Egypt.

Plutarch, *Solon*, 3

At first he used his poetry only in trifles, not for any serious purpose, but simply to pass away his idle hours; but afterwards he introduced moral sentences and state matters, which he did, not to record them merely as an historian, but to justify his own actions, and sometimes to correct, chastise, and stir up the Athenians to noble performances.

Solon, Frag. 4

By the ordinance of Zeus and the blessed immortals our city shall never perish, for Pallas Athene the great-hearted guardian, daughter of a mighty sire, holds her protecting hand above her; — but the citizens themselves hearkening to the voice of gain wish to destroy the great city in their senseless folly, and unjust is the purpose of the leaders and the people for whom, because of their overweening insolence, many sorrows are in store; for they know not how to keep down their wanton pride nor how in quietness to give the grace of order to the pleasures of the banquet as they come. But in their wealth so undeserved they yield to injustice, (?)[1] sparing neither the treasures of the gods or of the state they steal, pillaging on every hand, nor do they guard the holy foundations of Justice, who though silent knows what they do and what they have done, and in time comes to requite in full.

These evils have come upon the city like an incurable wound, and swiftly she has fallen to base slavery which awakens discord among kinsmen, and slumbering war which destroyed the lovely youth of many; the well-beloved city is soon consumed with contests of hostile parties dear to wrong-doers. These evils are rife among the people, and many of the poor go to a foreign land bound and sold in shameful chains. "So the curse that is on the whole state follows every man to his own home; no more can the doors of his courtyard keep it out; but over the high fence it leaps and hunts him down, yea though he hide himself in the innermost room within."

My heart bids me teach the Athenians these things: that evil law brings most evils to a city while good law brings good order and fits all things together, and ever places fetters on the unjust; she makes the rough smooth, stops excess, makes insolence to perish, and withers budding flowers of infatuation, makes straight all crooked judgments, and tames arrogant deeds, stops the work of sedition and the bitter anger of grievous strife; under her hand all in human life is right and wise.

[1] The text is very bad here.

2. CONDITIONS IN ATHENS

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, V

Such being the constitution in the body politic, and the bulk of the people being in bondage to the few, the people was in a state of opposition to the upper classes. As strife ran high, and the two parties had faced each other for a considerable time, they agreed to choose Solon as mediator and archon, and entrusted the constitution to him after he had composed a poem in elegiac metre, of which the beginning is as follows:

> I ponder, and within my soul lie woes,
> As I look on the most honourable land in Ionia;

for he ever took the lead, fighting and disputing vigorously for each side against the other, and afterwards recommended them both to put an end to the existing strife.

3. SOLON'S ECONOMIC REFORMS AS ARCHON

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, VI

Now, Solon, when he had got to be at the head of affairs, made the people free both for the present and the future, by forbidding loans on the security of the person, and he made laws, and a cancelling of all debts both private and public; this they call Seisachtheia (the disburdening ordinance), as having shaken off their burden.

PLUTARCH, *Solon*, 15

For the first thing which he settled was, that what debts remained should be forgiven, and no man, for the future, should engage the body of his debtor for security. Though some, as Androtion, affirm that the debts were not cancelled, but the interest only lessened, which sufficiently pleased the people; so that they named this benefit the Seisacthea, together with the enlarging their measures, and raising the value of their money; for he made a pound, which before passed for seventy-three drachmas, go for a hundred; so that, though the number of pieces in the payment was equal, the value was less; which proved a considerable benefit to those that were to discharge great debts, and no loss to the

creditors. But most agree that it was the taking off the debts that was called Seisacthea, which is confirmed by some places in his poem, where he takes honour to himself, that —

> The mortgage-stones that covered her, by me
> Removed, — the land that was a slave is free;

that some who had been seized for their debts he had brought back from other countries, where —

> . . . so far their lot to roam
> They had forgot the language of their home;

and some he had set at liberty —

> Who here in shameful servitude were held.

PLUTARCH, *Solon*, 16

In this he pleased neither party, for the rich were angry for their money, and the poor that the land was not divided, and, as Lycurgus ordered in his commonwealth, all men reduced to equality. . . .

Solon could not rise to that in his polity, being but a citizen of the middle classes; yet he acted fully up to the height of his power, having nothing but the good-will and good opinion of his citizens to rely on; and that he offended the most part, who looked for another result, he declares in the words —

> Formerly they boasted of me vainly; with averted eyes
> Now they look askance upon me; friends no more, but enemies.

And yet had any other man, he says, received the same power —

> He would not have forborne, nor let alone,
> But made the fattest of the milk his own.

Soon, however, becoming sensible of the good that was done, they laid by their grudges, made a public sacrifice, calling it Seisacthea, and chose Solon to new-model and make laws for the commonwealth, giving him the entire power over everything, their magistracies, their assemblies, courts, and councils; that he should appoint the number, times of meeting, and what estate they must

have that could be capable of these, and dissolve or continue any of the present constitutions, according to his pleasure.

PLUTARCH, *Solon*, 17

First, then, he repealed all Draco's laws, except those concerning homicide, because they were too severe, and the punishments too great; for death was appointed for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted of idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege or murder. So that Demades, in after time, was thought to have said very happily, that Draco's laws were written not with ink but blood; and he himself, being once asked why he made death the punishment of most offences, replied, "Small ones deserve that, and I have no higher for the greater crimes."

4. SOLON'S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, VII

So he established a constitution and made other laws, and they ceased to use the laws of Draco, except in matters of homicide. They inscribed the laws on the tablets, and placed them in the court where the king archon sat, and all swore to abide by them; and the nine archons, swearing beside the stone, declared that they would make an offering of a gold statue if they transgressed any of the laws; hence it is that they so swear even to this day. And he ratified the laws for a hundred years, and constituted the government in the following way: He divided property qualifications into four ratings, just as a division had existed before, viz., the Pentakosiomedimnus, the Knight, the Zeugites, and the Thes (poorest class). He assigned as officers of state out of Pentakosiomedimni and Knights and Zeugitæ, the nine archons and treasurers, and the government-sellers and the Eleven and the Kolakratæ, to each class assigning office in proportion to the magnitude of its assessment. To the class of Thetes he gave a share only in the Assembly and courts of justice. And all had to class as Pentakosiomedimni who, from their own property, made five hundred measures, dry and wet combined, and in the class of Knights such as made three hundred, or, as some say, were able to keep a

horse: . . . And all had to be rated as Zeugitæ who made two hundred measures combined, and all the rest as Thetes, having no share in any office of state; . . .

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, VIII

He caused the officers of state to be appointed by lot from candidates whom each of the tribes selected. For each selected ten for the nine archons; hence it is that it is still the practice of the tribes for each to appoint ten by lot, and then to appoint by lot from them. . . .

Now, there were four tribes just as before, and four tribe-kings. Each tribe was divided into three Trittyes (thirds of a tribe) and twelve Naukrariæ. Magistrates of the Naukrariæ were appointed, viz. the Naukrari, who had charge of the current revenues and expenditure; . . . He made the Council four hundred, a hundred from each tribe, and he assigned to the council of the Areopagitæ the duty of still watching over the laws generally, just as before it had been the overseer of the administration, and jealously guarded the greater number, and those the most important, of the interests of the citizens, and corrected offenders, having authority to fine and punish, and reported to the state the punishments it inflicted, without recording the reasons of those punishments, and sat in judgment on those who combined for the overthrow of the people, in conformity with Solon's legislation. Now, these were the duties that he assigned in their case. And seeing that the state was often torn by faction, and that some of the citizens from indifference stood aloof, of his own motion he passed a law specially directed against them as follows — that anyone who, when the state was divided into parties, did not take up arms and side with one or the other, should be deprived of his political rights, and have no part in the state.

Such, then, were his institutions regarding the officers of state. Now, the following are the three provisions of the constitution of Solon which appear to be the most favourable to the people: first and foremost, the prohibition of loans on the security of the person; then the right accorded to anyone who wished to seek in the courts a remedy for his wrongs; and third (by which, most of all, they say

the masses have acquired power), the right of appeal to the court of justice; for when the people is master of the vote, it becomes master of the government.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, X

In his laws, then, he seems to have introduced these measures in favour of the people, but prior to his legislation to have instituted the cancelling of debts, and afterwards the increase in measures and weights, as well as in the current coin. For it was in his time also that the measures were made larger than the Pheidonean standard, as well as the mina, which had formerly contained about seventy drachmæ. Now, the ancient standard coin was a double drachma. And he made the weight for the current coin sixty (-three) minæ to the talent, and additional minæ were assigned to the stater and all other weights.

5. SUMMARY OF HIS WORK

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XII

That this was the position of affairs all without exception agree, and he himself in his poetry refers to it in the following words:

> For to the people I gave such privilege as suffices,
> Neither taking away from or aiming at honour.
> But such as possessed power, and from their wealth were leaders,
> Them I counselled to retain nothing unseemly.
> I stood with my mighty shield thrown around both,
> And suffered not either to triumph unrighteously.

And again, read where he speaks about such as wished to divide the land among themselves:

> And they came on the spoil with a wealth of hope,
> And they thought each of them to find great prosperity,
> And that I, though talking smoothly, would manifest a harsh spirit.
> Vain were their thoughts then, and now angered with me,
> With eyes askance all regard me like enemies.
> Not rightly; for what I said, with the help of the gods, I have accomplished;
> But other things I was attempting in vain, nor does it please me
> To do aught by force of tyranny, or of our rich fatherland
> That the bad should have an equal share with the good.

6. STRIFE AFTER HIS MAGISTRACY ENDED

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XIII

After he had left his country, although the city was still in an unquiet state, for four years they lived in peace; but in the fifth year after the magistracy of Solon they did not appoint an archon, owing to the factions which prevailed; and a second time in the fifth year, for the same reason, they did not appoint to the office. And after this, in the same period, Damasias was elected archon, and continued in office for two years and two months, until he was driven from it by force. Then they decided, on account of the strength of party feeling, to elect ten archons, five from the nobles, three from the landowners, and two from the handicraftsmen; and these held office the year after Damasias, thus making it clear that the archon possessed the greatest power, for it is evident that they were always engaged in party strife about this office.

IV. CONQUEST OF ELEUSIS AND SALAMIS

Athens further extended her power at the expense of her neighbors, first by subduing the Eleusinians, then by wresting Salamis from the Megarians after a bitter struggle, incited to the supreme effort by these famous verses of Solon.

Pausanias, I, xxxviii, 3

In a battle between the Eleusinians and the Athenians, there fell Erechtheus, king of Athens, and Immaradus, son of Eumolpus; and peace was made on these terms: the Eleusinians were to perform the mysteries by themselves, but were in all other respects to be subject to the Athenians.

Pausanias, I, xl, 4

In the temple[1] itself is dedicated the bronze beak of a galley. They say they took this ship in a sea-fight with the Athenians off Salamis. The Athenians admit that for a time they ceded the island to the Megarians; but they say that afterwards Solon stirred

[1] Of Zeus at Megara.

them up by his verses, they renewed the strife, and, being victorious in the war, regained Salamis. The Megarians, however, assert that exiles from Megara, whom they name Dorycleans, went to the colonists in Salamis, and betrayed the island to the Athenians.

Solon, Frags. 1–2 (tr. Wright)

I come as a herald from lovely Salamis, with a song on my lips instead of common speech. . . . On that day may I change my country and be a citizen of Pholegandrus or of Sicinus but not of Athens ; for the moment I appear men will say : It is an Athenian, one of those who let Salamis go. . . . Forward to Salamis ! Let us fight for the lovely island and wipe out our shame and disgrace.

V. Pisistratus and his Family

1. PISISTRATUS

The wars of Athens gave many citizens a chance to distinguish themselves, moreover the factions and uncertainty which prevailed offered an opportunity for a strong or influential man to establish himself firmly in power.

Pisistratus is an excellent example of this. More than once in his chequered career he succeeded in setting up a tyranny or unconstitutional government. Though his means of securing power were not always above reproach, he made an excellent ruler, administering the laws with justice, providing work for the unemployed, improving economic conditions, and keeping the citizens too fully occupied to trouble much about government.

Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, XIV–XVI

Peisistratus, with his character of being a strong partisan of the people and the great reputation that he had made in the war against the Megarians, by covering himself with wounds and then pretending that he had suffered this treatment from the opposite faction, succeeded in persuading the people to give him a body-guard, on the proposal of Aristion. When he had got the club-bearers, as they were called, he rose up with them against the people, and

seized the Acropolis in the thirty-second year after the passing of the laws in the archonship of Komeas. The tale goes that Solon, when Peisistratus asked for the guard, spoke against it, and said that he was wiser than some and braver than others; for that he was wiser than all such as did not know that Peisistratus was aiming at absolute power, and braver than such as who, although they knew this, held their peace. When his words availed nothing, taking up his arms before the doors, he said that he had come to the rescue of his country as far as he was able (for he was by this time an exceedingly old man), and called upon everybody else to follow his example. Solon effected nothing at the time by his exhortations. And Peisistratus, after he had possessed himself of the supreme power, administered the state more like a citizen than a tyrant. But as his power was not yet firmly rooted, the parties of Megakles and Lykurgus came to an agreement, and drove him out in the sixth year after his first establishment in the archonship of Hegesias. In the twelfth year after this, Megakles, being harassed by the rival parties, again made proposals to Peisistratus on the condition that he should marry his daughter, and brought him back again in quaint and exceedingly simple fashion. For he first spread a report that Athena was bringing back Peisistratus; then, having found a tall and beautiful woman — as Herodotus says, of the deme of the Pæanes, but as some say, a Thracian, a seller of garlands of Kolyttus, whose name was Phye — he dressed her up so as to look like the goddess, and so brought back the tyrant with him. In this way Peisistratus made his entry, riding in a chariot with the woman sitting by his side, and the citizens, doing obeisance, received them in wonderment.

His first return from exile took place in this way. After this, when he was driven out the second time, about the seventh year after his return — for he did not retain his power long, but being unwilling to unite himself to the daughter of Megakles, for fear of giving offence to both factions, went secretly away — he first took part in colonizing a place in the neighbourhood of the Thermæan Gulf, which is called Rhækelus, and thence passed on to the parts about Pangæus. There he made money and hired soldiers, and coming to Eretria in the eleventh year, again he made

his first attempt to recover his power by force, with the good-will of many, particularly of the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos, besides the knights who were at the head of the government in Eretria. And having been victorious in the battle at Pallene, and recovered the supreme power, he stripped the people of their arms, and was now firmly seated in the tyranny. He went to Naxos also and established Lygdamis in power. Now, he stripped the people of their arms after the following fashion: Ordering a review under arms in the Anakeum, he pretended to make an attempt to harangue them, but spoke in a low voice; and when they said they could not hear, he bade them go up to the propylæa of the Acropolis, that he might be heard the better. Whilst he continued addressing them, those who had been appointed for the purpose took away the arms of the people, and shut them up in the neighbouring buildings of the Theseum. They then came and informed Peisistratus. After finishing his speech, he told the people what had been done about their arms, saying that they had no need to be surprised or out of heart, but bade them go home and attend to their own affairs, adding that all public matters would now be his concern.

The tyranny of Peisistratus was at first established in this way, and experienced the changes just enumerated. As we have said, Peisistratus administered the government with moderation, and more like a citizen than a tyrant. For, in applying the laws, he was humane and mild, and towards offenders clement, and, further, he used to advance money to the needy for their agricultural operations, thus enabling them to carry on the cultivation of their lands uninterruptedly. And this he did with two objects: that they might not live in the city, but being scattered over the country, and enjoying moderate means and engaged in their own affairs, they might have neither the desire nor the leisure to concern themselves with public matters. At the same time he had the advantage of a greater revenue from the careful cultivation of the land; for he took a tithe of the produce. It was for this reason, too, that he instituted jurors throughout the demes, and often, leaving the capital, made tours in the country, seeing matters for himself, and reconciling such as had differences, so that they might have no occasion to come to the city and neglect their lands. It was on such

a tour that the incident is said to have occurred about the man in Hymettus, who was cultivating what was afterwards called the "No-Tax-Land." For seeing a man delving at rocks with a wooden peg and working away, he wondered at his using such a tool, and bade his attendants ask what the spot produced. "Every ill and every woe under the sun," replied the man, "and Peisistratus must take his tithe of these ills and these woes." Now, the man made this answer not knowing who he was; but Peisistratus, pleased at his boldness of speech and love of work, gave him immunity from all taxes. And he never interfered with the people in any other way indeed during his rule, but ever cultivated peace and watched over it in times of tranquillity. And this is the reason why it often passed as a proverb that the tyranny of Peisistratus was the life of the Golden Age; for it came to pass afterwards, through the insolence of his sons, that the government became much harsher. But what more than any other of his qualities made him a favourite was his popular sympathies and kindness of disposition. For while in all other matters it was his custom to govern entirely according to the laws, so he never allowed himself any unfair advantage, and on one occasion when he was cited before the Areopagus on a charge of murder, he appeared himself in his own defence, and his accuser, getting frightened, withdrew from the suit. It was for such reasons also, that he remained tyrant for a long period, and when he lost his power easily recovered it again; for most of the upper classes and of the popular side desired it, since he helped the one by his intercourse with them, and the other by his assistance in their private affairs, and from his natural disposition could adapt himself to both. The laws of the Athenians regarding tyrants were mild in these times, all of them, and particularly the one relating to any attempt at tyranny, for their law stood as follows: "These are the ordinances of the Athenians, inherited from their fathers: whoever rises up to make himself a tyrant, or assists in establishing a tyranny, shall be deprived of his political rights, both himself and his family."

Herodotus, I, 59

This Pisistratus, at a time when there was civil contention in Attica between the party of the Sea-coast headed by Megacles the

son of Alcmæon, and that of the Plain headed by Lycurgus, one of the Aristolaids, formed the project of making himself tyrant, and with this view created a third party. Gathering together a band of partisans, and giving himself out for the protector of the Highlanders, he contrived the following stratagem. He wounded himself and his mules, and then drove his chariot into the market-place, professing to have just escaped an attack of his enemies, who had attempted his life as he was on his way into the country. He besought the people to assign him a guard to protect his person, reminding them of the glory which he had gained when he led the attack upon the Megarians, and took the town of Nisæa, at the same time performing many other exploits. The Athenians, deceived by his story, appointed him a band of citizens to serve as a guard, who were to carry clubs instead of spears, and to accompany him wherever he went. Thus strengthened, Pisistratus broke into revolt and seized the citadel. In this way he acquired the sovereignty of Athens, which he continued to hold without disturbing the previously existing offices or altering any of the laws. He administered the state according to the established usages, and his arrangements were wise and salutary.

Herodotus, I, 64

Upon this he set himself to root his power more firmly, by the aid of a numerous body of mercenaries, and by keeping up a full exchequer, partly supplied from native sources, partly from the countries about the river Strymon. He also demanded hostages from many of the Athenians who had remained at home, and not left Athens at his approach ; and these he sent to Naxos, which he had conquered by force of arms, and given over into the charge of Lygdamis.

2. MILTIADES IN THE NORTH

In the meantime Athens had been strengthening her hold on the Chersonese chiefly through the agency of Miltiades. His distinguished family had already played an important part in affairs, and Miltiades, finding that Athens was not large enough for him and Pisistratus at the same time, withdrew to the north, where he established most valuable connections.

Herodotus, VI, 34–39

Up to this time the cities of the Chersonese had been under the government of Miltiades, the son of Cimon, and grandson of Stesagoras, to whom they had descended from Miltiades, the son of Cypselus. . . .

Now Pisistratus was at this time sole lord of Athens; but Miltiades, the son of Cypselus, was likewise a person of much distinction. He belonged to a family which was wont to contend in the four-horse chariot-races, and traced its descent to Æacus and Egina, but which, from the time of Philæas, the son of Ajax, who was the first Athenian citizen of the house, had been naturalised at Athens. It happened that as the Dolonci passed his door Miltiades was sitting in his vestibule, which caused him to remark them, dressed as they were in outlandish garments, and armed moreover with lances. He therefore called to them, and, on their approach, invited them in, offering them lodging and entertainment. The strangers accepted his hospitality, and, after the banquet was over, they laid before him in full the directions of the oracle, and besought him on their own part to yield obedience to the god. Miltiades was persuaded ere they had done speaking; for the government of Pisistratus was irksome to him, and he wanted to be beyond the tyrant's reach. He therefore went straightway to Delphi, and inquired of the oracle whether he should do as the Dolonci desired.

As the Pythoness backed their request, Miltiades, son of Cypselus, who had already won the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia, left Athens, taking with him as many of the Athenians as liked to join in the enterprise, and sailed away with the Dolonci. On his arrival at the Chersonese, he was made king by those who had invited him. After this his first act was to build a wall across the neck of the Chersonese from the city of Cardia to Pactya, to protect the country from the incursions and ravages of the Apsinthians. The breadth of the isthmus at this part is thirty-six furlongs, the whole length of the peninsula within the isthmus being four hundred and twenty furlongs.

When he had finished carrying the wall across the isthmus, and had thus secured the Chersonese against the Apsinthians,

Miltiades proceeded to engage in other wars, and first of all attacked the Lampsacenians; but falling into an ambush which they had laid he had the misfortune to be taken prisoner. Now it happened that Miltiades stood high in the favour of Crœsus, king of Lydia. . . .

Thus did Miltiades, by the help of Crœsus, escape this danger. Some time afterwards he died childless, leaving his kingdom and his riches to Stesagoras, who was the son of Cimon, his half-brother. Ever since his death the people of the Chersonese have offered him the customary sacrifices of a founder; and they have further established in his honour a gymnic contest and a chariot-race, in neither of which is it lawful for any Lampsacenian to contend. . . .

Thus died Stesagoras; and upon his death the Pisistratidæ fitted out a trireme, and sent Miltiades, the son of Cimon, and brother of the deceased, to the Chersonese, that he might undertake the management of affairs in that quarter.

3. THE PISISTRATIDÆ

After the death of Pisistratus his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus, wished to keep the tyranny in the family. There seems to be confusion in some of the accounts. Evidently the brothers were ruling moderately when a personal quarrel resulted in the murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogiton. This led to great oppression and severity on the part of the survivor, Hippias, and he became so unpopular that he was forced into exile and withdrew to Sigeum, an Athenian stronghold (see above, pp. 74–76), until the time when he returned in company with the Medes against his native land.

The people now began to feel very bitter about tyranny and in spite of the fact that they had had no grudge against Hipparchus, and that some of the descendants of Pisistratus were honored in Athens and took a prominent part in public affairs as is attested by the statement of Thucydides and by a well-known inscription,

they identified the death of Hipparchus with the end of tyranny and celebrated the event in verse of all sorts, from the stately, dignified epigram of Simonides to the popular drinking song about Harmodius and Aristogiton which went the rounds of banquet tables for generations; while the statues of the tyrannicides set up in the market place were more popular than those of any other national heroes, were copied over and over, and when the originals were carried off by Xerxes they were replaced by copies that served as an ever-present reminder to the Athenians that tyranny and tyrants had no place among them.[1]

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XVIII

Hippias and Hipparchus were at the head of affairs by right of their claims and their ages; Hippias, being the elder, and by nature fitted for state affairs, and endowed with good sense, presided over the government. But Hipparchus was fond of trifling, amorous, and a votary of the Muses; it was he who sent for Anacreon and Simonides, and the rest of the poets, with their companions. . . . Harmodius and Aristogeiton were incited to do their deed in conjunction with many of their fellow-citizens. The celebration of the Panathenæa was proceeding, and they were lying in wait for Hippias on the Acropolis (now, he happened to be following whilst Hipparchus was getting the procession ready), when they saw one of their fellow-conspirators in friendly conversation with Hippias; thinking that he was turning informer, and wishing to do something before they were arrested, they descended from the Acropolis, and without waiting for the rest of the conspirators, killed Hipparchus by the Leokoreum as he was arranging the procession. Thus they ruined the whole plot, and of their number Harmodius was straightway killed by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton was subsequently apprehended, and for a long time subjected to outrage.

Thucydides, VI, 54

Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which I shall relate at

[1] See Pausanias, I, viii, 5, and Frazer's note.

some length, to show that the Athenians are not more accurate than the rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own history. Indeed, generally their government was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without exacting from the Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was always taken to have the offices in the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them that held the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias, and named after his grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the altar in the market-place, and obliterated the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is to the following effect: —

> Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
> Set up this record of his archonship
> In precinct of Apollo Pythias.

Hicks and Hill, 10

Pisistratus, son of Hippias, set up this memorial of his rule in the precinct of Pythian Apollo.

Thucydides, VI, 59

In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire, and the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action recounted. After this the tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death many of the citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge in case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a Lampsacene, Æantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that they had

great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription: —

Archedice lies buried in this earth,
Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth;
Unto her bosom pride was never known,
Though daughter, wife, and sister to the throne.

Herodotus, V, 55

After the death of Hipparchus (the son of Pisistratus, and brother of the tyrant Hippias), who, in spite of the clear warning he had received concerning his fate in a dream, was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton (men both of the race of the Gephyræans), the oppression of the Athenians continued by the space of four years; and they gained nothing, but were worse used than before.

Simonides, Frag. 131 (tr. Wright)

For the Athenians a great light dawned on the day when they slew Hipparchus.

SKOLION, *Harmodius and Aristogiton* (Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, 9)

In a myrtle branch shall I carry my sword
Like Harmodius and Aristogiton
When they slew the tyrant
And gave equal laws to all in Athens.

Dearest Harmodius, thou didst not die anywhere
And they say thou art in the islands of the blest,
Where is the swift-footed Achilles
And noble Diomede son of Tydeus.

In a myrtle branch shall I carry my sword
Like Harmodius and Aristogiton
When at the sacrifices of Athena
They slew Hipparchus the tyrant.

Your fame shall be eternal and forever,
Dearest Harmodius and Aristogiton,
Because you slew the tyrant
And gave equal laws to all in Athens.

Thucydides, VI, 59

Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was deposed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians and the banished Alcmæonidæ, and went with a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Æantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius; from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the Medes to Marathon.

Herodotus, VI, 107

The barbarians were conducted to Marathon by Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, who the night before had seen a strange vision in his sleep. He dreamt of lying in his mother's arms, and conjectured the dream to mean that he would be restored to Athens, recover the power which he had lost, and afterwards live to a good old age in his native country. Such was the sense in which he interpreted the vision. He now proceeded to act as guide to the Persians; and, in the first place, he landed the prisoners taken from Eretria upon the island that is called Ægileia, a tract belonging to the Styreans, after which he brought the fleet to anchor off Marathon, and marshalled the bands of the barbarians as they disembarked.

VI. The Alcmæonidæ, "The Accursed"

In the meantime the Pisistratidæ and their influence were being crowded out by other families, some of which had been of long-standing importance.

The Alcmæonidæ in spite of being "accursed" were too important, too prominent, and too generous to be kept out of affairs for long, and they generally had a hand in most matters. The circumstances of the curse being laid upon them is told in the story of Cylon and his conspiracy. (See pp. 138–140.)

Herodotus, V, 62–63

Upon the death of Hipparchus, Hippias, who was king, grew harsh towards the Athenians; and the Alcmæonidæ, an Athenian

family which had been banished by the Pisistratidæ, joined the other exiles, and endeavoured to procure their own return, and to free Athens, by force. They seized and fortified Leipsydrium above Pæonia, and tried to gain their object by arms; but great disasters befell them, and their purpose remained unaccomplished. They therefore resolved to shrink from no contrivance that might bring them success; and accordingly they contracted with the Amphictyons to build the temple which now stands at Delphi, but which in those days did not exist. Having done this, they proceeded, being men of great wealth and members of an ancient and distinguished family, to build the temple much more magnificently than the plan obliged them. Besides other improvements, instead of the coarse stone whereof by the contract the temple was to have been constructed, they made the facings of Parian marble.

These same men, if we may believe the Athenians, during their stay at Delphi persuaded the Pythoness by a bribe to tell the Spartans, whenever any of them came to consult the oracle, either on their own private affairs or on the business of the state, that they must free Athens. So the Lacedæmonians, when they found no answer ever returned to them but this, sent at last Anchimolius, the son of Aster — a man of note among their citizens — at the head of an army against Athens, with orders to drive out the Pisistratidæ, albeit they were bound to them by the closest ties of friendship.

THE CONSPIRACY OF CYLON

Thucydides, I, 126

In former generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant, thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the grand

festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz. the Diasia. It is celebrated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. However, fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But as time went on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment. It must be known that at that time most political functions were discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged companions were distressed for want of food and water. Accordingly Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest being hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as suppliants at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with the duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done to them, led them out and slew them. Some who as they passed by took refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were despatched on the spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by Cleomenes of Lacedæmon and an Athenian faction; the living were driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.

Herodotus, V, 71

The way in which "The Accursed" at Athens got their name, was the following. There was a certain Athenian called Cylon, a victor at the Olympic games, who aspired to the sovereignty, and aided by a number of his companions, who were of the same age

with himself, made an attempt to seize the citadel. But the attack failed; and Cylon became a suppliant at the image. Hereupon the Heads of the Naucraries, who at that time bore rule in Athens, induced the fugitives to remove by a promise to spare their lives. Nevertheless they were all slain; and the blame was laid on the Alcmæonidæ. All this happened before the time of Pisistratus.

VII. Cleisthenes and his Reforms

Cleisthenes was at this time the leading member of the family, and when he gained power he instituted constitutional reforms which were of lasting value, the most important being the division of the citizens into ten tribes and the introduction of ostracism.

It should be remembered that ostracism among the Greeks did not imply the disgrace which we attach to it. It carried no reflection on the moral character of the person; it was simply a convenient way of getting rid of a politician who was thought to have too much influence or to be otherwise dangerous.

There still exist some potsherds with the names of those to be ostracized scratched upon them, distinguished statesmen like Megacles, Xanthippus, and Themistocles, two of whom are mentioned in the quotation from Aristotle.

Herodotus, V, 66–67, 69

The power of Athens had been great before; but, now that the tyrants were gone, it became greater than ever. The chief authority was lodged with two persons, Clisthenes, of the family of the Alcmæonids, who is said to have been the persuader of the Pythoness, and Isagoras, the son of Tisander, who belonged to a noble house, but whose pedigree I am not able to trace further. Howbeit his kinsmen offer sacrifice to the Carian Zeus. These two men strove together for the mastery; and Clisthenes, finding himself the weaker, called to his aid the common people. Hereupon, instead of the four tribes among which the Athenians had been divided hitherto, Clisthenes made ten tribes, and parcelled

out the Athenians among them. He likewise changed the names of the tribes; for whereas they had till now been called after Geleon, Ægicores, Argades, and Hoples, the four sons of Ion, Clisthenes set these names aside, and called his tribes after certain other heroes, all of whom were native, except Ajax. Ajax was associated because, although a foreigner, he was a neighbour and an ally of Athens.

My belief is that in acting thus he did but imitate his maternal grandfather, Clisthenes, king of Sicyon. . . .

Having brought entirely over to his own side the common people of Athens, whom he had before disdained, he gave all the tribes new names, and made the number greater than formerly; instead of the four phylarchs he established ten; he likewise placed ten demes in each of the tribes; and he was, now that the common people took his part, very much more powerful than his adversaries.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXII

In consequence of these changes the constitution became much more popular than that of Solon; for it had come to pass that under the tyranny the laws of Solon had become a dead letter from disuse, and that Kleisthenes had made the others to win over the masses, among which was passed the law about ostracism. . . . Now this law had been passed by reason of their suspicion of those in power, because Peisistratus had established himself as tyrant when he was a leader of the people and a general. The very first man to be ostracised was one of his relations, Hipparchus, the son of Charmus of Kolyttus, on whose account especially it was that Kleisthenes, wishing to get him banished, passed the law. For the Athenians allowed all the friends of the tyrants, who had not taken any part in wrong-doing during the troubles, to live in the city, thus displaying the wonted clemency of the popular government. Of these Hipparchus was the leader and representative. At the beginning of the following year, in the archonship of Telesinus, they appointed by lot the nine archons according to tribes from the five hundred, who had been selected by the members of demes immediately after the tyranny (for formerly they had been all

elected). And Megakles, the son of Hippocrates of Alopeke, was ostracised. For three years then they kept ostracising the friends of the tyrants, and after this in the fourth year they removed anyone else besides who appeared to be too powerful. The first to be ostracised of those who were not connected with the tyranny was Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron.

VIII. Further Athenian Conquests

1. Chalcis and Bœotia

Troubles at home did not prevent the Athenians from extending their conquests. The defeat in one day of the Bœotians and the Chalcidians was one of their most brilliant exploits.

Herodotus speaks of the chains and dedicatory chariot to be seen on the Acropolis in his day, and they were still there in the time of Pausanias. Only a few inscribed fragments of the bases now remain.

Another offering erected out of these spoils was the portico of the Athenians at Delphi, on the stylobate of which is written: "The Athenians dedicated the colonnade and the arms and the figure-heads which they took from their enemies." (Pausanias, X, xi, 5)[1]

Herodotus, V, 77

So when the Spartan army had broken up from its quarters thus ingloriously, the Athenians, wishing to revenge themselves, marched first against the Chalcideans. The Bœotians, however, advancing to the aid of the latter as far as the Euripus, the Athenians thought it best to attack them first. A battle was fought accordingly; and the Athenians gained a very complete victory, killing a vast number of the enemy, and taking seven hundred of them alive. After this, on the very same day, they crossed into Eubœa, and engaged the Chalcideans with the like success; whereupon they left four thousand settlers upon the lands of the Hippobotæ, — which is the

[1] Frazer is inclined to follow Pausanias in referring this dedication to 429 B.C., after Phormio's victories, but Hicks and Hill, following various others, attribute it to this time. (See Hicks and Hill, p. 13.)

name the Chalcideans give to their rich men. All the Chalcidean prisoners whom they took were put in irons, and kept for a long time in close confinement, as likewise were the Bœotians, until the ransom asked for them was paid; and this the Athenians fixed at two minæ the man. The chains wherewith they were fettered the Athenians suspended in their citadel; where they were still to be seen in my day, hanging against the wall scorched by the Median flames, opposite the chapel which faces the west. The Athenians made an offering of the tenth part of the ransom-money: and expended it on the brazen chariot drawn by four steeds, which stands on the left hand immediately that one enters the gateway of the citadel. The inscription runs as follows: —

> When Chalcis and Bœotia dared her might,
> Athens subdued their pride in valorous fight;
> Gave bonds for insults; and, the ransom paid,
> From the full tenths these steeds for Pallas made.

SIMONIDES, *Epigrams*, 89[1] (tr. Mackail, *Select Epigrams*), 132

We fell under the fold of Dirphys, and a memorial is reared over us by our country near the Euripus, not unjustly; for we lost lovely youth facing the cloud of war. . . .

The sons of Athens quelled insolence with grievous chains of iron, and defeated the Bœotians and Chalcidians in deeds of war; these mares of theirs they have dedicated as a tithe to Pallas.

2. ÆGINA

Athens had a long struggle against Ægina, carried on with varying success. It was not till 457–456 B.C. that the "eyesore of Piræus" was finally conquered and enrolled in the confederacy of Delos.

Herodotus, V, 81, 89–90

The Eginetans, who were at that time a most flourishing people, elated with their greatness, and at the same time calling to mind their ancient feud with Athens, agreed to lend the Thebans aid, and forthwith went to war with the Athenians, without even giving them notice by a herald. The attention of these latter being engaged

[1] Numbers from Bergk, "Poetae Lyrici Graeci," 4th ed.

by the struggle with the Bœotians, the Eginetans in their ships of war made descents upon Attica, plundered Phalerum, and ravaged a vast number of the townships upon the sea-board, whereby the Athenians suffered very grievous damage. . . .

Hence, when the Thebans made their application for succour, the Eginetans, calling to mind the matter of images, gladly lent their aid to the Bœotians. They ravaged all the sea-coast of Attica; and the Athenians were about to attack them in return, when they were stopped by the oracle of Delphi, which bade them wait till thirty years had passed from the time that the Eginetans did the wrong, and in the thirty-first year, having first set apart a precinct for Æacus, then to begin the war. "So should they succeed to their wish," the oracle said; "but if they went to war at once, though they would still conquer the island in the end, yet they must go through much suffering and much exertion before taking it." On receiving this warning the Athenians set apart a precinct for Æacus — the same which still remains dedicated to him in their market-place — but they could not hear with any patience of waiting thirty years, after they had suffered such grievous wrong at the hands of the Eginetans.

Accordingly they were making ready to take their revenge when a fresh stir on the part of the Lacedæmonians hindered their projects.

Thucydides, I, 41

When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the Æginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to conquer Ægina, and to punish Samos.

Herodotus, VI, 87–89, 93–94

The Eginetans had never been punished for the wrongs which, to pleasure the Thebans, they had committed upon Athens. Now, however, conceiving that they were themselves wronged, and had a fair ground of complaint against the Athenians, they instantly prepared to revenge themselves. As it chanced that the Athenian Theoris, which was a vessel of five banks of oars, lay at Sunium, the Eginetans contrived an ambush, and made themselves masters

of the holy vessel, on board of which were a number of Athenians of the highest rank, whom they took and threw into prison.

At this outrage the Athenians no longer delayed, but set to work to scheme their worst against the Eginetans; . . .

The Athenians, however, did not come to the day; for their own fleet was not of force sufficient to engage the Eginetans, and while they were begging the Corinthians to lend them some ships, the failure of the enterprise took place. In those days the Corinthians were on the best of terms with the Athenians; and accordingly they now yielded to their request, and furnished them with twenty ships; but, as their law did not allow the ships to be given for nothing, they sold them to the Athenians for five drachms a-piece. As soon then as the Athenians had obtained this aid, and, by manning also their own ships, had equipped a fleet of seventy sail, they crossed over to Egina, but arrived a day later than the time agreed upon. . . .

Afterwards the Eginetans fell upon the Athenian fleet when it was in some disorder and beat it, capturing four ships with their crews.

Thus did war rage between the Eginetans and Athenians.

Thucydides, I, 14

It was quite at the end of this period that the war with Ægina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks.

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CHAPTER VII

THE ADVANCE OF PERSIA TO THE ÆGEAN

The rise of Persia — Conquest of Asia by Cyrus — Crœsus — Cambyses — Darius — Rule in the East — The Ionian revolt — Expedition against Greece — Marathon

I. The Rise of Persia

The following passages give an idea of conditions in Asia before the outbreak of the great struggle between Greece and Persia. They show how Persia gradually gained the ascendancy and pushed westward to the coast, absorbing on the way the domains and wealth of Crœsus and of the Ionian Greeks. The conquest of the kingdom of Lydia removed an important bulwark which had until then prevented direct contact between the Greek cities and the Persian empire.

1. CONQUEST OF ASIA BY CYRUS

Herodotus, I, 130, 141, 169

Thus after a reign of thirty-five years, Astyages lost his crown, and the Medes, in consequence of his cruelty, were brought under the rule of the Persians. Their empire over the parts of Asia beyond the Halys had lasted one hundred and twenty-eight years, except during the time when the Scythians had the dominion. Afterwards the Medes repented of their submission, and revolted from Darius, but were defeated in battle, and again reduced to subjection. Now, however, in the time of Astyages, it was the Persians who under Cyrus revolted from the Medes, and became thenceforth the rulers of Asia. Cyrus kept Astyages at his court during the remainder of his life, without doing him any further injury. Such then were the circumstances of the birth and bringing up of Cyrus, and such were the steps by which he mounted the

throne. It was at a later date that he was attacked by Crœsus, and overthrew him, as I have related in an earlier portion of this history. The overthrow of Crœsus made him master of the whole of Asia. . . .

Immediately after the conquest of Lydia by the Persians, the Ionian and Æolian Greeks sent ambassadors to Cyrus at Sardis, and prayed to become his lieges on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. Cyrus listened attentively to their proposals, and answered them by a fable. "There was a certain piper," he said, "who was walking one day by the seaside, when he espied some fish; so he began to pipe to them, imagining they would come out to him upon the land. But as he found at last that his hope was vain, he took a net, and enclosing a great draught of fishes, drew them ashore. The fish then began to leap and dance; but the piper said, 'Cease your dancing now, as you did not choose to come and dance when I piped to you.'" Cyrus gave this answer to the Ionians and Æolians, because, when he urged them by his messengers to revolt from Crœsus, they refused; but now, when his work was done, they came to offer their allegiance. It was in anger, therefore, that he made them this reply. The Ionians, on hearing it, set to work to fortify their towns, and held meetings at the Panionium, which were attended by all excepting the Milesians, with whom Cyrus had concluded a separate treaty, by which he allowed them the terms they had formerly obtained from Crœsus. The other Ionians resolved, with one accord, to send ambassadors to Sparta to implore assistance. . . .

Of all the Ionians these two states alone, rather than submit to slavery, forsook their fatherland. The others (I except Miletus) resisted Harpagus no less bravely than those who fled their country, and performed many feats of arms, each fighting in their own defence, but one after another they suffered defeat; the cities were taken, and the inhabitants submitted, remaining in their respective countries, and obeying the behests of their new lords. Miletus, as I have already mentioned, had made terms with Cyrus, and so continued at peace. Thus was continental Ionia once more reduced to servitude; and when the Ionians of the islands saw their brethren

upon the mainland subjugated, they also, dreading the like, gave themselves up to Cyrus.

Herodotus, I, 6–7, 26–28

Crœsus, son of Alyattes, by birth a Lydian, was lord of all the nations to the west of the river Halys. This stream, which separates Syria from Paphlagonia, runs with a course from south to north, and finally falls into the Euxine. So far as our knowledge goes, he was the first of the barbarians who had dealings with the Greeks, forcing some of them to become his tributaries, and entering into alliance with others. He conquered the Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians of Asia, and made a treaty with the Lacedæmonians. Up to that time all Greeks had been free. For the Cimmerian attack upon Ionia, which was earlier than Crœsus, was not a conquest of the cities, but only an inroad for plundering.

The sovereignty of Lydia, which had belonged to the Heraclides, passed into the family of Crœsus, who were called the Mermnadæ, . . .

On the death of Alyattes, Crœsus, his son, who was thirty-five years old, succeeded to the throne. Of the Greek cities, Ephesus was the first that he attacked. The Ephesians, when he laid siege to the place, made an offering of their city to Diana, by stretching a rope from the town wall to the temple of the goddess, which was distant from the ancient city, then besieged by Crœsus, a space of seven furlongs. They were, as I said, the first Greeks whom he attacked. Afterwards, on some pretext or other, he made war in turn upon every Ionian and Æolian state, bringing forward, where he could, a substantial ground of complaint; where such failed him, advancing some poor excuse.

In this way he made himself master of all the Greek cities in Asia, and forced them to become his tributaries; after which he began to think of building ships, and attacking the islanders. . . . Crœsus was charmed with the turn of the speech; and thinking there was reason in what was said, gave up his ship-building and concluded a league of amity with the Ionians of the isles.

Crœsus afterwards, in the course of many years, brought under his sway almost all the nations to the west of the Halys.

ZEELAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS

2. CRŒSUS

Mention has already been made (pp. 58–59) of the offerings sent by Crœsus to Delphi. This shows the great reputation of the Greek oracles even among those of non-Hellenic races. The vague, obscure answer is very characteristic as is also the belief in punishment of an innocent person for the wrongs done by a remote ancestor, "the sins of the fathers."

Herodotus, I, 46–47, 71

This led him to consider with himself whether it were possible to check the growing power of that people before it came to a head. With this design he resolved to make instant trial of the several oracles in Greece, and of the one in Libya. So he sent his messengers in different directions, some to Delphi, some to Abæ in Phocis, and some to Dodona; others to the oracle of Amphiaraus; others to that of Trophonius; others, again, to Branchidæ in Milesia. These were the Greek oracles which he consulted. To Libya he sent another embassy, to consult the oracle of Ammon. These messengers were sent to test the knowledge of the oracles, that, if they were found really to return true answers, he might send a second time, and inquire if he ought to attack the Persians.

The messengers who were despatched to make trial of the oracles were given the following instructions: they were to keep count of the days from the time of their leaving Sardis, and, reckoning from that date, on the hundredth day they were to consult the oracles, and to inquire of them what Crœsus the son of Alyattes, king of Lydia, was doing at that moment. The answers given them were to be taken down in writing, and brought back to him. None of the replies remain on record except that of the oracle at Delphi. There, the moment that the Lydians entered the sanctuary, and before they put their questions, the Pythoness thus answered them in hexameter verse: —

"I can count the sands, and I can measure the ocean;
I have ears for the silent, and know what the dumb man meaneth;
Lo! on my sense there striketh the smell of a shell-covered tortoise,
Boiling now on a fire, with the flesh of a lamb, in a cauldron, —
Brass is the vessel below, and brass the cover above it." . . .

Meanwhile Crœsus, taking the oracle in a wrong sense, led his forces into Cappadocia, fully expecting to defeat Cyrus and destroy the empire of the Persians. While he was still engaged in making preparations for his attack, a Lydian named Sandanis, who had always been looked upon as a wise man, but who after this obtained a very great name indeed among his countrymen, came forward and counselled the king in these words:

"Thou art about, oh! king, to make war against men who wear leathern trousers, and have all their other garments of leather; who feed not on what they like, but on what they can get from a soil that is sterile and unkindly; who do not indulge in wine, but drink water; who possess no figs nor anything else that is good to eat. If, then, thou conquerest them, what canst thou get from them, seeing that they have nothing at all? But if they conquer thee, consider how much that is precious thou wilt lose: if they once get a taste of our pleasant things, they will keep such hold of them that we shall never be able to make them loose their grasp. For my part, I am thankful to the gods, that they have not put it into the hearts of the Persians to invade Lydia."

Crœsus was not persuaded by this speech, though it was true enough; for before the conquest of Lydia, the Persians possessed none of the luxuries or delights of life.

Herodotus, I, 86, 90–91

Thus was Sardis taken by the Persians, and Crœsus himself fell into their hands, after having reigned fourteen years, and been besieged in his capital fourteen days; thus too did Crœsus fulfil the oracle, which said that he should destroy a mighty empire, — by destroying his own. Then the Persians who had made Crœsus prisoner brought him before Cyrus. . . .

Crœsus, finding his request allowed, sent certain Lydians to Delphi, enjoining them to lay his fetters upon the threshold of the temple, and ask the god, "If he were not ashamed of having encouraged him, as the destined destroyer of the empire of Cyrus, to begin a war with Persia, of which such were the first-fruits?" As they said this they were to point to the fetters; and further they were to inquire, "if it was the wont of the Greek gods to be ungrateful?"

The Lydians went to Delphi and delivered their message, on which the Pythoness is said to have replied — "It is not possible even for a god to escape the decree of destiny. Crœsus has been punished for the sin of his fifth ancestor, who, when he was one of the body-guard of the Heraclides, joined in a woman's fraud, and, slaying his master, wrongfully seized the throne. Apollo was anxious that the fall of Sardis should not happen in the lifetime of Crœsus, but be delayed to his son's days; he could not, however, persuade the Fates. All that they were willing to allow he took and gave to Crœsus. Let Crœsus know that Apollo delayed the taking of Sardis three full years, and that he is thus a prisoner three years later than was his destiny. Moreover it was Apollo who saved him from the burning pile. Nor has Crœsus any right to complain with respect to the oracular answer which he received. For when the god told him that, if he attacked the Persians, he would destroy a mighty empire, he ought, if he had been wise, to have sent again and inquired which empire was meant, that of Cyrus or his own; but if he neither understood what was said, nor took the trouble to seek for enlightenment, he has only himself to blame for the result. Besides, he had misunderstood the last answer which had been given him about the mule. Cyrus was that mule. For the parents of Cyrus were of different races, and of different conditions, — his mother a Median princess, daughter of King Astyages, and his father a Persian and a subject, who, though so far beneath her in all respects, had married his royal mistress."

Such was the answer of the Pythoness. The Lydians returned to Sardis and communicated it to Crœsus, who confessed, on hearing it, that the fault was his, not the god's. Such was the way in which Ionia was first conquered, and so was the empire of Crœsus brought to a close.

3. CAMBYSES

The conquests under Cyrus had not included Egypt, which was left for his son, Cambyses, to conquer at the expense of Psammetichus III. The date was probably about 525 B.C. Greek mercenaries were employed on both sides, in fact Greek influence and ideas were very strong in the house of Amasis to which Psammetichus belonged.

Herodotus, II, 1

On the death of Cyrus, Cambyses his son by Cassandane daughter of Pharnaspes took the kingdom. Cassandane had died in the lifetime of Cyrus, who had made a great mourning for her at her death, and had commanded all the subjects of his empire to observe the like. Cambyses, the son of this lady and of Cyrus, regarding the Ionian and Æolian Greeks as vassals of his father, took them with him in his expedition against Egypt among the other nations which owned his sway.

II. Darius

1. Rule in the East

Herodotus, III, 88–89

Thus was Darius, son of Hystaspes, appointed king; and, except the Arabians, all they of Asia were subject to him; for Cyrus, and after him Cambyses, had brought them all under. The Arabians were never subject as slaves to the Persians, but had a league of friendship with them from the time when they brought Cambyses on his way as he went into Egypt; for had they been unfriendly the Persians could never have made their invasion. . . .

This he set up in Persia; and afterwards he proceeded to establish twenty governments of the kind which the Persians call satrapies, assigning to each its governor, and fixing the tribute which was to be paid him by the several nations. And generally he joined together in one satrapy the nations that were neighbours, but sometimes he passed over the nearer tribes, and put in their stead those which were more remote. The following is an account of these governments, and of the yearly tribute which they paid to the king: — Such as brought their tribute in silver were ordered to pay according to the Babylonian talent; while the Euboic was the standard measure for such as brought gold. Now the Babylonian talent contains seventy Euboic minæ. During all the reign of Cyrus, and afterwards when Cambyses ruled, there were no fixed tributes, but the nations severally brought gifts to the king. On account of this and other like doings, the Persians say that Darius was a huckster, Cambyses a master, and Cyrus a father; for Darius looked

to making a gain in everything; Cambyses was harsh and reckless; while Cyrus was gentle, and procured them all manner of goods.[1]

The following inscription (an early copy of the original), with orders from Darius to one of his satraps, exhibits the characteristic Persian combination of courtesy with lordliness.

Hicks and Hill, 20

LETTER OF DARIUS, EARLY FIFTH CENTURY

The King of Kings, Darius son of Hystaspes, to Gadatas his slave speaks thus:

I learn that you are not obeying my orders in every respect: Inasmuch as you are benefiting my land by transplanting the fruits from beyond Euphrates to the parts below Asia, I commend your purpose and on this account great gratitude will be put to your credit in the house of the King; but inasmuch as you are disregarding my arrangement on behalf of the gods, I shall give you, if you do not alter your plan, an experience of an outraged temper; for you taxed the sacred gardeners of Apollo and ordered them to dig up ground that was unconsecrated, ignoring my ancestors' purpose toward the god who told the Persians all truth and . . .

2. THE IONIAN REVOLT

There was no general agreement among the Ionians on the question of revolt, partly because some thought they would be better off under kings than they would be at the mercy of a democracy, partly because there was no real political bond among the cities. Indeed, it had been the policy of the satraps to keep the cities apart.

They therefore realized that they must get help from the cities of Hellas proper and, as was natural, they sent first to Sparta, which was at that time the leading state in Greece. In spite of the attractions so eloquently described by Aristagoras, the Spartan king cannily demanded time to think the matter over. His answer shows that Sparta was never one to try innovations or rush into adventures.

[1] See Herodotus, III, 90–96, for a list of satrapies and tribute. The Euboic (silver) talent = £250 8s. 5d. The Babylonian talent = £292 3s. 3d. On money and standards see Ridgeway, in Whibley, "Companion to Greek Studies," pp. 444–455.

Herodotus, IV, 137

The Ionians now held a council. Miltiades the Athenian, who was king of the Chersonesites upon the Hellespont, and their commander at the Ister, recommended the other generals to do as the Scythians wished, and restore freedom to Ionia. But Histiæus the Milesian opposed this advice. "It is through Darius," he said, "that we enjoy our thrones in our several states. If his power be overturned, I cannot continue lord of Miletus, nor ye of your cities. For there is not one of them which will not prefer democracy to kingly rule." Then the other captains, who, till Histiæus spoke, were about to vote with Miltiades, changed their minds, and declared in favour of the last speaker.

Herodotus, V, 38, 49

Now the Mytileneans had no sooner got Coës into their power, than they led him forth from the city and stoned him; the Cymæans, on the other hand, allowed their tyrant to go free; as likewise did most of the others. And so this form of government ceased throughout all the cities. Aristagoras the Milesian, after he had in this way put down the tyrants, and bidden the cities choose themselves captains in their room, sailed away himself on board a trireme to Lacedæmon; for he had great need of obtaining the aid of some powerful ally. . . .

Cleomenes, however, was still king when Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletus, reached Sparta. At their interview, Aristagoras, according to the report of the Lacedæmonians, produced a bronze tablet, whereupon the whole circuit of the earth was engraved, with all its seas and rivers. Discourse began between the two; and Aristagoras addressed the Spartan king in these words following:— "Think it not strange, O King Cleomenes, that I have been at the pains to sail hither; for the posture of affairs, which I will now recount unto thee, made it fitting. Shame and grief is it indeed to none so much as to us, that the sons of the Ionians should have lost their freedom, and come to be the slaves of others; but yet it touches you likewise, O Spartans, beyond the rest of the Greeks, inasmuch as the preëminence over all Greece appertains to you. We beseech you, therefore, by the common gods of the

Grecians, deliver the Ionians, who are your own kinsmen, from slavery. Truly the task is not difficult; for the barbarians are an unwarlike people; and you are the best and bravest warriors in the whole world. Their mode of fighting is the following: — they use bows and arrows and a short spear; they wear trousers in the field, and cover their heads with turbans. So easy are they to vanquish! Know too that the dwellers in these parts have more good things than all the rest of the world put together — gold, and silver, and brass, and embroidered garments, beasts of burthen, and bond-servants — all which, if you only wish it, you may soon have for your own. The nations border on one another, in the order which I will now explain. Next to these Ionians" (here he pointed with his finger to the map of the world which was engraved upon the tablet that he had brought with him) "these Lydians dwell; their soil is fertile, and few people are so rich in silver. Next to them," he continued, "come these Phrygians, who have more flocks and herds than any race that I know, and more plentiful harvests. On them border the Cappadocians, whom we Greeks know by the name of Syrians: they are neighbours to the Cilicians, who extend all the way to this sea, where Cyprus (the island which you see here) lies. The Cilicians pay the king a yearly tribute of five hundred talents. Next to them come the Armenians, who live here — they too have numerous flocks and herds. After them come the Matieni, inhabiting this country; then Cissia, this province, where you see the river Choaspes marked, and likewise the town Susa upon its banks, where the Great King holds his court, and where the treasuries are in which his wealth is stored. Once masters of this city, you may be bold to vie with Zeus himself for riches. In the wars which ye wage with your rivals of Messenia, with them of Argos likewise and of Arcadia, about paltry boundaries and strips of land not so remarkably good, ye contend with those who have no gold, nor silver even, which often give men heart to fight and die. Must ye wage such wars, and when ye might so easily be lords of Asia, will ye decide otherwise?" Thus spoke Aristagoras; and Cleomenes replied to him, — "Milesian stranger, three days hence I will give thee an answer."

Herodotus, V, 50, 55, 96–97

So they proceeded no further at that time. When, however, the day appointed for the answer came, and the two once more met, Cleomenes asked Aristagoras, "how many days' journey it was from the sea of the Ionians to the king's residence?" Hereupon Aristagoras, who had managed the rest so cleverly, and succeeded in deceiving the king, tripped in his speech and blundered; for instead of concealing the truth, as he ought to have done if he wanted to induce the Spartans to cross into Asia, he said plainly that it was a journey of three months. Cleomenes caught at the words, and, preventing Aristagoras from finishing what he had begun to say concerning the road, addressed him thus:—"Milesian stranger, quit Sparta before sunset. This is no good proposal that thou makest to the Lacedæmonians, to conduct them a distance of three months' journey from the sea." When he had thus spoken, Cleomenes went to his home. . . .

When Aristagoras left Sparta he hastened to Athens, which had got quit of its tyrants in the way that I will now describe. . . .

On the return of Hippias to Asia from Lacedæmon, he moved heaven and earth to set Artaphernes against the Athenians, and did all that lay in his power to bring Athens into subjection to himself and Darius. So when the Athenians learnt what he was about, they sent envoys to Sardis, and exhorted the Persians not to lend an ear to the Athenian exiles. Artaphernes told them in reply, "that if they wished to remain safe, they must receive back Hippias." The Athenians, when this answer was reported to them, determined not to consent, and therefore made up their minds to be at open enmity with the Persians.

The Athenians had come to this decision, and were already in bad odour with the Persians, when Aristagoras the Milesian, dismissed from Sparta by Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, arrived at Athens. He knew that, after Sparta, Athens was the most powerful of the Grecian states. Accordingly he appeared before the people, and, as he had done at Sparta, spoke to them of the good things which there were in Asia, and of the Persian mode of fight —how they used neither shield nor spear, and were very easy to conquer. All this he urged, and reminded them also, that Miletus

was a colony from Athens, and therefore ought to receive their succour, since they were so powerful — and in the earnestness of his entreaties, he cared little what he promised — till, at the last, he prevailed and won them over. It seems indeed to be easier to deceive a multitude than one man — for Aristagoras, though he failed to impose on Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, succeeded with the Athenians, who were thirty thousand. Won by his persuasions, they voted that twenty ships should be sent to the aid of the Ionians, under the command of Melanthius, one of the citizens, a man of mark in every way. These ships were the beginning of mischief both to the Greeks and to the barbarians.

The Athenians probably did not realize that they were being offered the chance of a lifetime and that their decision was fraught with momentous consequences. There is little doubt that the part played by Athens in the great struggle was the making of her and raised her at once to first rank.

Sardis was of course rebuilt. It is at present being excavated by an American expedition (see *American Journal of Archæology*, 1910, pp. 401–416; 1911, pp. 445–458; 1912, pp. 465–479; 1913, pp. 471–478).

Herodotus, V, 99–105

The Athenians now arrived with a fleet of twenty sail, and brought also in their company five triremes of the Eretrians; which had joined the expedition, not so much out of goodwill towards Athens, as to pay a debt which they already owed to the people of Miletus. For in the old war between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, the Milesians fought on the Eretrian side throughout, while the Chalcideans had the help of the Samian people. Aristagoras, on their arrival, assembled the rest of his allies, and proceeded to attack Sardis, not however leading the army in person, but appointing to the command his own brother Charopinus, and Hermophantus, one of the citizens, while he himself remained behind in Miletus.

The Ionians sailed with this fleet to Ephesus, and, leaving their ships at Coressus in the Ephesian territory, took guides from the

city, and went up the country, with a great host. They marched along the course of the river Cayster, and, crossing over the ridge of Tmolus, came down upon Sardis and took it, no man opposing them; — the whole city fell into their hands, except only the citadel, which Artaphernes defended in person, having with him no contemptible force.

Though, however, they took the city, they did not succeed in plundering it; for, as the houses in Sardis were most of them built of reeds, and even the few which were of brick had a reed thatching for their roof, one of them was no sooner fired by a soldier than the flames ran speedily from house to house, and spread over the whole place. As the fire raged, the Lydians, and such Persians as were in the city, inclosed on every side by the flames, which had seized all the skirts of the town, and finding themselves unable to get out, came in crowds into the market-place, and gathered themselves upon the banks of the Pactolus. This stream, which comes down from Mount Tmolus, and brings the Sardians a quantity of gold-dust, runs directly through the market-place of Sardis, and joins the Hermus, before that river reaches the sea. So the Lydians and Persians, brought together in this way in the market-place and about the Pactolus, were forced to stand on their defence; and the Ionians, when they saw the enemy in part resisting, in part pouring towards them in dense crowds, took fright, and drawing off to the ridge which is called Tmolus, when night came, went back to their ships.

Sardis however was burnt, and, among other buildings, a temple of the native goddess Cybele was destroyed; which was the reason afterwards alleged by the Persians for setting on fire the temples of the Greeks. As soon as what had happened was known, all the Persians who were stationed on this side the Halys drew together, and brought help to the Lydians. Finding however, when they arrived, that the Ionians had already withdrawn from Sardis, they set off, and, following close upon their track, came up with them at Ephesus. The Ionians drew out against them in battle array; and a fight ensued, wherein the Greeks had very greatly the worse. Vast numbers were slain by the Persians: among other men of note, they killed the captain of the Eretrians, a certain Eualcidas,

a man who had gained crowns at the games, and received much praise from Simonides the Cean. Such as made their escape from the battle, dispersed among the several cities.

So ended this encounter. Afterwards the Athenians quite forsook the Ionians, and, though Aristagoras besought them much by his ambassadors, refused to give him any further help. Still the Ionians, notwithstanding this desertion, continued unceasingly their preparations to carry on the war against the Persian king, which their late conduct towards him had rendered unavoidable. Sailing into the Hellespont, they brought Byzantium, and all the other cities in that quarter, under their sway. Again, quitting the Hellespont, they went to Caria, and won the greater part of the Carians to their side; while Caunus, which had formerly refused to join with them, after the burning of Sardis, came over likewise.

All the Cyprians too, excepting those of Amathus, of their own proper motion espoused the Ionian cause. The occasion of their revolting from the Medes was the following. There was a certain Onesilus, younger brother of Gorgus, king of Salamis, and son of Chersis, who was son of Siromus, and grandson of Evelthon. This man had often in former times entreated Gorgus to rebel against the king; but, when he heard of the revolt of the Ionians, he left him no peace with his importunity. As, however, Gorgus would not hearken to him, he watched his occasion, and when his brother had gone outside the town, he with his partisans closed the gates upon him. Gorgus, thus deprived of his city, fled to the Medes; and Onesilus, being now king of Salamis, sought to bring about a revolt of the whole of Cyprus. All were prevailed on except the Amathusians, who refused to listen to him; whereupon Onesilus sate down before Amathus, and laid siege to it.

While Onesilus was engaged in the siege of Amathus, King Darius received tidings of the taking and burning of Sardis by the Athenians and Ionians; and at the same time he learnt that the author of the league, the man by whom the whole matter had been planned and contrived, was Aristagoras the Milesian. It is said that he no sooner understood what had happened, than, laying aside all thought concerning the Ionians, who would, he was sure, pay dear for their rebellion, he asked, "Who the Athenians were?" and,

being informed, called for his bow, and placing an arrow on the string, shot upward into the sky, saying, as he let fly the shaft — "Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians!" After this speech, he bade one of his servants every day, when his dinner was spread, three times repeat these words to him — "Master, remember the Athenians."

In spite of brave resistance on the part of the cities, they were gradually worn out by the superior numbers of the Persians, who frequently used the captured towns as bases of supplies for expeditions against neighboring places.

Herodotus, VI, 18–22, 31, 33

The Persians, when they had vanquished the Ionians in the sea-fight, besieged Miletus both by land and sea, driving mines under the walls, and making use of every known device, until at length they took both the citadel and the town, six years from the time when the revolt first broke out under Aristagoras. All the inhabitants of the city they reduced to slavery, and thus the event tallied with the announcement which had been made by the oracle.

For once upon a time, when the Argives had sent to Delphi to consult the god about the safety of their own city, a prophecy was given them, in which others besides themselves were interested; for while it bore in part upon the fortunes of Argos, it touched in a by-clause the fate of the men of Miletus. I shall set down the portion which concerned the Argives when I come to that part of my History, mentioning at present only the passage in which the absent Milesians were spoken of. This passage was as follows: —

> Then shalt thou, Miletus, so oft the contriver of evil,
> Be, thyself, to many a feast and an excellent booty:
> Then shall thy matrons wash the feet of long-haired masters; —
> Others shall then possess our lov'd Didymian temple.

Such a fate now befell the Milesians; for the Persians, who wore their hair long, after killing most of the men, made the women and children slaves; and the sanctuary at Didyma, the oracle no

less than the temple, was plundered and burnt; of the riches whereof I have made frequent mention in other parts of my History.

Those of the Milesians whose lives were spared, being carried prisoners to Susa, received no ill treatment at the hands of King Darius, but were established by him in Ampe, a city on the shores of the Erythræan sea, near the spot where the Tigris flows into it. Miletus itself, and the plain about the city, were kept by the Persians for themselves, while the hill-country was assigned to the Carians of Pedasus. . . .

The Athenians, on the other hand, showed themselves beyond measure afflicted at the fall of Miletus, in many ways expressing their sympathy, and especially by their treatment of Phrynichus. For when this poet brought out upon the stage his drama of the Capture of Miletus, the whole theatre burst into tears; and the people sentenced him to pay a fine of a thousand drachms, for recalling to them their own misfortunes. They likewise made a law, that no one should ever again exhibit that piece.

Thus was Miletus bereft of its inhabitants. . . .

The naval armament of the Persians wintered at Miletus, and in the following year proceeded to attack the islands off the coast, Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, which were reduced without difficulty. Whenever they became masters of an island, the barbarians, in every single instance, netted the inhabitants. Now the mode in which they practise this netting is the following. Men join hands, so as to form a line across from the north coast to the south, and then march through the island from end to end and hunt out the inhabitants. In like manner the Persians took also the Ionian towns upon the mainland, not however netting the inhabitants, as it was not possible. . . .

The sea force, after quitting Ionia, proceeded to the Hellespont, and took all the towns which lie on the left shore as one sails into the straits. For the cities on the right bank had already been reduced by the land force of the Persians.

Darius stood little in need of reminders of the Athenians. His expedition against them was evidently the culmination of a carefully thought-out plan for reducing the Greek cities, for he appears to

have left the coast fairly well subdued when he sent Mardonius ahead to clear the way and secure as many places as possible. A disastrous shipwreck placed a temporary check on the plan, and before venturing on another expedition Darius sent around demanding submission. The story of how the ambassadors were treated is a familiar one. A more picturesque version tells how they were thrown into a well to find earth and water.

3. EXPEDITION AGAINST GREECE

Herodotus, VI, 43–44, 48–49

The next spring Darius superseded all the other generals, and sent down Mardonius, the son of Gobryas, to the coast, and with him a vast body of men, some fit for sea, others for land service. Mardonius was a youth at this time, and had only lately married Artazostra, the king's daughter. When Mardonius, accompanied by this numerous host, reached Cilicia, he took ship and proceeded along shore with his fleet, while the land army marched under other leaders towards the Hellespont. In the course of his voyage along the coast of Asia he came to Ionia; and here I have a marvel to relate which will greatly surprise those Greeks who cannot believe that Otanes advised the seven conspirators to make Persia a commonwealth. Mardonius put down all the despots throughout Ionia, and in lieu of them established democracies. Having so done, he hastened to the Hellespont, and when a vast multitude of ships had been brought together, and likewise a powerful land force, he conveyed his troops across the strait by means of his vessels, and proceeded through Europe against Eretria and Athens.

At least these towns served as a pretext for the expedition, the real purpose of which was to subjugate as great a number as possible of the Grecian cities; and this became plain when the Thasians, who did not even lift a hand in their defence, were reduced by the sea force, while the land army added the Macedonians to the former slaves of the king. All the tribes on the hither side of Macedonia had been reduced previously. From Thasos the fleet stood across to the mainland, and sailed along

shore to Acanthus, whence an attempt was made to double Mount Athos. But here a violent north wind sprang up, against which nothing could contend, and handled a large number of the ships with much rudeness, shattering them and driving them aground upon Athos. 'T is said the number of the ships destroyed was little short of three hundred; and the men who perished were more than twenty thousand. For the sea about Athos abounds in monsters beyond all others; and so a portion were seized and devoured by these animals, while others were dashed violently against the rocks; some, who did not know how to swim, were engulfed; and some died of the cold. . . .

After this Darius resolved to prove the Greeks, and try the bent of their minds, whether they were inclined to resist him in arms or prepared to make their submission. He therefore sent out heralds in divers directions round about Greece, with orders to demand everywhere earth and water for the king. At the same time he sent other heralds to the various seaport towns which paid him tribute, and required them to provide a number of ships of war and horse-transports.

These towns accordingly began their preparations; and the heralds who had been sent into Greece obtained what the king had bid them ask from a large number of the states upon the mainland, and likewise from all the islanders whom they visited. Among these last were included the Eginetans, who, equally with the rest, consented to give earth and water to the Persian king.

When the Athenians heard what the Eginetans had done, believing that it was from enmity to themselves that they had given consent, and that the Eginetans intended to join the Persian in his attack upon Athens, they straightway took the matter in hand. In good truth it greatly rejoiced them to have so fair a pretext; and accordingly they sent frequent embassies to Sparta, and made it a charge against the Eginetans that their conduct in this matter proved them to be traitors to Greece.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 6

When the king of Persia sent messengers into Greece, with an interpreter, to demand earth and water, as an acknowledgment of

subjection, Themistocles, by the consent of the people, seized upon the interpreter, and put him to death, for presuming to publish the barbarian orders and decrees in the Greek language; this is one of the actions he is commended for, as also for what he did to Arthmius of Zelea, who brought gold from the king of Persia to corrupt the Greeks, and was, by an order from Themistocles, degraded and disfranchised, he and his children and his posterity; but that which most of all redounded to his credit was, that he put an end to all the civil wars of Greece, composed their differences, and persuaded them to lay aside all enmity during the war with the Persians; and in this great work, Chileus the Arcadian was, it is said, of great assistance to him.

Darius now proceeded to take personal charge of the invasion, intrusting it to generals of his own selection. Hippias, son of Pisistratus, who had long been in exile was only too glad to join the Persians and guide them to the best points of attack. That personal reasons entered into his conduct may easily be seen from his desire to overthrow the existing constitution and get into power again, and from the prominent position occupied by his ancestral enemy Miltiades.

Herodotus, VI, 94–101

Meantime the Persian pursued his own design, from day to day exhorted by his servant to "remember the Athenians," and likewise urged continually by the Pisistratidæ, who were ever accusing their countrymen. Moreover it pleased him well to have a pretext for carrying war into Greece, that so he might reduce all those who had refused to give him earth and water. As for Mardonius, since his expedition had succeeded so ill, Darius took command of the troops from him, and appointed other generals in his stead, who were to lead the host against Eretria and Athens; to wit, Datis, who was by descent a Mede, and Artaphernes, the son of Artaphernes, his own nephew. These men received orders to carry Athens and Eretria away captive, and to bring the prisoners into his presence.

So the new commanders took their departure from the court and went down to Cilicia, to the Aleian plain, having with them a numerous and well-appointed land army. Encamping here, they were joined by the sea force which had been required of the several states, and at the same time by the horse-transports which Darius had, the year before, commanded his tributaries to make ready. Aboard these the horses were embarked; and the troops were received by the ships of war; after which the whole fleet, amounting in all to six hundred triremes, made sail for Ionia. Thence, instead of proceeding with a straight course along the shore to the Hellespont and to Thrace, they loosed from Samos and voyaged across the Icarian sea through the midst of the islands; mainly, as I believe, because they feared the danger of doubling Mount Athos, where the year before they had suffered so grievously on their passage; but a constraining cause also was their former failure to take Naxos.

When the Persians, therefore, approaching from the Icarian sea, cast anchor at Naxos, which, recollecting what there befell them formerly, they had determined to attack before any other state, the Naxians, instead of encountering them, took to flight, and hurried off to the hills. The Persians however succeeded in laying hands on some, and them they carried away captive, while at the same time they burnt all the temples together with the town. This done, they left Naxos, and sailed away to the other islands.

While the Persians were thus employed, the Delians likewise quitted Delos, and took refuge in Tenos. And now the expedition drew near, when Datis sailed forward in advance of the other ships; commanding them, instead of anchoring at Delos, to rendezvous at Rhenea, over against Delos, while he himself proceeded to discover whither the Delians had fled; after which he sent a herald to them with this message: —

"Why are ye fled, O holy men? Why have ye judged me so harshly and so wrongfully? I have surely sense enough, even had not the king so ordered, to spare the country which gave birth to the two gods,— to spare, I say, both the country and its inhabitants. Come back therefore to your dwellings; and once more inhabit your island."

Such was the message which Datis sent by his herald to the Delians. He likewise placed upon the altar three hundred talents' weight of frankincense, and offered it.

After this he sailed with his whole host against Eretria, taking with him both Ionians and Æolians. When he was departed, Delos (as the Delians told me) was shaken by an earthquake, the first and last shock that has been felt to this day. And truly this was a prodigy whereby the god warned men of the evils that were coming upon them. For in the three following generations of Darius the son of Hystaspes, Xerxes the son of Darius, and Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, more woes befell Greece than in the twenty generations preceding Darius;—woes caused in part by the Persians, but in part arising from the contentions among their own chief men respecting the supreme power. Wherefore it is not surprising that Delos, though it had never before been shaken, should at that time have felt the shock of an earthquake. And indeed there was an oracle, which said of Delos—

"Delos' self will I shake, which never yet has been shaken."

Of the above names Darius may be rendered "Worker," Xerxes "Warrior," and Artaxerxes "Great Warrior." And so might we call these kings in our own language with propriety.

The barbarians, after loosing from Delos, proceeded to touch at the other islands, and took troops from each, and likewise carried off a number of the children as hostages. Going thus from one to another, they came at last to Carystus; but here the hostages were refused by the Carystians, who said they would neither give any, nor consent to bear arms against the cities of their neighbours, meaning Athens and Eretria. Hereupon the Persians laid siege to Carystus, and wasted the country round, until at length the inhabitants were brought over and agreed to do what was required of them.

Meanwhile the Eretrians, understanding that the Persian armament was coming against them, besought the Athenians for assistance. Nor did the Athenians refuse their aid, but assigned to them as auxiliaries the four thousand landholders to whom they had allotted the estates of the Chalcidean Hippobatæ. At Eretria, however, things were in no healthy state; for though they had called

in the aid of the Athenians, yet they were not agreed among themselves how they should act; some of them were minded to leave the city and to take refuge in the heights of Eubœa, while others, who looked to receiving a reward from the Persians, were making ready to betray their country. So when these things came to the ears of Æschines, the son of Nothon, one of the first men in Eretria, he made known the whole state of affairs to the Athenians who were already arrived, and besought them to return home to their own land, and not perish with his countrymen. And the Athenians hearkened to his counsel, and, crossing over to Oropus, in this way escaped the danger.

The Persian fleet now drew near and anchored at Tamynæ, Chœreæ, and Ægilia, three places in the territory of Eretria. Once masters of these posts, they proceeded forthwith to disembark their horses, and made ready to attack the enemy. But the Eretrians were not minded to sally forth and offer battle; their only care, after it had been resolved not to quit the city, was, if possible, to defend their walls. And now the fortress was assaulted in good earnest, and for six days there fell on both sides vast numbers, but on the seventh day Euphorbus, the son of Alcimachus, and Philagrus, the son of Cyneas, who were both citizens of good repute, betrayed the place to the Persians. These were no sooner entered within the walls than they plundered and burnt all the temples that there were in the town, in revenge for the burning of their own temples at Sardis; moreover, they did according to the orders of Darius, and carried away captive all the inhabitants.

4. MARATHON

The only continuous narrative of the battle of Marathon that has been preserved is that of Herodotus, but there are few events which were more generally and constantly commemorated in legend, verse, and art.

Herodotus, VI, 102, 104–106

The Persians, having thus brought Eretria into subjection after waiting a few days, made sail for Attica, greatly straitening the Athenians as they approached, and thinking to deal with them as

they had dealt with the people of Eretria. And, because there was no place in all Attica so convenient for their horse as Marathon, and it lay moreover quite close to Eretria, therefore Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, conducted them thither.

When intelligence of this reached the Athenians, they likewise marched their troops to Marathon, and there stood on the defensive, having at their head ten generals, of whom one was Miltiades. . . .

It was this Miltiades who now commanded the Athenians, after escaping from the Chersonese, and twice nearly losing his life. First he was chased as far as Imbrus by the Phœnicians, who had a great desire to take him and carry him up to the king; and when he had avoided this danger, and, having reached his own country, thought himself to be altogether in safety, he found his enemies waiting for him, and was cited by them before a court and impeached for his tyranny in the Chersonese. But he came off victorious here likewise, and was thereupon made general of the Athenians by the free choice of the people.

And first, before they left the city, the generals sent off to Sparta a herald, one Pheidippides, who was by birth an Athenian, and by profession and practice a trained runner. This man, according to the account which he gave to the Athenians on his return, when he was near Mount Parthenium, above Tegea, fell in with the god Pan, who called him by his name, and bade him ask the Athenians "wherefore they neglected him so entirely, when he was kindly disposed towards them, and had often helped them in times past, and would do so again in time to come?" The Athenians, entirely believing in the truth of this report, as soon as their affairs were once more in good order, set up a temple to Pan under the Acropolis, and, in return for the message which I have recorded, established in his honour yearly sacrifices and a torch-race.

On the occasion of which we speak, when Pheidippides was sent by the Athenian generals, and, according to his own account, saw Pan on his journey, he reached Sparta on the very next day after quitting the city of Athens. Upon his arrival he went before the rulers, and said to them —

"Men of Lacedæmon, the Athenians beseech you to hasten to their aid, and not allow that state, which is the most ancient in all

Greece, to be enslaved by the barbarians. Eretria, look you, is already carried away captive; and Greece weakened by the loss of no mean city."

Thus did Pheidippides deliver the message committed to him. And the Spartans wished to help the Athenians, but were unable to give them any present succour, as they did not like to break their established law. It was then the ninth day of the first decade; and they could not march out of Sparta on the ninth, when the moon had not reached the full. So they waited for the full of the moon.

Herodotus, VI, 108–117

The Athenians were drawn up in order of battle in a sacred close belonging to Hercules, when they were joined by the Platæans, who came in full force to their aid. Some time before, the Platæans had put themselves under the rule of the Athenians; and these last had already undertaken many labours on their behalf. . . .

The Athenian generals were divided in their opinions; and some advised not to risk a battle, because they were too few to engage such a host as that of the Medes, while others were for fighting at once; and among these last was Miltiades. He therefore, seeing that opinions were thus divided, and that the less worthy counsel appeared likely to prevail, resolved to go to the polemarch, and have a conference with him. For the man on whom the lot fell to be polemarch at Athens was entitled to give his vote with the ten generals, since anciently the Athenians allowed him an equal right of voting with them. The polemarch at this juncture was Callimachus of Aphidnæ; to him therefore Miltiades went, and said: —

"With thee it rests, Callimachus, either to bring Athens to slavery, or, by securing her freedom, to leave behind thee to all future generations a memory beyond even Harmodius and Aristogeiton. For never since the time that the Athenians became a people were they in so great a danger as now. If they bow their necks beneath the yoke of the Medes, the woes which they will have to suffer when given into the power of Hippias are already determined on; if, on the other hand, they fight and overcome,

Athens may rise to be the very first city in Greece. How it comes to pass that these things are likely to happen, and how the determining of them in some sort rests with thee, I will now proceed to make clear. We generals are ten in number, and our votes are divided; half of us wish to engage, half to avoid a combat. Now, if we do not fight, I look to see a great disturbance at Athens which will shake men's resolutions, and then I fear they will submit themselves; but if we fight the battle before any unsoundness show itself among our citizens, let the gods but give us fair play, and we are well able to overcome the enemy. On thee therefore we depend in this matter, which lies wholly in thine own power. Thou hast only to add thy vote to my side and thy country will be free, and not free only, but the first state in Greece. Or, if thou preferrest to give thy vote to them who would decline the combat, then the reverse will follow."

Miltiades by these words gained Callimachus; and the addition of the polemarch's vote caused the decision to be in favour of fighting. Hereupon all those generals who had been desirous of hazarding a battle, when their turn came to command the army, gave up their right to Miltiades. He however, though he accepted their offers, nevertheless waited, and would not fight, until his own day of command arrived in due course.

Then at length, when his own turn was come, the Athenian battle was set in array, and this was the order of it. Callimachus the polemarch led the right wing; for it was at that time a rule with the Athenians to give the right wing to the polemarch. After this followed the tribes, according as they were numbered, in an unbroken line; while last of all came the Platæans, forming the left wing. And ever since that day it has been a custom with the Athenians, in the sacrifices and assemblies held each fifth year at Athens, for the Athenian herald to implore the blessing of the gods on the Platæans conjointly with the Athenians. Now, as they marshalled the host upon the field of Marathon, in order that the Athenian front might be of equal length with the Median, the ranks of the centre were diminished, and it became the weakest part of the line, while the wings were both made strong with a depth of many ranks.

So when the battle was set in array, and the victims showed themselves favourable, instantly the Athenians, so soon as they were let go, charged the barbarians at a run. Now the distance between the two armies was little short of eight furlongs. The Persians, therefore, when they saw the Greeks coming on at speed, made ready to receive them, although it seemed to them that the Athenians were bereft of their senses, and bent upon their own destruction; for they saw a mere handful of men coming on at a run without either horsemen or archers. Such was the opinion of the barbarians; but the Athenians in close array fell upon them, and fought in a manner worthy of being recorded. They were the first of the Greeks, so far as I know, who introduced the custom of charging the enemy at a run, and they were likewise the first who dared to look upon the Median garb, and to face men clad in that fashion. Until this time the very name of the Medes had been a terror to the Greeks to hear.

The two armies fought together on the plain of Marathon for a length of time; and in the mid battle, where the Persians themselves and the Sacæ had their place, the barbarians were victorious, and broke and pursued the Greeks into the inner country; but on the two wings the Athenians and the Platæans defeated the enemy. Having so done, they suffered the routed barbarians to fly at their ease, and joining the two wings in one, fell upon those who had broken their own centre, and fought and conquered them. These likewise fled, and now the Athenians hung upon the runaways and cut them down, chasing them all the way to the shore, on reaching which they laid hold of the ships and called aloud for fire.

It was in the struggle here that Callimachus the polemarch, after greatly distinguishing himself, lost his life; Stesilaus too, the son of Thrasilaus, one of the generals, was slain; and Cynægirus, the son of Euphorion, having seized on a vessel of the enemy's by the ornament at the stern, had his hand cut off by the blow of an axe, and so perished; as likewise did many other Athenians of note and name.

Nevertheless the Athenians secured in this way seven of the vessels; while with the remainder the barbarians pushed off, and taking aboard their Eretrian prisoners from the island where they

had left them, doubled Cape Sunium, hoping to reach Athens before the return of the Athenians. The Alcmæonidæ were accused by their countrymen of suggesting this course to them; they had, it was said, an understanding with the Persians, and made a signal to them, by raising a shield, after they were embarked in their ships.

The Persians accordingly sailed round Sunium. But the Athenians with all possible speed marched away to the defence of their city, and succeeded in reaching Athens before the appearance of the barbarians: and as their camp at Marathon had been pitched in a precinct of Hercules, so now they encamped in another precinct of the same god at Cynosarges. The barbarian fleet arrived, and lay to off Phalerum, which was at that time the haven of Athens; but after resting awhile upon their oars, they departed and sailed away to Asia.

There fell in this battle of Marathon, on the side of the barbarians, about six thousand and four hundred men; on that of the Athenians, one hundred and ninety-two. Such was the number of the slain on the one side and the other.

PLUTARCH, *Aristides*, V (tr. Perrin)

In the battle the Athenian centre was the hardest pressed, and it was there that the Barbarians held their ground the longest, over against the tribes Leontis and Antiochis. There, then, Themistocles and Aristides fought brilliantly, ranged side by side; for one was a Leontid, the other an Antiochid.

The following quotation from the "Persians" of Æschylus brings out most vividly the ignorance of Persia regarding Athens.

The scene is by a stroke of dramatic genius laid at the Persian court at the time of Xerxes' invasion, ten years later than that of Darius. Atossa, the queen, a very intelligent woman, whose opinion was highly respected by all at the court, seems to know little of Athens. It is hard to decide whether the great defeat of ten years before had faded from her mind or whether it was too incidental to trouble about. The following dialogue takes place between her and the chorus, composed of Persian elders.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 231–245

ATOSSA. Yet one doubt, dear friends, resolve me. Tell me, Persians, if ye may,
Whereabout on Earth's wide bosom Athens lies, as travellers say.

CHO. Yonder, where our lord the Sun-god droops and dwindles, far away.

AT. Wherefore was my son desirous Athens 'neath his power to bring?

CHO. Hellas then in all her borders would be subject to the king.

AT. Say; keeps Athens at her bidding such a multitudinous host?

CHO. Such a host, whose valiant prowess Persia knows of to her cost.

AT. What besides their men of valour? Have they wealth enough in store?

CHO. Yea, a vein by nature treasured in their land, of silver ore.

AT. Is it strength to draw the arrow that exalts them thus in might?

CHO. Not the bow, but shielded armour, and the spear for standing fight.

AT. Say, what shepherd sways their numbers? who their army's king and lord?

CHO. They call no man lord or master, buckle under no man's word.

AT. Then they ne'er will stand the onset of a strange invading foe.

CHO. They destroyed Dareius' army, great in number, fair in show.

AT. Thought of terror for the parents of our warriors now away!

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 472–476

AT. O sullen Fortune! How deceitfully
Thou hast robbed the Persians of their purposes!
To his unending sorrow hath my son
Pursued his vengeance on the Athenians' pride!
Too few of ours did Marathon consume,
For whom my son planning the recompense,
Hath brought this tumult of disasters down.

The following epigram, said to have been written by Æschylus for his own tomb, makes no mention of himself as the foremost dramatist of his day, his bravery in the battle of Marathon being in his eyes his chief claim to fame.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Epigram* 4 (tr. Mackail)

Æschylus son of Euphorion the Athenian this monument hides, who died in wheat-bearing Gela; but of his approved valour the Marathonian grave may tell and the deep-haired Mede who knew it.

Pausanias mentions one or two of the commemorative monuments, and the "soros," or mound, of Marathon is still the dominant feature on the plain.[1] The "Men of Marathon" became proverbial and are constantly being held up, by Aristophanes for example, as models for their degenerate successors to whom they formed so great a contrast.

Pausanias, III, xii, 7

The people of Ægium in Achaia also show a tomb in their market-place which they assert to be the tomb of Talthybius. When the heralds whom King Darius sent to Greece to demand earth and water were murdered, the wrath of Talthybius at the crime was manifested against Lacedæmon as a state; but at Athens it fell on the house of a private man, Miltiades, son of Cimon. For it was Miltiades who caused the Athenians to kill the heralds that came to Attica.

Pausanias, I, xxxii, 3

There is a township of Marathon equally distant from Athens and from Carystus in Eubœa. It was at this point of Attica that the barbarians landed, and were beaten in battle, and lost some of their ships as they were putting off to sea. In the plain is the grave of the Athenians, and over it are tombstones with the names of the fallen arranged according to tribes. There is another grave

[1] Macan, "Herodotus," Bks. VII–IX, Vol. II, App. I, pp. 5–6, footnote 1, gives an exhaustive list of the memorials of the battle as well as many references to it in literature for centuries after.

for the Bœotians of Platæa and the slaves; for slaves fought then for the first time. There is a separate tomb of Miltiades, son of Cimon. He died subsequently, after he had failed to capture Paros, and had been put on his trial for it by the Athenians. Here every night you may hear horses neighing and men fighting. To go on purpose to see the sight never brought good to any man; but with him who unwittingly lights upon it by accident the spirits are not angry. The people of Marathon worship the men who fell in the battle, naming them heroes; and they worship Marathon, from whom the township got its name; and Hercules, alleging that they were the first of the Greeks who deemed Hercules a god. Now it befell, they say, that in the battle there was present a man of rustic aspect and dress, who slaughtered many of the barbarians with a plough, and vanished after the fight. When the Athenians inquired of the god, the only answer he vouchsafed was to bid them honour the hero Echetlæus. There is also a trophy of white marble. The Athenians assert that they buried the Medes, because it is a sacred and imperative duty to cover with earth a human corpse, but I could find no grave; for there was neither a barrow nor any other mark to be seen: they just carried them to a trench and flung them in pell-mell.[1]

[1] For the epigrams of Simonides on Marathon see the following chapter, where all those relating to the Persian wars are given together.

CHAPTER VIII

WARS AGAINST PERSIA AND CARTHAGE

Xerxes — Preparations of the Persians — Preparations of the Greeks — Thermopylæ and Artemisium — Capture of the Acropolis — Salamis; preparations — The battle of Salamis — Platæa — Mycale — Importance of the war for Athens — Themistocles — The western Greeks — Rise of Gelon — Victories over Carthage and the Etruscans — Various battles of the Persian war

I. Xerxes

1. PREPARATIONS OF THE PERSIANS

Preparations for another invasion were at once begun by Darius and carried on after his death by Xerxes. The following selections tell the stupendous scale on which they were made and the great number of troops involved.[1]

The speech put by Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxes gives several of the motives which inspired the undertaking.

Herodotus, VII, 1, 4–5

Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at Marathon reached the ears of King Darius, the son of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians, which had been already roused by their attack upon Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off messengers to make proclamation through the several states, that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased rate; while ships, horses, provisions, and transports were likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands; and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three years, while everywhere, as Greece was to be attacked, the best and bravest were enrolled for the service, and had to make their preparations accordingly. . . .

[1] See Tarn, "The Fleet of Xerxes," in *J. H. S.*, 1908 pp. 202 ff., for a recent estimate of the numbers.

Darius, when he had thus appointed Xerxes his heir, was minded to lead forth his armies; but he was prevented by death while his preparations were still proceeding. He died in the year following the revolt of Egypt and the matters here related, after having reigned in all six-and-thirty years, leaving the revolted Egyptians and the Athenians alike unpunished. At his death the kingdom passed to his son Xerxes.

Now Xerxes, on first mounting the throne, was coldly disposed towards the Grecian war, and made it his business to collect an army against Egypt. But Mardonius, the son of Gobryas, who was at the court, and had more influence with him than any of the other Persians, being his own cousin, the child of a sister of Darius, plied him with discourses like the following: —

"Master, it is not fitting that they of Athens escape scot-free, after doing the Persians such great injury. Complete the work which thou hast now on hand, and then, when the pride of Egypt is brought low, lead an army against Athens. So shalt thou thyself have good report among men, and others shall fear hereafter to attack thy country."

Thus far it was of vengeance that he spoke; but sometimes he would vary the theme, and observe by the way, "that Europe was a wondrous beautiful region, rich in all kinds of cultivated trees, and the soil excellent: no one, save the king, was worthy to own such a land."

Herodotus, VII, 8, 20, 33–35

"My intent is to throw a bridge over the Hellespont and march an army through Europe against Greece, that thereby I may obtain vengeance from the Athenians for the wrongs committed by them against the Persians and against my father. Your own eyes saw the preparations of Darius against these men; but death came upon him, and balked his hopes of revenge. In his behalf, therefore, and in behalf of all the Persians, I undertake the war, and pledge myself not to rest till I have taken and burnt Athens, which has dared, unprovoked, to injure me and my father. Long since they came to Asia with Aristagoras of Miletus, who was one of our slaves, and, entering Sardis, burnt its temples and its sacred

groves; again, more lately, when we made a landing upon their coast under Datis and Artaphernes, how roughly they handled us ye do not need to be told." . . .

Reckoning from the recovery of Egypt, Xerxes spent four full years in collecting his host, and making ready all things that were needful for his soldiers. It was not till the close of the fifth year that he set forth on his march, accompanied by a mighty multitude. For of all the armaments whereof any mention has reached us, this was by far the greatest; insomuch that no other expedition compared to this seems of any account. . . .

Xerxes, after this, made preparations to advance to Abydos, where the bridge across the Hellespont from Asia to Europe was lately finished. Midway between Sestos and Madytus in the Hellespontine Chersonese, and right over against Abydos, there is a rocky tongue of land which runs out for some distance into the sea. This is the place where no long time afterwards the Greeks under Xanthippus, the son of Ariphron, took Artayctes the Persian, who was at that time governor of Sestos, and nailed him living to a plank. He was the Artayctes who brought women into the temple of Protesilaus at Elæus, and there was guilty of most unholy deeds.

Towards this tongue of land then, the men to whom the business was assigned carried out a double bridge from Abydos; and while the Phœnicians constructed one line with cables of white flax, the Egyptians in the other used ropes made of papyrus. Now it is seven furlongs across from Abydos to the opposite coast. When, therefore, the channel had been bridged successfully, it happened that a great storm arising broke the whole work to pieces, and destroyed all that had been done.

So when Xerxes heard of it he was full of wrath, and straightway gave orders that the Hellespont should receive three hundred lashes, and that a pair of fetters should be cast into it. Nay, I have even heard it said, that he bade the branders take their irons and therewith brand the Hellespont. It is certain that he commanded those who scourged the waters to utter, as they lashed them, these barbarian and wicked words: "Thou bitter water, thy lord lays on thee this punishment because thou hast wronged him

without a cause, having suffered no evil at his hands. Verily King Xerxes will cross thee, whether thou wilt or no. Well dost thou deserve that no man should honour thee with sacrifice; for thou art of a truth a treacherous and unsavoury river." While the sea was thus punished by his orders, he likewise commanded that the overseers of the work should lose their heads.

Herodotus, VII, 55–56, 60

When, however, his offerings were made, the army began to cross; and the foot-soldiers, with the horsemen, passed over by one of the bridges — that (namely) which lay towards the Euxine — while the sumpter-beasts and the camp-followers passed by the other, which looked on the Ægean. Foremost went the Ten Thousand Persians, all wearing garlands upon their heads; and after them a mixed multitude of many nations. These crossed upon the first day.

On the next day the horsemen began the passage; and with them went the soldiers who carried their spears with the point downwards, garlanded, like the Ten Thousand; — then came the sacred horses and the sacred chariot; next Xerxes with his lancers and the thousand horse; then the rest of the army. At the same time the ships sailed over to the opposite shore. According, however, to another account which I have heard, the king crossed the last.

As soon as Xerxes had reached the European side, he stood to contemplate his army as they crossed under the lash. And the crossing continued during seven days and seven nights, without rest or pause. . . .

What the exact number of the troops of each nation was I cannot say with certainty — for it is not mentioned by any one — but the whole land army together was found to amount to one million seven hundred thousand men. The manner in which the numbering took place was the following. A body of ten thousand men was brought to a certain place, and the men were made to stand as close together as possible; after which a circle was drawn around them, and the men were let go: then where the circle had been, a fence was built about the height of a man's middle; and the enclosure

was filled continually with fresh troops, till the whole army had in this way been numbered. When the numbering was over, the troops were drawn up according to their several nations.

Herodotus, VII, 83, 89, 96, 99–100

The whole of the infantry was under the command of these generals, excepting the Ten Thousand. The Ten Thousand, who were all Persians and all picked men, were led by Hydarnes, the son of Hydarnes. They were called "the Immortals," for the following reason. If one of their body failed either by the stroke of death or of disease, forthwith his place was filled up by another man, so that their number was at no time either greater or less than 10,000.

Of all the troops the Persians were adorned with the greatest magnificence, and they were likewise the most valiant. Besides their arms, which have been already described, they glittered all over with gold, vast quantities of which they wore about their persons. . . .

The triremes amounted in all to twelve hundred and seven. . . .

On board of every ship was a band of soldiers, Persians, Medes, or Sacans. The Phœnician ships were the best sailers in the fleet, and the Sidonians the best among the Phœnicians. The contingent of each nation, whether to the fleet or to the land army, had at its head a native leader; but the names of these leaders I shall not mention, as it is not necessary for the course of my History. For the leaders of some nations were not worthy to have their names recorded; and besides, there were in each nation as many leaders as there were cities. . . .

Of the other lower officers I shall make no mention, since no necessity is laid on me; but I must speak of a certain leader named Artemisia, whose participation in the attack upon Greece, notwithstanding that she was a woman, moves my special wonder. She had obtained the sovereign power after the death of her husband; and, though she had now a son grown up, yet her brave spirit and manly daring sent her forth to the war, when no need required her to adventure. Her name, as I said, was Artemisia, and she was the daughter of Lygdamis; by race she was on his

side a Halicarnassian, though by her mother a Cretan. She ruled over the Halicarnassians, the men of Cos, of Nisyrus, and of Calydna; and the five triremes which she furnished to the Persians were, next to the Sidonian, the most famous ships in the fleet. She likewise gave to Xerxes sounder counsel than any of his other allies. Now the cities over which I have mentioned that she bore sway, were one and all Dorian; for the Halicarnassians were colonists from Trœzen, while the remainder were from Epidaurus. Thus much concerning the sea-force.

Now when the numbering and marshalling of the host was ended, Xerxes conceived a wish to go himself throughout the forces, and with his own eyes behold everything.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 1–27

CHORUS

When the countless Persian host
Left for Hellas' distant coast,
We remained, a faithful band,
Set to guard the sacred land, —
Old, and therefore counted meet
Watchmen of this ancient seat,
To protect the hearths and homes
Round the ancestral golden domes.
Xerxes' self, Dareius' son,
King and lord, chose forth each one.
Now my prophet-mind within
Darkly musing doth begin
For our sovereign lord's return,
With his gilded host, to yearn.
All the youth of Asia born
Long have left her weak and lorn.
With a voice of piteous tone
Cries she for her strong ones gone.
Nor to this our citadel
Runs or rides a man to tell
Of the souls of priceless worth

Who from Susa's walls went forth,
And Ecbatana's proud hold
And the Cissian fortress old, —
Horsemen, shipmen, and the throng
That on foot make armies strong:
Haught Amistres' dignity,
Artaphernes' chivalry,
Megabates high in power,
Bright Astaspes, Persia's flower.
Kings that host were marshalling,
Vassals of the mighty king,
Ordering troops in countless flow, —
Masters of the twanging bow,
Masters of the bounding steed,
Dauntless hearts of glorious breed;
Dreadful in their bright array,
Dreadful in the hurtling fray.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 59–71

Persia's flower of youth is flown,
Asia mourns her nurslings gone,
Longing wives and parents dear
Count the lingering hours with fear.

Over the firth and away
To the opposite neighbouring shore
That conquering host and their leader have passed in royal array,
On the deep by the daughter of Athamas once ferried o'er;
He hath bridged the sea-ways with a close-framed flax-bound floor,
And the neck of the prancing brine hath felt his yoke.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 87–91

What man is of power, what army of strength or size,
To stem that torrent, or bar the invincible wave?
What strong sea-wall shall hinder its onward course?
Nay, Persia's gatherèd host hath resistless force,
And her people's hearts are brave.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 126–131

For over the bridge-like mole
Binding Asia to Europe, the whole great host
Are gone, every valiant soul;
Horseman, and footman, and charioteer,
Like a swarm of bees with their leader, their myriads crossed,
They have crossed, and left us here.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 176–199

ATOSSA. I am nightly visited with haunting dreams,
E'er since my son levied that host and went
To sack the towns of the Iaones.
But last night's dream was far more clear than any.
I saw two women, fairly attired, the first
In flowing Persian robes; in Dorian garb
The other; — on they came, of stature tall,
Beyond the measure of humanity,
Faultless in beauty, sisters of one stock.
But for their native dwelling-place, methought,
The one had Grecian land allotted her,
The other, Barbarous. Now, in my dream,
I saw them fall to quarrel, and my son
Perceived it, and would tame and pacify
Their anger; he would yoke them to his car
And place his collar on their necks. Whereat
The one showed pride in such accoutrement,
With docile paces curbing to the rein.
But the other plunged, and with rebellious force
Wrecked the fine chariot-gear, and tore away
From all control, sundering the equal yoke.
My son fell headlong, and Dareius stood
Beside and pitied him — whom Xerxes seeing
Began to rend his garments in my dream.

2. PREPARATIONS OF THE GREEKS

Certain of the Greek cities had in the meantime been busy with preparations. The fatal difficulty, however, in effecting united action was a great handicap. It was almost impossible to count on who would stand together and who would go over to the Persian side.

The Delphic oracle gave little encouragement, and the responses were more obscure than ever, but the common sense of Themistocles interpreted them in a reasonable way. Indeed it was to him more than to any other that the growth of Athens was due, for he built up its navy, ostensibly for use against Ægina, so that when the Persians arrived the Athenians had an excellent fleet to face them.

Herodotus, VII, 138–144

To return, however, to my main subject, — the expedition of the Persian king, though it was in name directed against Athens, threatened really the whole of Greece. And of this the Greeks were aware some time before; but they did not all view the matter in the same light. Some of them had given the Persian earth and water, and were bold on this account, deeming themselves thereby secured against suffering hurt from the barbarian army; while others, who had refused compliance, were thrown into extreme alarm. For whereas they considered all the ships in Greece too few to engage the enemy, it was plain that the greater number of states would take no part in the war, but warmly favoured the Medes. . . .

If then a man should now say that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece, he would not exceed the truth. For they truly held the scales; and whichever side they espoused must have carried the day. They too it was who, when they had determined to maintain the freedom of Greece, roused up that portion of the Greek nation which had not gone over to the Medes; and so, next to the gods, *they* repulsed the invader. Even the terrible oracles which reached them from Delphi, and struck fear into their hearts, failed to persuade them to fly from Greece. They had the courage to remain faithful to their land, and await the coming of the foe.

When the Athenians, anxious to consult the oracle, sent their messengers to Delphi, hardly had the envoys completed the customary rites about the sacred precinct, and taken their seats inside the sanctuary of the god, when the Pythoness, Aristonice by name, thus prophesied —

"Wretches, why sit ye here? Fly, fly to the ends of creation,
Quitting your homes, and the crags which your city crowns with her circlet.
Neither the head, nor the body is firm in its place, nor at bottom
Firm the feet, nor the hands; nor resteth the middle uninjur'd.
All — all ruined and lost. Since fire, and impetuous Ares,
Speeding along in a Syrian chariot, hastes to destroy her.
Not alone shalt thou suffer; full many the towers he will level,
Many the shrines of the gods he will give to a fiery destruction.
Even now they stand with dark sweat horribly dripping,
Trembling and quaking for fear; and lo! from the high roofs trickleth
Black blood, sign prophetic of hard distresses impending.
Get ye away from the temple; and brood on the ills that await ye!"

When the Athenian messengers heard this reply, they were filled with the deepest affliction: whereupon Timon, the son of Androbulus, one of the men of most mark among the Delphians, seeing how utterly cast down they were at the gloomy prophecy, advised them to take an olive-branch, and entering the sanctuary again, consult the oracle as suppliants. The Athenians followed this advice, and going in once more, said — "O king! we pray thee reverence these boughs of supplication which we bear in our hands, and deliver to us something more comforting concerning our country. Else we will not leave thy sanctuary, but will stay here till we die." Upon this the priestess gave them a second answer, which was the following: —

"Pallas has not been able to soften the lord of Olympus,
Though she has often prayed him, and urged him with excellent counsel.
Yet once more I address thee in words than adamant firmer.
When the foe shall have taken whatever the limit of Cecrops
Holds within it, and all which divine Cithæron shelters,
Then far-seeing Zeus grants this to the prayers of Athene;
Safe shall the wooden wall continue for thee and thy children.
Wait not the tramp of the horse, nor the footmen mightily moving
Over the land, but turn your back to the foe, and retire ye.

Yet shall a day arrive when ye shall meet him in battle.
Holy Salamis, thou shalt destroy the offspring of women,
When men scatter the seed, or when they gather the harvest."

This answer seemed, as indeed it was, gentler than the former one; so the envoys wrote it down, and went back with it to Athens. When, however, upon their arrival, they produced it before the people, and inquiry began to be made into its true meaning, many and various were the interpretations which men put on it; two, more especially, seemed to be directly opposed to one another. Certain of the old men were of opinion that the god meant to tell them the citadel would escape; for this was anciently defended by a palisade; and they supposed that barrier to be the "wooden wall" of the oracle. Others maintained that the fleet was what the god pointed at; and their advice was that nothing should be thought of except the ships, which had best be at once got ready. Still such as said the "wooden wall" meant the fleet, were perplexed by the last two lines of the oracle —

"Holy Salamis, thou shalt destroy the offspring of women,
When men scatter the seed, or when they gather the harvest."

These words caused great disturbance among those who took the wooden wall to be the ships; since the interpreters understood them to mean, that, if they made preparations for a sea-fight, they would suffer a defeat off Salamis.

Now there was at Athens a man who had lately made his way into the first rank of citizens: his true name was Themistocles; but he was known more generally as the son of Neocles. This man came forward and said, that the interpreters had not explained the oracle altogether aright — "for if," he argued, "the clause in question had really respected the Athenians, it would not have been expressed so mildly; the phrase used would have been 'Luckless Salamis,' rather than 'Holy Salamis,' had those to whom the island belonged been about to perish in its neighbourhood. Rightly taken, the response of the god threatened the enemy, much more than the Athenians." He therefore counselled his countrymen to make ready to fight on board their ships, since *they* were the wooden wall in which the god told them to trust. When Themistocles had

thus cleared the matter, the Athenians embraced his view, preferring it to that of the interpreters. The advice of these last had been against engaging in a sea-fight; "all the Athenians could do," they said, "was, without lifting a hand in their defence, to quit Attica, and make a settlement in some other country."

Themistocles had before this given a counsel which prevailed very seasonably. The Athenians, having a large sum of money in their treasury, the produce of the mines at Laureium, were about to share it among the full-grown citizens, who would have received ten drachmas apiece, when Themistocles persuaded them to forbear the distribution, and build with the money two hundred ships, to help them in their war against the Eginetans. It was the breaking out of the Eginetan war which was at this time the saving of Greece; for hereby were the Athenians forced to become a maritime power. The new ships were not used for the purpose for which they had been built, but became a help to Greece in her hour of need. And the Athenians had not only these vessels ready before the war, but they likewise set to work to build more; while they determined, in a council which was held after the debate upon the oracle, that, according to the advice of the god, they would embark their whole force aboard their ships, and, with such Greeks as chose to join them, give battle to the barbarian invader. Such, then, were the oracles which had been received by the Athenians.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 3–4

Now the rest of his countrymen thought that the defeat of the Barbarians at Marathon was the end of the war; but Themistocles thought it to be only the beginning of greater contests, and for these he anointed himself, as it were, to be the champion of all Hellas, and put his city into training, because, while it was yet afar off, he expected the evil that was to come.

And so, in the first place, whereas the Athenians were wont to divide up among themselves the revenue coming from the silver mines at Laureium, he, and he alone, dared to come before the people with a motion that this division be given up, and that with these moneys triremes be constructed for the war against Ægina. This was the greatest war then raging in Hellas, and the islanders

controlled the sea, owing to the number of their ships. Wherefore all the more easily did Themistocles carry his point, not by trying to terrify the citizens with dreadful pictures of Darius or the Persians, — these were too far away and inspired no very serious fear of their coming, — but by making opportune use of the bitter jealousy which they cherished toward Ægina in order to secure the armament he desired. The result was that with those moneys they built an hundred triremes, which actually fought at Salamis against Xerxes.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXII

And in the third year after this, during the archonship of Nicodemus, when the mines at Maronea were discovered, and the state acquired a hundred talents from working them, some counselled the people to divide the money among themselves. But Themistokles would not allow it, declaring that he would not use the money, and urged them to advance it on loan to the hundred richest men among the Athenians, to each a talent, and then recommended, if it met their approval, that it should be expended in the service of the state, and if not, that they should get in the money from those who had borrowed it. Getting the money in this way, he had a hundred triremes built, each of the hundred talents building one; and it was with these ships that they fought at Salamis against the barbarians.

As was to be expected, there was a good deal of division of opinion over the leadership. Sparta had held the commanding position for so long that even the new fleet of Athens which made her the first naval power did not secure for her the undisputed command on the sea.

Thucydides, I, 18

Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards the barbarians returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great danger the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedæmonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians

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having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the Hellenes, who had revolted from the king, as well as those who had aided him in the war. At the head of the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedæmon, one the first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas.

3. THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM

A strategic line, on sea and land, extending between Artemisium and Thermopylæ, was seized by the Greeks and an attempt at coöperation was made between the two branches.

The vivid and picturesque account of Herodotus describes one of the most famous occasions in history. The inscriptions which he quotes are attributed to Simonides, who might well be called the poet laureate of the war.

Herodotus, VII, 175–178

The Greeks, on their return to the Isthmus, took counsel together concerning the words of Alexander, and considered where they should fix the war, and what places they should occupy. The opinion which prevailed was, that they should guard the pass of Thermopylæ; since it was narrower than the Thessalian defile, and at the same time nearer to them. Of the pathway, by which the Greeks who fell at Thermopylæ were intercepted, they had no knowledge, until, on their arrival at Thermopylæ, it was discovered to them by the Trachinians. This pass then it was determined that they should guard, in order to prevent the barbarians from penetrating into Greece through it; and at the same time it was resolved that the fleet should proceed to Artemisium, in the region of Histiæotis; for, as those places are near to one another, it would be easy for the fleet and army to hold communication. The two places may be thus described.

Artemisium is where the sea of Thrace contracts into a narrow channel, running between the isle of Sciathus and the mainland of

Magnesia. When this narrow strait is passed you come to the line of coast called Artemisium; which is a portion of Eubœa, and contains a temple of Artemis (Diana). As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is, at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This however is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it is still narrower a little above and a little below Thermopylæ. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place, it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill, impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta; while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives call "The Cauldrons;" and above them stands an altar sacred to Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and in this there had of old times been a gateway. These works were made by the Phocians, through fear of the Thessalians, at the time when the latter came from Thesprotia to establish themselves in the land of Æolis, which they still occupy. As the Thessalians strove to reduce Phocis, the Phocians raised the wall to protect themselves, and likewise turned the hot springs upon the pass, that so the ground might be broken up by water-courses, using thus all possible means to hinder the Thessalians from invading their country. The old wall had been built in very remote times; and the greater part of it had gone to decay through age. Now however the Greeks resolved to repair its breaches, and here make their stand against the barbarians. At this point there is a village very nigh the road, Alpeni by name, from which the Greeks reckoned on getting corn for their troops.

These places, therefore, seemed to the Greeks fit for their purpose. Weighing well all that was likely to happen, and considering that in this region the barbarians could make no use of their vast numbers, nor of their cavalry, they resolved to await here the invader of Greece. And when news reached them of the Persians being in Pieria, straightway they broke up from the Isthmus, and proceeded, some on foot to Thermopylæ, others by sea to Artemisium.

The Greeks now made all speed to reach the two stations.

Herodotus, VII, 201–207

King Xerxes pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia, while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These straits the Greeks in general called Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates); but the natives, and those who dwell in the neighbourhood, call them Pylæ (the Gates). Here then the two armies took their stand; the one master of all the region lying north of Trachis, the other of the country extending southward of that place to the verge of the continent.

The Greeks who at this spot awaited the coming of Xerxes were the following: — From Sparta, three hundred men-at-arms: from Arcadia, a thousand Tegeans and Mantineans, five hundred of each people; a hundred and twenty Orchomenians, from the Arcadian Orchomenus; and a thousand from other cities: from Corinth, four hundred men: from Phlius, two hundred: and from Mycenæ, eighty. Such was the number from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia, seven hundred Thespians and four hundred Thebans.

Besides these troops, the Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the latter a thousand men. . . .

The various nations had each captains of their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. . . .

He had now come to Thermopylæ, accompanied by the three hundred men which the law assigned him, whom he had himself chosen from among the citizens, and who were all of them fathers with sons living. On his way he had taken the troops from Thebes, whose number I have already mentioned, and who were under the command of Leontiades the son of Eurymachus. The reason why he made a point of taking troops from Thebes, and Thebes only, was, that the Thebans were strongly suspected of being well inclined to the Medes. Leonidas therefore called on them to come with him to the war, wishing to see whether they would comply with his demand, or openly refuse, and disclaim the Greek alliance. They, however, though their wishes leant the other way, nevertheless sent the men.

The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it was likely they might have done had they seen that Sparta was backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army. The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ decided so speedily; wherefore they were content to send forward a mere advance guard. Such accordingly were the intentions of the allies.

The Greek forces at Thermopylæ, when the Persian army drew near to the entrance of the pass, were seized with fear; and a council was held to consider about a retreat. It was the wish of the Peloponnesians generally that the army should fall back upon the Peloponnese, and there guard the Isthmus. But Leonidas, who saw with what indignation the Phocians and Locrians heard of this plan, gave his voice for remaining where they were, while they sent envoys to the several cities to ask for help, since they were too few to make a stand against an army like that of the Medes.

Herodotus, VII, 219–228

The Greeks at Thermopylæ received the first warning of the destruction which the dawn would bring on them from the seer Megistias, who read their fate in the victims as he was sacrificing. After this deserters came in, and brought the news that the Persians were marching round by the hills: it was still night when these men arrived. Last of all, the scouts came running down from the heights, and brought in the same accounts, when the day was just beginning to break. Then the Greeks held a council to consider what they should do, and here opinions were divided: some were strong against quitting their post, while others contended to the contrary. So when the council had broken up, part of the troops departed and went their ways homeward to their several states; part however resolved to remain, and to stand by Leonidas to the last.

It is said that Leonidas himself sent away the troops who departed, because he tendered their safety, but thought it unseemly that either he or his Spartans should quit the post which they had been especially sent to guard. For my own part, I incline to think that Leonidas gave the order, because he perceived the allies to be out of heart and unwilling to encounter the danger to which his own mind was made up. He therefore commanded them to retreat, but said that he himself could not draw back with honour; knowing that, if he stayed, glory awaited him, and that Sparta in that case would not lose her prosperity. For when the Spartans, at the very beginning of the war, sent to consult the oracle concerning it, the answer which they received from the Pythoness was, "that either Sparta must be overthrown by the barbarians, or one of her kings must perish." The prophecy was delivered in hexameter verse, and ran thus: —

"O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedæmon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
He cannot be withstood by the courage of bulls nor of lions,
Strive as they may; he is mighty as Zeus; there is nought that shall stay him,
Till he have got for his prey your king, or your glorious city."

The remembrance of this answer, I think, and the wish to secure the whole glory for the Spartans, caused Leonidas to send the allies away. This is more likely than that they quarrelled with him, and took their departure in such unruly fashion.

To me it seems no small argument in favour of this view, that the seer also who accompanied the army, Megistias, the Acarnanian, — said to have been of the blood of Melampus, and the same who was led by the appearance of the victims to warn the Greeks of the danger which threatened them, — received orders to retire (as it is certain he did) from Leonidas, that he might escape the coming destruction. Megistias, however, though bidden to depart, refused, and stayed with the army; but he had an only son present with the expedition, whom he now sent away.

So the allies, when Leonidas ordered them to retire, obeyed him and forthwith departed. Only the Thespians and the Thebans

remained with the Spartans; and of these the Thebans were kept back by Leonidas as hostages, very much against their will. The Thespians, on the contrary, stayed entirely of their own accord, refusing to retreat, and declaring that they would not forsake Leonidas and his followers. So they abode with the Spartans, and died with them. Their leader was Demophilus, the son of Diadromes.

At sunrise Xerxes made libations, after which he waited until the time when the forum is wont to fill, and then began his advance. Ephialtes had instructed him thus, as the descent of the mountain is much quicker, and the distance much shorter, than the way round the hills, and the ascent. So the barbarians under Xerxes began to draw nigh; and the Greeks under Leonidas, as they now went forth determined to die, advanced much further than on previous days, until they reached the more open portion of the pass. Hitherto they had held their station within the wall, and from this had gone forth to fight at the point where the pass was the narrowest. Now they joined battle beyond the defile, and carried slaughter among the barbarians, who fell in heaps. Behind them the captains of the squadrons, armed with whips, urged their men forward with continual blows. Many were thrust into the sea, and there perished; a still greater number were trampled to death by their own soldiers; no one heeded the dying. For the Greeks, reckless of their own safety and desperate, since they knew that, as the mountain had been crossed, their destruction was nigh at hand, exerted themselves with the most furious valour against the barbarians.

By this time the spears of the greater number were all shivered, and with their swords they hewed down the ranks of the Persians; and here, as they strove, Leonidas fell fighting bravely, together with many other famous Spartans, whose names I have taken care to learn on account of their great worthiness, as indeed I have those of all the three hundred. There fell too at the same time very many famous Persians: among them, two sons of Darius, Abrocomes and Hyperanthes, his children by Phratagune, the daughter of Artanes. Artanes was brother of King Darius, being a son of Hystaspes, the son of Arsames; and when he gave his daughter

to the king, he made him heir likewise of all his substance; for she was his only child.

Thus two brothers of Xerxes here fought and fell. And now there arose a fierce struggle between the Persians and the Lacedæmonians over the body of Leonidas, in which the Greeks four times drove back the enemy, and at last by their great bravery succeeded in bearing off the body. This combat was scarcely ended when the Persians with Ephialtes approached; and the Greeks, informed that they drew nigh, made a change in the manner of their fighting. Drawing back into the narrowest part of the pass, and retreating even behind the cross wall, they posted themselves upon a hillock, where they stood all drawn up together in one close body, except only the Thebans. The hillock whereof I speak is at the entrance of the straits, where the stone lion stands which was set up in honour of Leonidas. Here they defended themselves to the last, such as still had swords using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth; till the barbarians, who in part had pulled down the wall and attacked them in front, in part had gone round and now encircled them upon every side, overwhelmed and buried the remnant which was left beneath showers of missile weapons.

Thus nobly did the whole body of Lacedæmonians and Thespians behave. . . .

The slain were buried where they fell; and in their honour, nor less in honour of those who died before Leonidas sent the allies away, an inscription was set up, which said: —

> Here did four thousand men from Pelops' land
> Against three hundred myriads bravely stand.

This was in honour of all. Another was for the Spartans alone: —

> Go, stranger, and to Lacedæmon tell
> That here, obeying her behests, we fell.

This was for the Lacedæmonians. The seer had the following: —

> The great Megistias' tomb you here may view,
> Whom slew the Medes, fresh from Spercheius' fords.
> Well the wise seer the coming death foreknew,
> Yet scorned he to forsake his Spartan lords.

These inscriptions, and the pillars likewise, were all set up by the Amphictyons, except that in honour of Megistias, which was inscribed to him (on account of their sworn friendship) by Simonides, the son of Leoprepes.

These few lines mention two very essential characteristics of Themistocles's policy — the imaginative foresight and the practical way of facing a situation at the expense of all personal considerations. It was no easy matter to persuade any Greek city to surrender the command to another.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 7

Having taken upon himself the command of the Athenian forces, he immediately endeavoured to persuade the citizens to leave the city, and to embark upon their galleys, and meet with the Persians at a great distance from Greece; but many being against this, he led a large force, together with the Lacedæmonians, into Tempe, that in this pass they might maintain the safety of Thessaly, which had not as yet declared for the king; but when they returned without performing anything, and it was known that not only the Thessalians, but all as far as Bœotia, was going over to Xerxes, then the Athenians more willingly hearkened to the advice of Themistocles to fight by sea, and sent him with a fleet to guard the straits of Artemisium.

When the contingents met here, the Greeks would have the Lacedæmonians to command, and Eurybiades to be their admiral; but the Athenians, who surpassed all the rest together in number of vessels, would not submit to come after any other, till Themistocles, perceiving the danger of the contest, yielded his own command to Eurybiades, and got the Athenians to submit, extenuating the loss by persuading them, that if in this war they behaved themselves like men, he would answer for it after that, that the Greeks, of their own will, would submit to their command. And by this moderation of his, it is evident that he was the chief means of the deliverance of Greece, and gained the Athenians the glory of alike surpassing their enemies in valour, and their confederates in wisdom.

Herodotus, VIII, 16–19

And now the fleet of Xerxes advanced in good order to the attack, while the Greeks on their side remained quite motionless at Artemisium. The Persians therefore spread themselves, and came forward in a half-moon, seeking to encircle the Greeks on all sides, and thereby prevent them from escaping. The Greeks, when they saw this, sailed out to meet their assailants; and the battle forthwith began. In this engagement the two fleets contended with no clear advantage to either, — for the armament of Xerxes injured itself by its own greatness, the vessels falling into disorder, and oft-times running foul of one another; yet still they did not give way, but made a stout fight, since the crews felt it would indeed be a disgrace to turn and fly from a fleet so inferior in number. The Greeks therefore suffered much, both in ships and men; but the barbarians experienced a far larger loss of each. So the fleets separated after such a combat as I have described.

On the side of Xerxes the Egyptians distinguished themselves above all the combatants; for besides performing many other noble deeds, they took five vessels from the Greeks with their crews on board. On the side of the Greeks the Athenians bore off the meed of valour; and among them the most distinguished was Clinias, the son of Alcibiades, who served at his own charge with two hundred men, on board a vessel which he had himself furnished.

The two fleets, on separating, hastened very gladly to their anchorage-grounds. The Greeks, indeed, when the battle was over, became masters of the bodies of the slain and the wrecks of the vessels; but they had been so roughly handled, especially the Athenians, one-half of whose vessels had suffered damage, that they determined to break up from their station, and withdraw to the inner parts of their country.

Then Themistocles, who thought that if the Ionian and Carian ships could be detached from the barbarian fleet, the Greeks might be well able to defeat the rest, called the captains together. They met upon the sea-shore, where the Eubœans were now assembling their flocks and herds; and here Themistocles told them he thought that he knew of a plan whereby he could detach from the king

those who were of most worth among his allies. This was all that he disclosed to them of his plan at that time.

Herodotus, VIII, 22, 40–41

And now Themistocles chose out the swiftest sailers from among the Athenian vessels, and, proceeding to the various watering-places along the coast, cut inscriptions on the rocks, which were read by the Ionians the day following, on their arrival at Artemisium. The inscriptions ran thus: — "Men of Ionia, ye do wrong to fight against your own fathers, and to give your help to enslave Greece. We beseech you therefore to come over, if possible, to our side: if you cannot do this, then, we pray you, stand aloof from the contest yourselves, and persuade the Carians to do the like. If neither of these things be possible, and you are hindered, by a force too strong to resist, from venturing upon desertion, at least when we come to blows fight backwardly, remembering that you are sprung from us, and that it was through you we first provoked the hatred of the barbarian." Themistocles, in putting up these inscriptions, looked, I believe, to two chances — either Xerxes would not discover them, in which case they might bring over the Ionians to the side of the Greeks; or they would be reported to him and made a ground of accusation against the Ionians, who would thereupon be distrusted, and would not be allowed to take part in the sea-fights. . . .

Meanwhile, the Grecian fleet, which had left Artemisium, proceeded to Salamis, at the request of the Athenians, and there cast anchor. The Athenians had begged them to take up this position, in order that they might convey their women and children out of Attica, and further might deliberate upon the course which it now behoved them to follow. Disappointed in the hopes which they had previously entertained, they were about to hold a council concerning the present posture of their affairs. For they had looked to see the Peloponnesians drawn up in full force to resist the enemy in Bœotia, but found nothing of what they had expected; nay, they learnt that the Greeks of those parts, only concerning themselves about their own safety, were building a wall across the Isthmus, and intended to guard the Peloponnese, and let the rest

of Greece take its chance. These tidings caused them to make the request whereof I spoke, that the combined fleet should anchor at Salamis.

So while the rest of the fleet lay to off this island, the Athenians cast anchor along their own coast. Immediately upon their arrival, proclamation was made, that every Athenian should save his children and household as he best could; whereupon some sent their families to Egina, some to Salamis, but the greater number to Trœzen. This removal was made with all possible haste, partly from a desire to obey the advice of the oracle, but still more for another reason. The Athenians say that they have in their Acropolis a huge serpent, which lives in the temple, and is the guardian of the whole place. Nor do they only say this, but, as if the serpent really dwelt there, every month they lay out its food, which consists of a honey-cake. Up to this time the honey-cake had always been consumed; but now it remained untouched. So the priestess told the people what had happened; whereupon they left Athens the more readily, since they believed that the goddess had already abandoned the citadel. As soon as all was removed, the Athenians sailed back to their station.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 8–9

Though the fights between the Greeks and Persians in the straits of Eubœa were not so important as to make any final decision of the war, yet the experience which the Greeks obtained in them was of great advantage; for thus, by actual trial and in real danger, they found out that neither number of ships, nor riches and ornaments, nor boasting shouts, nor barbarous songs of victory, were any way terrible to men that knew how to fight, and were resolved to come hand to hand with their enemies; these things they were to despise, and to come up close and grapple with their foes. This Pindar appears to have seen, and says justly enough of the fight at Artemisium, that —

> There the sons of Athens set
> The stone that freedom stands on yet.

For the first step towards victory undoubtedly is to gain courage. Artemisium is in Eubœa, beyond the city of Histiæa, a sea-beach

open to the north; most nearly opposite to it stands Olizon, in the country which formally was under Philoctetes; there is a small temple there, dedicated to Artemis, surnamed of the Dawn, and trees about it, around which again stand pillars of white marble; and if you rub them with your hand, they send forth both the smell and colour of saffron. On one of these pillars these verses are engraved: —

> With numerous tribes from Asia's region brought
> The sons of Athens on these waters fought;
> Erecting, after they had quelled the Mede,
> To Artemis this record of the deed.

There is a place still to be seen upon this shore, where, in the middle of a great heap of sand, they take out from the bottom a dark powder like ashes, or something that has passed the fire; and here, it is supposed, the shipwrecks and bodies of the dead were burnt.

But when news came from Thermopylæ to Artemisium informing them that king Leonidas was slain, and that Xerxes had made himself master of all the passages by land, they returned back to the interior of Greece, the Athenians having the command of the rear, the place of honour and danger, and much elated by what had been done.

As Themistocles sailed along the coasts, he took notice of the harbours and fit places for the enemy's ships to come to land at, and engraved large letters in such stones as he found there by chance, as also in others which he set up on purpose near to the landing-places, or where they were to water; in which inscriptions he called upon the Ionians to forsake the Medes, if it were possible, and to come over to the Greeks, who were their proper founders and fathers, and were now hazarding all for their liberties; but, if this could not be done, at any rate to impede and disturb the Persians in all engagements. He hoped that these writings would prevail with the Ionians to revolt, or raise some trouble by making their fidelity doubtful to the Persians.

Now, though Xerxes had already passed through Doris and invaded the country of Phocis, and was burning and destroying the cities of the Phocians, yet the Greeks sent them no relief; and,

though the Athenians earnestly desired them to meet the Persians in Bœotia, before they could come into Attica, as they themselves had come forward by sea at Artemisium, they gave no ear to their requests, being wholly intent upon Peloponnesus, and resolved to gather all their forces together within the Isthmus, and to build a wall from sea to sea in that narrow neck of land; so that the Athenians were enraged to see themselves betrayed, and at the same time afflicted and dejected at their own destitution. For to fight alone against such a numerous army was to no purpose, and the only expedient now left them was to leave their city and cling to their ships; which the people were very unwilling to submit to, imagining that it would signify little now to gain a victory, and not understanding how there could be deliverance any longer after they had once forsaken the temples of their gods and exposed the tombs and monuments of their ancestors to the fury of their enemies.

4. CAPTURE OF THE ACROPOLIS

The Athenians had remained in their homes till the last possible moment and then fled in despair to neighboring spots until return was safe.

It took a long time to repair the terrible havoc wrought by the Persians on the Acropolis. Most of the buildings were razed to the ground, the statues of the gods were overturned and shattered, only to be reverently laid to rest when the Athenians returned and the great work of restoration and rebuilding on a far larger and finer scale began.

Herodotus, VIII, 50–53

As the captains from the Peloponnese were thus advising, there came an Athenian to the camp, who brought word that the barbarians had entered Attica, and were ravaging and burning everything. For the division of the army under Xerxes was just arrived at Athens from its march through Bœotia, where it had burnt Thespiæ and Platæa — both which cities were forsaken by their inhabitants, who had fled to the Peloponnese — and now it was laying

waste all the possessions of the Athenians. Thespiæ and Platæa had been burnt by the Persians, because they knew from the Thebans that neither of those cities had espoused their side. . . .

They found the city forsaken; a few people only remained in the temple, either keepers of the treasures, or men of the poorer sort. These persons having fortified the citadel with planks and boards, held out against the enemy. It was in some measure their poverty which had prevented them from seeking shelter in Salamis; but there was likewise another reason which in part induced them to remain. They imagined themselves to have discovered the true meaning of the oracle uttered by the Pythoness, which promised that "the wooden wall" should never be taken — the wooden wall, they thought, did not mean the ships, but the place where they had taken refuge.

The Persians encamped upon the hill over against the citadel, which is called Mars' hill by the Athenians, and began the siege of the place, attacking the Greeks with arrows whereto pieces of lighted tow were attached, which they shot at the barricade. And now those who were within the citadel found themselves in a most woeful case; for their wooden rampart betrayed them; still, however, they continued to resist. It was in vain that the Pisistratidæ came to them and offered terms of surrender — they stoutly refused all parley, and among their other modes of defence, rolled down huge masses of stone upon the barbarians as they were mounting up to the gates: so that Xerxes was for a long time very greatly perplexed, and could not contrive any way to take them.

At last, however, in the midst of these many difficulties, the barbarians made discovery of an access. For verily the oracle had spoken truth; and it was fated that the whole mainland of Attica should fall beneath the sway of the Persians. Right in front of the citadel, but behind the gates and the common ascent — where no watch was kept, and no one would have thought it possible that any foot of man could climb — a few soldiers mounted from the sanctuary of Aglaurus, Cecrops' daughter, notwithstanding the steepness of the precipice. As soon as the Athenians saw them upon the summit, some threw themselves headlong from the wall, and so perished; while others fled for refuge to the inner part of

the temple. The Persians rushed to the gates and opened them, after which they massacred the suppliants. When all were slain, they plundered the temple, and fired every part of the citadel.

5. SALAMIS; PREPARATIONS

Before the battle of Salamis there was much discussion over the policy to be adopted. Some favored leaving the Athenians in the lurch and withdrawing to the Peloponnesus; others advocated delaying as much as possible. Themistocles, however, realized that the best chance for the Greeks lay in taking advantage of the situation in which they found themselves — in the narrow straits, where the small number of the Greek ships would be at the least disadvantage and where the swift, light vessels could outmaneuver the heavier craft of the enemy. To accomplish this Themistocles resorted to stratagem, and also played a generous part in disregarding certain personal differences between himself and Aristides. The result bore out the wisdom and saneness of his judgment.

Herodotus, VIII, 63–64, 66

At these words of Themistocles, Eurybiades changed his determination; principally, as I believe, because he feared that if he withdrew the fleet to the Isthmus, the Athenians would sail away, and knew that without the Athenians, the rest of their ships could be no match for the fleet of the enemy. He therefore decided to remain, and give battle at Salamis.

And now, the different chiefs, notwithstanding their skirmish of words, on learning the decision of Eurybiades, at once made ready for the fight. Morning broke; and, just as the sun rose, the shock of an earthquake was felt both on shore and at sea: whereupon the Greeks resolved to approach the gods with prayer, and likewise to send and invite the Æacids to their aid. And this they did, with as much speed as they had resolved on it. Prayers were offered to all the gods; and Telamon and Ajax were invoked at once from Salamis, while a ship was sent to Egina to fetch Æacus himself, and the other Æacids. . . .

The men belonging to the fleet of Xerxes, after they had seen the Spartan dead at Thermopylæ, and crossed the channel from Trachis to Histiæa, waited there by the space of three days, and then sailing down through the Euripus, in three more came to Phalerum. In my judgment, the Persian forces both by land and sea when they invaded Attica were not less numerous than they had been on their arrival at Sepias and Thermopylæ. For against the Persian loss in the storm and at Thermopylæ, and again in the sea-fights off Artemisium, I set the various nations which had since joined the king — as the Malians, the Dorians, the Locrians, and the Bœotians — each serving in full force in his army except the last, who did not number in their ranks either the Thespians or the Platæans; and together with these, the Carystians, the Andrians, the Tenians, and the other people of the islands, who all fought on this side except the five states already mentioned. For as the Persians penetrated further into Greece, they were joined continually by fresh nations.

Herodotus, VIII, 75–76

Then Themistocles, when he saw that the Peloponnesians would carry the vote against him, went out secretly from the council, and, instructing a certain man what he should say, sent him on board a merchant ship to the fleet of the Medes. The man's name was Sicinnus; he was one of Themistocles' household slaves, and acted as tutor to his sons; in after times, when the Thespians were admitting persons to citizenship, Themistocles made him a Thespian, and a rich man to boot. The ship brought Sicinnus to the Persian fleet, and there he delivered his message to the leaders in these words: —

"The Athenian commander has sent me to you privily, without the knowledge of the other Greeks. He is a well-wisher to the king's cause, and would rather success should attend on you than on his countrymen; wherefore he bids me tell you that fear has seized the Greeks and they are meditating a hasty flight. Now then it is open to you to achieve the best work that ever ye wrought, if only ye will hinder their escaping. They no longer agree among themselves, so that they will not now make any resistance — nay, 't is likely ye may see a fight already begun between such as favour

and such as oppose your cause." The messenger, when he had thus expressed himself, departed and was seen no more.

Then the captains, believing all that the messenger had said, proceeded to land a large body of Persian troops on the islet of Psyttaleia, which lies between Salamis and the mainland; after which, about the hour of midnight, they advanced their western wing towards Salamis, so as to inclose the Greeks. At the same time the force stationed about Ceos and Cynosura moved forward, and filled the whole strait as far as Munychia with their ships. This advance was made to prevent the Greeks from escaping by flight, and to block them up in Salamis, where it was thought that vengeance might be taken upon them for the battles fought near Artemisium. The Persian troops were landed on the islet of Psyttaleia, because, as soon as the battle began, the men and wrecks were likely to be drifted thither, as the isle lay in the very path of the coming fight, — and they would thus be able to save their own men and destroy those of the enemy. All these movements were made in silence, that the Greeks might have no knowledge of them; and they occupied the whole night, so that the men had no time to get their sleep.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 11

Among the great actions of Themistocles at this crisis, the recall of Aristides was not the least, for, before the war, he had been ostracised by the party which Themistocles headed, and was in banishment; but now, perceiving that the people regretted his absence, and were fearful that he might go over to the Persians to revenge himself, and thereby ruin the affairs of Greece, Themistocles proposed a decree that those who were banished for a time might return again, to give assistance by word and deed to the cause of Greece with the rest of their fellow-citizens.

6. THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS

Herodotus, VIII, 84–85

The fleet had scarce left the land when they were attacked by the barbarians. At once most of the Greeks began to back water, and were about touching the shore, when Ameinias of Pallene, one

of the Athenian captains, darted forth in front of the line, and charged a ship of the enemy. The two vessels became entangled, and could not separate, whereupon the rest of the fleet came up to help Ameinias, and engaged with the Persians. Such is the account which the Athenians give of the way in which the battle began; but the Eginetans maintain that the vessel which had been to Egina for the Æacidæ, was the one that brought on the fight. It is also reported, that a phantom in the form of a woman appeared to the Greeks, and, in a voice that was heard from end to end of the fleet, cheered them on to the fight; first, however, rebuking them, and saying — "Strange men, how long are ye going to back water?"

Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus, the Ionians. Of these last a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 15

Then the rest, put on an equality in numbers with their foes, because the Barbarians had to attack them by detachments in the narrow strait and so ran foul of one another, routed them, though they resisted till the evening drew on, and thus "bore away," as Simonides says, "that fair and notorious victory, than which no more brilliant exploit was ever performed upon the sea, either by Hellenes or Barbarians, through the manly valor and common ardor of all who fought their ships, but through the clever judgment of Themistocles."

Herodotus, VIII, 86–89

Far the greater number of the Persian ships engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for each thought that the king's eye was upon himself.

What part the several nations, whether Greek or barbarian, took in the combat, I am not able to say for certain; Artemisia, however, I know, distinguished herself in such a way as raised her even higher than she stood before in the esteem of the king. For after confusion had spread throughout the whole of the king's fleet, and her ship was closely pursued by an Athenian trireme, she, having no way to fly, since in front of her were a number of friendly vessels, and she was nearest of all the Persians to the enemy, resolved on a measure which in fact proved her safety. Pressed by the Athenian pursuer, she bore straight against one of the ships of her own party, a Calyndian, which had Damasithymus, the Calyndian king, himself on board. I cannot say whether she had had any quarrel with the man while the fleet was at the Hellespont, or no — neither can I decide whether she of set purpose attacked his vessel, or whether it merely chanced that the Calyndian ship came in her way — but certain it is that she bore down upon his vessel and sank it, and that thereby she had the good fortune to procure herself a double advantage. For the commander of the Athenian trireme, when he saw her bear down on one of the enemy's fleet, thought immediately that her vessel was a Greek, or else had deserted from the Persians, and was now fighting on the Greek side; he therefore gave up the chase, and turned away to attack others.

Thus in the first place she saved her life by the action, and was enabled to get clear off from the battle; while further, it fell out that in the very act of doing the king an injury she raised herself to a greater height than ever in his esteem. For as Xerxes beheld the fight, he remarked (it is said) the destruction of the vessel, whereupon the bystanders observed to him — "Seest thou, master, how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk a ship of the enemy?" Then Xerxes asked if it were really Artemisia's doing; and they answered, "Certainly; for they knew her ensign:" while all made sure that the sunken vessel belonged to the opposite side. Everything, it is said, conspired to prosper the queen — it was especially fortunate for her that not one of those on board the Calyndian ship survived to become her accuser. Xerxes, they say, in reply to the remarks made to him, observed — "My men have behaved like women, my women like men!"

There fell in this combat Ariabignes, one of the chief commanders of the fleet, who was son of Darius and brother of Xerxes; and with him perished a vast number of men of high repute, Persians, Medes, and allies. Of the Greeks there died only a few; for, as they were able to swim, all those that were not slain outright by the enemy escaped from the sinking vessels and swam across to Salamis. But on the side of the barbarians more perished by drowning than in any other way, since they did not know how to swim. The great destruction took place when the ships which had been first engaged began to fly; for they who were stationed in the rear, anxious to display their valour before the eyes of the king, made every effort to force their way to the front, and thus became entangled with such of their own vessels as were retreating.

Herodotus, VIII, 91, 93, 95

When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to make their escape to Phalerum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance or fled to shore, while the Eginetans dealt with those which endeavoured to escape down the strait; so that the Persian vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than forthwith they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. . . .

The Greeks who gained the greatest glory of all in the sea-fight off Salamis were the Eginetans, and after them the Athenians. The individuals of most distinction were Polycritus the Eginetan, and two Athenians, Eumenes of Anagyrus, and Ameinias of Pallene; the latter of whom had pressed Artemisia so hard. And assuredly, if he had known that the vessel carried Artemisia on board, he would never have given over the chase till he had either succeeded in taking her, or else been taken himself. For the Athenian captains had received special orders touching the queen; and moreover a reward of ten thousand drachmas had been proclaimed for any one who should make her prisoner; since there was great indignation felt that a woman should appear in arms against Athens. However, as I said before, she escaped; and so

did some others whose ships survived the engagement; and these were all now assembled at the port of Phalerum. . . .

In the midst of the confusion Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, the Athenian, of whom I lately spoke as a man of the greatest excellence, performed the following service. He took a number of the Athenian heavy-armed troops, who had previously been stationed along the shore of Salamis, and, landing with them on the islet of Psyttaleia, slew all the Persians by whom it was occupied.

Herodotus, VIII, 97, 99

Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine to sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe, and run great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to fly; but, as he wished to hide his purpose alike from the Greeks and from his own people, he set to work to carry a mound across the channel to Salamis, and at the same time began fastening a number of Phœnician merchant ships together, to serve at once for a bridge and a wall. He likewise made many warlike preparations, as if he were about to engage the Greeks once more at sea. Now, when these things were seen, all grew fully persuaded that the king was bent on remaining, and intended to push the war in good earnest. Mardonius, however, was in no respect deceived; for long acquaintance enabled him to read all the king's thoughts. Meanwhile, Xerxes, though engaged in this way, sent off a messenger to carry intelligence of his misfortune to Persia. . . .

At Susa, on the arrival of the first message, which said that Xerxes was master of Athens, such was the delight of the Persians who had remained behind, that they forthwith strewed all the streets with myrtle boughs, and burnt incense, and fell to feasting and merriment. In like manner, when the second message reached them, so sore was their dismay, that they all with one accord rent their garments, and cried aloud, and wept and wailed without stint. They laid the blame of the disaster on Mardonius; and their

grief on the occasion was less on account of the damage done to their ships, than owing to the alarm which they felt about the safety of the king. Hence their trouble did not cease till Xerxes himself, by his arrival, put an end to their fears.

Nothing could be more dramatic than Æschylus's description of the court at Susa, stunned to silence by the awful news of the disaster. The contrast with the brave, confident setting out of the expedition is overwhelming. The breathless messenger then relates the story in answer to manifold questions and ends with a most thrilling narrative of the battle itself.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 249–259

CHORUS. All the truth for good or evil thou wilt learn without delay,
For there comes a man whose running clearly proves his Persian breed,
And methinks some certain tidings travel on his foot of speed.

Enter MESSENGER

MESSENGER. Imperial centre of vast Asia,
Land of the Persians, port and haven of wealth,
What plenitude of glory at one stroke
Is perished! Persia's flower is fallen and gone.
Ah me!
'T is evil even to herald evil news.
Yet, Persians, I must open all your grief.
The whole of the Asian army is destroyed.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 290–301

ATOSSA. I am stunned to silence; for such weight of woe
Baffles expression, making question dumb.
Yet god-appointed griefs must be endured.
Speak then in order, though thy faltering tongue
May quail in the recital, — who survives,
And whom of our commanders must we mourn?
What warrior, gifted with the marshal's wand,

Hath fallen and left his post, defenceless now?
MESS. The king yet living sees the light of day.
AT. A light of blessing for my palace home;
Fair day-spring in mid-darkness! Tell me more.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 334–371

AT. What number of the Grecian fleet so great
Emboldened them to meet our Persian men,
Thus front to front, and armèd prow to prow?
MESS. For numbers, be assured, our Asian fleet
Lacked not pre-eminence. The Greeks that day
Had ten times thirty ships, whereof were ten
Renowned for swiftness. Xerxes, well I wot,
Led full a thousand, — and, of noted speed,
Two hundred sail and seven. From such account
Judge if we seemed unequal for that fight.
Some power unearthly swayed the balance there
To countervail advantage for our loss.
The gods themselves protect Athena's town.
AT. Then Athens yet remains unsacked, unrazed?
MESS. Even unendangered while Athenians live.
AT. Whence came the encounter of the navies? Tell.
Which gave the onset? Was 't the Grecian fleet?
Or did my son in pride of strength begin?
MESS. From nothing mortal, from some angry god,
Came the beginning of that course of woe.
A man of Hellas, from the Athenian host,
Came and told Xerxes thy great son this tale:
"Let but the shades of gloomy Night come o'er,
The Hellenes will not bide, but, each his way,
Manning the benches with a rush, will seek
By covert flight to save themselves alive."
Xerxes, on hearing it, perceiving not
The envy of Heaven, nor the Greek man's guile,
Forthwith to all his admirals gave command
That when the sun had ceased to burn the ground
With ardent beams, and darkness occupied

The ætherial realm, our navy's main should then
In triple line watch o'er the passages
Of exit from the strait, while other ships
All round the isle of Aias should keep guard;
And if the Greeks escaped from death and doom,
Finding some secret outlet for their fleet,
The captains all should lose their heads.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 386–471

But when fair day with milk-white steeds appeared
And covered all the land with gladdening rays,
Then rose from that Greek armament a song
Both loud and musical, and the island rocks
Re-echoed, shouting battle. On our side
Fell disappointment, wonder and dismay,
Shattering the general hope. Not as for flight
Pealed forth the Hellenes that high Pæan-hymn,
But with good courage rallying to the fray.
All yonder side blazed with the trumpet's blare.
Then with one impulse, at the pilot's word,
All oars were dipped and smote the seething brine,
And swiftly their whole battle hove in view.
Their right wing in good order led the way,
Then all their navy followed; then one heard
A cry that grew: "Sons of Hellenes, on!
Save Hellas, save your children, save your wives,
Your fathers' graves, the temples of their gods,
From slavery! Fight, to defend your all!"
Then from a sea of Persian voices roared
The counter clamour. For the hour was come.
Now ship smote ship with brazen-pointed prow.
A Greek began that onslaught, tearing off
All the ornature from a Sidonian hull.
Then on and on, with ships for spears, they fought.
The Persian fleet, in a perpetual stream,
At first appeared invincible; but when
Their numbers in the narrows packed and hemmed

Grew dense, they cracked their oarage in the crowd,
And smote each other with their beaks of brass,
And none might help his fellow. Ware of this,
The Grecian shipmasters with cunning skill
Justled us round and round, — till hulls capsized,
And all the sea was hidden from our sight,
With wrecks and human carnage covered o'er.
The cliffs and jutting reefs were thronged with dead,
And every vessel left in the Asian fleet
Rowed hard for safety in disordered rout,
But they, like men who have tunnies in the net,
With fragments of snapped oars, splinters of wreck,
Smote, hacked and slew, that all that reach of sea
With wailing cries and shouts of triumphing
Resounded, till work-baffling night came down.
Ten days on end would not suffice to tell,
In ceaseless talk, the whole account of woe.
Let this suffice thee; never heretofore
Died in one day so vast a number of men.

AT. Woe, woe! What floods of sorrow are unbound
For Persia, and the whole Barbarian world!

MESS. Know thou, the grief of griefs is yet to come.
Such dire calamity befell them there,
That more than twice outweighed what hath been told.

AT. What chance could be more dire than that we have heard?
Declare, what onslaught of calamity
Came on the host, transcending all that woe?

MESS. What Persian men were there of noblest strain,
For birth and valour of spirit most approved,
Foremost in constant service to the king,
Most cruel deaths ingloriously have died.

AT. O loss ineffable! O cruel blow!
How mean'st thou these have perished? By what doom?

MESS. In front of Salamis an island lies,
Small, rough for moorage, which dance-loving Pan
Haunts with light hoof, roving the seaward ground.

There planted Xerxes that choice band, that when
The broken foemen on that island shore
Sought refuge, they might take the helpless prey
And kill them, rescuing from the narrow seas
What friends might drift there.
Badly he foresaw
Futurity. For when the God had given
To Greece the glory of that fight, forthwith
In the afternoon, before the sun was low,
They cased them in their armour, and leapt forth
From shipboard, and encircled all that isle.
Our nobles knew not where to turn. Then came
The crashing stones from stalwart hands, then flew
The life-destroying arrow from the string.
Last, in one roaring flood from every side
They rushed and closed them round with havoc dire,
And smote and hewed them limb from limb, until
Those princely lives, to a man, were all extinct.
Xerxes beheld and groaned, o'erwhelmed with woe.
A seat was his commanding all the host,
A lofty mound near to the open sea.
Whence, with loud cries, and rending of his robes,
He rose in sudden haste, and passed the word
For the land army to retreat: then rushed
To headlong flight. — Such dire calamity
Beside the former calls for thy lament.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 477–512

AT. But tell us of the remnant of the fleet,
Where didst thou leave them? Canst thou certify?
MESS. The captains of what ships remained afloat
Sailed down the wind in rash disordered flight.
Meantime the escaping army suffered loss,
Some perishing of thirst by the clear wells
In wide Bœotia, while the rest of us,
Hungry and scant of breath, passed on within
Phocis and Doris and the Melian shore,

Where mild Spercheius laves a smiling land.
From thence the borders of Achaia's plain
And towns of Thessaly received our host,
Hardly bested and hungering: there most died,
Of thirst and famine. Both were in the extreme.
Yet moved we onward through Magnesian wastes
To Macedonia, crossing Axius' fords,
And passing Bolbe's waving reeds; then came
To Mount Pangaion and the Edonians' land.
That night, against the season of the year,
By Providence Divine a wintry storm
Made hard with ice the Strymon's holy stream,
That men who erst had set the gods at nought
Bowed down and worshipped, praising Earth and Heaven.
When those loud prayers were ended, all the host
Began to cross the ice-encrusted ford.
But only those who started ere the sun
Had shed abroad his beams remain alive.
For the bright orb with radiant warmth dissolved
And sundered the mid passage: down they fell,
Heaped on each other: he was fortunate
Who in that throng first yielded up his breath.
Not many are they who 'scaped, and with much toil
Hardly have passed through Thracia to a land
Where friendly hearths received them. Persia mourns
The loss of all that youth, her dearest flower.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Persians*, 787–828

CHO. Say, Lord Dareius, what shall be the end?
How shall we Persians meet the time to come,
How make the best of fortune?
DAREIUS. Nevermore
Wage wars on Hellas, though the Median host
Be thrice so many. For the country there
Fights for her sons.
CHO. How meanst thou that the land
Fights for her men?

DAR. The more assailants come
The more she kills by famine.
CHO. Then we 'll raise
A chosen band of warriors able and few.
DAR. Not even the remnant that remains behind
To range through Hellas, shall return alive.
CHO. How? Doth not all that force of Eastern men
Pass Helle's ford from Europe hitherward?
DAR. Few out of all that multitude — if aught
Of credence to Heaven's oracles be due
From him who, looking on to-day's event,
Sees their fulfilment absolute and clear.
For thus 't is prophesied. Through idle hope
Xerxes will leave the choicest of his men
To winter where Asopus with cool rills
Waters the plain, giving Bœotia's land
A draught right welcome. What awaits them there?
Vengeance condign for impious violence.
They came to Hellas, and were not afraid
To plunder shrines and burn the temples down.
No reverence held them; — altars laid in dust,
Statues uprooted from their pedestals,
All things divine o'erturned, attest their guilt.
Nor shall their punishment be less: — they suffer
Even now, and more shall suffer; still that fount
Is gushing, unexhausted, unexplored.
Platæa's plain shall prove it, pasted over
With blood of slaughter from the Spartan spear.
Three generations hence those heaps of slain
Voiceless shall blazon to posterity
Loud warnings against human pride. That flower
Soon falls, and yields calamity for fruit,
Unlooked-for harvest of dire misery.
Mark well the wages of their sin, and bear
Hellas and Athens ever in mind. Let none,
Raising his heart above the things he hath
In passionate love for plans unrealized,

Make shipwreck of great fortune. Zeus brings on
His inquisition at the destined hour,
A judge severe to punish boastful thoughts.

Salamis no less than Marathon was sung by the contemporary poets; the brilliant Pindar and the sympathetic Simonides both refer to it in noble verse.

Simonides's epigram was inscribed on stone and set up for all to read; and when it had fallen into a dilapidated condition it was restored by the chief priest, Helladius, as this fragmentary inscription states.

PINDAR, *Isthm.*, IV, 48

Many arrows hath my truthful tongue in store wherewith to sound the praises of her sons: and even but now in war might Aias' city, Salamis, bear witness thereto in her deliverance by Aigina's seamen amid the destroying tempest of Zeus, when death came thick as hail on the unnumbered hosts.

Hicks and Hill, 17

HEADING DRAWN UP BY HELLADIUS

Since the inscription of those heroes who fell in the Persian War and who lie here was damaged by time, Helladius the chief priest caused it to be rewritten in honour of the dead and of the city. Simonides wrote it.

Simonides, 107

EPIGRAM

Desiring to speed the day of freedom for Hellas and the Megarians, we received the fate of death; some by the steep mountain of Eubœa, where is the precinct of holy Artemis who bears the bow, some in the mountain of Mycale, some before Salamis (after destroying utterly the ships of the Phœnicians), some too in the Bœotian plain, who dared to fight hand to hand against mounted men. Our townsmen gave this honour to us, dead, in the centre of the thronged agora of Nisæa.

NOTE BY HELLADIUS

Up to my time the city has sacrificed a bull.

7. PLATÆA

The final act had now come and Persia made her last effort at conquest. As the victory at Salamis was due chiefly to the Athenians, so the success at Platæa was largely the work of the Lacedæmonians.

Herodotus, IX, 61–65

The Athenians, as soon as they received this message, were anxious to go to the aid of the Spartans, and to help them to the uttermost of their power; but, as they were upon the march, the Greeks on the king's side, whose place in the line had been opposite theirs, fell upon them, and so harassed them by their attacks that it was not possible for them to give the succour they desired. Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, and the Tegeans — whom nothing could induce to quit their side — were left alone to resist the Persians. Including the light-armed, the number of the former was 50,000; while that of the Tegeans was 3000. Now, therefore, as they were about to engage with Mardonius and the troops under him, they made ready to offer sacrifice. The victims, however, for some time were not favourable; and, during the delay, many fell on the Spartan side, and a still greater number were wounded. For the Persians had made a rampart of their wicker shields, and shot from behind them such clouds of arrows, that the Spartans were sorely distressed. The victims continued unpropitious; till at last Pausanias raised his eyes to the Heræum of the Platæans, and calling the goddess to his aid, besought her not to disappoint the hopes of the Greeks.

As he offered his prayer, the Tegeans, advancing before the rest, rushed forward against the enemy; and the Lacedæmonians, who had obtained favourable omens the moment that Pausanias prayed, at length, after their long delay, advanced to the attack; while the Persians, on their side, left shooting, and prepared to meet them. And first the combat was at the wicker shields.

Afterwards, when these were swept down, a fierce contest took place by the side of the temple of Demeter, which lasted long, and ended in a hand-to-hand struggle. The barbarians many times seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers, untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan ranks, and so perished.

The fight went most against the Greeks, where Mardonius, mounted upon a white horse, and surrounded by the bravest of all the Persians, the thousand picked men, fought in person. So long as Mardonius was alive, this body resisted all attacks, and, while they defended their own lives, struck down no small number of Spartans; but after Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of the army, perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians, and took to flight. Their light clothing, and want of bucklers, were of the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defence.

Then was the warning of the oracle fulfilled; and the vengeance which was due to the Spartans for the slaughter of Leonidas was paid them by Mardonius — then too did Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, and grandson of Anaxandrides (I omit to recount his other ancestors, since they are the same with those of Leonidas), win a victory exceeding in glory all those to which our knowledge extends. Mardonius was slain by Arimnestus, a man famous in Sparta — the same who in the Messenian war, which came after the struggle against the Medes, fought a battle near Stenyclerus with but three hundred men against the whole force of the Messenians, and himself perished, and the three hundred with him.

The Persians, as soon as they were put to flight by the Lacedæmonians, ran hastily away, without preserving any order, and took refuge in their own camp, within the wooden defence which they had raised in the Theban territory. It is a marvel to me how it came to pass, that although the battle was fought quite close to the grove of Demeter, yet not a single Persian appears to have died on

the sacred soil, nor even to have set foot upon it, while round about the precinct, in the unconsecrated ground, great numbers perished. I imagine — if it is lawful, in matters which concern the gods, to imagine anything — that the goddess herself kept them out, because they had burnt her dwelling at Eleusis. Such, then, was the issue of this battle.

PINDAR, *Pyth.*, I, 75

From Salamis shall I of Athenians take reward of thanks, at Sparta when I shall tell in a song to come of the battle before Kithairon, wherein the Medes that bear crooked bows were overthrown, but by the fair-watered banks of Himeras it shall be for the song I have rendered to the sons of Deinomenes, which by their valour they have earned, since the men that warred against them are overthrown.

Sparta did not wear her honors gracefully. Her king erected an arrogant epigram on the famous tripod that was dedicated at Delphi, but the Lacedæmonians erased this and added the list of cities who had shared in the victories.

The base which supported the tripod was in the form of three intertwined serpents, and the names on their coils may still be seen in the Hippodrome at Constantinople, where the monument was carried at some time after Pausanias had seen it at Delphi.[1]

Thucydides, I, 132

But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:—

> The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
> This monument, that Phœbus might be praised.

[1] See Pausanias, X, xiii, 5, and Frazer's note; also Hicks and Hill, 19 and note. Further dedicatory offerings are spoken of by Pausanias at Olympia (V, xxiii, 1–2), and at Platæa (IX, ii, 4), and there must have been many others.

At the time the Lacedæmonians had at once erased the couplet, and inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of the barbarian and dedicated the offering.

Pausanias, V, xxiii, 1–2

Passing by the entrance to the Council House you come to a standing image of Zeus without an inscription. Then turning to the north you will come to another image of Zeus, which looks towards the rising sun: it was dedicated by the Greeks who fought at Platæa against Mardonius and the Medes. There are also engraved on the right side of the pedestal the names of the cities that took part in the battle, first the Lacedæmonians, next the Athenians, third and fourth the Corinthians and Sicyonians, fifth the Aeginetans, next the Megarians and Epidaurians, the Arcadians of Tegea and Orchomenus, and after them the peoples of Phlius, Trœzen, and Hermion, the Tirynthians of Argolis, the Platæans (the only Bœotian people), the Argives of Mycenæ, the islanders of Ceos and Melos, the Ambraciots of Thesprotis in Epirus, the Tenians and Lepreans. The Lepreans were the only people from Triphylia, but the Tenians were not the only people from the Aegean and the Cyclades, there were also Naxians and Cythnians, also Styrians from Eubœa. After these, there were the Eleans and Potidæans and Anactorians, and, lastly, the Chalcidians of the Euripus.

Pausanias, IX, ii, 4

Just at the entrance into Platæa are the graves of the men who fought against the Medes. There are separate graves for the Lacedæmonians and Athenians who fell, and elegies of Simonides are carved upon them. The rest of the Greeks are buried in a common tomb. Not far from this common tomb is an altar of Zeus of Freedom. . . . It is of bronze; but the altar and image of Zeus are made of white marble. They still celebrate games called the Eleutheria ("games of freedom") every fourth year, at which the chief prizes offered are for running. They run in armour in front of the altar. The trophy which the Greeks set up for the battle of Platæa stands about fifteen furlongs from the city.

PLUTARCH, *Aristides*, 19

Of those who contended in behalf of Hellas, there fell in all one thousand three hundred and sixty. Of these, fifty-two were Athenians, all of the Æantid tribe, according to Clidemus, which made the bravest contest (for which reason the Æantids used to sacrifice regularly to the Sphragitic nymphs the sacrifice ordained by the Pythian oracle for the victory, receiving the expenses therefor from the public funds); ninety-one were Lacedæmonians, and sixteen were men of Tegea.

Astonishing, therefore, is the statement of Herodotus, where he says that these one hundred fifty-nine represented the only Hellenes who engaged the enemy, and that not one of the rest did so. Surely the total number of those who fell, as well as the monuments erected over them, testifies that the success was a common one. Besides, had the men of three cities only made the contest, while the rest sat idly by, the altar would not have been inscribed as it was:

> Here did the Hellenes, flushed with a victory granted by Ares
> Over the routed Persians, together, for Hellas delivered,
> Build them an altar of Zeus, Zeus as Deliverer known.

8. MYCALE

The navy in the meantime had not been idle. The victory at Mycale took place on the same day as the battle of Platæa. This freed a good part of the Aegean from Persian dominion.

Herodotus, IX, 96–97, 100–101, 106

The Greeks, as soon as the victims were favourable, put to sea, and sailed across from Delos to Samos. Arriving off Calami, a place upon the Samian coast, they brought the fleet to an anchor near the temple of Hera which stands there, and prepared to engage the Persians by sea. These latter, however, no sooner heard of the approach of the Greeks, than, dismissing the Phœnician ships, they sailed away with the remainder to the mainland. For it had been resolved in council not to risk a battle, since the Persian fleet was thought to be no match for that of the enemy. They fled, therefore, to the main, to be under the protection of their land

army, which now lay at Mycale, and consisted of the troops left behind by Xerxes to keep guard over Ionia. This was an army of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranes, a Persian of more than common beauty and stature. The captains resolved therefore to betake themselves to these troops for defence, to drag their ships ashore, and to build a rampart around them, which might at once protect the fleet, and serve likewise as a place of refuge for themselves.

Having so resolved, the commanders put out to sea; and passing the temple of the Eumenides, arrived at Gæson and Scolopoeis, which are in the territory of Mycale. Here is a temple of Eleusinian Demeter, built by Philistus the son of Pasicles, who came to Asia with Neileus the son of Codrus, what time he founded Miletus. At this place they drew the ships up on the beach, and surrounded them with a rampart made of stones and trunks of trees, cutting down for this purpose all the fruit-trees which grew near, and defending the barrier by means of stakes firmly planted in the ground. Here they were prepared either to win a battle, or undergo a siege — their thoughts embracing both chances. . . .

The Greeks now, having finished their preparations, began to move towards the barbarians; when, lo! as they advanced, a rumour flew through the host from one end to the other — that the Greeks had fought and conquered the army of Mardonius in Bœotia. At the same time a herald's wand was observed lying upon the beach. Many things prove to me that the gods take part in the affairs of man. How else, when the battles of Mycale and Platæa were about to happen on the selfsame day, should such a rumour have reached the Greeks in that region, greatly cheering the whole army, and making them more eager than before to risk their lives.

A strange coincidence too it was, that both the battles should have been fought near a precinct of Eleusinian Demeter. The fight at Platæa took place, as I said before, quite close to one of Demeter's temples; and now the battle at Mycale was to be fought hard by another. Rightly, too, did the rumour run, that the Greeks with Pausanias *had gained* their victory; for the fight at Platæa fell early in the day, whereas that at Mycale was towards evening.

That the two battles were really fought on the same day of the same month became apparent when inquiries were made a short time afterwards. Before the rumour reached them, the Greeks were full of fear, not so much on their own account, as for their countrymen, and for Greece herself, lest she should be worsted in her struggle with Mardonius. But when the voice fell on them, their fear vanished, and they charged more vigorously and at a quicker pace. So the Greeks and the barbarians rushed with like eagerness to the fray; for the Hellespont and the Islands formed the prize for which they were about to fight. . . .

The Greeks, when they had slaughtered the greater portion of the barbarians, either in the battle or in the rout, set fire to their ships and burnt them, together with the bulwark which had been raised for their defence, first however removing therefrom all the booty, and carrying it down to the beach. Besides other plunder, they found here many caskets of money. When they had burnt the rampart and the vessels, the Greeks sailed away to Samos, and there took counsel together concerning the Ionians, whom they thought of removing out of Asia. Ionia they proposed to abandon to the barbarians; and their doubt was, in what part of their own possessions in Greece they should settle its inhabitants. For it seemed to them a thing impossible that they should be ever on the watch to guard and protect Ionia; and yet otherwise there could be no hope that the Ionians would escape the vengeance of the Persians. Hereupon the Peloponnesian leaders proposed, that the seaport towns of such Greeks as had sided with the Medes should be taken away from them, and made over to the Ionians. The Athenians, on the other hand, were very unwilling that any removal at all should take place, and misliked the Peloponnesians holding councils concerning their colonists. So, as they set themselves against the change, the Peloponnesians yielded with a good will. Hereupon the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders, who had helped the Greeks at this time, were received into the league of the allies; and took the oaths, binding themselves to be faithful, and not desert the common cause. Then the Greeks sailed away to the Hellespont, where they meant to break down the bridges, which they supposed to be still extended across the strait.

9. IMPORTANCE OF THE WAR FOR ATHENS

Thucydides in the following passage sums up the Athenians' own statement of their services to Greece during the Persian Wars.

Thucydides, I, 73–74

" But to the Median war and contemporary history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you are so ill-advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part of his army.

" Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz. the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing

our property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably attained."

10. THEMISTOCLES

The Athenians with customary fickleness refused to stand by Themistocles during the latter part of his career, and in a spirit of basest ingratitude had him banished.

Probably few men in history who have rendered enormous services to their country have been reviled more than he. One of his most spiteful critics was Timocreon of Rhodes, whose witty though manifestly unfair abuse spread like wildfire. His own statement shows him to have been anything but unprejudiced, and he did much harm to the reputation of Themistocles. When, however, we consider the judgment of two of the keenest critics of antiquity, Plutarch and especially Thucydides, and see how they estimated the great Athenian's ability and achievements we can relegate Timocreon to the obscurity from which he ought never to have emerged.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 20–21

When the Lacedæmonians proposed, at the general council of the Amphictyonians, that the representatives of those cities which were not in the league, nor had fought against the Persians, should be excluded, Themistocles, fearing that the Thessalians, with those of Thebes, Argos, and others, being thrown out of the council, the Lacedæmonians would become wholly masters of the votes, and do what they pleased, supported the deputies of the cities, and prevailed with the members then sitting to alter their opinion on this point, showing them that there were but one-and-thirty cities which had partaken in the war, and that most of these, also, were very small; how intolerable would it be, if the rest of Greece should be excluded, and the general council should come to be ruled by two or three great cities. By this, chiefly, he incurred the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians, whose honours and favours were now shown to Cimon, with a view to making him the opponent of the state policy of Themistocles.

He was also burdensome to the confederates, sailing about the islands and collecting money from them. Herodotus says, that, requiring money of those of the island of Andros, he told them that he had brought with him two goddesses, Persuasion and Force; and they answered him that they had also two great goddesses, which prohibited them from giving him any money, Poverty and Impossibility. Timocreon, the Rhodian poet, reprehends him somewhat bitterly for being wrought upon by money to let some who were banished return, while abandoning himself, who was his guest and friend. The verses are these: —

Pausanias you may praise, and Xanthippus, he be for,
For Leutychidas, a third; Aristides, I proclaim,
From the sacred Athens came.
The one true man of all; for Themistocles Latona doth abhor,
The liar, traitor, cheat, who to gain his filthy pay,
Timocreon, his friend, neglected to restore
To his native Rhodian shore;
Three silver talents took, and departed (curses with him) on his way,
Restoring people here, expelling there, and killing here,
Filling evermore his purse: and at the Isthmus gave a treat,
To be laughed at, of cold meat,
Which they ate, and prayed the gods some one else might give the feast another year.

But after the sentence and banishment of Themistocles, Timocreon reviles him yet more immoderately and wildly in a poem that begins thus: —

> Unto all the Greeks repair,
> O Muse, and tell these verses there,
> As is fitting and is fair.

The story is, that it was put to the question whether Timocreon should be banished for siding with the Persians, and Themistocles gave his vote against him. So when Themistocles was accused of intriguing with the Medes, Timocreon made these lines upon him: —

> So now Timocreon, indeed, is not the sole friend of the Mede,
> There are some knaves besides; nor is it only mine that fails,
> But other foxes have lost tails. —

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 22

At length the Athenians banished him, making use of the ostracism to humble his eminence and authority, as they ordinarily did with all whom they thought too powerful, or, by their greatness, disproportionable to the equality thought requisite in a popular government. For the ostracism was instituted, not so much to punish the offender, as to mitigate and pacify the violence of the envious, who delighted to humble eminent men, and who, by fixing this disgrace upon them, might vent some part of their rancour.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 17

Herodotus writes, that of all the cities of Greece, Ægina was held to have performed the best service in the war; while all single men yielded to Themistocles, though, out of envy, unwillingly; and when they returned to the entrance of Peloponnesus, where the several commanders delivered their suffrages at the altar, to determine who was most worthy, every one gave the first vote for himself and the second for Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians carried him with them to Sparta, where, giving the rewards of valour to Eurybiades, and of wisdom and conduct to Themistocles, they crowned him with olive, presented him with the best chariot in the city, and sent three hundred young men to accompany him to the

confines of their country. And at the next Olympic games, when Themistocles entered the course, the spectators took no farther notice of those who were contesting the prizes, but spent the whole day in looking upon him, showing him to the strangers, admiring him, and applauding him by clapping their hands, and other expressions of joy, so that he himself, much gratified, confessed to his friends that he then reaped the fruit of all his labours for the Greeks.

Pausanias, VIII, 1, 3

Not long afterwards, when the Argives were celebrating the Nemean games, it chanced that Philopœmen was present at the competition of the minstrels. Pylades, a native of Megalopolis, and the most famous minstrel of his time, who had gained a Pythian victory, was singing an air of Timotheus the Milesian, called "The Persians." Scarcely had he struck up the song —

The glorious crown of freedom who giveth to Greece —

when all the people turned and looked at Philopœmen, and with clapping of hands signified that the song referred to him. I have heard that much the same thing happened to Themistocles at Olympia: the people in the theatre stood up to do him honour.

Thucydides, I, 138

For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.

II. The Western Greeks

1. RISE OF GELON

While these stirring events were taking place in Greece, the Greek settlements in Sicily were the scene of great activity. Gelon had become tyrant of Syracuse, with many cities under his sway, and he was sought as an ally against Persia. Circumstances in Sicily, the rivalry of other cities, the impending invasion by Carthage, and the troubles with the Etruscans made it impossible to comply with the request. Gelon was successful in all these affairs at home.

He and his family were very rich and generous and sent fine offerings to Olympia and Delphi. Some were for victories in war, others for victories in the games, particularly in horse-races. Several of the most splendid of Pindar's odes were written to commemorate these victories.

Herodotus, VII, 155–156

When, however, Hippocrates, after a reign of the same length as that of Cleander his brother, perished near the city Hybla, as he was warring with the native Sicilians, then Gelo, pretending to espouse the cause of the two sons of Hippocrates, Eucleides and Cleander, defeated the citizens who were seeking to recover their freedom, and having so done, set aside the children, and himself took the kingly power. After this piece of good fortune, Gelo likewise became master of Syracuse, in the following manner. The Syracusan landholders, as they were called, had been driven from their city by the common people assisted by their own slaves, the Cyllyrians, and had fled to Casmenæ. Gelo brought them back to Syracuse, and so got possession of the town; for the people surrendered themselves, and gave up their city on his approach.

Being now master of Syracuse, Gelo cared less to govern Gela, which he therefore entrusted to his brother Hiero, while he strengthened the defences of his new city, which indeed was now all in all to him. And Syracuse sprang up rapidly to power and became a flourishing place. For Gelo razed Camarina to the ground, and

brought all the inhabitants to Syracuse, and made them citizens; he also brought thither more than half the citizens of Gela, and gave them the same rights as the Camarinæans. So likewise with the Megarians of Sicily — after besieging their town and forcing them to surrender, he took the rich men, who, having made the war, looked now for nothing less than death at his hands, and carrying them to Syracuse, established them there as citizens; while the common people, who, as they had not taken any share in the struggle, felt secure that no harm would be done to them, he carried likewise to Syracuse, where he sold them all as slaves to be conveyed abroad. He did the like also by the Eubœans of Sicily, making the same difference. His conduct towards both nations arose from his belief, that a "people" was a most unpleasant companion. In this way Gelo became a great king.

2. VICTORIES OVER CARTHAGE AND THE ETRUSCANS

Herodotus, VII, 165–166

They, however, who dwell in Sicily, say that Gelo, though he knew that he must serve under the Lacedæmonians, would nevertheless have come to the aid of the Greeks, had not it been for Terillus, the son of Crinippus, king of Himera; who, driven from his city by Thero, the son of Ænesidemus, king of Agrigentum, brought into Sicily at this very time an army of three hundred thousand men, Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligurians, Helisycians, Sardinians, and Corsicans, under the command of Hamilcar the son of Hanno, king of the Carthaginians. Terillus prevailed upon Hamilcar, partly as his sworn friend, but more through the zealous aid of Anaxilaus the son of Cretines, king of Rhegium; who, by giving his own sons to Hamilcar as hostages, induced him to make the expedition. Anaxilaus herein served his own father-in-law; for he was married to a daughter of Terillus, by name Cydippe. So, as Gelo could not give the Greeks any aid, he sent (they say) the sum of money to Delphi.

They say too, that the victory of Gelo and Thero in Sicily over Hamilcar the Carthaginian, fell out upon the very day that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Salamis. Hamilcar, who was a Carthaginian on his father's side only, but on his mother's a Syracusan, and who had been raised by his merit to the throne of

Carthage, after the battle and the defeat, as I am informed, disappeared from sight: Gelo made the strictest search for him, but he could not be found anywhere, either dead or alive.

Diodorus Siculus, XI, 51 (tr. Booth, Vol. I, p. 401)

When Acestorides was archon at Athens, and Cæsio Fabius and T. Virginius consuls of Rome, at that time Hiero king of Syracuse (at the request of the citizens of Cuma in Italy, by their ambassadors, who were greatly annoyed by the Etruscans) sent a considerable fleet to their assistance, who joining battle with the Etruscans of Tyrrhenia, in a sea-fight sunk several of their ships, and obtained a complete victory, and so the power of the Etruscans being broken, they returned to Syracuse.

At the sumptuous courts of Gelon and of Hieron were gathered many of the most famous writers of Greece. Even from a very early date Sicily was identified with poets, but at this time Æschylus, Pindar, Simonides, Bacchylides (to mention only a few) frequented the courts of the tyrants of Sicily.

Pindar, *Pyth.*, I, 71

I pray thee, son of Kronos, grant that the Phœnician and the Tuscan war-cry be hushed at home, since they have beheld the calamity of their ships that befell them before Cumæ, even how they were smitten by the captain of the Syracusans, who from their swift ships hurled their youth into the sea, to deliver Hellas from the bondage of the oppressor.

Pindar, *Ol.*, VI, 92

And bid them make mention of Syracuse and Ortygia, which Hieron ruleth with righteous sceptre devising true counsels, and doth honour to Demeter whose footsteps make red the corn, and to the feast of her daughter with white steeds, and to the might of Aetnaean Zeus. Also he is well known of the sweet voices of the song and lute. Let not the on-coming time break his good fortune. And with joyful welcome may he receive this triumphal song, which travelleth from home to home, leaving Stymphalos' walls, the mother-city of Arcadia, rich in flocks.

PINDAR, *Pyth.*, III, 68

And then in a ship would I have sailed, cleaving the Ionian sea, to the fountain of Arethusa, to the home of my Aitnaian friend, who ruleth at Syracuse, a king of good will to the citizens, not envious of the good, to strangers wondrous fatherly. Had I but landed there and brought unto him a twofold joy, first golden health and next this my song of triumph to be a splendour in his Pythian crown, which of late Pherenikos won by his victory at Kirrha — I say that then should I have come unto him, after that I had passed over the deep sea, a farther-shining light than any heavenly star.

The following inscriptions were on bases at Delphi which formerly supported tripods.

Hicks and Hill, 16

Gelon the Syracusan, son of Dinomenes, dedicated (these) to Apollo. Bion the Milesian, son of Diodorus, made the tripod and the Victory.

Simonides, 141

I say that Gelon, Hieron, Polyzalus, Thrasybulus, sons of Dinomenes, set up the tripod when they had defeated the barbarian nations, and that they held out the hand of a strong ally to the Greeks in the struggle for freedom.[1]

Among the most famous inscriptions extant is this one on a bronze helmet now in the British Museum (Walters, "Catalogue of Bronzes," 250).

Hicks and Hill, 22

Hieron son of Dinomenes and the Syracusans to Zeus, these Etruscan spoils from Cyme.

Simonides, 109

Those who were bringing to Phœbus the first fruits from the Tyrrhenians,[2] one sea, one night, one grave buried with due honours.

[1] Diodorus, XI, xxvi, 7, mentions four tripods offered out of the Carthaginian spoils. On the epigram of Simonides see Hicks and Hill, 16 and note.

[2] Bergk reads "Sparta."

Pausanias, VIII, xlii, 9

For at the time when Xerxes crossed into Europe, Gelo, son of Dinomenes, was tyrant of Syracuse and of all the rest of Sicily; but when Gelo died, the sovereignty devolved on his brother Hiero; and as Hiero died before he dedicated to Olympian Zeus the offerings which he had vowed for his victories in the chariot-race, they were offered by his son Dinomenes in his stead. These offerings are also works of Onatas; and there are inscriptions at Olympia. The one over the votive offering is this: —

> For his victories in thy august contest, Olympian Zeus,
> One victory with the four-horse car, and two with the race-horse,
> Hiero bestowed these gifts on thee: they were dedicated by his son,
> Dinomenes, in memory of his Syracusan sire.

The other inscription runs: —

> Onatas, son of Micon, wrought me:
> He dwelt in a house in the isle of Aegina.

III. Various Battles of the Persian War

The following poems are selections from the writings of Simonides in commemoration of various battles during the contest.

Fragments of Simonides

Epig. 90

The Athenians, fighting in the van of the Greeks at Marathon, brought low the power of the Medes, decked in gold.

Epig. 133

Me, the goat-footed, Arcadian Pan, who stood against Persia, fighting for the Athenians, Miltiades placed here.

Lyric frag. 4

Of those who died at Thermopylæ glorious is the fate and fair the destiny. No tomb for them, but an altar; no tears, but fame instead, and, for lamentation, praise. A monument like this, rust shall not corrupt nor time that destroys all else. (Tr. Wright.)

This sepulchre of valiant men has received the fair fame of Hellas to dwell therein; and a witness is Leonidas the Spartan king who has left a great glory of valour and eternal fame.

Epig. 91

Here once four thousand from Peloponnesus fought against three hundred thousand.

Epig. 92 (tr. Murray)

Stranger, bear word to the Spartans that we lie here obedient to their charge.

Epig. 94

This is the monument of famous Megistias, whom the Medes slew when they left the Spercheus river, a prophet, who knowing well the fates that were to come, had not the heart to abandon the leaders of Sparta.

Epig. 95

Glorious the soil, Leonidas, king of spacious Sparta, that covers those who died here with you when they had withstood the shock of many arrows and of swift-footed horses and men of the Medes in war.

Epig. 93

Opous, mother-city of the Locrians with their just laws, mourns for those who perished on behalf of Hellas against the Medes.

Epig. 135

After the Athenians had defeated the hosts of men of every race from the land of Asia in a naval battle once in this sea, when the army of the Medes had perished, they dedicated these memorials to the virgin Artemis.

Epig. 96

Stranger, once we dwelt in the well-watered citadel of Corinth, but now Salamis, the island of Ajax, holds us. Here we destroyed the Phœnician and Persian ships and the Medes, and rescued holy Hellas.

Epig. 97

All Hellas balanced on the razor's edge we saved from slavery with our own lives, and here we lie. But we fastened on the proud

Persians all sorts of ills, memories of the hard sea-fight. Though Salamis holds our bones, Corinth our fatherland has set up this memorial for our service.

Epig. 98

This is the grave of that Adimantus through whose counsel Hellas crowned herself with freedom.

Epig. 136

Democritus was the third leader in the battle, when the Greeks by Salamis engaged with the Medes upon the sea; he took and destroyed five ships, and a sixth, a Dorian boat, he saved from capture by barbarian hands.

Epig. 134

These weapons of the hostile Medes the sailors of Diodorus dedicated to Leto as a memento of the naval battle.

Epig. 139

The saviours of the broad land of Hellas dedicated this tripod, when they had freed their cities from hateful slavery.

Epig. 84

And in the midst of the fighters those who inhabit Ephyre, with many springs, well versed in all valorous deeds of war, and those who dwell in the city of Glaucus, the citadel of Corinth, who have as fairest witness of their struggles the golden sun shining in the ether, which will exalt the broad-spread fame of their fathers and themselves.

Epig. 138

Pausanias, the leader of the Greeks, when he had destroyed the army of the Medes, dedicated this memorial to Apollo.

Epig. 140

The Greeks, through power of victory by the work of Ares, trusting in the brave temper of their souls, when they had driven out the Persians set up this altar of Zeus of Freedom in the name of free Hellas.

Epig. 100 (tr. Mackail)

If to die nobly is the chief part of excellence, to us out of all men Fortune gave this lot; for hastening to set a crown of freedom on Hellas, we lie possessed of praise that grows not old.

Epig. 99 (tr. Mackail)

These men having set a crown of imperishable glory on their own land were folded in the dark cloud of death; yet being dead they have not died, since from on high their excellence raises them gloriously out of the house of Hades.

Epig. 101

The sons of the Athenians who drove back the army of the Persians, kept off bitter slavery from their country.

Epig. 113

When I behold the tomb where Megacles lies buried, I pity thee, poor Callias, for the grief thou hast to bear.

Epig. 143

These arrows that have ceased from woeful war lie under cover in the temple of Athena, often indeed amidst the battle's grievous turmoil in the combat of men they have been bathed in the blood of the Persian cavalry.

Epig. 137

These bronze statues of women who prayed on behalf of Greece and the gallant fighters of Corinth, were dedicated to divine Cypris, for the goddess Aphrodite was not willing to hand over the Acropolis of the Greeks to the Medes.

Epig. 105

These lost their glorious youth by the Eurymedon, fighting against the archers of the Medes, warriors on land and on the swift-wayed ships they left the fairest memorial of courage when they died.

Epig. 106

Fierce Ares in a shower of blood once bathed his long pointed arrows in the breasts of these men; but this dust covers the

lifeless remains of the ever-living dead, in memory of those men who bore the brunt of battle.

Epig. 142

From the time when the sea divided Europe asunder from Asia and fierce Ares fell upon the cities of mortals, by no one of earth-dwelling men was done a better deed on land and sea alike. For these men on land destroyed many Medes and on shore the sea took a hundred Phœnician ships full of men, and Asia groaned bitterly, smitten by them as she was in both arms by the force of war.

Epig. 108

Hail, noblest, with your great glory in war, sons of Athens surpassing in horsemanship, who once fighting for your fair land lost your young lives striving against very many of the Greeks.

Epig. 102

It was the valor of these men that kept the smoke of the burning of wide-floored Tegea from rising to heaven. They chose to leave the city in the beauty of liberty to their children, and themselves to die in the forefront of battle.

Epig. 103

Let us remember the valiant men whose tomb this is, who died protecting Tegea rich in sheep; spearsmen for their city that Hellas might not perish and so destroy its freedom.

Æschylus, *Epig.* 3 (tr. Mackail)

These men also, the steadfast among spears, dark Fate destroyed as they defended their native land rich in sheep; but they being dead their glory is alive, who woefully clad their limbs in the dust of Ossa.

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CHAPTER IX

FROM THE PERSIAN TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The confederacy and the empire — The growth of Athens — The leadership of Athens; assessment — Cimon, admiral and statesman — Wars with other cities — Sparta — Conquest of Ægina — Pericles — Early career — Reduction of Eubœa — Colonizing policy — Public works — The Athenian navy — Foreign policy — Personal rule and statesmanship — The ideal of Pericles for Athens

I. The Confederacy and the Empire

1. THE GROWTH OF ATHENS

Athens had shown her importance and ability during the Persian Wars and was in no mood to return to a position inferior to that of Sparta. As her naval power had been responsible for her rise she determined to develop it to the utmost and secure supremacy on the sea.

Thucydides, I, 18–19

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedæmon; for this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great danger the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedæmonians in virtue

of their superior power; and the Athenians having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted from the king, as well as those who had aided him in the war. At the head of the one stood Athens, at the head of the other Lacedæmon, one the first naval, the other the first military power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the Lacedæmonians and Athenians quarrelled, and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school of danger.

The policy of Lacedæmon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the alliance flourished intact.

But before turning her attention farther afield Athens had first to rebuild her shattered city and her walls and to establish a strong harbor at Piræus.

Thucydides, I, 89–93

The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, King of the Lacedæmonians, the commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnese. But the Athenians and the allies

from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure of the barbarians from their country, at once proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from the places where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the circumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian grandees had taken up their quarters.

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedæmonians sent an embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at the strength of her newly acquired navy, and the valour which she had displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in throwing down the walls that still held together of the ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed; it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third invasion, would not have any strong place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his base of operations; and that Peloponnese would suffice for all as a base for both retreat and offence. After the Lacedæmonians had thus spoken, they were, on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send him off with all speed to Lacedæmon, but not to despatch his colleagues as soon as they had selected them, but to wait until they had raised their wall to the height from which defence was possible. Meanwhile the whole population in the city was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their wives and their children, sparing no edifice, private or public, which might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down. After giving these instructions, and adding that

he would be responsible for all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at Lacedæmon he did not seek an audience with the authorities, but tried to gain time and made excuses. When any of the government asked him why he did not appear in the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained in Athens by some engagement; however, that he expected their speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet there. At first the Lacedæmonians trusted the words of Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going on and already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive, and should not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons from Sparta to inspect, whose report might be trusted. They despatched them accordingly. Concerning these Themistocles secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting them under open constraint, and not to let them go until they had themselves returned. For his colleagues had now joined him, Abronichus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that when the Lacedæmonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let them go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to his message, and Themistocles had an audience with the Lacedæmonians, and at last openly told them that Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants; that any embassy which the Lacedæmonians or their allies might wish to send to them, should in future proceed on the assumption that the people to whom they were going was able to distinguish both its own and the general interests. That when the Athenians thought fit to abandon their city and to embark in their ships, they ventured on that perilous step without consulting them; and that on the other hand, wherever they had deliberated with the Lacedæmonians, they had proved themselves to be in judgment second to none. That they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military strength it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to

the common interest. It followed, he observed, either that all the members of the confederacy should be without walls, or that the present step should be considered a right one.

The Lacedæmonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was prompted not by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government: besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens on account of the patriotism which she had displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the defeat of their wishes could not but cause them secret annoyance. The envoys of each state departed home without complaint.

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To this day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs and sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the city were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they laid hands on everything without exception in their haste. Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the walls of Piræus, which had been begun before, in his year of office as archon; being influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by the great start which the Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people. For he first ventured to tell them to stick to the sea and forthwith began to lay the foundations of the empire. It was by his advice, too, that they built the walls of that thickness which can still be discerned round Piræus, the stones being brought up by two waggons meeting each other. Between the walls thus formed there was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and lead. About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by their size and thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he thought that they might be adequately defended by a small garrison of invalids, and the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by sea was easier for the

king's army than that by land: he also thought Piræus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard pressed by land, to go down into Piræus, and defy the world with their fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and commenced their other buildings immediately after the retreat of the Mede.

PLUTARCH, *Themistocles*, 19

Next he proceeded to establish the harbour of Piræus, observing the great natural advantages of the locality, and desirous to unite the whole city with the sea, and to reverse, in a manner, the policy of ancient Athenian kings, who, endeavouring to withdraw their subjects from the sea, and to accustom them to live, not by sailing about, but by planting and tilling the earth, spread the story of the dispute between Athena and Poseidon for the sovereignty of Athens, in which Athena, by producing to the judges an olive-tree, was declared to have won; whereas Themistocles did not only knead up, as Aristophanes says, the port and the city into one, but made the city absolutely the dependant and the adjunct of the port, and the land of the sea, which increased the power and confidence of the people against the nobility; the authority coming into the hands of sailors and boatswains and pilots. Thus it was one of the orders of the thirty tyrants, that the hustings in the assembly, which had faced towards the sea, should be turned round towards the land; implying their opinion that the empire by sea had been the origin of the democracy, and that the farming population were not so much opposed to oligarchy.

2. THE LEADERSHIP OF ATHENS; ASSESSMENT

The transition from Delian Confederacy to Athenian Empire seems to have come about in a gradual, almost imperceptible way.

The arrangements made by Aristides were accepted by all as just and satisfactory.

Thucydides, I, 96–99

The Athenians having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias fixed which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which

ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the king's country. Now was the time that the office of "Treasurers for Hellas" was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the money contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy commenced with independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a common congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and in administration during the interval between the Median and the present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, and against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with them on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either to Hellenic history before the Median war, or to the Median war itself. Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire.

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros the island in the Ægean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonised it themselves. This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which the rest of Eubœa remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this was the first instance of the engagement being broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the order which circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of defection, that connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labour. In some other respects the Athenians were not the old

popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. For this the allies had themselves to blame; the wish to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to leave their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her navy with the funds which they contributed, a revolt always found them without resources or experience for war.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXIII–XXIV

But after the Median war the council of the Areopagus again became powerful, and administered the government, having got the leadership, not from any formal decree, but from having brought about the sea-fight at Salamis. For when the generals had shown themselves quite unequal to the emergency, and had proclaimed a *sauve qui peut*, the Areopagus came forward with funds, and distributing eight drachmæ to each sailor, so manned the ships. For this reason they yielded to its claims, and the Athenians were governed well at this particular period; for circumstances led them to give their attention to war; they were held in high esteem among the Greeks, and made themselves masters of the sea, despite the Lacedæmonians. The leaders of the people in these days were Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, and Themistokles, the son of Neokles, the latter devoting himself to military matters, while the former enjoyed the reputation of being a sagacious statesman, and conspicuous for justice among his contemporaries. They accordingly made use of the services of the one in war, and of the other in council. The rebuilding of the walls, however, was conducted by both of them together, notwithstanding their political differences; but it was Aristides who urged on the revolt of the Ionians and the alliance with the Lacedæmonians, watching his opportunity when the Laconians had been brought into ill odour by the doings of Pausanias. This was the reason why it was he who apportioned to the cities the tributes which were first imposed in the third year after the sea-fight at Salamis in the archonship of Timosthenes, and why he made a treaty with

the Ionians, offensive and defensive, in confirmation of which they sunk the bars of iron in the sea.

After this, when the city was now in good heart and its treasury overflowing, he advised the people to lay a claim to national supremacy, and to leave the country, and come and live in the city; saying that there would be the means of living for all, for some in military service, for others in keeping guard, and for the rest in public employments, and that in this way they would obtain national supremacy. Yielding to these representations, they assumed the leadership of Greece, and treated the allies in sufficiently lordly fashion, except the Chians and Lesbians and Samians; for these they kept as guards of their empire, leaving them their forms of government, and not interfering with their rule over such subjects as they had. They established for the masses easy means of subsistence, just in the way Aristides had shown them; for from their tributes and their taxes and their allies the maintenance of more than twenty thousand men was provided. There were six thousand jurors, and sixteen hundred archers, and in addition to them twelve hundred cavalry, five hundred of the Council, and guards of the dockyards five hundred, and in the city fifty guards, and home magistrates up to seven hundred men, and men on foreign service up to seven hundred; and besides these, when they afterwards engaged in war, two thousand five hundred hoplites, and twenty guard-ships, and other ships which brought the tributes, manned by two thousand men chosen by lot, and further the Prytaneum, and orphans and guards of prisoners; for all these derived their maintenance from the public funds.

PLUTARCH, *Aristides*, 24

The Hellenes used to pay a sort of contribution for the war even while the Lacedæmonians had the leadership, but now they wished to be assessed equably city by city. So they asked the Athenians for Aristides, and commissioned him to inspect their several territories and revenues, and then to fix the assessments according to each member's worth and ability to pay.

And yet, though he became master of such power, and though after a fashion Hellas put all her property in his sole hands, poor

as he was when he went forth on this mission, he came back from it poorer still, and he made his assessments of moneys not only with purity and justice, but also to the grateful satisfaction and convenience of all concerned. Indeed, as men of old hymned the praises of the age of Cronus, — the golden age, — so did the allies of the Athenians praise the tariff of Aristides, calling it a kind of blessed happening for Hellas, especially as, after a short time, it was doubled and then again trebled.

For the tax which Aristides laid amounted to four hundred and sixty talents only; but Pericles must have added almost a third to this, since Thucydides says that when the war began the Athenians had a revenue of six hundred talents from their allies. And after the death of Pericles the demagogues enlarged it little by little, and at last brought the sum total up to thirteen hundred talents, not so much because the war, by reason of its length and vicissitudes, became extravagantly expensive, as because they themselves led the people off into the distribution of public moneys for spectacular entertainments, and for the erection of images and sanctuaries.

So then Aristides had a great and admirable name for his adjustment of the revenues.

PLUTARCH, *Aristides*, 25

And in general, as Theophrastus tells us, while the man was strictly just in his private relations to his fellow-citizens, in public matters he often acted in accordance with the policy which his country had adopted, feeling that this required considerable injustice. For instance, he says that when the question of removing the moneys of the confederacy from Delos to Athens, contrary to the compacts, was being debated at the instance of the Samians, Aristides declared that it was unjust, but advantageous.

Thucydides, II, 9, 13

That [i.e. the Confederacy] of Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and some tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns,

the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and their resources for the war. . . .

They were also to keep a tight rein on their allies — the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital. Here they had no reason to despond. Apart from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings, and for Potidæa. This did not include the uncoined gold and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be restored. Such was their financial position — surely a satisfactory one.

PLUTARCH, *Cimon*, 11

The allies of the Athenians began now to be weary of war and military service, willing to have repose, and to look after their husbandry and traffic. For they saw their enemies driven out of the country, and did not fear any new vexations from them. They still paid the tax they were assessed at, but did not send men and galleys, as they had done before. This the other Athenian generals wished to constrain them to, and by judicial proceedings against defaulters, and penalties which they inflicted on them, made the government uneasy, and even odious. But Cimon practised a contrary method; he forced no man to go that was not willing, but of

those that desired to be excused from service he took money and vessels unmanned, and let them yield to the temptation of staying at home, to attend to their private business. Thus they lost their military habits, and luxury and their own folly quickly changed them into unwarlike husbandmen and traders; while Cimon, continually embarking large numbers of Athenians on board his galleys, thoroughly disciplined them in his expeditions, and ere long made them the lords of their own paymasters. The allies, whose indolence maintained them, while they thus went sailing about everywhere, and incessantly bearing arms and acquiring skill, began to fear and flatter them, and found themselves after a while allies no longer, but unwittingly become tributaries and slaves.

The formal transfer of the treasury from Delos to Athens marked the official recognition of what must have been the true state of affairs for some time.[1]

This policy of course invoked a great deal of criticism, and Athens was accused of enslaving free states and using their money for her own purposes. This she justified on the grounds that she was giving the states the protection agreed on and that it was her own concern how the money was used.

Thucydides makes out a good case for the Athenians.

Thucydides, VI, 82–83, 85

"Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of the Syracusans compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right we have to it. The best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means of escaping their domination. After the Median war we had a fleet, and so got rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedæmonians, who had no

[1] Among the most valuable historical records left to us are the tribute lists which were inscribed on marble slabs and set up in Athens. The quota due from each city is indicated there. Unfortunately they are in too fragmentary a condition to be inserted here. (See Hicks and Hill, 33 and notes.) They form the basis of such works as Köhler's "Urkunden" and Boeckh's "Staatshaushaltung."

right to give orders to us more than we to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and being appointed leaders of the king's former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking that we are least likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother country, that is to say against us, together with the Mede, and instead of having the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so.

"We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did us mischief by their ready subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We make no fine professions of having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety. . . .

"Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to weaken our friends, but by means of their strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas we treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in money; while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, are free altogether, because they occupy convenient positions round Peloponnese."

Among the cities mentioned in the quota list for 450 B.C. is Erythræ in Ionia. The text of the following inscription shows some of the matters regulated between Athens and her subject allies. In this case Athens seems to have maintained pretty full control over their affairs.

Hicks and Hill, 32

CONSTITUTION OF ERYTHRÆ, B.C. 455–450

(*a*) The Erythræans are to contribute to the great Panathenæa offerings worth not less than three minæ. And the hieropoioi are to distribute to each Erythræan present a drachma's weight of the flesh of the victims. And if they contribute, indeed, but less than three minæ's worth as they are told, the priests are to buy victims, and the Erythræan people are to be registered as owing the amount spent. Any other (i.e. anybody but an Erythræan) who wishes to may feast upon the meat.

(*b*) The senate of the Erythræans is to be one hundred and twenty men elected by lot. The one elected is to undergo an examination in the senate; and no one less than thirty years old can legally serve. Those who are ineligible may be prosecuted, and they cannot serve within four years. On the present occasion the overseers and the commandant shall cast lots and establish the senate, in the future the senate and the commandant. Each of the senators-elect at Erythræ before he enters upon his office shall swear by Zeus, Apollo and Demeter, invoking utter destruction on himself and his children if he breaks his oath; the oath is to be taken over the victims while they are burning. The senate in session shall require this. If not, there may be a fine of one thousand drachmas or whatever the people of Erythræ shall vote that they pay down. The oath follows: — "I shall serve as best I can and as fairly as possible towards the people of Erythræ and of Athens and the allies, and I will not revolt from the people of Athens or from the allies of Athens, neither I myself nor will I try to persuade anyone else. Nor will I be a deserter myself or influence anyone else to desert, no, not one. Nor will I receive a single exile myself or be persuaded to do so by another, of those who escaped to the Persians, without a decree of the Athenians and the people. Nor will I exile any of those who remained, without decree of the Athenians and the people."

(*c*) If any Erythræan kills another Erythræan, let him be put to death. And if exile for life is decreed against anyone, he shall be exiled from all territory in alliance with the Athenians and his

property shall be confiscated by the Erythræan state, and if anyone is caught attempting to betray the city of the Erythræans to the tyrants, let him be killed without penalty (to the slayer) and his children too, unless his children are shown to be conducting themselves properly towards the people of Erythræ and of Athens. The children of the guilty man are to deposit half his property and keep half. . . .

3. CIMON, ADMIRAL AND STATESMAN

Athens was fortunate in having at this time in the person of Cimon exactly the right man to extend her empire and influence. His brilliant victories on the sea secured for her territory and wealth, the latter of which was spent largely in strengthening the walls around the city and those on the way to Piræus.

A bronze palm tree and a gilt image of Athena were dedicated at Delphi out of the spoils. (Pausanias, X, xv, 4)

Thucydides, I, 98

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros the island in the Ægean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonised it themselves. This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which the rest of Eubœa remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on conditions.

Plutarch, *Cimon*, 7

Cimon, strengthened with the accession of the allies, went as general into Thrace. For he was told that some great men among the Persians, of the king's kindred, being in possession of Eion, a city situated upon the river Strymon, infested the neighbouring Greeks. First he defeated these Persians in battle, and shut them up within the walls of their town. Then he fell upon the Thracians of the country beyond the Strymon, because they supplied Eion with victuals, and driving them entirely out of the country, took possession of it as conqueror, by which means he reduced the besieged to such straits, that Butes, who commanded there for the

king, in desperation set fire to the town, and burned himself, his goods, and all his relations, in one common flame. By this means, Cimon got the town, but no great booty; as the barbarians had not only consumed themselves in the fire, but the richest of their effects. However, he put the country about into the hands of the Athenians, a most advantageous and desirable situation for a settlement. For this action, the people permitted him to erect the stone Hermæ, upon the first of which was this inscription: —

> Of bold and patient spirit, too, were those,
> Who, where the Strymon under Eion flows,
> With famine and the sword, to utmost need,
> Reduced at last the children of the Mede.

Upon the second stood this: —

> The Athenians to their leaders this reward
> For great and useful service did accord;
> Others hereafter shall, from their applause,
> Learn to be valiant in their country's cause.

And upon the third the following: —

> With Atreus' sons, this city sent of yore
> Divine Menestheus to the Trojan shore;
> Of all the Greeks, so Homer's verses say,
> The ablest man an army to array:
> So old the title of her sons the name
> Of chiefs and champions in the field to claim.

PLUTARCH, *Cimon*, 8

Cimon, by these means, got the town, expelled the Dolopian pirates, and so opened the traffic of the Ægean sea. And, understanding that the ancient Theseus, the son of Ægeus, when he fled from Athens and took refuge in this isle, was here treacherously slain by King Lycomedes, who feared him, Cimon endeavoured to find out where he was buried. For an oracle had commanded the Athenians to bring home his ashes, and pay him all due honours as a hero; but hitherto they had not been able to learn where he was interred, as the people of Scyros dissembled the knowledge of it, and were not willing to allow a search. But now, great inquiry being made, with some difficulty he found out

the tomb and carried the relics into his own galley, and with great pomp and show brought them to Athens, four hundred years, or thereabouts, after his expulsion. This act got Cimon great favour with the people.

Thucydides, I, 100

Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon, between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, when the Athenians won both battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon, son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole Phœnician fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels.

Plutarch, *Cimon*, 12

Nor did any man ever do more than Cimon did to humble the pride of the Persian king. He was not content with getting rid of him out of Greece; but following close at his heels, before the barbarians could take breath and recover themselves, he was already at work, and what with his devastations, and his forcible reduction of some places, and the revolts and voluntary accession of others in the end from Ionia to Pamphylia, all Asia was clear of Persian soldiers.

Plutarch, *Cimon*, 12–13

Ephorus says the admiral of the Persian fleet was Tithraustes, and the general of the land army Pherendates; but Callisthenes is positive that Ariomandes, the son of Gobryas, had the supreme command of all the forces. He lay waiting with the whole fleet at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, with no design to fight, but expecting a reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships on their way from Cyprus. Cimon, aware of this, put out to sea, resolved, if they would not fight a battle willingly, to force them to it. The barbarians, seeing this, retired within the mouth of the river to avoid being attacked; but when they saw the Athenians come upon them, notwithstanding their retreat, they met them with six hundred ships, as Phanodemus relates, but, according to Ephorus, only with three hundred and fifty. However, they did nothing worthy such mighty forces, but immediately turned the prows of

their galleys toward the shore, where those that came first threw themselves upon the land, and fled to their army drawn up thereabout, while the rest perished with their vessel or were taken. By this, one may guess at their number, for though a great many escaped out of the fight, and a great many others were sunk, yet two hundred galleys were taken by the Athenians.

When their land army drew toward the seaside, Cimon was in suspense whether he should venture to try and force his way on shore; as he should thus expose his Greeks, wearied with slaughter in the first engagement, to the swords of the barbarians, who were all fresh men, and many times their number. But seeing his men resolute, and flushed with victory, he bade them land, though they were not yet cool from their first battle. As soon as they touched ground, they set up a shout and ran upon the enemy, who stood firm and sustained the first shock with great courage, so that the fight was a hard one, and some principal men of the Athenians in rank and courage were slain. At length, though with much ado, they routed the barbarians, and killing some, took others prisoners, and plundered all their tents and pavilions, which were full of rich spoil. Cimon, like a skilled athlete at the games, having in one day carried off two victories wherein he surpassed that of Salamis by sea and that of Platæa by land, was encouraged to try for yet another success. News being brought that the Phœnician succours, in number eighty sail, had come in sight at Hydrum, he set off with all speed to find them, while they as yet had not received any certain account of the larger fleet, and were in doubt what to think; so that, thus surprised, they lost all their vessels and most of their men with them. This success of Cimon so daunted the King of Persia that he presently made that celebrated peace, by which he engaged that his armies should come no nearer the Grecian sea than the length of a horse's course, and that none of his galleys or vessels of war should appear between the Cyanean and Chelidonian isles. Callisthenes, however, says that he did not agree to any such articles, but that, upon the fear this victory gave him, he did in reality thus act, and kept off so far from Greece, that when Pericles with fifty and Ephialtes with thirty galleys cruised beyond the Chelidonian isles, they did not discover one Persian vessel. But

in the collection which Craterus made of the public acts of the people, there is a draft of this treaty given. And it is told, also, that at Athens they erected the altar of Peace upon this occasion, and decreed particular honours to Callias, who was employed as ambassador to procure the treaty.

The people of Athens raised so much money from the spoils of this war, which were publicly sold, that besides other expenses, and raising the south wall of the citadel, they laid the foundation of the long walls, not, indeed, finished till at a later time, which were called the Legs. And the place where they built them being soft and marshy ground, they were forced to sink great weights of stone and rubble to secure the foundation, and did all this out of the money Cimon supplied them with. It was he, likewise, who first embellished the upper city with those fine and ornamental places of exercise and resort, which they afterwards so much frequented and delighted in. He set the market-place with plane-trees; and the Academy, which was before a bare, dry, and dirty spot, he converted into a well-watered grove, with shady alleys to walk in, and open courses for races.

PLUTARCH, *Cimon*, 10

Cimon now grew rich, and what he gained from the barbarians with honour, he spent yet more honourably upon the citizens. For he pulled down all the enclosures of his gardens and grounds, that strangers, and the needy of his fellow-citizens, might gather of his fruits freely. At home he kept a table, plain, but sufficient for a considerable number; to which any poor townsman had free access, and so might support himself without labour, with his whole time left free for public duties. Aristotle states, however, that this reception did not extend to all the Athenians, but only to his own fellow-townsmen, the Laciadæ. Besides this, he always went attended by two or three young companions, very well clad; and if he met with an elderly citizen in a poor habit, one of these would change clothes with the decayed citizen, which was looked upon as very nobly done. He enjoined them, likewise, to carry a considerable quantity of coin about them, which they were to convey silently into the hands of the better class of poor men, as they stood by

them in the market-place. This, Cratinus the poet speaks of in one of his comedies, the Archilochi —

> For I, Metrobius too, the scrivener poor,
> Of ease and comfort in my age secure
> By Greece's noblest son in life's decline,
> Cimon, the generous-hearted, the divine,
> Well-fed and feasted hoped till death to be,
> Death which, alas! has taken him ere me.

Gorgias the Leontine gives him this character, that he got riches that he might use them, and used them that he might get honour by them. And Critias, one of the thirty tyrants, makes it, in his elegies, his wish to have —

> The Scopads' wealth, and Cimon's nobleness,
> And King Agesilaus's success.

. . . Cimon, by keeping open house for his fellow-citizens, and giving travellers liberty to eat the fruits which the several seasons produced in his land, seemed to restore to the world that community of goods, which mythology says existed in the reign of Saturn. Those who object to him, that he did this to be popular and gain the applause of the vulgar, are confuted by the constant tenor of the rest of his actions, which all tended to uphold the interests of the nobility and the Spartan policy, of which he gave instances, when together with Aristides he opposed Themistocles, who was advancing the authority of the people beyond its just limits, and resisted Ephialtes, who, to please the multitude, was for abolishing the jurisdiction of the court of Areopagus. And when all of his time, except Aristides and Ephialtes, enriched themselves out of the public money, he still kept his hands clean and untainted, and to his last day never acted or spoke for his own private gain or emolument.

PLUTARCH, *Cimon*, 5

All the other points of Cimon's character were noble and good. He was as daring as Miltiades, and not inferior to Themistocles in judgment, and was incomparably more just and honest than either of them. Fully their equal in all military virtues, in the

ordinary duties of a citizen at home he was immeasurably their superior. And this, too, when he was very young, his years not yet strengthened by any experience. For when Themistocles, upon the Median invasion, advised the Athenians to forsake their city and their country, and to carry all their arms on shipboard and fight the enemy by sea, in the straits of Salamis; when all the people stood amazed at the confidence and rashness of this advice, Cimon was seen, the first of all men, passing with a cheerful countenance through the Ceramicus, on his way with his companions to the citadel, carrying a bridle in his hand to offer to the goddess, intimating that there was no more need of horsemen now, but of mariners. There, after he had paid his devotions to the goddess, and offered up the bridle, he took down one of the bucklers that hung upon the walls of the temple, and went down to the port; by this example giving confidence to many of the citizens. He was also of a fairly handsome person, according to the poet Ion, tall and large, and let his thick and curly hair grow long. After he had acquitted himself gallantly in this battle of Salamis, he obtained great repute among the Athenians, and was regarded with affection, as well as admiration. He had many who followed after him, and bade him aspire to actions not less famous than his father's battle of Marathon. And when he came forward in political life, the people welcomed him gladly, being now weary of Themistocles; in opposition to whom, and because of the frankness and easiness of his temper, which was agreeable to every one, they advanced Cimon to the highest employments in the government. The man that contributed most to his promotion was Aristides, who early discerned in his character his natural capacity, and purposely raised him, that he might be a counterpoise to the craft and boldness of Themistocles.

Cimon enjoyed a well-deserved popularity among his fellow-citizens, whom he treated with great generosity.

He was ostracized when the hot-headed populace blamed him for too moderate a policy toward the Lacedæmonians, but they found they could not do without him and he was soon recalled. He took out a squadron to Egypt and Cyprus and lost his life during the expedition.

PLUTARCH, *Cimon*, 17–19

Some time after this, the Lacedæmonians sent a second time to desire succours of the Athenians against the Messenians and Helots, who had seized upon Ithome. But when they came, fearing their boldness and gallantry, of all that came to their assistance, they sent them only back, alleging they were designing innovations. The Athenians returned home, enraged at this usage, and vented their anger upon all those who were favourers of the Lacedæmonians, and seizing some slight occasion, they banished Cimon for ten years, which is the time prescribed to those that are banished by the ostracism. . . .

Accordingly, they did not long retain their severity toward Cimon, partly upon remembrance of his former services, and partly, perhaps, induced by the juncture of the times. For being defeated at Tanagra in a great battle, and fearing the Peloponnesians would come upon them at the opening of the spring, they recalled Cimon by a decree, of which Pericles himself was author. So reasonable were men's resentments in those times, and so moderate their anger, that it always gave way to the public good. Even ambition, the least governable of all human passions, could then yield to the necessities of the state.

Cimon, as soon as he returned, put an end to the war, and reconciled the two cities. Peace thus established, seeing the Athenians impatient of being idle, and eager after the honour and aggrandisement of war, lest they should set upon the Greeks themselves, or with so many ships cruising about the isles and Peloponnesus they should give occasions to intestine wars, or complaints of their allies against them, he equipped two hundred galleys, with design to make an attempt upon Egypt and Cyprus; purposing, by this means, to accustom the Athenians to fight against the barbarians, and enrich themselves honestly by spoiling those who were the natural enemies of Greece. . . .

He died, some say, of sickness, while besieging Citium, in Cyprus; according to others, of a wound he received in a skirmish with the barbarians. When he perceived he should die, he commanded those under his charge to return, and by no means to let the news of his death be known by the way; this they did with such secrecy

that they all came home safe, and neither their enemies nor the allies knew what had happened. Thus, as Phanodemus relates, the Grecian army was, as it were, conducted by Cimon thirty days after he was dead. But after his death there was not one commander among the Greeks that did anything considerable against the barbarians, and instead of uniting against their common enemies, the popular leaders and partisans of war animated them against one another to that degree, that none could interpose their good offices to reconcile them. And while, by their mutual discord, they ruined the power of Greece, they gave the Persians time to recover breath, and repair all their losses.

Thucydides, I, 112

Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtæus, the king in the marshes ; the rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians by land and sea, and being victorious on both elements departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt.

II. Wars with other Cities

1. Sparta

The old trouble between Athens and Sparta broke out over an incident during the revolt of the people of Ithome. Those Athenians who had gone to render assistance were treated with suspicion by Sparta. Athens lost no time in forming an alliance with Argos, Sparta's inveterate enemy.

It has been suggested that the friendly references to Argos in the "Agamemnon" and "Eumenides" of Æschylus are an indirect reflection of the relations recently established between Athens and Argos. (See Hill, "Sources," p. 99.)

Pausanias, I, xxix, 8

The alliance with Argos is said to have been brought about as follows. The city of Lacedæmon having been shaken by an earthquake, the Helots revolted and withdrew to Ithome. On their revolt the Lacedæmonians sent for help to Athens and elsewhere. The Athenians despatched to their aid a body of picked troops under Cimon, son of Miltiades, but the Lacedæmonians suspected and dismissed them. The insult appeared to the Athenians intolerable, and on their way back they concluded an alliance with the Argives, the eternal foes of Lacedæmon.

Thucydides, I, 101–103

So the Lacedæmonians being engaged in a war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the siege obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls, delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the continent together with the mine.

The Lacedæmonians meanwhile finding the war against the rebels in Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon. The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedæmonians their own deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by assault. The first open quarrel between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arose out of this expedition [to Thasos]. The Lacedæmonians, when assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon them as of alien extraction, began to fear that if they remained, they might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the allies, without declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had now no need of them. But the Athenians, aware that their dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable reason of the two, but from suspicions which had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of having done nothing to merit such treatment

from the Lacedæmonians; and the instant that they returned home they broke off the alliance which had been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same oaths and making the same alliance with the Thessalians.

Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years' resistance, surrendered to Lacedæmon; the conditions being that they should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be the slave of his captor. It must be known that the Lacedæmonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth with their children and their wives, and being received by Athens from the hatred that she now felt for the Lacedæmonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians received another addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the Lacedæmonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegæ, and built the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisæa, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens.

The exiled Messenians were well treated by Athens, who helped to settle them in Naupactus.

A statue-base with the inscription quoted by Pausanias has been found at Olympia, but the date of it is still disputed (see above, p. 90).

Pausanias, V, xxiv, 3

On the right of the great temple is a Zeus looking to the rising sun: it is twelve feet high, and they say that it was dedicated by the Lacedæmonians when they entered on the second war with the rebel Messenians. There is a couplet inscribed on it:—

> Receive, O prince, son of Cronus, Olympian Zeus, a fair image,
> And be propitious to the Lacedæmonians.

Thucydides, I, 107–108

Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with their whole levy and a thousand Argives and the respective contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong. The march was prompted by the notion that the Lacedæmonians were at a loss how to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedæmonians during the battle.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Bœotia. After heavy loss on both sides victory declared for the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

After the battle of Tanagra votive offerings were set up by the Lacedæmonians in the temple of Zeus at Olympia.

The second of the following inscriptions quoted by Pausanias is attributed to Simonides.

Pausanias, V, x, 2

The temple and image of Zeus were made from the booty at the time when the Eleans conquered Pisa and the vassal states that revolted with her. That the image was made by Phidias is attested by the inscription under the feet of Zeus: —

Phidias, Charmides' son, an Athenian, made me.

The temple is built in the Doric style, and columns run all round it on the outside. It is made of native conglomerate. The height of it up to the gable is sixty-eight feet, its breadth ninety-five, its length two hundred and thirty. The architect was Libon, a native.

Pausanias, V, x, 4

A gilt kettle is set on each extremity of the roof of the temple at Olympia; and a Victory, also gilt, stands just at the middle of the gable. Under the image of Victory is hung a golden shield with the Gorgon Medusa wrought in relief on it. The inscription on the shield sets forth the persons who dedicated it and their reason for doing so. It runs thus: —

The temple hath a golden shield: from Tanagra
The Lacedæmonians and their allies brought it and dedicated it
As a gift taken from the Argives, Athenians, and Ionians,
The tithe offered in acknowledgment of victory in the war.

2. CONQUEST OF ÆGINA

The long-continued struggle between Athens and Ægina was finally ended at this time. Ægina became a member of the confederacy.

Thucydides, I, 105, 108

Subsequently war broke out between Ægina and Athens, and there was a great battle at sea off Ægina between the Athenians and Æginetans, each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy's ships, and landed in the country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son of Strœbus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the Æginetans, threw into Ægina a force of three hundred heavy infantry, who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that with a large force absent in Ægina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help the Megarians without raising the siege of Ægina. But the Athenians, instead of moving the army of Ægina, raised a force of the old and young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the Megarid under the command of Myronides. After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that they had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy. Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up their trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road, dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry, and placing the light troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here suffered a severe blow.

The bulk of her army continued its retreat home. . . . This was followed by the surrender of the Æginetans to Athens on conditions; they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future.

III. Pericles

Leadership of the Athenians now passed to Pericles, under whom Athens reached the culmination of democratic government, wise expansion, and artistic glory.

1. EARLY CAREER

Plutarch, *Pericles*, 3, 7

Pericles was of the tribe Acamantis, and the township Cholargus, of the noblest birth both on his father's and mother's side. Xanthippus, his father, who defeated the King of Persia's generals in the battle at Mycale, took to wife Agariste, the grandchild of Clisthenes, who drove out the sons of Pisistratus, and nobly put an end to their tyrannical usurpation, and, moreover, made a body of laws, and settled a model of government admirably tempered and suited for the harmony and safety of the people. . . .

Pericles, while yet but a young man, stood in considerable apprehension of the people, as he was thought in face and figure to be very like the tyrant Pisistratus, and those of great age remarked upon the sweetness of his voice, and his volubility and rapidity in speaking, and were struck with amazement at the resemblance. Reflecting, too, that he had a considerable estate, and was descended of a noble family, and had friends of great influence, he was fearful all this might bring him to be banished as a dangerous person; and for this reason meddled not at all with state affairs, but in military service showed himself of a brave and intrepid nature. But when Aristides was now dead, and Themistocles driven out, and Cimon was for the most part kept abroad by the expeditions he made in parts out of Greece, Pericles, seeing things in this posture, now advanced and took his side, not with the rich and few, but with the many and poor, contrary to his natural bent, which was far from democratical; but, most likely fearing he might fall

under suspicion of aiming at arbitrary power, and seeing Cimon on the side of the aristocracy, and much beloved by the better and more distinguished people, he joined the party of the people, with a view at once both to secure himself and procure means against Cimon.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 11

And the aristocratical party, seeing that Pericles was already before this grown to be the greatest and foremost man of all the city, but nevertheless wishing there should be somebody set up against him, to blunt and turn the edge of his power, that it might not altogether prove a monarchy, put forward Thucydides of Alopece,[1] a discreet person, and a near kinsman of Cimon's, to conduct the opposition against him; who, indeed, though less skilled in warlike affairs than Cimon was, yet was better versed in speaking and political business and keeping close guard in the city, and, engaging with Pericles on the hustings, in a short time brought the government to an equality of parties. For he would not suffer those who were called the honest and good (persons of worth and distinction) to be scattered up and down and mix themselves and be lost among the populace, as formerly, diminishing and obscuring their superiority amongst the masses; but taking them apart by themselves and uniting them in one body, by their combined weight he was able, as it were upon the balance, to make a counterpoise to the other party.

For, indeed, there was from the beginning a sort of concealed split, or seam, as it might be in a piece of iron, marking the different popular and aristocratical tendencies; but the open rivalry and contention of these two opponents made the gash deep, and severed the city into the two parties of the people and the few. And so Pericles, at that time, more than at any other, let loose the reins to the people, and made his policy subservient to their pleasure, contriving continually to have some great public show or solemnity, some banquet, or some procession or other in the town to please them, coaxing his countrymen like children with such delights and pleasures as were not, however, unedifying. Besides that every

[1] This is, of course, not the historian but Thucydides, son of Melesias, an able conservative leader. See Aristotle, "Constitution of Athens," XXVIII.

year he sent out threescore galleys, on board of which there were numbers of the citizens, who were in pay eight months, learning at the same time and practising the art of seamanship.

2. REDUCTION OF EUBŒA

Thucydides, I, 114

The Athenians then crossed over again to Eubœa under the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but Histiæa was settled by convention; the Histiæans they expelled from their homes, and occupied their territory themselves.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 23

Immediately after this, turning his forces against the revolters, and passing over into the island of Eubœa with fifty sail of ships and five thousand men in arms, he reduced their cities, and drove out the citizens of the Chalcidians, called Hippobotæ, horse-feeders, the chief persons for wealth and reputation among them; and removing all the Histiæans out of the country, brought in a plantation of Athenians in their room; making them his one example of severity, because they had captured an Attic ship and killed all on board.

ARISTOPHANES, *Clouds*, 211 ff.

"The Eubœan land, as you see, already lies stretched out alongside (Attica) to a great length."

"I see, for it was set alongside by us and Pericles."

The acquisition of Eubœa was a great gain for many reasons. This inscription belongs to the same class as that already quoted for Erythræ, and settles the form of government, taxes, and general status of the city of Chalcis.

Hicks and Hill, 40

SETTLEMENT OF CHALCIS, B.C. 446

It was voted by the senate and people. Antiochis was the prytanizing tribe; Dracontides presided.

Diognetus moved: That the oath be taken by the senate and judges of the Athenians as follows: — "I will not exile the

Chalcidians from Chalcis nor lay waste the city, nor will I deprive any citizen of his rights, nor banish nor arrest nor kill nor confiscate the property of anyone who has not been tried by the Athenian people, nor will I put to vote without proper summons any charge against the community or any individual; and any embassy which comes I will conduct before the senate within ten days, whenever I am presiding, to the best of my power; and I will ratify this to the Chalcidians as long as they are obedient to the people of Athens." The embassy which comes from Chalcis shall have opportunity to take this oath with the commissioners and those Athenians who have taken it shall be recorded. The generals are to be responsible that all take the oath.

The Chalcidians are to take oath as follows: — "I will not revolt from the people of Athens in any way or manner, either in word or deed, nor will I yield to anyone who seeks to revolt, and if anyone tries to make me revolt I will denounce him to the Athenians, and I will pay to the Athenians the tribute which we agree on, and I shall be the best and fairest ally that I can, and I will help the people of the Athenians and defend them if anyone wrong them, and I will be obedient to the Athenians." All adult Chalcidians are to take this oath. Whoever refuses to take it is to be disfranchised and his property confiscated, and one tenth of his property is to go to Olympian Zeus. And the embassy of the Athenians on its arrival at Chalcis shall administer the oath with the commissioners in Chalcis and those of the Chalcidians that have taken it are to be recorded.

Anticles moved: For good fortune to Athens, that the Athenians and Chalcidians take the oath just as the Athenian people decreed for the Eretrians. The generals are to see that it is done as soon as possible. The people are forthwith to choose five men who on their arrival at Chalcis shall administer the oath. With reference to the hostages this answer is to be given to the Chalcidians: — That for the present the Athenians think it best to leave things as decided, but if, after having taken counsel, it seems best to them they will make a settlement as may seem suitable to Athenians and Chalcidians. Aliens resident in Chalcis, unless while inhabiting there they pay taxes at Athens or unless they

have been granted immunity by the Athenians, are to pay in Chalcis just like other Chalcidians.

The secretary of the senate is to have this decree and oath inscribed at Athens on a stone slab and set up on the Acropolis, at the expense of the Chalcidians; and in Chalcis the senate of the Chalcidians is to have it inscribed and set up in the precinct of Olympian Zeus.

These are the matters decreed about the Chalcidians.

The sacrifices in obedience to the oracles about Eubœa are to be performed as soon as possible, in conjunction with Hierocles by three men whom the senate is to choose from its own members. The generals are to be jointly responsible to see that it is done as soon as possible, and they are to furnish funds for it.

Archestratus moved: That the motion of Anticles be amended as follows: — That punishments for Chalcidians shall be settled by themselves at Chalcis, just as the Athenians do at Athens, except in cases of exile, death and disfranchisement. That concerning these matters there be appeal at Athens to the heliastic courts of the thesmothetæ in accordance with the decree of the people. The generals are to see to their best ability about garrisoning of Eubœa, that it may be for the best advantage of the Athenians.

Oath.

3. COLONIZING POLICY

Pericles realized that some outlet must be found for the surplus population. Attention has more than once been called to the fact that Athens was never in a position of economic independence and easily became overcrowded. Southern Italy, the Chersonese, and the Euxine were among the districts to which colonies were sent out. The suggestion has been made that the settlements near the Black Sea, as well as the ill-fated expedition to Egypt, were intended to establish Athenian centers in the corn-growing districts in order to secure a sure food supply. Athens thus aimed to anticipate any interference on the part of her enemies who might attempt to cut her off from these centers.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 11, 19–20

He sent, moreover, a thousand of them into the Chersonese as planters, to share the land among them by lot, and five hundred more into the isle of Naxos, and half that number to Andros, a thousand into Thrace to dwell among the Bisaltæ, and others into Italy, when the city Sybaris, which now was called Thurii, was to be repeopled. And this he did to ease and discharge the city of an idle, and, by reason of their idleness, a busy, meddling crowd of people; and at the same time to meet the necessities and restore the fortunes of the poor townsmen, and to intimidate, also, and check their allies from attempting any change, by posting such garrisons, as it were, in the midst of them. . . .

But of all his expeditions, that to the Chersonese gave most satisfaction and pleasure, having proved the safety of the Greeks who inhabited there. For not only by carrying along with him a thousand fresh citizens of Athens he gave new strength and vigour to the cities, but also by belting the neck of land, which joins the peninsula to the continent, with bulwarks and forts from sea to sea, he put a stop to the inroads of the Thracians, who lay all about the Chersonese, and closed the door against a continual and grievous war, with which that country had been long harassed, lying exposed to the encroachments and influx of barbarous neighbours, and groaning under the evils of a predatory population both upon and within its borders. . . .

Entering also the Euxine Sea with a large and finely equipped fleet, he obtained for the Greek cities any new arrangements they wanted, and entered into friendly relations with them; and to the barbarous nations, and kings and chiefs round about them, displayed the greatness of the power of the Athenians, their perfect ability and confidence to sail wherever they had a mind, and to bring the whole sea under their control. He left the Sinopians thirteen ships of war, with soldiers under the command of Lamachus, to assist them against Timesileus the tyrant; and when he and his accomplices had been thrown out, obtained a decree that six hundred of the Athenians that were willing should sail to Sinope and plant themselves there with the Sinopians, sharing among them the houses and land which the tyrant and his party had previously held.

Only one inscription has been found about the establishment of a colony, and we have no express mention of Brea in literary records. That it was one of the Thracian settlements referred to by Plutarch is practically certain.

The details of mutual relations, etc., are most valuable. (See note on Hicks and Hill, 41.)

Hicks and Hill, 41

COLONY TO BREA, B.C. 446–444

. . . but if anyone introduces [certain forbidden articles] the person informing against him or prosecuting shall seize him as security. And the founders shall furnish as many herds of goats as seems best to those who sacrifice for favorable omens on behalf of the colony. Let the land commissioners choose ten men, one from each tribe. These latter are to assign the land. Democlides with full power is to establish the colony to the best of his ability. The reserved precincts are to be left as they are and no others are to be set aside. A full suit of armor is to be sent to the great Panathenæa and a phallus to the great Dionysia. If anyone leads an expedition against the land of the colonists, the cities are to help with all speed according to the agreements which in the secretaryship of . . . were made about the cities in Thrace. This is to be inscribed on a slab and set up on the Acropolis, and the colonists are to furnish the slab at their own expense. If any chairman let a question come to vote against the decree or any orator speaks or tries to urge anyone to rescind it or to break any of the resolutions, he shall lose his civil rights, and his children shall also, and his property shall be confiscated and one tenth given to the god, unless the colonists themselves make some request on their own behalf.

Whichever of the soldiers shall have been enrolled as prospective colonists shall within thirty days after arrival in Athens be in Brea to take up residence. The colony shall set out within thirty days. Æschines shall follow and hand over money for expenses.

Phantocles moved the following amendment to Democlides' motion: That the presidents of Erechtheis introduce Phantocles to the senate at the first session; and that thetes and zeugitæ go as colonists to Brea.

4. PUBLIC WORKS

The remains of the Periclean buildings form the best commentary on this passage about the public works of Pericles.

Two inscriptions remain in fragmentary condition relating to the building of the temple of Wingless Victory and the Parthenon, with some account of the moneys expended.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 12–13

That which gave most pleasure and ornament to the city of Athens, and the greatest admiration and even astonishment to all strangers, and that which now is Greece's only evidence that the power she boasts of and her ancient wealth are no romance or idle story, was his construction of the public and sacred buildings. Yet this was that of all his actions in the government which his enemies most looked askance upon and cavilled at in the popular assemblies, crying out how that the commonwealth of Athens had lost its reputation and was ill-spoken of abroad for removing the common treasure of the Greeks from the isle of Delos into their own custody; and how that their fairest excuse for so doing, namely, that they took it away for fear the barbarians should seize it, and on purpose to secure it in a safe place, this Pericles had made unavailable, and how that "Greece cannot but resent it as an insufferable affront, and consider herself to be tyrannised over openly, when she sees the treasure, which was contributed by her upon a necessity for the war, wantonly lavished out by us upon our city, to gild her all over, and to adorn and set her forth, as it were some vain woman, hung round with precious stones and figures and temples, which cost a world of money."

Pericles, on the other hand, informed the people, that they were in no way obliged to give any account of those moneys to their allies, so long as they maintained their defence, and kept off the

barbarians from attacking them; while in the meantime they did not so much as supply one horse or man or ship, but only found money for the service; "which money," said he, "is not theirs that give it, but theirs that receive it, if so be they perform the conditions upon which they receive it." And that it was good reason, that, now the city was sufficiently provided and stored with all things necessary for the war, they should convert the overplus of its wealth to such undertakings as would hereafter, when completed, give them eternal honour, and, for the present, while in process, freely supply all the inhabitants with plenty. With their variety of workmanship and of occasions for service, which summon all arts and trades and require all hands to be employed about them, they do actually put the whole city, in a manner, into state-pay; while at the same time she is both beautified and maintained by herself. For as those who are of age and strength for war are provided for and maintained in the armaments abroad by their pay out of the public stock, so, it being his desire and design that the undisciplined mechanic multitude that stayed at home should not go without their share of public salaries, and yet should not have them given them for sitting still and doing nothing, to that end he thought fit to bring in among them, with the approbation of the people, these vast projects of buildings and designs of work, that would be of some continuance before they were finished, and would give employment to numerous arts, so that the part of the people that stayed at home might, no less than those that were at sea or in garrisons or on expeditions, have a fair and just occasion of receiving the benefit and having their share of the public moneys.

The materials were stone, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, cypress-wood; and the arts or trades that wrought and fashioned them were smiths and carpenters, moulders, founders and braziers, stone-cutters, dyers, goldsmiths, ivory-workers, painters, embroiderers, turners; those again that conveyed them to the town for use, merchants and mariners and ship-masters by sea, and by land, cartwrights, cattle-breeders, waggoners, rope-makers, flax-workers, shoemakers and leather-dressers, road-makers, miners. And every trade in the same nature, as a captain in an army has his particular company

of soldiers under him, had its own hired company of journeymen and labourers belonging to it banded together as in array, to be as it were the instrument and body for the performance of the service. Thus, to say all in a word, the occasions and services of these public works distributed plenty through every age and condition.

As then grew the works up, no less stately in size than exquisite in form, the workmen striving to outvie the material and the design with the beauty of their workmanship, yet the most wonderful thing of all was the rapidity of their execution.

Undertakings, any one of which singly might have required, they thought, for their completion, several successions and ages of men, were every one of them accomplished in the height and prime of one man's political service. Although they say, too, that Zeuxis once, having heard Agatharchus the painter boast of despatching his work with speed and ease, replied, "I take a long time." For ease and speed in doing a thing do not give the work lasting solidity or exactness of beauty; the expenditure of time allowed to a man's pains beforehand for the production of a thing is repaid by way of interest with a vital force for the preservation when once produced. For which reason Pericles's works are especially admired, as having been made quickly, to last long. For every particular piece of his work was immediately, even at that time, for its beauty and elegance, antique; and yet in its vigour and freshness looks to this day as if it were just executed. There is a sort of bloom of newness upon those works of his, preserving them from the touch of time, as if they had some perennial spirit and undying vitality mingled in the composition of them.

Phidias had the oversight of all the works, and was surveyor-general, though upon the various portions other great masters and workmen were employed. For Callicrates and Ictinus built the Parthenon; the chapel at Eleusis, where the mysteries were celebrated, was begun by Corœbus, who erected the pillars that stand upon the floor or pavement, and joined them to the architraves; and after his death Metagenes of Xypete added the frieze and the upper line of columns; Xenocles of Cholargus roofed or arched the lantern on top of the temple of Castor and Pollux; and the long wall, which Socrates says he himself heard Pericles propose

to the people, was undertaken by Callicrates. This work Cratinus ridicules, as long in finishing —

> 'T is long since Pericles, if words would do it,
> Talked up the wall; yet adds not one mite to it.

The Odeum, or music-room, which in its interior was full of seats and ranges of pillars, and outside had its roof made to slope and descend from one single point at the top, was constructed, we are told, in imitation of the King of Persia's Pavilion; this likewise by Pericles's order; which Cratinus again, in his comedy called the Thracian Women, made an occasion of raillery —

> So, we see here,
> The Long-pate Zeus, our Pericles appear,
> Since ostracism time, he 's laid aside his head,
> And wears the new Odeum in its stead.

Pericles, also eager for distinction, then first obtained the decree for a contest in musical skill to be held yearly at the Panathenæa, and he himself, being chosen judge, arranged the order and method in which the competitors should sing and play on the flute and on the harp. And both at that time, and at other times also, they sat in this music-room to see and hear all such trials of skill.

The propylæa, or entrances to the Acropolis, were finished in five years' time, Mnesicles being the principal architect. A strange accident happened in the course of building, which showed that the goddess was not averse to the work, but was aiding and co-operating to bring it to perfection. One of the artificers, the quickest and the handiest workman among them all, with a slip of his foot fell down from a great height, and lay in a miserable condition, the physicians having no hope of his recovery. When Pericles was in distress about this, Athena appeared to him at night in a dream, and ordered a course of treatment, which he applied, and in a short time and with great ease cured the man. And upon this occasion it was that he set up a brass statue of Athena, surnamed Health, in the citadel near the altar, which they say was there before. But it was Phidias who wrought the goddess's image in gold, and he has his name inscribed on the pedestal as the workman of

it; and indeed the whole work in a manner was under his charge, and he had, as we have said already, the oversight over all the artists and workmen, through Pericles's friendship for him.

Hicks and Hill, 37

TEMPLE OF ATHENA NIKÉ, ABOUT B.C. 450–446

. . . moved: That a priestess of Athena Niké, who may be any native woman born of native parents, be appointed and the sanctuary furnished with a door according to the specifications of Callicrates, and the contractors shall let out the contract in the prytany of Leontis, and the priestess is to draw as pay fifty drachmas and the legs and skins of the victims, and the temple and a stone altar are to be built according to the specifications of Callicrates.

Hestiæus moved: To choose three men from the senate who together with Callicrates shall draw up the contract and report to the senate what they decide about letting out the contract. . . .

Voted by the senate and the people, Ægeis was prytanizing tribe, Neoclides was secretary; Hagnodemus presided.

Callias moved: That the colacretæ in office in the month of Poseideon pay over regularly to the priestess of Athena Niké the fifty drachmas indicated on the stele. . . .

Hicks and Hill, 47

BUILDING OF THE PARTHENON, B.C. 438

The Gods, Athena, Fortune

Cichesippus of Myrrhinous was secretary for those who had charge of setting up the statue.
Receipts from . . . [unfinished]

Cichesippus of Myrrhinous was secretary for those who had charge of setting up the statue.
Receipts from the treasurers for whom Demostratus of Xupete was secretary; treasurers were Ctesion, Strosias, Antiphates, Menander, Thymochares, Smocordus, Phidelides, —

100 talents.

Spent:

87 talents, 4652 drachmas for gold, (weight, 6 talents, 1500 drachmas, 5 obols).

2 talents, 743 drachmas for ivory. . . .

5. THE ATHENIAN NAVY

These three passages, which refer to conditions at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, show clearly that the Athenians realized that their chief strength lay in the fleet and the consequent control of the sea.

Thucydides, II, 13–14

He also gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. . . .

The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although part of it was left without one, viz. that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piræus, a distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the circumference of Piræus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded.

Thucydides, I, 143

"This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have criticised in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders: can you conceive a more impregnable position?

Well, this in future should, as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men's lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit."

Thucydides, III, 17

If at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis; a hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed at Potidæa and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred and fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It was this, with Potidæa, that most exhausted her revenues — Potidæa being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two drachmæ a day, one for himself and another for his servant), which amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way her money was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships ever manned by her.

Thucydides, II, 16

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, and that they were able,

without moving the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentecosiomedimni, and the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased.

The Spartans seem, to an extraordinary degree, to have undervalued the Athenian navy. It is remarkable that they were too dull to realize how many years the navy of Athens had been developing and that they themselves could not hope to rival a seasoned fleet at a moment's notice. As Pericles stated in his reply, Athens had the largest and best class of native coxswains and sailors in Hellas.

Thucydides, I, 121, 143

The naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be removed by our practice. . . .

Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them, by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the danger of such a step,

none of our foreign sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days' high pay.

6. FOREIGN POLICY

Thucydides and Plutarch agree in attributing to Pericles a very wise, sane policy regarding foreign conquests. The city had been roused to wild enthusiasm and mad schemes, which he blocked even at the risk of unpopularity.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 20

But in other things he did not comply with the giddy impulses of the citizens, nor quit his own resolutions to follow their fancies, when, carried away with the thought of their strength and great success, they were eager to interfere again in Egypt, and to disturb the King of Persia's maritime dominions. Nay, there were a good many who were, even then, possessed with that unblest and inauspicious passion for Sicily, which afterward the orators of Alcibiades's party blew up into a flame. There were some also who dreamt of Tuscany and Carthage, and not without plausible reason in their present large dominion and prosperous course of their affairs.

But Pericles curbed this passion for foreign conquest, and unsparingly pruned and cut down their ever busy fancies for a multitude of undertakings; and directed their power for the most part to securing and consolidating what they had already got, supposing it would be quite enough for them to do, if they could keep the Lacedæmonians in check; to whom he entertained all along a sense of opposition; which, as upon many other occasions, so he particularly showed by what he did in the time of the holy war. The Lacedæmonians, having gone with an army to Delphi, restored Apollo's temple, which the Phocians had got into their possession, to the Delphians; immediately after their departure, Pericles, with another army, came and restored the Phocians. And the Lacedæmonians, having engraven the record of their privilege of consulting the oracle before others, which the

Delphians gave them, upon the forehead of the brazen wolf which stands there, he, also, having received from the Phocians the like privilege for the Athenians, had it cut upon the same wolf of brass on his right side.

That he did well and wisely in thus restraining the exertions of the Athenians within the compass of Greece, the events themselves that happened afterward bore sufficient witness.

Thucydides, II, 65

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedæmon, but applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little that they ever possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of all for the public necessities. For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the

war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies — projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude — in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

7. PERSONAL RULE AND STATESMANSHIP

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 15–16

At length, coming to a final contest with Thucydides which of the two should ostracise the other out of the country, and having gone through this peril, he threw his antagonist out, and broke up the confederacy that had been organised against him. So that now all schism and division being at an end, and the city brought to evenness and unity, he got all Athens and all affairs that pertained to the Athenians into his own hands, their tributes, their armies, and their galleys, the islands, the sea, and their wide-extended power, partly over other Greeks and partly over barbarians, and all that empire, which they possessed, founded and fortified upon subject nations and royal friendships and alliances.

After this he was no longer the same man he had been before, nor as tame and gentle and familiar as formerly with the populace, so as readily to yield to their pleasures and to comply with the desires of the multitude, as a steersman shifts with the winds. Quitting that loose, remiss, and, in some cases, licentious court of the popular will, he turned those soft and flowery modulations to the austerity of aristocratical and regal rule; and employing this uprightly and undeviatingly for the country's best interests, he was able generally to lead the people along, with their own wills and consents, by persuading and showing them what was to be done; and sometimes, too, urging and pressing them forward extremely against their will, he made them, whether they would or no, yield submission to what was for their advantage. In which, to say the truth, he did but like a skilful physician, who, in a complicated and chronic disease, as he sees occasion, at one while allows his patient the moderate use of such things as please him, at another while gives him keen pains and drugs to work the cure. For there arising and growing up, as was natural, all manner of distempered feelings among a people which had so vast a command and dominion, he alone, as a great master, knowing how to handle and deal fitly with each one of them, and, in an especial manner, making that use of hopes and fears, as his two chief rudders, with the one to check the career of their confidence at any time, with the other to raise them up and cheer them when under any

discouragement, plainly showed by this, that rhetoric, or the art of speaking, is, in Plato's language, the government of the souls of men, and that her chief business is to address the affections and passions, which are as it were the strings and keys to the soul, and require a skilful and careful touch to be played on as they should be. The source of this predominance was not barely his power of language, but, as Thucydides assures us, the reputation of his life, and the confidence felt in his character; his manifest freedom from every kind of corruption, and superiority to all considerations of money. Notwithstanding he had made the city of Athens, which was great of itself, as great and rich as can be imagined, and though he were himself in power and interest more than equal to many kings and absolute rulers, who some of them also bequeathed by will their power to their children, he, for his part, did not make the patrimony his father left him greater than it was by one drachma.

Thucydides, indeed, gives a plain statement of the greatness of his power; and the comic poets, in their spiteful manner, more than hint at it, styling his companions and friends the new Pisistratidæ, and calling on him to abjure any intention of usurpation, as one whose eminence was too great to be any longer proportionable to and compatible with a democracy or popular government. And Teleclides says the Athenians had surrendered up to him —

> The tribute of the cities, and with them, the cities too, to do with them as he pleases, and undo;
> To build up, if he likes, stone walls around a town; and again, if so he likes, to pull them down;
> Their treaties and alliances, power, empire, peace, and war, their wealth and their success forever more.

Nor was all this the luck of some happy occasion; nor was it the mere bloom and grace of a policy that flourished for a season; but having for forty years together maintained the first place among statesmen such as Ephialtes and Leocrates and Myronides and Cimon and Tolmides and Thucydides were, after the defeat and banishment of Thucydides, for no less than fifteen years longer, in the exercise of one continuous unintermitted command in the office, to which he was annually re-elected, of General, he preserved his integrity unspotted.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 9

Since Thucydides describes the rule of Pericles as an aristocratical government, that went by the name of a democracy, but was, indeed, the supremacy of a single great man, while many others say, on the contrary, that by him the common people were first encouraged and led on to such evils as appropriations of subject territory, allowances for attending theatres, payments for performing public duties, and by these bad habits were, under the influence of his public measures, changed from a sober, thrifty people, that maintained themselves by their own labours, to lovers of expense, intemperance, and licence, let us examine the cause of this change by the actual matters of fact.

At the first, as has been said, when he set himself against Cimon's great authority, he did caress the people. Finding himself come short of his competitor in wealth and money, by which advantages the other was enabled to take care of the poor, inviting every day some one or other of the citizens that was in want to supper, and bestowing clothes on the aged people, and breaking down the hedges and enclosures of his grounds, that all that would might freely gather what fruit they pleased, Pericles, thus outdone in popular arts, by the advice of one Damonides of Œa, as Aristotle states, turned to the distribution of the public moneys; and in a short time having bought the people over, what with moneys allowed for shows and for service on juries, and what with other forms of pay and largess, he made use of them against the council of Areopagus, of which he himself was no member, as having never been appointed by lot either chief archon, or lawgiver, or king, or captain. For from of old these offices were conferred on persons by lot, and they who had acquitted themselves duly in the discharge of them were advanced to the court of Areopagus. And so Pericles, having secured his power in interest with the populace, directed the exertions of his party against this council with such success, that most of these causes and matters which had been used to be tried there were, by the agency of Ephialtes, removed from its cognisance; Cimon, also, was banished by ostracism as a favourer of the Lacedæmonians and a hater of the people, though in wealth and noble birth he was among the first, and had won

several most glorious victories over the barbarians, and had filled the city with money and spoils of war; as is recorded in the history of his life. So vast an authority had Pericles obtained among the people.

Æschylus, in the "Eumenides," gives us the best picture of the origin of the court of the Areopagus at the time of the trial of Orestes.[1]

ÆSCHYLUS, *Eumenides*, 470–489 (tr. Campbell)

ATHENA. Too hard for human judgement is this case,
Should mortal undertake it. Yea for me
To give decision in a wrathful suit
For homicide, were to exceed my right.
Moreover, — thou art come unto my town
Not unaneled, — a harmless suppliant,
And cleansed; — yet, ere thou art called my citizen,
I would have thee clear from every shadow of blame.
Now these, where they have power, not easily
May be dismissed, but if they compass not
The victory they crave, their venomed will
Falls on the land for evil in time to come.
So stands the business, troublous every way;
Alike disastrous and impossible
For me, to let them bide, to ban them forth.
Howbeit, since the affair hath lighted here,
The court I now appoint for trial of blood,
— Men reverencing the sanction of their oath, —
Shall live in ordinance for evermore.
Produce your witness, let your proofs be called
In oath-bound aid to fortify your right.
While I cull forth from holy Athens here
My citizens of noblest note, to give
On this great plea their true arbitrament
With righteous thoughts, not swerving from their oath.

[1] Bury (p. 348) points out that the true greatness of the Areopagus as a court and not as a council is indicated by Æschylus.

ÆSCHYLUS, *Eumenides*, 675–710

ATH. Athenians, ye who are trying this first cause
Of human bloodshedding, hear my decree
The people of Ægeus shall for evermore
Maintain this council, incorruptible,
This mount of Ares, tabernacle and seat
Of the Amazons, who came in armed might
Opposing Theseus, and, to thwart his will,
Built here and fortified this virgin rock
And sacrificed to Ares, whence the name
Of Areiopagus; the dread whereof
And awful reverence inbred in the race
By day and night continuing shall restrain
This folk from wrong-doing, whilst the citizens
Avoid rash innovation. Crystal streams
Tainted with clay yield no refreshing draught.
I counsel this my people to revere,
And guard from change, the form of state removed
Alike from anarchy and tyranny,
Not casting forth all terror from the realm,
Since who of mortals, fearing nought, is just?
Standing in awe, then, of this worshipped seat,
With hearts of righteousness, ye shall preserve
A fortress of protection for your land
Mightier than any held by human kind
From Scythia to the isle of Pelops old.
This Court-house inaccessible to wealth
I here inaugurate, swift for redress,
Yet capable of mercy, watching o'er
Poor souls that slumber, warden of the soil.
I have thus prolonged my charge for the behoof
Of mine own citizens in times to be.
Now stand you forth, lift each his voting-ball,
And in decision of this pending suit,
Respect your oaths. There is no more to say.

The fifth century was full of momentous changes, as the following selection from Aristotle shows.

The abolition of the last aristocratic stronghold, the Areopagus, the payment of jurists' fees, and the absolute democracy of the state are here indicated. Aristotle suggests some bad features of the system; the noblest expression of democratic ideals and what he hoped them to achieve is that given by Pericles.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXV

The people therefore got its means of support in this way. And for about seventeen years after the Persian war the constitution was maintained under the presidency of the Areopagitæ, although it was gradually losing ground. But as the masses were increasing in power, Ephialtes, the son of Sophonides, with the reputation of being incorruptible and of entertaining just intentions towards the constitution, became leader of the people, and made an attack on the council. First he made away with many of the Areopagitæ, bringing actions against them for their administration. Afterwards, in the archonship of Konon, he stripped the council of all the privileges, in right of which it was the guardian of the constitution, and made them over partly to the five hundred and partly to the courts of justice.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXVI–XXVII

After this, in the course of circumstances, the constitution became further weakened through the zeal of the leaders of the people, for in these times, as it fell out, the more moderate party was without a leader. Now Kimon, the son of Miltiades, was at their head, a man comparatively young, and who had entered upon public life late. Moreover, the greater portion of this party had been destroyed in war, which happened in this way: The army was enrolled in those times from those who were on the list for service, and generals were appointed to command who had no experience of war, but were held in honour for their ancestral glories, the consequence of which was, that those who went to the wars perished by two or three thousand at a time. In this way the moderate men, both of the people and of the well-to-do, were used up. Now, in everything else the government was administered differently to what it was before, when men gave heed to the laws, but the election of the

nine archons was not disturbed. Still, in the sixth year after the death of Ephialtes, they decreed that those who were to be balloted for in the elections of the nine archons should be selected also from the Zeugitæ, and the first of that class who filled the office was Mnesitheides. But all before him had belonged to the Knights and Pentakosiomedimni, while the Zeugitæ used to hold the offices that went round in succession (but not the archonship), unless some oversight of the provisions of the laws chanced to occur. In the fifth year after this, in the archonship of Lysikrates, the thirty jurors were again established, who were called after the demes. In the third year after him, in the archonship of Antidotus, owing to the great increase in the number of citizens, they decreed, on the proposal of Perikles, that no one should share in political rights unless both his parents were citizens.

After this Perikles came to lead the people. He first made a name for himself when, as a young man, he called in question the accounts of Kimon during his command. The constitution then became, in the course of events, still more democratical; for he stripped the Areopagitæ of some of their privileges, and, what was the cardinal point of his policy, urged on the state to acquire naval power, in consequence of which the masses grew bold, and drew the whole government more into their own hands. And in the forty-ninth year after the sea-fight at Salamis, in the archonship of Pythodorus, the Peloponnesian war broke out, during which the people, shut up as they were in the city and accustomed to serve for pay in the armies, partly of their own free will, and partly against their wishes, elected to administer the government themselves. And Perikles was the first to introduce pay for the services of the jurors, thus bidding for popularity as against the influence that Kimon derived from his ample means. For Kimon, as the possessor of royal wealth, first discharged the public services with great splendour, and afterwards supported many of the members of his deme. Any of the Lakiadæ who liked might go to him every day to get their rations; moreover, all his grounds were left unfenced, so that anyone who liked could help himself to the fruit. But as Perikles did not possess the means of indulging in public expenditure of this kind, on the advice of Damonides of Œa (who had the reputation

of being the prompter of Perikles' wars, for which reason also they ostracised him later), since his private property did not allow him to provide subsistence for the populace, he instituted pay for the jurors. And to these causes some assign the deterioration in the conduct of affairs, as the appointments to office were designedly made more and more by haphazard instead of by merit. And bribery in the law courts also began to be practised after this, Anytus being the first to show how to do it after his command at Pylos; for when he was put upon his trial for losing it, he bribed the court and was acquitted.

The reputation of Pericles as an orator was very high among the ancients. We can judge of it for ourselves in the famous Funeral Oration put into his mouth by Thucydides.

Thucydides, I, 139

Among them came forward Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, ablest alike in counsel and in action.

Plutarch, *Pericles*, 8

The style of speaking most consonant to his form of life and the dignity of his views he found, so to say, in the tones of that instrument with which Anaxagoras had furnished him; of his teaching he continually availed himself, and deepened the colours of rhetoric with the dye of natural science. For having, in addition to his great natural genius, attained, by the study of nature, to use the words of the divine Plato, this height of intelligence, and this universal consummating power, and drawing hence whatever might be of advantage to him in the art of speaking, he showed himself far superior to all others. Upon which account, they say, he had his nickname given him, though some are of opinion he was named the Olympian from the public buildings with which he adorned the city; and others again, from his great power in public affairs, whether of war or peace. Nor is it unlikely that the confluence of many attributes may have conferred it on him. However, the comedies represented at the time, which, both in good earnest and in merriment, let fly many hard words at him, plainly show that he got that appellation especially from his speaking; they speak of

his "thundering and lightning" when he harangued the people, and of his wielding a dreadful thunderbolt in his tongue.

A saying also of Thucydides, the son of Melesias, stands on record, spoken by him by way of pleasantry upon Pericles's dexterity. Thucydides was one of the noble and distinguished citizens, and had been his greatest opponent; and, when Archidamus, the King of the Lacedæmonians, asked him whether he or Pericles were the better wrestler, he made this answer: "When I," said he, "have thrown him and given him a fair fall, by persisting that he had no fall, he gets the better of me, and makes the bystanders, in spite of their own eyes, believe him." The truth, however, is, that Pericles himself was very careful what and how he was to speak, insomuch that, whenever he went up to the hustings, he prayed the gods that no one word might unawares slip from him unsuitable to the matter and the occasion.

He has left nothing in writing behind him, except some decrees; and there are but very few of his sayings recorded; one, for example, is, that he said Ægina must, like a gathering in a man's eye, be removed from Piræus; and another, that he said he saw already war moving on its way towards them out of Peloponnesus.

EUPOLIS, *The Demes* (Bothe, "Frag. Com." Vol. I, p. 162, in Jebb, "Attic Orators," Vol. I, p. cxxvi)

"This man," says Eupolis, "whenever he came forward, proved himself the greatest orator among men: like a good runner, he could give the other speakers ten feet start, and win. . . . Rapid you call him; but, besides his swiftness, a certain persuasion sat upon his lips — such was his spell: and, alone of the speakers, he ever left his sting in the hearers."

8. THE IDEAL OF PERICLES FOR ATHENS

THE FUNERAL ORATION

Thucydides, II, 34–46

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent

which has been erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered. Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the female relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as follows:

"Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds, would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people's cost. And I could have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar with every fact of the story, may think that some point has not been set forth with that fulness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men

can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.

"I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave us our several possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we reached our position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew, what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.

"Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing,

advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

"Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own.

"If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the Lacedæmonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our marine and

to despatch our citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them.

"Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflexion. But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by conferring not by receiving favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians who, fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.

"In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas; while I doubt if the world can produce a man, who where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.

"Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in the cases in which it set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their having any. For there is justice in the claim that stedfastness in his country's battles should be as a cloak to cover a man's other imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of

these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory.

"So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realise the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common by them all they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart. These take as your

model, and judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism!

"Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honour that never grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.

"Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to overtake, but even to approach their

renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men whether for good or for bad.

"My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are found the best citizens.

"And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your relatives, you may depart."

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CHAPTER X

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Preliminary — The Corinthian-Corcyræan incident — Potidæa — Sides taken — The Athenian population; conditions in Attica — The Ten Years' War — Spartan invasion of Attica and its results — The death and successors of Pericles — Cleon — Nicias — The revolt of Mitylene — Pylos — Amphipolis — The Peace of Nicias — Period of so-called truce — Alliance with Argos — The Melian affair

I. Preliminary

1. The Corinthian-Corcyræan incident

The inevitable struggle between Athens and Sparta was drawing nearer, although a temporary peace had been patched up between them. The war really grew out of a petty quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, and after some preliminary battles, both sides sent embassies to Athens to try to win over her powerful fleet as an ally.

The Corcyræans made out a very good case, in showing the great advantage to Athens of an ally situated as she was on the route to the west.

Thucydides, I, 31, 36

Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyræans, spent the whole of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large bounties. The Corcyræans, alarmed at the news of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into alliance, and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the Corcyræan navy being joined by

the Athenian, and her prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: the Corcyræans spoke as follows: . . .

"But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish defection. And there is a wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision is for Athens no less than for Corcyra, and that you are not making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval powers in Hellas, Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth, and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the struggle."

Athens was won over to the Corcyræan side and sent a few ships which she supplemented later, as we know from Thucydides and Plutarch and from an inscription concerning the expenses of this expedition.

Thucydides, I, 44–45, 55

When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed, and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory, or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance, and on the departure of the Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were commanded by Lacedæmonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty. . . .

This was the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, viz. that they had fought against them with the Corcyræans in time of treaty.

PLUTARCH, *Pericles*, 29

After this was over, the Peloponnesian war beginning to break out in full tide, he advised the people to send help to the Corcyræans, who were attacked by the Corinthians, and to secure to themselves an island possessed of great naval resources, since the Peloponnesians were already all but in actual hostilities against them. The people readily consenting to the motion, and voting an aid and succour for them, he despatched Lacedæmonius, Cimon's son, having only ten ships with him, as it were out of a design to affront him. . . .

Being, however, ill spoken of on account of these ten galleys, as having afforded but a small supply to the people that were in need, and yet given a great advantage to those who might complain of the act of intervention, Pericles sent out a larger force afterwards to Corcyra, which arrived after the fight was over. And when now the Corinthians, angry and indignant with the Athenians, accused them publicly at Lacedæmon, the Megarians joined with them, complaining that they were, contrary to common right and the articles of peace sworn to among the Greeks, kept out and driven away from every market and from all ports under the control of the Athenians. The Æginetans, also, professing to be ill-used and treated with violence, made supplications in private to the Lacedæmonians for redress, though not daring openly to call the Athenians in question. In the meantime, also, the city Potidæa, under the dominion of the Athenians, but a colony formerly of the Corinthians, had revolted, and was beset with a formal siege, and was a further occasion of precipitating the war.

Thucydides, I, 51

It was by this time getting late, and the pæan had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyræans and the inability of their handful of ships to protect them.

Hicks and Hill, 53

EXPENSES TO CORCYRA, B.C. 433–432

The Athenians spent the following for Corcyra:

In the archonship of Apseudes and in the senate for which Critiades son of Phainus of Tithras was first secretary, the treasurers of the sacred moneys of Athena, . . . from Cerameis and the archon-colleagues for whom Crates of Lamptræ son of Nauton was secretary, handed over to the generals first sailing for Corcyra, Lacedæmonius of Laciadæ, Proteas of Æxone, Diotimus of Euonymon, in the first prytany of Æantis, (thirteen days of it had passed?), six talents.

In the archonship of Apseudes and the senate for which Critiades of Tithras son of Phainus was first secretary, the treasurers of the sacred moneys of Athena, . . . of Erchia and his fellow-archons for whom Euthias of Anaphlystus, son of Æschron, was secretary, handed over to the second detachment of generals setting out for Corcyra, Glaucon of Cerameis, Metagenes of Cœle, Dracontides from Bate, in the first prytany of Æantis, (the last day of the prytany?) . . . .

2. POTIDÆA

Trouble next broke out in the north in Potidæa, which was in the embarrassing position of being a Corinthian colony and a tributary ally of Athens.

Thucydides, I, 56–58

Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The Potidæans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the allies in the

direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. . . .

Meanwhile the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went to Lacedæmon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against them; and receiving from the Lacedæmonian government a promise to invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidæa, the Potidæans, thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard, and settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place: meanwhile to those who followed his advice he gave a part of his territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland, and prepared for war.

Thucydides, I, 63

Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa. Not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe, though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is about seven miles off, and in sight of Potidæa, when the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry present on either side. After the battle the Athenians

set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general.

Hicks and Hill, 54

EPITAPH OF THOSE WHO FELL AT POTIDÆA

The air received the souls, the earth the bodies of those who fell at Potidæa's gates. Some lie in hostile soil among their foes, others broke past the wall. . . . This city and the people of Erechtheus mourn its men who fell at Potidæa in the forefront of the fighting, the sons of Athens, who put their lives into the balance and bartered them for glory to bring honor to their native land. (Tr. Macurdy in *The Classical Weekly*, Vol. II, p. 139)

It was in this battle that Alcibiades made his military début. Plutarch tells a charming story of his rescue by Socrates, which he repaid in like manner on a later occasion.

PLUTARCH, *Alcibiades*, 8

Whilst he was very young, he was a soldier in the expedition against Potidæa, where Socrates lodged in the same tent with him, and stood next to him in battle. Once there happened a sharp skirmish, in which they both behaved with signal bravery; but Alcibiades receiving a wound, Socrates threw himself before him to defend him, and beyond any question saved him and his arms from the enemy, and so in all justice might have challenged the prize of valour. But the generals appearing eager to adjudge the honour to Alcibiades, because of his rank, Socrates, who desired to increase his thirst after glory of a noble kind, was the first to give evidence for him, and pressed them to crown him, and to decree to him the complete suit of armour. Afterwards, in the battle of Delium, when the Athenians were routed, and Socrates with a few others was retreating on foot, Alcibiades, who was on horseback, observing it, would not pass on, but stayed to shelter him from the danger, and brought him safe off, though the enemy pressed hard upon them, and cut off many. But this happened some time after.

Thucydides, I, 66

The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her colony of Potidæa, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it, were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that they had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly fighting against her on the side of the Potidæans. For all this, war had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for this was a private enterprise on the part of Corinth.

3. SIDES TAKEN

After this Corinth immediately summoned the allies to Lacedæmon, where many matters were discussed; and the Corinthians, after reproaching the Lacedæmonians with inactivity about coming to their aid, thus characterized the Athenians:

Thucydides, I, 70

"We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with friends who are in error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them. Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point out a neighbour's faults, particularly when we contemplate the great contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are characterised by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release.

Further, there is promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's cause; their intellect they jealously husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The deficiency created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions. Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the days of their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting: their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others.

"Such is Athens, your antagonist."

Archidamus, the Spartan king, fully justified the usual policy of conservatism, but one of the ephors advocated more active measures, and finally the majority voted for war.

Thucydides, I, 84–85

"And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. We are both

warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters, — such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in practice, — but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day's brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is deeply involved, — but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidæa, send on the matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents."

Thucydides, I, 87–88, 125

"Vote therefore, Lacedæmonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandisement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors."

With these words he, as Ephor, himself put the question to the assembly of the Lacedæmonians. He said that he could not determine which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision

is by acclamation not by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly he said, "All Lacedæmonians who are of opinion that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there," pointing out a certain place; "all who are of the opposite opinion, there." They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had despatched the objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the thirty years' truce, which was entered into after the affair of Eubœa.

The Lacedæmonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them. . . .

The Lacedæmonians having now heard all give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun.

The Periclean policy outlined in this speech is consistent with what had been previously advocated — to trust to the ships even at the cost of abandoning property on land.

Thucydides, I, 140–142

"There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you, who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it was clear before, that Lacedæmon entertained designs against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedæmonians never yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us to raise the siege of Potidæa, to let Ægina be independent, to revoke the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent. I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions or consenting

to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands, before any attempt at legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one meaning, and that is slavery.

"As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

"But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again,

we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy's country, with Athens just as much fortified against it, as it against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

Thucydides, I, 143, 145

"This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have criticised in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders: can you conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should,

as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. . . . Did not our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity unimpaired."

4. THE ATHENIAN POPULATION; CONDITIONS IN ATTICA

The people of Attica, though legally Athenians who went to town for all official business, lived largely on farms or estates in the country. The rural population was a source of great joy to the comic poets, whose characters are largely drawn from it.

They were willing, however, to make the sacrifice in spite of the discomfort it involved.

Thucydides, II, 14, 16–17

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even to the woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and cattle they sent over to Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians than with others. . . .

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent townships. Even after the centralisation of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent

at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city. . . .

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such other places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgicon had been forbidden by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle which said —

> Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate,
> Woe worth the day that men inhabit it!

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. Many also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small to hold them; though afterwards they divided the long walls and a great part of Piræus into lots and settled there. All this while great attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was the state of preparation at Athens.

Besides the rural population, there was a large and heterogeneous throng in the Piræus. It was made up of sailors, traders, and laborers, who in politics were usually extreme democrats. They are well characterized in the following passage. It is sometimes difficult to tell how far the subtle irony is to be taken seriously. We know that the author (sometimes called Xenophon, but almost surely not he) was not in sympathy with democratic government.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Athenians*, I, 2

In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer classes and the People of Athens should be better off than the men of birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who man the fleet, and put round the city her girdle of power. The steersman, the boatswain, the lieutenant, the look-out-man at the prow, the shipwright — these are the people who engird the city with power far rather than her heavy infantry and men of birth and quality. This being the case, it seems only just that offices of state should be thrown open to every one both in the ballot and the show of hands, and that the right of speech should belong to any one who likes, without restriction. For, observe, there are many of these offices which, according as they are in good or in bad hands, are a source of safety or of danger to the People, and in these the People prudently abstains from sharing; as, for instance, it does not think it incumbent on itself to share in the functions of the general or of the commander of cavalry. The sovereign People recognizes the fact that in forgoing the personal exercise of these offices, and leaving them to the control of the more powerful citizens, it secures the balance of advantage to itself. It is only those departments of government which bring emolument and assist the private estate that the People cares to keep in its own hands.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Athenians*, I, 12

It is for this reason then that we have established an equality between our slaves and free men; and again between our resident aliens and full citizens, because the city stands in need of her resident aliens to meet the requirements of such a multiplicity of arts and for the purposes of her navy. That is, I repeat, the justification of the equality conferred upon our resident aliens.

XENOPHON, *Polity of the Athenians*, II, 11

As to wealth, the Athenians are exceptionally placed with regard to Hellenic and foreign communities alike, in their ability to hold it. For, given that some state or other is rich in timber for shipbuilding, where is it to find a market for the product except by persuading the ruler of the sea? Or, suppose the wealth of some

state or other to consist of iron, or may be of bronze, or of linen yarn, where will it find a market except by permission of the supreme maritime power? Yet these are the very things, you see, which I need for my ships. Timber I must have from one, and from another iron, from a third bronze, from a fourth linen yarn, from a fifth wax, etc. Besides which they will not suffer their antagonists in those parts to carry these products elsewhither, or they will cease to use the sea. Accordingly I, without one stroke of labour, extract from the land and possess all these good things, thanks to my supremacy on the sea; whilst not a single other state possesses the two of them. Not timber, for instance, and yarn together, the same city. But where yarn is abundant, the soil will be light and devoid of timber. And in the same way bronze and iron will not be products of the same city. And so for the rest, never two, or at best three, in one state, but one thing here and another thing there. Moreover, above and beyond what has been said, the coast-line of every mainland presents, either some jutting promontory, or adjacent island, or narrow strait of some sort, so that those who are masters of the sea can come to moorings at one of these points and wreak vengeance on the inhabitants of the mainland.

II. The Ten Years' War, 431–421

1. Spartan Invasion of Attica and its Results

Finally the threatened invasion of Attica took place, and the Athenians had to look on and see their fields plundered and their crops destroyed.

The blame for this was laid on Pericles, who had seen to the passage of certain decrees excluding Megara from trade. The Megarians had then turned to the Spartans for help in securing justice.

Thucydides, II, 19, 21

But after he had assaulted Œnoe, and every possible attempt to take it had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after

the Theban attempt upon Platæa, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedæmon, was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages, and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Ægaleus on their right, through Cropia, until they reached Acharnæ, the largest of the Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp there, and continued their ravages for a long while. . . .

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnæ, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the Median wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole of the public suffering.

In the "Acharnians" Aristophanes describes the unfortunate countryman, Dicæopolis, who is miserable in the city and only

too eager for peace that he may go back to his farm. The Acharnians, who live in a little village near Mount Parnes, have seen their lands ravaged and are anti-Spartan to the backbone.

ARISTOPHANES, *Acharnians*, 32–39 (tr. Frere)

I fidget about, and yawn and scratch myself;
Looking in vain to the prospect of the fields,
Loathing the city, longing for a peace,
To return to my poor village and my farm,
That never used to cry, "Come buy my charcoal!"
Nor, "Buy my oil!" nor "Buy my anything!"
But gave me what I wanted, freely and fairly,
Clear of all cost, with never a word of buying,
Or such buy-words. So here I 'm come, resolved
To bawl, to abuse, to interrupt the speakers,
Whenever I hear a word of any kind
Except for an immediate peace.

ARISTOPHANES, *Acharnians*, 300–330

CHORUS. We detest you worse than Cleon, him that, if he gets his dues,
We shall cut up into thongs to serve the knights for straps and shoes.
We 'll not hear ye; your alliance with the worst of enemies,
With the wicked hated Spartans, we 'll avenge it and chastise
DICÆOPOLIS. Don't be talking of the Spartans; 't is another question wholly,
All my guilt or innocence depends upon the treaty solely.
CHO. Don't imagine to cajole us with your arguments and fetches;
You confess you made a peace with those abominable wretches.
DIC. Well, the very Spartans even, — I 've my doubts and scruples whether
They 've been totally to blame, in ev'ry instance, altogether
CHO. Not to blame in every instance! Villain, vagabond, how dare ye,
Talking treason to our faces, to suppose that we should spare ye.

Dic. Not so totally to blame; and I would show that, here and there,
The treatment they received from us has not been absolutely fair.
Cho. What a scandal! what an insult! what an outrage on the state!
Are ye come to plead before us as the Spartans' advocate?
Dic. I 'm prepared to plead the cause, and bring my neck here for a pledge,
Placed upon the chopping block, ready to meet the axe's edge.
Cho. Don't be standing shilly-shally, comrades, let the traitor die.
Pummel him with stones to pieces, pound and maul him utterly,
Mash the villain to a jelly, like a vat of purple dye.
Dic. I 'm astonished at your temper. Won't you give me leave to say
Something in my own defence, my good Acharnians? Hear me, pray!
Cho. We 're determined not to hear ye.
Dic. That will be severe indeed.
Cho. We 're determined.
Dic. Good Acharnians, give me time and hear me plead.
Cho. Death awaits you, death this instant.
Dic. Then the quick resolve is taken.
Know that I 've secured a hostage destined to redeem my bacon.
He, your homebred kindly kinsman, he with me shall live or perish.

ARISTOPHANES, *Acharnians*, 509–522

Dic. First, I detest the Spartans most extremely;
And wish, that Neptune, the Tænarian deity,
Would bury them in their houses with his earthquakes.
For I 've had losses — losses, let me tell ye,
Like other people; vines cut down and injured.
But, among friends (for only friends are here,)
Why should we blame the Spartans for all this?
For people of ours, some people of our own,
Some people from amongst us here, I mean;
But not the people (pray remember that;)

I never said the people, — but a pack
Of paltry people, mere pretended citizens,
Base counterfeits, went laying informations,
And making a confiscation of the jerkins
Imported here from Megara; pigs moreover,
Pumpkins, and pecks of salt, and ropes of onions,
Were voted to be merchandise from Megara,
Denounced, and seized, and sold upon the spot.

ARISTOPHANES, *Acharnians*, 530–554

DIC. For Pericles, like an Olympian Zeus,
With all his thunder and his thunderbolts,
Began to storm and lighten dreadfully,
Alarming all the neighbourhood of Greece;
And made decrees, drawn up like drinking songs,
In which it was enacted and concluded,
That the Megarians should remain excluded
From every place where commerce was transacted,
With all their ware — like "old care" — in the ballad:
And this decree, by land and sea, was valid.
Then the Megarians, being all half starved,
Desired the Spartans, to desire of us,
Just to repeal those laws; the laws I mentioned,
Occasioned by the stealing of those strumpets.
And so they begged and prayed us several times;
And we refused; and so they went to war.
You 'll say, "They should not." Why, what should they have done?
Just make it your own case; suppose the Spartans
Had manned a boat, and landed on your islands,
And stolen a pug puppy from Seriphos;
Would you then have remained at home inglorious?
Not so, by no means; at the first report,
You would have launched at once three hundred gallies,
And filled the city with the noise of troops;
And crews of ships, crowding and clamouring
About the muster-masters and pay-masters;

With measuring corn out at the magazine,
And all the porch choked with the multitude;
With figures of Athena, newly furbished,
Painted and gilt, parading in the streets;
With wineskins, kegs, and firkins, leeks and onions;
With garlic crammed in pouches, nets, and pokes;
With garlands, singing girls, and bloody noses.
Our arsenal would have sounded and resounded
With bangs and thwacks of driving bolts and nails;
With shaping oars, and holes to put the oar in;
With hacking, hammering, clattering and boring;
Words of command, whistles and pipes and fifes.
"Such would have been your conduct. Will you say,
That Telephus should have acted otherwise?"

ARISTOPHANES, *Peace*, 603–614 (tr. Rogers)

HERMES. O most sapient worthy farmers, listen now and understand,
If you fain would learn the reason, why it was she left the land.
Phidias began the mischief, having come to grief and shame,
Pericles was next in order, fearing he might share the blame,
Dreading much your hasty temper, and your savage bulldog ways,
So before misfortune reached him, he contrived a flame to raise,
By his Megara-enactment setting all the world ablaze.
Such a bitter smoke ascended while the flames of war he blew,
That from every eye in Hellas everywhere the tears it drew.
Wailed the vine, and rent its branches, when the evil news it heard;
Butt on butt was dashed and shivered, by revenge and anger stirred;
There was none to stay the tumult; Peace in silence disappeared.

2. THE DEATH AND SUCCESSORS OF PERICLES

In spite of the unpopularity of Pericles and the hostile criticisms with which he was deluged, the Athenians must often have wished him back, for after his death the leadership was assumed by most inferior persons.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXVIII

So long then as Perikles was at the head of the people, the government went on better, but on his death it became much worse. For then, for the first time, the people took for its leader a man who was not held in respect by such as entertained moderate views; whereas in former times it had always, without exception, been led by men of character. . . . On the death of Perikles, Nikias took the lead of the nobles, he who met his end in Sicily; and of the democratic party, Kleon, the son of Kleænetus. He has the reputation of having, more than any other man, led the people astray by his impetuosity, and was the first to raise his voice to a shriek from the rostra and indulge in abusive language, and to harangue with his apron on, while everybody else respected the ordinary decencies of public speaking. After them Theramenes, the son of Hagnon, led the other side, while at the head of the people was Kleophon, the lyre-maker, who first introduced the payment of the two obols. For some time he distributed it, but afterwards Kallikrates, the Pæanian, put a stop to it, having first promised that he would add another obol to the two obols. Later on they were both condemned to death; for it is the custom of the masses, when they discover that they have been grossly deceived, to hate those who have led them on to do anything that is not right. And from Kleophon onward the leadership of the people successively passed without interruption to such men as were the most willing to act boldly and gratify the populace, looking only to the immediate present. For of those who conducted the government at Athens, and succeeded to the old rulers, Nikias and Thucydides and Theramenes appear to have approved themselves the best. In the case of Nikias and Thucydides almost all agree that they showed themselves to be not only good and honourable men, but also fit to govern, and that they administered the state in every respect in conformity with the national traditions. With regard to Theramenes, however, as disturbances in the forms of government occurred in his time, opinions differ. Still, he seems to such as do not express a mere off-hand opinion, not to have overthrown all these forms, as his accusers charge him with doing, but to have carried on all of them so long as they did not contravene the laws;

thus acting like a man who was able to live under any form of government, which is indeed the duty of a good citizen, but who would not be a party to any that was contrary to the law, and so he became an object of hatred.

EUPOLIS, *The Demes* (Bury, p. 428)

Men of lineage fair
And of wealthy estate
Once our generals were,
The noble and great,
Whom as gods we adored, and as gods they guided and guarded the state.

Things are not as then.
Ah, how different far
A manner of men
Our new generals are,
The rascals and refuse our city now chooses to lead us to war!

"The Knights," produced in B.C. 424, is full of references to these low-born demagogues, some of whom were honest enough but most of whom inspired little respect among the populace in spite of their efforts to ingratiate themselves. Aristophanes gives us a highly coloured characterization of these gentry. In the play we have the generals Demosthenes (not the orator), a man of marked ability, and Nicias, whose worst fault was his lack of self-confidence, both of whom belonged to the older régime, when the state was ruled by tried statesmen. The Paphlagonian, a wild barbarian, is Cleon the tanner, who claims to be the devoted friend of Demus (or the people), but who is supplanted by the Sausage-Seller. In the end Demus is heartily ashamed of having been so taken in by Cleon.

3. CLEON

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 125–149

DEMOSTHENES. O villainous Paphlagon, this it was you feared,
This oracle about yourself!

NICIAS. What is it?

DEM. Herein is written how himself shall perish.
NIC. How shall he?
DEM. How? The oracle says straight out,
That first of all there comes an oakum-seller
Who first shall manage all the State's affairs.
NIC. One something-seller; well, what follows, pray?
DEM. Next after him there comes a sheep-seller.
NIC. Two something-sellers; what 's this seller's fortune?
DEM. He 'll hold the reins, till some more villainous rogue
Arise than he; and thereupon he 'll perish.
Then follows Paphlagon, our leather-seller,
Thief, brawler, roaring as Cycloborus roars.
NIC. The leather-seller, then, shall overthrow
The sheep-seller.
DEM. He shall.
NIC. O wretched me,
Is there no other something-seller left?
DEM. There is yet one; a wondrous trade *he* has.
NIC. What, I beseech you?
DEM. Shall I tell you?
NIC. Aye.
DEM. A sausage-seller ousts the leather-seller.
NIC. A sausage-seller! Goodness, what a trade!
Wherever shall we find one?
DEM. That 's the question.
NIC. Why here comes one, 't is providential surely,
Bound for the agora.
DEM. Hi, come hither! here!
You dearest man, you blessed sausage-seller!
Arise, a Saviour to the State and us.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 191–193

DEMOSTHENES. To be a Demus-leader is not now
For lettered men, nor yet for honest men,
But for the base and ignorant.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 1110–1119

CHORUS. Proud, O Demus, thy sway.
Thee, as Tyrant and King,
All men fear and obey.
Yet, O yet, 't is a thing
Easy, to lead thee astray.
Empty fawning and praise
Pleased thou art to receive;
All each orator says
Sure at once to believe;
Wit thou hast, but 't is roaming;
Ne'er we find it its home in.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 713–715

PAPHLAGON. . . .
But I can fool him to my heart's content.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. How sure you see that Demus is your own!
PAPH. Because I know the tit-bits he prefers.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 733–743

DEMUS. And who are you?
SAUSAGE-SELLER. A rival for your love.
Long have I loved, and sought to do you good,
With many another honest gentleman,
But Paphlagon won't let us. You yourself,
Excuse me sir, are like the boys with lovers.
The honest gentlemen you won't accept,
Yet give yourself to lantern-selling chaps,
To sinew-stitchers, cobblers, aye and tanners.
PAPH. Because I am good to Demus.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. Tell me how.
PAPH. 'T was I slipped in before the general there
And sailed to Pylus, and brought the Spartans.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 1355–1363

DEMUS. I am ashamed of all my former faults.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. You 're not to blame; pray don't imagine that.

'T was they who tricked you so. But answer this;
If any scurvy advocate should say,
Now please remember, justices, ye'll have
No barley, if the prisoner gets off free,
How would you treat that scurvy advocate?
DEMUS. I 'd tie Hyperbolus about his neck,
And hurl him down into the Deadman's Pit.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. Why now you are speaking sensibly and well.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 1388–1396

SAUSAGE-SELLER. I think you 'll think so when you get the sweet
Thirty-year treaties. Treaties dear, come here.
DEMUS. Worshipful Zeus! how beautiful they are.
Would n't I like to solemnize them all.
Whence got you these?
SAUSAGE-SELLER. Why, had not Paphlagon
Bottled them up that you might never see them?
Now then I freely give you them to take
Back to your farms, with you.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 973–996

CHORUS. O bright and joyous day,
O day most sweet to all
Both near and far away,
The day of Cleon's fall.
Yet in our Action-mart
I overheard by chance
Some ancient sires and tart
This counter-plea advance,
That but for him the State
Two things had ne'er possessed: —
A STIRRER-up of hate,
A PESTLE of unrest.
His swine-bred music we
With wondering hearts admire;
At school, his mates agree,

He always tuned his lyre
In Dorian style to play.
His master wrathful grew;
He sent the boy away,
And this conclusion drew,
This boy from all his friends
Donations seeks to wile,
His art begins and ends
In Dono-do-rian style.

4. NICIAS

A contrast to the boisterous violent Cleon is Nicias, the dignified, very religious, timid man, who also was ridiculed by the comic writers of his day.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 6

Nicias declined all difficult and lengthy enterprises; if he took a command, he was for doing what was safe; and if, as thus was likely, he had for the most part success, he did not attribute it to any wisdom, conduct, or courage of his own, but, to avoid envy, he thanked fortune for all, and gave the glory to the divine powers. And the actions themselves bore testimony in his favour; the city met at that time with several considerable reverses, but he had not a hand in any of them. The Athenians were routed in Thrace by the Chalcidians, Calliades and Xenophon commanding in chief. Demosthenes was the general when they were unfortunate in Ætolia. At Delium they lost a thousand citizens under the conduct of Hippocrates; the plague was principally laid to the charge of Pericles, he, to carry on the war, having shut up close together in the town the crowd of people from the country who, by the change of place, and of their usual course of living, bred the pestilence. Nicias stood clear of all this; under his conduct was taken Cythera, an island most commodious against Laconia, and occupied by the Lacedæmonian settlers; many places, likewise, in Thrace, which had revolted, were taken or won over by him; he shutting up the Megarians within their town, seized upon the isle of Minoa; and soon after, advancing from thence to Nisæa, made himself

master there, and then making a descent upon the Corinthian territory, fought a successful battle, and slew a great number of the Corinthians with their captain Lycophron. There it happened that two of his men were left by an oversight, when they carried off the dead, which when he understood, he stopped the fleet, and sent a herald to the enemy for leave to carry off the dead; though by law and custom, he that by a truce craved leave to carry off the dead was hereby supposed to give up all claim to the victory. Nor was it lawful for him that did this to erect a trophy, for his is the victory who is master of the field, and he is not master who asks leave, as wanting power to take. But he chose rather to renounce his victory and his glory than to let two citizens lie unburied. He scoured the coast of Laconia all along, and beat the Lacedæmonians that made head against him. He took Thyrea, occupied by the Æginetans, and carried the prisoners to Athens.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 3

Neither had he the nimble wit of Cleon to win the Athenians to his purposes by amusing them with bold jests; unprovided with such qualities, he courted them with dramatic exhibitions, gymnastic games, and other public shows, more sumptuous and more splendid than had been ever known in his or in former ages. Amongst his religious offerings, there was extant, even in our days, the small figure of Athena in the citadel, having lost the gold that covered it; and a shrine in the temple of Dionysus, under the tripods, that were presented by those who won the prize in the shows or plays. For at these he had often carried off the prize, and never once failed. . . . His performances at Delos are, also, on record, as noble and magnificent works of devotion. For whereas the choruses which the cities sent to sing hymns to the god were wont to arrive in no order, as it might happen, and, being there met by a crowd of people crying out to them to sing, in their hurry to begin, used to disembark confusedly, putting on their garlands, and changing their dresses as they left the ships, he, when he had to convoy the sacred company, disembarked the chorus at Rhenea, together with the sacrifice, and other holy appurtenances. And having brought along with him from Athens a bridge fitted by

measurement for the purpose, and magnificently adorned with gilding and colouring, and with garlands and tapestries: this he laid in the night over the channel betwixt Rhenea and Delos, being no great distance. And at break of day he marched forth with all the procession to the god, and led the chorus, sumptuously ornamented, and singing their hymns, along over the bridge. The sacrifices, the games, and the feast being over, he set up a palm-tree of brass for a present to the god, and bought a parcel of land with ten thousand drachmas which he consecrated; with the revenue the inhabitants of Delos were to sacrifice and to feast, and to pray the gods for many good things to Nicias. This he engraved on a pillar, which he left in Delos to be a record of his bequest. This same palm-tree, afterwards broken down by the wind, fell on the great statue which the men of Naxos presented, and struck it to the ground.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 4

For he was one of those who dreaded the divine powers extremely, and, as Thucydides tells us, was much given to arts of divination. . . . In short, his timidity was a revenue to rogues, and his humanity to honest men. We find testimony in the comic writers, as when Teleclides, speaking of one of the professed informers, says: —

> Charicles gave the man a pound, the matter not to name,
> That from inside a money-bag into the world he came;
> And Nicias, also, paid him four; I know the reason well,
> But Nicias is a worthy man, and so I will not tell.

So, also, the informer whom Eupolis introduces in his Maricas, attacking a good, simple, poor man: —

> How long ago did you and Nicias meet?
> I did but see him just now in the street.
>
> The man has seen him and denies it not,
> 'T is evident that they are in a plot.
>
> See you, O citizens! 't is fact,
> Nicias is taken in the act.
>
> Taken, Fools! take so good a man
> In aught that 's wrong none will or can.

Cleon, in Aristophanes, makes it one of his threats: —

I 'll outscream all the speakers, and make Nicias stand aghast.

Phrynichus also implies his want of spirit and his easiness to be intimidated in the verses —.

A noble man he was, I well can say,
Nor walked like Nicias, cowering on his way.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 8

Aristophanes has a jest against him on this occasion in the Birds: —

Indeed, not now the word that must be said
Is, do like Nicias, or retire to bed.

And, again, in his Husbandmen: —

I wish to stay at home and farm,
What then?
Who should prevent you?
You, my countrymen;
Whom I would pay a thousand drachmas down,
To let me give up office and leave town.
Enough; content; the sum two thousand is,
With those that Nicias paid to give up his.

5. THE REVOLT OF MITYLENE

The revolt of Mitylene and its suppression shows the Athenians in a most unenviable light. Through the violence of Cleon they were persuaded to a deed of horrible butchery, but repented just in time to send a second expedition to stop it.

Although the population was not annihilated Mitylene was most severely treated. The inscription dealing with the expedition is too fragmentary to be of much service, but we have some information about the cleruchy of Athenians which was established there.

Thucydides, III, 36

Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding the Lacedæmonian, Salæthus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to Athens, together with the Mitylenians that he had placed

in Tenedos, and any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also sent back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salæthus, the Athenians at once put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Platæa, which was still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should do with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and children. It was remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest, subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to argue a long meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in despatching the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflexion on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote; which they the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most of the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity for reconsidering the matter. An assembly was therefore at once called, and after much expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of Cleænetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke as follows: . . .

Thucydides, III, 40

"No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their offence was not involuntary, but of malice and

deliberate; and mercy is only for unwilling offenders. I therefore now as before persist against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire — pity, sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence should be shown towards those who will be our friends in future, instead of towards men who will remain just what they were, and as much our enemies as before. To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who escaped the plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched it; but reflect what they would have done if victorious over you, especially as they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which you then attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn, without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates."

Thucydides, III, 47–50

"Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will immediately have the people on their side, through your having announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims of justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the possibility of such a combination.

"Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force."

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste, for fear that the first might

reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a night's start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute the sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.

The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion put to death by the Athenians, the number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of their ships. Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but all their land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three thousand allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders, who were sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay a rent of two minæ a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the future subject to Athens. Such were the events that took place at Lesbos.

Hicks and Hill, 61

ATHENIAN CLERUCHY IN LESBOS, B.C. 427

. . . the Athenians order . . . submitting their cases to be tried before the overseers of the Athenians according to the compacts made with the Mitylenians [before the revolt]. And the Mitylenian tenants are to pay back to the cleruchs whatever was sold that was on the field before the land was given to them by the generals and the soldiers.

The secretary of the senate is to inscribe this on a stone slab and set it up on the Acropolis, and the Mitylenians (?) are to pay for it . . . this is to be inscribed and the embassy of the Mitylenians is to be entertained in the Prytaneum to-morrow. . . .

6. PYLOS

The affair at Pylos was the first great success for the Athenians. There had been a long siege and counter-siege, and things were dragging on so that the Athenians were in great need of reënforcements, when Cleon began to boast about what he would do if in command. Thucydides says they were glad to send him and get rid of him; but in any case, when reënforcements arrived the Athenians made a supreme effort and took a large number of Spartans prisoners — the first time it had ever occurred.

Thucydides, IV, 2–3

About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and sat down and laid waste the country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which they had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals Eurymedon and Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already preceded them thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to the Corcyræans in the town, who were being plundered by the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels had lately sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city would make it easy for them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had remained without employment since his return from Acarnania, applied and obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the coast of Peloponnese.

Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet into Pylos. Demosthenes at once

urged them to fortify the place, it being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedæmonians call it, being about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by; while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same dialect as the Lacedæmonians, could do them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty garrison.

Thucydides, IV, 8–9

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica the Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Periœci at once set out for Pylos, the other Lacedæmonians following more slowly as they had just come in from another campaign. Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra and being dragged by their crews across the isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon them to his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedæmonians prepared to assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances of the harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the harbour, at once

makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the Lacedæmonians meant to close with a line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry thither, stationing others along the coast. By this means the island and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and, therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedæmonians, without sea-fight or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied, as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedæmonians about to attack him by sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. Among these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the rest. Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the best fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, with orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty heavy infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with these went outside the

wall down to the sea, where he thought that the enemy would most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was difficult and rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was the weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage their ardour, as the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had here paid little attention to their defences, and the enemy if he could force a landing might feel secure of taking the place. At this point, accordingly, going down to the water's edge, he posted his heavy infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged them. . . .

Thucydides, IV, 21

Such were the words of the Lacedæmonians, their idea being that the Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it, and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this policy was Cleon, son of Cleænetus, a popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedæmonians must restore Nisæa, Pegae, Trœzen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.

Thucydides, IV, 26–28

Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieging the Lacedæmonians in the island, the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remaining where they were. The blockade was very laborious for the Athenians from want of food and water; there was no spring except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one, and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on the sea beach and drink such water as they could find. They also suffered from want of room, being encamped in a

narrow space; and as there was no anchorage for the ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn, while the others were anchored out at sea. But their greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with only brackish water to drink, a matter which they had imagined would take them only a few days. The fact was, that the Lacedæmonians had made advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a siege; high prices being offered, and freedom promised to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing so. The Helots accordingly were most forward to engage in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward side of the island. They were best pleased, however, when they could catch a wind to carry them in. It was more easy to elude the look-out of the galleys, when it blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for them to anchor round the island; while the Helots had their boats rated at their value in money, and ran them ashore, without caring how they landed, being sure to find the soldiers waiting for them at the landing-places. But all who risked it in fair weather were taken. Divers also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; these at first escaped notice, but afterwards a look-out was kept for them. In short, both sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to throw in provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction.

At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that corn found its way in to the men in the island caused no small perplexity; and the Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be then impossible. The country offered no resources in itself, and even in summer they could not send round enough. The blockade of a place without harbours could no longer be kept up; and the men would either escape by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their corn. What caused still more alarm was the attitude of the

Lacedæmonians, who must, it was thought by the Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys; and they began to repent having rejected the treaty. Cleon, perceiving the disfavour with which he was regarded for having stood in the way of the convention, now said that their informants did not speak the truth; and upon the messengers recommending them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, Cleon himself and Theagenes were chosen by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware that he would now be obliged either to say what had been already said by the men whom he was slandering, or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending commissioners and wasting their time and opportunities, if they believed what was told them, they ought to sail against the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus, then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with a force and take those in the island, and that if he had himself been in command, he would have done it.

Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cleon for not sailing now if it seemed to him so easy, and further seeing himself the object of attack, told him that for all that the generals cared, he might take what force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cleon fancied that this resignation was merely a figure of speech, and was ready to go, but finding that it was seriously meant, he drew back, and said that Nicias, not he, was general, being now frightened, and having never supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his favour. Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and resigned the command against Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the multitude is wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, the more they encouraged Nicias to hand over his command, and clamoured at Cleon to go. At last, not knowing how to get out of his words, he undertook the expedition, and came forward and said that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but would sail without taking any one from the city with him, except the Lemnians and Imbrians that were at Athens, with some

targeteers that had come up from Ænus, and four hundred archers from other quarters. With these and the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either bring the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them on the spot. The Athenians could not help laughing at his fatuity, while sensible men comforted themselves with the reflexion that they must gain in either circumstance; either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would reduce the Lacedæmonians.

After he had settled everything in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the preparations for his voyage.

Thucydides, IV, 36, 41

The struggle began to seem endless, when the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were losing their labour: but that if they would give him some archers and light troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he would undertake to find, he thought he could force the approach. Upon receiving what he asked for, he started from a point out of sight in order not to be seen by the enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the island permitted, and where the Lacedæmonians, trusting to the strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after the greatest difficulty in getting round without their seeing him, and suddenly appeared on the high ground in their rear, to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the still greater joy of his expectant friends. The Lacedæmonians thus placed between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to compare small things with great, as at Thermopylæ, where the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind, began to give way, and overcome by the odds against them and exhausted from want of food, retreated.

The Athenians were already masters of the approaches when Cleon and Demosthenes perceiving that, if the enemy gave way a single step further, they would be destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the battle and held their men back; wishing to take the

Lacedæmonians alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might relax on hearing the offer of terms, and that they might surrender and yield to the present overwhelming danger. Proclamation was accordingly made, to know if they would surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians to be dealt with at their discretion.

The Lacedæmonians hearing this offer, most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands to show that they accepted it. . . .

Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hellenes so much as this. It was the opinion that no force or famine could make the Lacedæmonians give up their arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and die with them in their hands: indeed people could scarcely believe that those who had surrended were of the same stuff as the fallen; and an Athenian ally, who some time after insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island if those that had fallen were men of honour, received for answer that the *atraktos* — that is, the arrow — would be worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from the rest; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those whom the stones and the arrows happened to hit.

Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined to keep them in prison until the peace, and if the Peloponnesians invaded their country in the interval, to bring them out and put them to death. Meanwhile the defence of Pylos was not forgotten; the Messenians from Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos formerly belonged, some of the likeliest of their number, and began a series of incursions into Laconia, which their common dialect rendered most destructive. The Lacedæmonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to be seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness to betray this to the Athenians began to send envoys to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners. The Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected anything. Such was the history of the affair of Pylos.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 40–60

DEMOSTHENES. I 'll tell them now. We two have got a master,
Demus of Pnyx-borough, such a sour old man,
Quick-tempered, country-minded, bean-consuming,
A trifle hard of hearing. Last new moon
He bought a slave, a tanner, Paphlagon,
The greatest rogue and liar in the world.
This tanning-Paphlagon, he soon finds out
Master's weak points; and cringing down before him
Flatters, and fawns, and wheedles, and cajoles,
With little apish leather-snippings, thus;
O Demus, try one case, get the three-obol,
Then take your bath, gorge, guzzle, eat your fill.
Would you I set your supper? Then he 'll seize
A dish some other servant has prepared,
And serve it up for master; and quite lately
I 'd baked a rich Laconian cake at Pylus,
When in runs Paphlagon, and bags my cake,
And serves it up to Demus as his own.
But us he drives away, and none but he
Must wait on master; there he stands through dinner
With leathern flap, and flicks away the speakers.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 842–866

PAPHLAGON. O matters have not come to that, my very worthy friends!
I 've done a deed, a noble deed, a deed which so transcends
All other deeds, that all my foes of speech are quite bereft,
While any shred of any shield, from Pylus brought, is left.

SAUSAGE-SELLER. Halt at those Pylian shields of yours! a lovely hold you 're lending.
For if you really Demus love, what meant you by suspending
Those shields with all their handles on, for action ready strapped?
O Demus, there 's a dark design within those handles wrapped,
And if to punish him you seek, those shields will bar the way.
You see the throng of tanner-lads he always keeps in pay,
And round them dwell the folk who sell their honey and their cheeses;

And these are all combined in one, to do whate'er he pleases.
And if the oyster-shelling game you seem inclined to play,
They 'll come by night with all their might and snatch those shields away,
And then with ease will run and seize the passes of — your wheat.
DEMUS. Oh, are the handles really there? You rascal, what deceit
Have you so long been practising that Demus you may cheat?
PAPH. Pray don't be every speaker's gull, nor dream you 'll ever get
A better friend than I, who all conspiracies upset.
Alone I crushed them all, and now, if any plots are brewing
Within the town, I scent them down, and raise a grand hallooing.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. O ay, you 're like the fisher-folk, the men who hunt for eels,
Who when the mere is still and clear catch nothing for their creels,
But when they rout the mud about and stir it up and down,
'T is then they do; and so do you, when you perturb the town.

ARISTOPHANES, *Knights*, 1166–1172

PAPH. Look, here 's a jolly little cake I bring,
Cooked from the barley-grain I brought from Pylus.
SAUSAGE-SELLER. And here I 'm bringing splendid scoops of bread,
Scooped by the Goddess with her ivory hand.
DEMUS. A mighty finger you must have, dread lady!
PAPH. And here 's pease-porridge, beautiful and brown.
Pallas Pylæmachus it was that stirred it.

The famous statue described by Pausanias is still to be seen at Olympia.

Pausanias, V, xxvi, 1

The Dorian Messenians, who received Naupactus from the Athenians, dedicated at Olympia the image of Victory that stands on the pillar. It is a work of Pæonius of Mende, and is made from spoils taken from the enemy, at the time, I think, when they made war on the Acarnanians of Œniadæ. But the Messenians

themselves say that the offering is a trophy of the battle in which they fought on the Athenian side in the island of Sphacteria, and that they refrained from inscribing the name of the enemy from fear of the Lacedæmonians; for, say they, they had no fear of the Acarnanians of Œniadæ.

Hicks and Hill, 63

MESSENIAN AND NAUPACTIAN VICTORIES, B.C. 426–425

Messenians and Naupactians dedicated (this statue) to Olympian Zeus as a tithe from their enemies. Pæonius, a Mendæan, made (it), and he was victorious in making the top-figures (*akroteria*) which were to be placed on the temple. (Frazer, note on V, xxvi, 1)

7. AMPHIPOLIS

The scene of the war now shifted to Thrace and in the struggle there both Cleon and Brasidas lost their lives. Thus the two chief opponents of peace were removed, and a treaty was made, followed later by an alliance.

Thucydides, IV, 102, 104

The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the Thracian places, marched against Amphipolis, the Athenian colony on the river Strymon. A settlement upon the spot on which the city now stands, was before attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled from king Darius), who was however dislodged by the Edonians; and thirty-two years later by the Athenians, who sent thither ten thousand settlers of their own citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These were cut off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years after, the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias, being sent out as leader of the colony) and drove out the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly called Ennea-hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport at the mouth of the river, not more than three miles from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphipolis, because the Strymon flows round it on two sides, and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and land alike, running a long wall across from river to river, to complete the circumference. . . .

The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the town; and the capture of many of those outside, and the flight of the rest within the wall, combined to produce great confusion among the citizens; especially as they did not trust one another. It is even said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had advanced straight against the town, he would probably have taken it. In fact, however, he established himself where he was and overran the country outside, and for the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a demonstration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile the party opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, and in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides, son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to their relief. On receipt of this message he at once set sail with seven ships which he had with him, in order, if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its capitulation, or in any case to save Eion.

Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea from Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the right of working the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and had thus great influence with the inhabitants of the continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible, before the people of Amphipolis should be encouraged by his arrival to hope that he could save them by getting together a force of allies from the sea and from Thrace, and so refuse to surrender. He accordingly offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any of the Amphipolitans and Athenians who chose, might continue to enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship; while those who did not wish to stay had five days to depart, taking their property with them.

Thucydides, IV, 106–108

. . . and thus the surrender was made and Brasidas was admitted by them on the terms of his proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and late in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered the harbour of Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of

Amphipolis, and having been within a night of taking Eion: had the ships been less prompt in relieving it, in the morning it would have been his.

After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to secure it against any present or future attack of Brasidas, and received such as had elected to come there from the interior according to the terms agreed on. Meanwhile Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats down the river to Eion to see if he could not seize the point running out from the wall, and so command the entrance; at the same time he attempted it by land, but was beaten off on both sides and had to content himself with arranging matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood. Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him; the Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro; and Galepsus and Œsyme, which are Thasian colonies, not long after followed its example. Perdiccas too came up immediately after the capture and joined in these arrangements.

The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the enemy caused great alarm at Athens. Not only was the town valuable for the timber it afforded for shipbuilding, and the money that it brought in; but also, although the escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedæmonians a means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on the contrary, the path seemed open. There was also the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the moderation displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the declarations which he was everywhere making that he was sent out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas, felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition, and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on to them; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake in their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as that power afterwards turned out to be,

and their judgment was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound prevision; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in Bœotia, joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements of Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to engage his single army at Nisæa, made the allies confident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood that they should find the Lacedæmonians full of zeal at starting, made them eager to venture. Observing this, the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as far as was possible at such short notice and in winter; while Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedæmon asking for reinforcements, and himself made preparations for building galleys in the Strymon. The Lacedæmonians however did not send him any, partly through envy on the part of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war

Thucydides, V, 10–16

After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the sally, and placed the rest with Clearidas at the Thracian gates to support him as had been agreed. Meanwhile he had been seen coming down from Cerdylium and then in the city, which is overlooked from the outside, sacrificing near the temple of Athene; in short, all his movements had been observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who had at the moment gone on to look about him, that the whole of the enemy's force could be seen in the town, and that the feet of horses and men in great numbers were visible under the gates, as if a sally were intended. Upon hearing this he went up to look, and having done so, being unwilling to venture upon the decisive step of a battle before his reinforcements came up, and fancying that he would have time to retire, bid the retreat be sounded and sent orders to the men to effect it by moving on the left wing in the direction of Eion, which was indeed the only way practicable. This however not being quick enough for him, he

joined the retreat in person and made the right wing wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side to the enemy. It was then that Brasidas seeing the Athenian force in motion and his opportunity come, said to the men with him and the rest, "Those fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way their spears and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom stand a charge. Quick, some one, and open the gates I spoke of, and let us be out and at them with no fears for the result." Accordingly issuing out by the palisade gate and by the first in the long wall then existing, he ran at the top of his speed along the straight road, where the trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the hill, and fell upon and routed the centre of the Athenians, panic-stricken by their own disorder and astounded at his audacity. At the same moment Clearidas in execution of his orders issued out from the Thracian gates to support him, and also attacked the enemy. The result was that the Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on both sides, fell into confusion; and their left towards Eion, which had already got on some distance, at once broke and fled. Just as it was in full retreat and Brasidas was passing on to attack the right, he received a wound; but his fall was not perceived by the Athenians, as he was taken up by those near him and carried off the field.. The Athenian right made a better stand, and though Cleon, who from the first had no thought of fighting, at once fled and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer, his infantry forming in close order upon the hill twice or thrice repulsed the attacks of Clearidas, and did not finally give way until they were surrounded and routed by the missiles of the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Thus the Athenian army was all now in flight; and such as escaped being killed in the battle or by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, dispersed among the hills, and with difficulty made their way to Eion. The men who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, brought him into the town with the breath still in him: he lived to hear of the victory of his troops, and not long after expired. The rest of the army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit stripped the dead and set up a trophy.

After this all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of what is now the

market-place, and the Amphipolitans having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards sacrifice to him as a hero and have given to him the honour of games and annual offerings. They constituted him the founder of their colony, and pulled down the Hagnonic erections and obliterated everything that could be interpreted as a memorial of his having founded the place; for they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver, and courting as they did the alliance of Lacedæmon for fear of Athens, in their present hostile relations with the latter they could no longer with the same advantage or satisfaction pay Hagnon his honours. They also gave the Athenians back their dead. About six hundred of the latter had fallen and only seven of the enemy, owing to there having been no regular engagement, but the affair of accident and panic that I have described. After taking up their dead the Athenians sailed off home, while Clearidas and his troops remained to arrange matters at Amphipolis.

About the same time three Lacedæmonians — Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas — led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy infantry to the towns in the direction of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis reformed matters there as seemed good to them. While they delayed there, this battle took place and so the summer ended.

With the beginning of the winter following Ramphias and his companions penetrated as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians opposed their further advance, and Brasidas whom they came to reinforce was dead, they turned back home, thinking that the moment had gone by, the Athenians being defeated and gone, and themselves not equal to the execution of Brasidas' designs. The main cause however of their return was because they knew that when they set out, Lacedæmonian opinion was really in favour of peace.

Indeed it so happened that directly after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, both sides ceased to prosecute the war and turned their attention to peace. Athens had suffered severely at Delium, and again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis, and had no longer that confidence in her strength which had made her before refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate victory which her success at the moment had inspired; besides, she was

afraid of her allies being tempted by her reverses to rebel more generally, and repented having let go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of Pylos had offered. Lacedæmon, on the other hand, found the event of the war falsify her notion that a few years would suffice for the overthrow of the power of the Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at Sparta; she saw her country plundered from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and she was in constant apprehension that those who remained in Peloponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage of the situation to renew their old attempts at revolution. Besides this, as chance would have it, her thirty years' truce with the Argives was upon the point of expiring; and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in Peloponnese of intending to go over to the enemy, as was indeed the case.

These considerations made both sides disposed for an accommodation; the Lacedæmonians being probably the most eager, as they ardently desired to recover the men taken upon the island, the Spartans among whom belonged to the first families and were accordingly related to the governing body in Lacedæmon. Negotiations had been begun directly after their capture, but the Athenians in their hour of triumph would not consent to any reasonable terms; though after their defeat at Delium Lacedæmon, knowing that they would be now more inclined to listen, at once concluded the armistice for a year, during which they were to confer together and see if a longer period could not be agreed upon.

Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphipolis, and the death of Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace on either side — the latter from the success and honour which war gave him, the former because he thought that, if tranquillity were restored, his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less credited — the foremost candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, the most fortunate general of his time, each desired peace more ardently than ever.

8. THE PEACE OF NICIAS

Thucydides, V, 17–18

And at last, after many claims had been urged on either side at the conferences, a peace was agreed on upon the following basis. Each party was to restore its conquests, but Athens was to keep Nisæa; her demand for Platæa being met by the Thebans asserting that they had acquired the place not by force or treachery, but by the voluntary adhesion upon agreement of its citizens; and the same, according to the Athenian account, being the history of her acquisition of Nisæa. This arranged, the Lacedæmonians summoned their allies, and all voting for peace except the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, who did not approve of these proceedings, they concluded the treaty and made peace, each of the contracting parties swearing to the following articles: —

The Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies made a treaty, and swore to it, city by city, as follows: —

1. Touching the national temples, there shall be a free passage by land and by sea to all who wish it, to sacrifice, travel, consult, and attend the oracle or games, according to the customs of their countries.

2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians shall be governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges, the land and the people, according to the custom of their country.

3. The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians, and upon the Lacedæmonians and the allies of the Lacedæmonians, without fraud or hurt by land or by sea.

4. It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt, either for the Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in any way or means whatsoever. But should any difference arise between them they are to have recourse to *law* and oaths, according as may be agreed between the parties.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back Amphipolis to the Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of cities given up by the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to go where they please and to take their property with them; and the cities shall be independent, paying only the tribute of Aristides. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians or their allies to carry on war against them after the treaty has been concluded, so long as the tribute is paid. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus,

Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These cities shall be neutral, allies neither of the Lacedæmonians nor of the Athenians; but if the cities consent, it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them their allies, provided always that the cities wish it. The Mecybernæans, Sanæans, and Singæans shall inhabit their own cities, as also the Olynthians and Acanthians; but the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back Panactum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall give back Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante to the Lacedæmonians, and also all Lacedæmonians that are in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the Athenian dominions, and shall let go the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all others in Scione that are allies of the Lacedæmonians, and all whom Brasidas sent in there, and any others of the allies of the Lacedæmonians that may be in the prison at Athens or elsewhere in the Athenian dominions.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall in like manner give back any of the Athenians or their allies that they may have in their hands.

8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermyle, and any other cities that the Athenians may have, the Athenians may adopt such measures as they please.

9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedæmonians and their allies, city by city. Every man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, seventeen from each city. The oath shall be as follows: — "I will abide by this agreement and treaty honestly and without deceit." In the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedæmonians and their allies to the Athenians; and the oath shall be renewed annually by both parties. Pillars shall be erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, and at Lacedæmon in the temple of Amyclæ.

10. If anything be forgotten, whatever it be, and on whatever point, it shall be consistent with their oath for both parties the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to alter it, according to their discretion.

The treaty begins from the Ephoralty of Pleistolas in Lacedæmon, on the 27th day of the month of Artemisium, and from the Archonship of Alcæus at Athens, on the 25th day of the month of Elaphebolion. Those who took the oath and poured the libations for the Lacedæmonians were Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinadas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

Thucydides, V, 23–24

Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian ambassadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were exchanged, upon the terms following: —

1. The Lacedæmonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years.

2. Should any enemy invade the territory of Lacedæmon and injure the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians shall help them in such way as they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedæmon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud.

3. Should any enemy invade the territory of Athens and injure the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians shall help them in such way as they most effectively can, according to their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedæmon and Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not make peace without the other. This to be honestly, loyally, and without fraud.

4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall help the Lacedæmonians with all their might, according to their power.

5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on either side that swore to the other. It shall be renewed annually by the Lacedæmonians going to Athens for the Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedæmon for the Hyacinthia, and a pillar shall be set up by either party; at Lacedæmon near the statue of Apollo at Amyclæ, and at Athens on the Acropolis near the statue of Athena. Should the Lacedæmonians and Athenians see fit to add to or take away from the alliance in any particular, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both parties to do so, according to their discretion.

Those who took the oath for the Lacedæmonians were Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This alliance was made not long after the treaty; and the Athenians gave back the men from the island to the Lacedæmonians, and the summer of the eleventh year began. This completes the history of the first war, which occupied the whole of the ten years previously.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 9

The persons who had principally hindered the peace were Cleon and Brasidas. War setting off the virtue of the one and hiding the villainy of the other, gave to the one occasions of achieving brave actions, to the other opportunity of committing equal dishonesties. Now when these two were in one battle both slain near

Amphipolis, Nicias was aware that the Spartans had long been desirous of a peace, and that the Athenians had no longer the same confidence in the war. Both being alike tired, and, as it were by consent, letting fall their hands, he, therefore, in this nick of time, employed his efforts to make a friendship betwixt the two cities, and to deliver the other states of Greece from the evils and calamities they laboured under, and so establish his own good name for success as a statesman for all future time. He found the men of substance, the elder men, and the land-owners and farmers pretty generally all inclined to peace. And when, in addition to these, by conversing and reasoning, he had cooled the wishes of a good many others for war, he now encouraged the hopes of the Lacedæmonians, and counselled them to seek peace. They confided in him, as on account of his general character for moderation and equity, so, also, because of the kindness and care he had shown to the prisoners taken at Pylos and kept in confinement, making their misfortune the more easy to them.

The Athenians and the Spartans had before this concluded a truce for a year, and during this, by associating with one another, they had tasted again the sweets of peace and security and unimpeded intercourse with friends and connections, and thus longed for an end of that fighting and bloodshed, and heard with delight the chorus sing such verses as —

> —— my lance I 'll leave
> Laid by, for spiders to o'erweave,

and remembered with joy the saying, In peace, they who sleep are awaked by the cock-crow, not by the trumpet. So shutting their ears, with loud reproaches, to the forebodings of those who said that the Fates decreed this to be a war of thrice nine years, the whole question having been debated, they made a peace. And most people thought, now, indeed, they had got an end of all their evils. And Nicias was in every man's mouth, as one especially beloved of the gods, who, for his piety and devotion, had been appointed to give a name to the fairest and greatest of all blessings. For in fact they considered the peace Nicias's work, as the

war the work of Pericles ; because he, on light occasions, seemed to have plunged the Greeks into great calamities, while Nicias had induced them to forget all the evils they had done each other and to be friends again ; and so to this day it is called the Peace of Nicias.

This peace caused general rejoicing and the population went mad with enthusiasm. The "Peace" of Aristophanes came out at this time, most fully in sympathy with the treaty.

ARISTOPHANES, *Peace*, 632–647 (tr. Rogers)

HERMES. Then your labouring population, flocking in from vale and plain,
Never dreamed that, like the others, they themselves were sold for gain ;
But as having lost their grape-stones, and desiring figs to get,
Every one his rapt attention on the public speakers set ;
These beheld you poor and famished, lacking all your home supplies,
Straight they pitchforked out the Goddess, scouting her with yells and cries,
Whensoe'er (for much she loved you) back she turned with wistful eyes.
Then with suits they vexed and harassed your substantial rich allies,
Whispering in your ear, "The fellow leans to Brasidas," and you
Like a pack of hounds in chorus on the quivering victim flew.
Yea, the City, sick and pallid, shivering with disease and fright,
Any calumny they cast her, ate with ravenous appetite.
Till at last your friends perceiving whence their heavy wounds arose,
Stopped with gold the mouths of speakers who were such disastrous foes.
Thus the scoundrels throve and prospered: whilst distracted Hellas came
Unobserved to wrack and ruin : but the fellow most to blame
Was a tanner.

ARISTOPHANES, *Peace*, 260–300

WAR. Run in and get a pestle.
RIOT. We 've not got one;
We only moved in yesterday, you know.
WAR. Then run at once and borrow one from Athens.
RIOT. I 'll run by Zeus; or else I 'm sure to catch it.
TRYGÆUS. What 's to be done, my poor dear mortals, now?
Just see how terrible our danger is:
For if that varlet bring a pestle back,
War will sit down and pulverize our cities.
Heavens! may he perish, and not bring one back.
WAR. How now!
RIOT. Well?
WAR. Don't you bring it?
RIOT. Just look here, sir:
The pestle the Athenians had is lost,
The tanner fellow that disturbed all Hellas.
TRYG. O well done he, Athena, mighty mistress;
Well is he lost, and for the state's advantage,
Before they 've mixed us up this bitter salad.
WAR. Then run away and fetch from Lacedæmon
The other pestle.
RIOT. Yes, sir.
WAR. Don't be long.
TRYG. Now is the crisis of our fate, my friends.
And if there 's here a man initiate
In Samothrace, 't is now the hour to pray
For the averting of — the varlet's feet.
RIOT. Alas! alas! and yet again, alas!
WAR. What ails you? don't you bring one now?
RIOT. O sir,
The Spartans too have lost their pestle now.
WAR. How so, you rascal?
RIOT. Why, they lent it out
To friends up Thraceward, and they lost it there.
TRYG. And well done they! Well done! Twin sons of Zeus!
Take courage, mortals: all may yet be well.

WAR. Pick up the things, and carry them away;
I 'll go within and make myself a pestle.
TRYG. Now may I sing the ode that Datis made,
The ode he sang in ecstasy at noon,
"*Eh, sirs, I'm pleased, and joyed, and comforted.*"
Now, men of Hellas, now the hour has come
To throw away our troubles and our wars,
And, ere another pestle rise to stop us,
To pull out Peace, the joy of all mankind.
O all ye farmers, merchants, artisans,
O all ye craftsmen, aliens, sojourners,
O all ye islanders, O all ye peoples,
Come with ropes, and spades, and crowbars, come in eager hurrying haste,
Now the cup of happy fortune, brothers, it is ours to taste.

III. PERIOD OF SO-CALLED TRUCE

1. ALLIANCE WITH ARGOS

Once more inveterate jealousy burst forth, and one faction of the Athenians managed to put through an alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis.

The text of the treaty is given by Thucydides, who copied it from an inscription, a fragment of which is still extant.[1]

Thucydides, V, 43, 47, 78

The breach between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he being offended with the Lacedæmonians for having

[1] See Hicks and Hill, 69 and note

negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connexion of his family with them as their *Proxeni*, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken in the island. Being thus, as he thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedæmonians were not to be trusted, but that they only treated, in order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and afterwards to attack Athens alone; and now, immediately upon the above breach occurring, he sent privately to the Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans, with proposals of alliance; as the moment was propitious and he himself would do all he could to help them. . . .

The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, acting for themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred years, to be without fraud or hurt by land and by sea.

1. It shall not be lawful to carry on war, either for the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, against the Athenians, or the allies in the Athenian empire; or for the Athenians and their allies against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, or their allies, in any way or means whatsoever.

The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a hundred years upon the terms following: —

2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the relief of Athens, according as the Athenians may require by message, in such way as they most effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the territory, the offending state shall be the enemy of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all these cities; and no one of the cities shall be able to make peace with that state, except all the above cities agree to do so.

3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, if an enemy invade the country of Elis, Mantinea, or Argos, according as the above cities may require by message, in such way as they most effectually can, to the best of their power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the territory, the state offending shall be the enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and war shall be made against it by all these cities, and peace may not be made with that state except all the above cities agree to it.

4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile purposes through the country of the powers contracting, or of the allies in their respective empires, or to go by sea, except all the cities — that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis — vote for such passage.

5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them for thirty days from their arrival in the city that has required them, and upon their return in the same way; if their services be desired for a longer period the city that sent for them shall maintain them, at the rate of three Æginetan obols per day for a heavy-armed soldier, archer, or light soldier, and an Æginetan drachma for a trooper.

6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war is in its own country; but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint expedition the command shall be equally divided among all the cities.

7. The treaty shall be sworn to by the Athenians for themselves and their allies, by the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by each state individually. Each shall swear the oath most binding in his country over full-grown victims; the oath being as follows:

"I WILL STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES, JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS WHATSOEVER."

The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the magistrates, the Prytanes administering it; at Argos by the Senate, the Eighty, and the Artynæ, the Eighty administering it; at Mantinea by the Demiurgi, the Senate, and the other magistrates, the Theori and Polemarchs administering it; at Elis by the Demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six Hundred, the Demiurgi and the Thesmophylaces administering it. The oaths shall be renewed by the Athenians going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos thirty days before the Olympic games; by the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans going to Athens ten days before the great feast of the Panathenæa. The articles of the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone pillar by the Athenians in the citadel, by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo; by the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus, in the market-place; and a brazen pillar shall be erected jointly by them at the Olympic games now at hand. Should the above cities see good to make any addition to these articles, whatever all the above cities shall agree upon, after consulting together, shall be binding.

Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded, still the treaty between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians was not renounced by either party. . . .

After this intercourse was renewed between them, and not long afterwards the same party contrived that the Argives should give up the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and should make a treaty and alliance with the Lacedæmonians.

As the feeling toward Argos on the occasion of a former alliance had been reflected in the "Eumenides" of Æschylus, so in the "Suppliants" of Euripides the bond of union is pronounced with all due solemnity and all sorts of evils invoked upon the one who breaks it.

EURIPIDES, *Suppliants*, 1191–1209 (tr. Way)

Be this the oath, — that never Argive men
Shall bear against this land array of war;
If others come, their spear shall bar the way.
If ye break oath, and come against our town,
Call down on Argos miserable ruin.
And where to slay the victims hear me tell:
Thou hast a brazen tripod in thine halls,
Which Herakles, from Ilium's overthrow
Hasting upon another mighty task,
Bade thee to set up at the Pythian hearth.
O'er this three throats of three sheep sever thou,
And in the tripod's hollow grave the oath.
Then give it to the Delphian God to guard,
Token of oaths and witness unto Hellas.
And that keen knife, wherewith thou shalt have gashed
The victims with the death-wound, bury thou
In the earth's depths hard by the seven pyres.
For, if they march on Athens ever, this
Shown them, shall daunt, and turn them back with shame.

On the other hand, the bitter feeling toward Sparta finds expression in two passages in the "Andromache."

EURIPIDES, *Andromache*, 445–453 (tr. Way)

O ye in all folk's eyes most loathed of men,
Dwellers in Sparta, senates of treachery,
Princes of lies, weavers of webs of guile,
Thoughts crooked, wholesome never, devious all, —
A crime is your supremacy in Greece!
What vileness lives not with you? — swarming murders?

Covetousness? — O ye convict of saying
This with the tongue, while still your hearts mean that!
Now ruin seize ye!

EURIPIDES, *Andromache*, 724–726

If spear-renown
And battle-fame be ta'en from Sparta's sons,
In all else are ye meanest of mankind.

2. THE MELIAN AFFAIR

One other incident of this time has been quoted rather fully on account of its vivid and dramatic character. The affair over Mitylene had been bad, but it lacked the diabolical cynicism of some of the arguments brought forward at the time when Athens felt it incumbent upon her to force Melos into a dependent position.

Thucydides, V, 84, 89–114

The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the suspected persons still left of the Lacedæmonian faction to the number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedæmon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows: — . . .

ATHENIANS. — "For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences — either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us — and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedæmonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."

MELIANS. — "As we think, at any rate, it is expedient — we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest — that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon."

ATHENIANS. — "The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedæmon, even if Lacedæmon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both."

MELIANS. — "And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?"

ATHENIANS. — "Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you."

MELIANS. — "So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side."

ATHENIANS. — "No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power."

MELIANS. — "Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?"

ATHENIANS. — "As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea."

MELIANS. — "But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?"

ATHENIANS. — "Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger."

MELIANS. — "Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke."

ATHENIANS. — "Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty,

but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are."

MELIANS. — "But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect."

ATHENIANS. — "Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction."

MELIANS. — "You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedæmonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational."

ATHENIANS. — "When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason

to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lacedæmonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedæmonians, when their own interests or their country's laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon."

MELIANS. — "But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies."

ATHENIANS. — "Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedæmonians generally court as little as possible."

MELIANS. — "But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood insures our fidelity."

ATHENIANS. — "Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to, is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedæmonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?"

MELIANS. — "But they would have others to send. The Cretan sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedæmonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy."

ATHENIANS. — "Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact, that after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly opened to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin."

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered, "Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited

these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedæmonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both."

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference said, "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedæmonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived."

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

Thucydides, V, 116

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedæmonians intended to invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their fellow-citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.

Once more we turn to Euripides, who in the "Trojan Women," produced at this time, brings before us the heartrending pathos of the lot of the captives. The lines are just as true of affairs at Melos as at Troy.[1]

EURIPIDES, *Trojan Women*, 1081–1106 (tr. Murray)

A WOMAN

Dear one, O husband mine,
Thou in the dim dominions
Driftest with waterless lips,
Unburied; and me the ships
Shall bear o'er the bitter brine,
Storm-birds upon angry pinions,
Where the towers of the Giants shine
O'er Argos cloudily,
And the riders ride by the sea.

OTHERS

And children still in the Gate
Crowd and cry,
A multitude desolate,
Voices that float and wait
As the tears run dry:
"Mother, alone on the shore
They drive me, far from thee:
Lo, the dip of the oar,
The black hull on the sea!
Is it the Isle Immortal,
Salamis, waits for me?
Is it the Rock that broods
Over the sundered floods
Of Corinth, the ancient portal
Of Pelops' sovranty?"

[1] For the historical interpretation of these passages from Euripides see Macurdy in *The Classical Weekly*, II (1908–1909), pp. 138–140, 145–148.

A Woman

Out in the waste of foam,
Where rideth dark Menelaus,
Come to us there, O white
And jagged, with wild sea light
And crashing of oar-blades, come,
O thunder of God, and slay us:
While our tears are wet for home,
While out in the storm go we,
Slaves of our enemy!

Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 1190–1191

O ye Argives, was your spear
Keen, and your hearts so low and cold, to fear
This babe? 'T was a strange murder for brave men!

CHAPTER XI

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (CONTINUED)

The Sicilian expedition — Debate on the undertaking — Preparations — Mutilation of the Hermæ and burlesque of the mysteries — Departure of the expedition — Command and policy

I. The Sicilian Expedition

The question of sending an expedition to Sicily was warmly debated. Great efforts were made by their allies, the Egestæans, to secure the aid of the Athenians.

In the discussion which followed Nicias made a supreme effort to stop any such plan. The arguments which he advanced were attributed by his fellow citizens to his timid disposition, but the eloquent though wild speech of Alcibiades led Nicias to make a second strong statement of the difficulties in which such an undertaking would involve the Athenians.

The enthusiasm for the expedition could not be checked, but the people unwisely chose as one of the commanders the man who had done all in his power to prevent it.

1. PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

Thucydides, VI, 1, 6

The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there are only two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland. . . .

Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now bent upon invading; being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had also the specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. But they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestæans had gone to war with their neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and sea. The Egestæans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital argument, that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially as they, the Egestæans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war. The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by the Egestæans and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if there was really the money that they talked of in the treasury and temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the war with the Selinuntines.

2. DEBATE ON THE UNDERTAKING

Thucydides, VI, 8–10, 12–13

Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestæans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians

held an assembly, and after hearing from the Egestæans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the Egestæans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens. Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by the generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight and specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the enterprise, and gave them the following counsel: —

"Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do. . . .

"I will, therefore, content myself with showing that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.

"I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet — for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta — but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; and secondly,

because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all. Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedæmonians do not yet move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestæans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them, while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.

"And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. . . .

"Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestæans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedæmon.

"We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own — especially if he be still too young to command — who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such an one to maintain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remember

that such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand.

"When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels; that the Egestæans, for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the future we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must help in their need, and who can never help us in ours."

Thucydides, VI, 15–18

By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his license in his own life and habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his enemies; and although publicly his

conduct of the war was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. . . .

"What I know is that persons of this kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with their fellow-men and especially with their equals, leave to posterity the desire of claiming connexion with them even without any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged, not as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the question is whether any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united the most powerful states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedæmonians to stake their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.

"Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments to deal with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win their confidence and prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established themselves on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas

greatly over-estimated their numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war. The states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found as I say, and I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will the powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these very adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire, depending solely on their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.

"In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have not assisted us. . . .

"Be convinced then that we shall augment our power at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them see how little we care for the peace that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that levity, sobriety, and

deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can."

Thucydides, VI, 19–21, 23–24

Nicias, perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows: —

"I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the present juncture. From all that I hear we are going against cities that are great and not subject to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us from their connexion with Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits from some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead of importing it.

"Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous cavalry. . . .

"Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of the enemy except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have need of much good counsel and more good fortune — a hard matter for mortal men to aspire to — I wish as far as may be to make myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign to him my command."

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 12

It was Alcibiades, at any rate, whom when the Egestean and Leontine ambassadors arrived and urged the Athenians to make an expedition against Sicily, Nicias opposed, and by whose persuasions and ambition he found himself overborne, who, even before the people could be assembled, had preoccupied and corrupted their judgment with hopes and with speeches; insomuch that the young men at their sports, and the old men in their workshops, and sitting together on the benches, would be drawing maps of Sicily, and making charts showing the seas, the harbours, and general character of the coast of the island opposite Africa. For they made not Sicily the end of the war but rather its starting-point and headquarters from whence they might carry it to the Carthaginians, and possess themselves of Africa, and of the seas as far as the pillars of Hercules. The bulk of the people, therefore, pressing this way, Nicias, who opposed them, found but few supporters, nor those of much influence; for the men of substance, fearing lest they should seem to shun the public charges and ship-money, were quiet against their inclination; nevertheless he did not tire nor give it up, but even after the Athenians decreed a war and chose him in the first place general, together with Alcibiades

and Lamachus, when they were again assembled, he stood up, dissuaded them, and protested against the decision, and laid the blame on Alcibiades, charging him with going about to involve the city in foreign dangers and difficulties, merely with a view to his own private lucre and ambition. Yet it came to nothing. Nicias, because of his experience, was looked upon as the fitter for the employment, and his wariness with the bravery of Alcibiades, and the easy temper of Lamachus, all compounded together, promised such security, that he did but confirm the resolution. Demostratus, who, of the popular leaders, was the one who chiefly pressed the Athenians to the expedition, stood up and said he would stop the mouth of Nicias from urging any more excuses, and moved that the generals should have absolute power, both at home and abroad, to order and to act as they thought best; and this vote the people passed.

In the eyes of many this undertaking was not an innovation or a further greed for conquest but the consistent development of a policy of expansion toward the west which, according to Plutarch, began in the time of Pericles.

We know that Athens had allied herself with Corcyra (on the route), had sent a colony to Thurii, and had formed alliances with some Sicilian cities.[1]

PLUTARCH, *Alcibiades*, 17

The Athenians, even in the lifetime of Pericles, had already cast a longing eye upon Sicily; but did not attempt anything till after his death. Then, under pretence of aiding their confederates, they sent succours upon all occasions to those who were oppressed by the Syracusans, preparing the way for sending over a greater force. But Alcibiades was the person who inflamed this desire of theirs to the height, and prevailed with them no longer to proceed secretly, and by little and little, in their design, but to sail out with a great fleet, and undertake at once to make themselves masters of the island. He possessed the people with great hopes, and he

[1] See further, Cornford, "Thucydides Mythistoricus."

himself entertained yet greater; and the conquest of Sicily, which was the utmost bound of their ambition, was but the mere outset of his expectation. Nicias endeavoured to divert the people from the expedition, by representing to them that the taking of Syracuse would be a work of great difficulty; but Alcibiades dreamed of nothing less than the conquest of Carthage and Libya, and by the accession of these conceiving himself at once made master of Italy and Peloponnesus, seemed to look upon Sicily as little more than a magazine for the war. The young men were soon elevated with these hopes, and listened gladly to those of riper years, who talked wonders of the countries they were going to; so that you might see great numbers sitting in the wrestling grounds and public places, drawing on the ground the figure of the island and the situation of Libya and Carthage. Socrates the philosopher and Meton the astrologer are said, however, never to have hoped for any good to the commonwealth from this war.

3. PREPARATIONS

Thucydides, VI, 25–26

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would thus do so in the safest way possible. The Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became more eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet.

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at once before them all what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon this he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise upon that matter more at leisure with his colleagues ; as far however as he could see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys — the Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and sending for others from the allies — not less than five thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian and allied, and if possible more ; and the rest of the armament in proportion ; archers from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable, being got ready by the generals and taken with them.

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that the generals should have full powers in the matter of the numbers of the army and of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests of Athens. After this the preparations began ; messages being sent to the allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just recovered from the plague and the long war, and a number of young men had grown up and capital had accumulated by reason of the truce, everything was the more easily provided.

4. MUTILATION OF THE HERMÆ AND BURLESQUE OF THE MYSTERIES

The incident of the mutilation of the Hermæ was one of the famous mysteries of antiquity. Bury's view that it was perpetrated by the Corinthians, who had the most to lose by the Athenian ascendancy in Sicily, has much to recommend it. It was not only the superstitious — or very religious — Athenians who were scrupulous about all religious matters before a great undertaking.

Any incident of ill-omen could not fail to cast a shadow on the joyous enthusiasm about the expedition.

Strictly speaking, the mutilation of the Hermæ and the burlesque of the mysteries were unconnected episodes, but they became closely associated and confused in men's minds, giving rise to the idea that the same people were necessarily responsible for both.

Thucydides, VI, 27–29

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermæ in the city of Athens, that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the doorways of private houses and temples, had in one night most of them their faces mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large public rewards were offered to find the authors; and it was further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having been committed should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy.

Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermæ but about some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These accordingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermæ were part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the general and undemocratic license of his life and habits.

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also before going on the expedition, the preparations for which were now complete, offered to stand his trial, that it might be seen whether he was guilty of the acts imputed to him; desiring to be punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command.

Andocides the famous orator, who was accused of being involved, relates in this speech, "On the Mysteries," what he knows of both incidents and of Alcibiades's connection with them.

The Mysteries appear to have been religious dramas something like the miracle and the morality plays of the Middle Ages in

which probably a representation of the rape of Persephone was given. Details are very few, owing to the fact that none but the initiated could share therein. The fearful sacrilege involved in a burlesque of this religious drama caused a tremendous scandal. At his trial Andocides brought forward many witnesses to testify about the affair.

ANDOCIDES, *De Mysteriis*, 11–18

An assembly was being held by request of the generals for Sicily, — Nicias, Lamachus and Alcibiades, and the trireme of the admiral Lamachus was already outside the harbor when Pythonicus arose in the meeting and said: "Athenians, you are sending out an army and this great expedition, and you are going to begin a perilous campaign. Yet I shall bring you evidence that your general, Alcibiades, has taken part in performances of the mysteries in a private house with the assistance of others, and if you vote immunity to the man for whom I ask it, a servant of one of the men here present, although uninitiated, will recite the mysteries to you; and if I am not telling the truth, deal with me as you will."

When Alcibiades disputed this vigorously and denied the statement, the presiding officers voted to have the uninitiated withdraw, and to go themselves for the lad whom Pythonicus mentioned. And they went and brought a servant of Archebiades the son of Polemarchus; Andromachus was his name. When they had voted immunity for him, he said that the mysteries were habitually performed in the house of Pulytion; Alcibiades and Niciades and Meletus were the actors, but others were present and witnessed the performances; and slaves too were present, himself and his brother and Icesius the flute player and Meletus's slave.

This man was the first witness to this effect and he gave in the list of the following men. Of these Polystratus was arrested and put to death, but the others escaped and you passed sentence of death against them.

Names given by Andromachus:

Alcibiades, Niciades, Meletus, Archebiades, Archippus, Diogenes, Polystratus, Aristomenes, Œonias, Panætius.

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The first information given against these men, gentlemen of the jury, was this of Andromachus. Now please call Diognetus.

Were you a commissioner, Diognetus, when Pythonicus brought the charge in the assembly against Alcibiades? "I was."

Then do you know that Andromachus gave information about the performances in Pulytion's house? "I do."

Are these then the names of the men against whom he has informed? "They are."

A second piece of information was brought. There was a metic, Teucer, here who fled secretly to Megara and from there he offered the senate, if they would give him protection, to furnish information both about the mysteries in which he had taken part, giving the names of the others who took part with him, and also to tell whatever he knew about the mutilation of the Hermæ. When the senate had voted, — for it had full power, — they went to Megara for him, and when he was promised immunity, he denounced his companions. These also, in consequence of Teucer's evidence all fled. Now please read their names.

Names of those denounced by Teucer:

Phædrus, Gniphonides, Isonomus, Hephæstodorus, Cephisodorus, himself, Diognetus, Smindurides, Philocrates, Antiphon, Tisarchus, Pantacles.

Remember, gentlemen of the jury, that they admit all these charges.

A third testimony was given. The wife of Alcmæonides, who had also been the wife of Damon, by name Agariste, gave information that Alcibiades and Axiochus and Adimantus celebrated the mysteries in the house of Charmides near the temple of Olympian Zeus. All these fled as a result of the testimony.

There was still one more piece of evidence. Lydus, slave of Pherecles of Themacus, testified that the mysteries were performed in the house of Pherecles his master in Themacus. He denounced the others and said that my father was present, but that he was asleep with his face covered. Speusippus, a senator, proposed to hand them over to the proper court. Then my father furnished

securities and indicted Speusippus for illegal procedure and carried the case through before a court of six thousand Athenians, and Speusippus did not get even two hundred votes out of that large number. The one who above all others entreated and induced my father to stand trial was myself, and then the rest of his relatives also urged him.

Please call Callias and Stephanus, and also Philippus and Alexippus, for these are the kinsmen of Acumenus and Autocrator who fled in consequence of Lydus's information. Autocrator is the nephew of the former and Acumenus the uncle of the latter. It is natural that they should hate the man who drove them out and they are likely to know through whose efforts they went into exile. Look into the faces of these jurymen and tell them if I speak the truth.[1]

ANDOCIDES, *De Mysteriis*, 34–45

MUTILATION OF THE HERMÆ

In discussing the mutilation of the statues and the information given, I will proceed as I promised you, for I shall tell you the whole affair from the beginning. When Teucer came from Megara, after obtaining immunity he testified what he knew about the Mysteries, and of those who mutilated the Hermæ he denounced eighteen men. When these had been indicted, some of them escaped but others were arrested and put to death on Teucer's testimony.

Please read their names.

Teucer denounced in the matter of the Hermæ: Euctemon, Glaucippus, Eurymachus, Polyeuctus, Plato, Antidorus, Charippus, Theodorus, Alcisthenes, Menestratus, Eryximachus, Euphiletus, Eurydamas, Pherecles, Meletus, Timanthes, Archidamus, Telenicus.

Of these men some have returned and are here, and those who have died have many relatives in Athens: let any of these who pleases rise during my speech and prove if he can that anyone of these went into exile or was put to death through my efforts.

After these occurrences, Pisander and Charicles, who were members of the commission of inquiry, regarded at that time as very well disposed to the democracy, said that these outrages were not

[1] Addressed to witnesses.

the work of a few men but were done with a view to the overthrow of the democracy, and that the investigation should continue and not be given up. The city was in such terror that whenever the herald gave notice for the senate to go to the council house and took down the flag, at the same signal the senate came to the senate-house and everyone in the market-place fled from it in the fear that he might be arrested.

Encouraged by the evil plight of the city, Dioclides brought information before the senate, alleging that he knew those who had mutilated the Hermæ and that there were about three hundred of them, and stated how he had gained a knowledge of the affair. I ask you to pay good attention to these matters, gentlemen of the jury, and recall them with me to see if my statements prove to be true, and inform each other, for in your presence his statements were made and you are my witnesses in the case.

He said that he had a slave at Laurium, and that he had occasion to go for a payment due him. Getting up very early he made a mistake about the hour and started out, as there was a full moon. When he had come to the gateway of Dionysus, he saw several persons descending from the Odeum into the orchestra. Afraid of them, he drew into the shadow, and crouched down between the pillar and the column with the bronze statue of the general. He said he saw men to about the number of three hundred, standing in groups of about fifteen or twenty, and seeing their faces by the moonlight he recognized most of them.

In the first place, judges, he took this fiction to work on — a disgraceful business — in order that it might rest with him to include in this list any Athenian he pleased, or at pleasure to exempt him. He said that after seeing this he went on to Laurium, and on the next day heard that the Hermæ had been mutilated, and that he, therefore, knew at once that it was the work of these men.

When he got back to the city, he said, he found commissioners were already chosen and a reward of one hundred minæ announced. He saw Euphemus, brother of Callias son of Telecles, sitting in a smithy, took him to the temple of Hephæstus and told him what I have told you, namely, that he had seen us on the preceding night. Now, he said, he had no wish to obtain money from the

state rather than from us, provided that he might gain our friendship. Euphemus answered that he was grateful to him for the information, and urged him to have the kindness to come to Leogoras's house, "That you and I may confer there with Andocides and the other persons in question."

The next day, he said, he came there and was just knocking on the door when my father happened to be coming out, and said "Is it you our friends are expecting? Well, one ought not to reject such friends" — and with these words he was gone. It was in this way he sought to ruin my father, by making him seem an accomplice. He stated that we had said we had decided to offer two talents of silver to him instead of the hundred minæ from the state, and that if we should attain our ends, he would be one of us, and pledges should be exchanged.

He answered, as he alleged, that he would think the matter over, and we told him to come to the house of Callias son of Telecles, that he might be present too. And thus he tried to ruin my brother-in-law also. He said he went to Callias's house, and concluded an agreement with us and gave us pledges on the Acropolis, and that we after promising to give him the money at the beginning of the month failed to keep our word and did not pay it, therefore he had come to give information about the mutilation of the statues.

This then, judges, was the information he brought the senate. He gave in the names of the men whom he said he recognized, forty-two in all, first Mantitheus and Apsephion, senators who were sitting before him, and then the others. Pisander rose and said it was necessary to annul the decree passed under Scamandrius and put the accused to the torture, that night might not come on before they found out all the guilty men. The senate applauded this.

Mantitheus and Apsephion when they heard this seated themselves at the hearth, beseeching them not to put them to the torture but to allow them to give bail and have a trial. With difficulty they got permission, and when they had furnished securities they mounted their horses and went as deserters to the enemy, leaving the bondsmen, who became liable to the same penalties as those for whom they had become sureties.

The senate retired and conferred in private, had us seized and put in the pillory. Then they summoned the generals and ordered them to proclaim that those Athenians who lived in the city should proceed under arms to the market-place, those at the Long Walls to the Theseum, those in the Piræus to the market-place of Hippodamus; that before night the knights should sound the trumpet-call to the Anaceum; that the senate should go to the Acropolis and sleep there; and that the presidents should sleep in the Rotunda.

The Bœotians who had found out the state of affairs had marched down and were on the frontier. And Dioclides, the cause of all these evils, was crowned and escorted in a chariot to the town-hall, and given a banquet as though he had been saviour of the city.

The name of Alcibiades does not appear officially in connection with the case about the Hermæ. He was, however, accused on the former charge, but went off on the expedition without having to stand trial. According to Thucydides he volunteered to do so; according to Plutarch he was condemned for contempt of court and his goods confiscated.

Fragments of an inscription survive, giving an inventory of his personal effects, which were sold — household furniture, slaves, and other property. (See Hicks and Hill, 72.)

PLUTARCH, *Alcibiades*, 22

The information against him was conceived in this form: —

"Thessalus, the son of Cimon, of the township of Laciadae, lays information that Alcibiades, the son of Clinias of the township of the Scambonidæ, has committed a crime against the goddesses Demeter and Persephone, by representing in derision the holy mysteries, and showing them to his companions in his own house. Where, being habited in such robes as are used by the chief priest when he shows the holy things, he named himself the chief priest, Pulytion the torch-bearer, and Theodorus, of the township of Phegæa, the herald; and saluted the rest of his company as Initiates and Novices, all which was done contrary to the laws and institutions of the Eumolpidæ, and the heralds and priests of the temple at Elèusis."

He was condemned as contumacious upon his not appearing, his property confiscated, and it was decreed that all the priests and priestesses should solemnly curse him. But one of them, Theano, the daughter of Menon, of the township of Agraule, is said to have opposed that part of the decree, saying that her holy office obliged her to make prayers, but not execrations.

5. THE DEPARTURE OF THE EXPEDITION

The brilliant hopes with which the expedition started out form a striking contrast to the consequences — the lack of harmony among the leaders, the wearing delays and postponements, the failure to make use of what good opportunities presented themselves, the discouraging series of reverses, the broken health of Nicias, the pathetic attempts at conquest, the disheartening retreats, and, finally, the wholesale butchery of the Athenians.

Thucydides, VI, 30–32

After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller craft and the rest of the expedition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the Ionian sea from thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves, and such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piræus upon a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to sea. With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the city, both citizens and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each escorting those that belonged to them, their friends, their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation upon their way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long voyage which they were going to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when they were now upon the point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to them than when they voted for the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that could not but

comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief.

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time. In mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against Potidæa under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies besides. But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment. The present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea alike, and was furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as required. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state; the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty men of war and forty transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable; while the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the *thranitæ* and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to their arms and personal accoutrements.

From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in their different departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For if any one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals — that is to say, the sums which the state had already spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the generals, and those which individuals had expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of exchange — it

would have been found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those who undertook it.

The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they meant to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary before putting out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but by all together to the voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations made by the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well. The hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first sailing out in column then raced each other as far as Ægina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the allied forces were also assembling.

6. COMMAND AND POLICY

Thucydides, VI, 46–49

Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the sums promised, all that could be produced was thirty talents. The generals were not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had most reason to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise. The Egestæans had had recourse to the following stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They took the envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the treasures deposited there; bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave

an impression of wealth quite out of proportion to their really small value. They also privately entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phœnician and Hellenic towns, and each brought them to the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly the same, and everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they got back to Athens. The dupes in question — who had in their turn persuaded the rest — when the news got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers.

Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object of the expedition, and if the Egestæans could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly; but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and after displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.

Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not disgrace itself by going away without having done anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinians, who lay right in the passage and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for the army. Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to terms with Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.

Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people were still unprepared, and the panic at its height. Every armament was most terrible at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into the enemy by the aspect of their numbers — which would never appear so considerable as at present — by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of the engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city. The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades.

Thucydides, VI, 63

Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began to prepare for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching against them. From the moment when the Athenians failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage; and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicily, and going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought less of them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of confidence, to lead them to Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the Athenian

armament, and among other insults asked them whether they had not really come to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle the Leontines in their own.

Thucydides, VII, 7–8, 16

Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that either were lukewarm in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian envoys were also despatched to Lacedæmon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or in any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise, meaning to try their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly confident.

Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own difficulties daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had before sent frequent reports of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incumbent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they were in a critical position, and that unless speedily recalled or strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He feared, however, that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through failure of memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought it best to write a letter, to insure that the Athenians should know his own opinion without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts of the case. His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary danger. . . .

Such were the contents of Nicias' letter. When the Athenians had heard it they refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two colleagues, naming Menander and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war, to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn partly from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly

from the allies. The colleagues chosen for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the army that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of them; but Demosthenes stayed behind to organise the expedition, meaning to start as soon as it was spring, and sent for troops to the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy infantry at home.

Thucydides, VII, 36–41

Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a second attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which they had been collecting for this very purpose in order to do something before their arrival. In addition to other improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now adopted in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a smaller compass to make them more solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the vessel's sides for a length of six cubits within and without, in the same way as the Corinthians had altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from their being more used to sail round and charge the enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, and that the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ships in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow to prow, they would stave in the enemy's bows, by striking with solid and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for want of room would be unable to use their favourite manœuvre of breaking the line or of sailing round, as the Syracusans would do their best not to let them do the one, and want of room would prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the Syracusans' chief manœuvre, as being that which they should find most useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed, would not be able to back water

in any direction except towards the shore, and that only for a little way, and in the little space in front of their own camp. The rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space and all to the same point, would run foul of one another and fall into disorder, which was, in fact, the thing that did the Athenians most harm in all the sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans, the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in possession of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now more confident after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked by land and sea at once. The town force Gylippus led out a little the first and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, where it looked towards the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and the light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the opposite side; the ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out immediately afterwards. The Athenians at first fancied that they were to be attacked by land only, and it was not without alarm that they saw the fleet suddenly approaching as well; and while some were forming upon the walls and in front of them against the advancing enemy, and some marching out in haste against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the Olympieum and from outside, others manned the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against about eighty of the Syracusans.

After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating and skirmishing with each other, without either being able to gain any advantage worth speaking of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias, seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack again, compelled the

captains to refit any of the ships that had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the stockade which they had driven into the sea in front of their ships, to serve instead of an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each other, in order that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat in safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians all day until nightfall.

The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but with the same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the day the rivals spent as before, confronting and skirmishing with each other; until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige every one to bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, thus enabling the commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it.

In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got ready, upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to the town, and at once landed and took their dinner upon the spot; while the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at their leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other occupations, under the idea that they had done with fighting for that day. Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again sailed against them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them fasting, got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them. For some time both parties remained on the defensive without engaging, until the Athenians at last resolved not to let themselves be worn out by waiting where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans received them, and charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove in a great part of the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater damage was done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran in

upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and sailed against their sides, and discharged from thence their darts upon the sailors.

At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen to their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchantmen, where they were stopped by the beams armed with dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage. Two of the Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and were destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of the Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans retired and set up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident of having a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal success by land.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 17

When, therefore, he brought again the army to Syracuse, such was his conduct, and with such celerity, and at the same time security, he came upon them, that nobody knew of his approach, when already he had come to shore with his galleys at Thapsus, and had landed his men; and before any could help it, he had surprised Epipolæ, had defeated the body of picked men that came to its succour, took three hundred prisoners, and routed the cavalry of the enemy, which had been thought invincible. But what chiefly astonished the Syracusans, and seemed incredible to the Greeks, was in so short a space of time the walling about of Syracuse, a town not less than Athens, and far more difficult, by the unevenness of the ground, and the nearness of the sea and the marshes adjacent, to have such a wall drawn in a circle round it; yet this, all within a very little, finished by a man that had not even his health for such weighty cares, but lay ill of the stone, which may justly bear the blame for what was left undone. I admire the industry of the general, and the bravery of the soldiers for what they succeeded in. Euripides, after their ruin and disaster, writing their funeral elegy, said that —

> Eight victories over Syracuse they gained,
> While equal yet to both the gods remained.

And in truth one shall not find eight, but many more victories, won by these men against the Syracusans, till the gods, in real truth, or fortune intervened to check the Athenians in this advance to the height of power and greatness.

Thucydides, VII, 59–60

Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of which had by this time joined, neither party experiencing any subsequent accession. It was no wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans and their allies thought that it would win them great glory if they could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by sea or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside across its mouth, which is nearly a mile wide, and made all their other arrangements for the event of the Athenians again venturing to fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans or their ideas.

The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of their further designs, called a council of war. The generals and colonels assembled and discussed the difficulties of the situation; the point which pressed most being that they no longer had provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that they would not have any in future unless they could command the sea. They therefore determined to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross-wall and garrison a small space close to the ships, only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and if victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land for the nearest friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was no sooner settled than carried into effect: they descended gradually from the upper lines and manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of age to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten ships in all, on board of which

they embarked a number of archers and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from the other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by the nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it.

Thucydides, VII, 70–72

The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the same number of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the outlet, and the remainder all round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians on all sides at once; while the land forces held themselves in readiness at the points at which the vessels might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came up to the barrier, with the first shock of their charge they overpowered the ships stationed there, and tried to undo the fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the whole harbour, and was more obstinately disputed than any of the preceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great zeal in bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders, and the helmsmen great skill in manœuvring, and great emulation one with another; while the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did their best not to let the service on deck be outdone by the others; in short, every man strove to prove himself the first in his particular department. And as many ships were engaged in a small compass (for these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever known, being together little short of two hundred), the regular attacks with the beak were few, there being no opportunity of backing water or of breaking the line; while the collisions caused by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from or attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge the men on the decks rained darts and arrows and stones upon her; but once alongside, the heavy infantry tried to board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters also it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was charging an enemy

on one side and being charged herself on another, and that two, or sometimes more ships had perforce got entangled round one, obliging the helmsmen to attend to defence here, offence there, not to one thing at once, but to many on all sides; while the huge din caused by the number of ships crashing together not only spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The boatswains on either side in the discharge of their duty and in the heat of the conflict shouted incessantly orders and appeals to their men; the Athenians they urged to force the passage out, and now if ever to show their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their country; to the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, and conquering, to exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals, moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle backing ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by name and asked him — the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than that sea which had cost them so much labour to win; the Syracusans, whether they were flying from the flying Athenians, whom they well knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could.

Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance, were a prey to the most agonising and conflicting emotions; the natives thirsting for more glory than they had already won, while the invaders feared to find themselves in even worse plight than before. Then all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle itself. Close to the scene of action and not all looking at the same point at once, some saw their friends victorious and took courage, and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them of salvation, while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as the strife was protracted without decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation of their minds, and they suffered the worst agony of all, ever just

within reach of safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once, shrieks, cheers, "*We win*," "*We lose*," and all the other manifold exclamations that a great host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight, and with much shouting and cheering chased them in open rout to the shore. The naval force, one one way, one another, as many as were not taken afloat, now ran ashore and rushed from on board their ships to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away by one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran down, some to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their wall, while the remaining and most numerous part already began to consider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the panic of the present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered very nearly what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedæmonians with the loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without the help of some extraordinary accident.

The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives having been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies now picked up their wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misfortune, never even thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wrecks, but wished to retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they should man the ships they had left and make another effort to force their passage out next morning; saying that they had still left more ships fit for service than the enemy, the Athenians having about sixty remaining as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was quite of his mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer to believe in the possibility of success.

Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

Thucydides, VII, 74–75

Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of the streams and rivers, posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the army where they thought best; while their fleet sailed up to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians. Some few were burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had been thrown up on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and conveyed to the town.

After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been done in the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place upon the second day after the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, not merely from the single circumstance that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone, and themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things most grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and each man as he recognised a friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who had perished. These fell to entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging them to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative whom they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of departure, and following as far as they could, and when their bodily strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that the whole army being filled with tears and distracted after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy's land, where they had already suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among them. Indeed they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and that no small one, escaping; the whole multitude upon the march being not less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they could

which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers, contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals, in some cases for want of servants, in others through not trusting them; as they had long been deserting and now did so in greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally, and the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent alleviated by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially when they contrasted the splendour and glory of their setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended. For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with prayer and pæans, and now started to go back with omens directly contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness of the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.

Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along the ranks and encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under the circumstances, raising his voice still higher and higher as he went from one company to another in his earnestness, and in his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many as possible.

Thucydides, VII, 80–82

During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched conditions of their troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and numbers of them disabled in the numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light as many fires as possible, and to lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but towards the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syracusans. The whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to the other side of Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and barbarian towns in that quarter. They accordingly lit a number of fires and set out by night. Now all armies, and the greatest most of all, are liable to fears and alarms,

especially when they are marching by night through an enemy's country and with the enemy near; and the Athenians falling into one of these panics, the leading division, that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more than half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the Helorine Road, pushed on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to follow the stream up through the interior, where they hoped to be met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river, they found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage of the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed the river and went on to another called the Erineus, according to the advice of their guides.

Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the Athenians were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them escape on purpose, and hastily pursuing by the road which they had no difficulty in finding that they had taken, overtook them about dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in disorder, owing to the night-panic above referred to, and at once attacked and engaged them, the Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they were separated from the rest, and hemming them in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the circumstances their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating as fast as possible, and only fighting when forced to do so. On the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order to form his men for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by his pursuers and himself and the Athenians with him placed in the most distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that, and olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good

reason adopted in preference to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with desperate men was now more for the advantage of the Athenians than for their own; besides, their success had now become so certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order not to be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, they would be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.

In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from every side with missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out with their wounds and other sufferings; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation, offering their liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come over to them; and some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon for all the rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition that no one was to be put to death either by violence or imprisonment or want of the necessaries of life. Upon this they surrendered to the number of six thousand in all, laying down all the money in their possession, which filled the hollows of four shields, and were immediately conveyed by the Syracusans to the town.

Thucydides, VII, 84–87

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins, others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians,

most of them drinking greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it.

At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedæmonians to do what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night, and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at Catana.

The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. The rest of their Athenian and allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this seeming the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could take the enemy's generals to Lacedæmon. One of them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias, was for the same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to procure the release of the prisoners by persuading

the Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the Lacedæmonians felt kindly towards him; and it was in this that Nicias himself mainly confided when he surrendered to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who had been in correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of his being put to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations; others, especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by means of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these persuaded the allies and put him to death. This or the like was the cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to virtue.

The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them, the heat of the sun and the stifling closeness of the air tormented them during the day, and then the nights, which came on autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change; besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of room, and the bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the variation in the temperature, or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon another, intolerable stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him daily. In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared them. For some seventy days they thus lived all together, after which all, except the Athenians and any Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold. The total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state exactly, but it could not have been less than seven thousand.

This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army — everything was destroyed, and few out of many returned home.

PLUTARCH, *Nicias*, 26, 28

But among the many miserable spectacles that appeared up and down in the camp, the saddest sight of all was Nicias himself, labouring under his malady, and unworthily reduced to the scantiest supply of all the accommodations necessary for human wants, of which he in his condition required more than ordinary, because of his sickness; yet bearing up under all this illness, and doing and undergoing more than many in perfect health. And it was plainly evident that all this toil was not for himself, or from any regard to his own life, but that purely for the sake of those under his command he would not abandon hope. And, indeed, the rest were given over to weeping and lamentation through fear or sorrow, but he, whenever he yielded to anything of the kind, did so, it was evident, from reflection upon the shame and dishonour of the enterprise, contrasted with the greatness and glory of the success he had anticipated, and not only the sight of his person, but, also, the recollection of the arguments and the dissuasions he used to prevent this expedition enhanced their sense of the undeservedness of his sufferings, nor had they any heart to put their trust in the gods, considering that a man so religious, who had performed to the divine powers so many and so great acts of devotion, should have no more favourable treatment than the wickedest and meanest of the army.

Nicias, however, endeavoured all the while by his voice, his countenance, and his carriage, to show himself undefeated by these misfortunes. . . .

Timæus says that Demosthenes and Nicias did not die, as Thucydides and Philistus have written, by the order of the Syracusans, but that upon a message sent them from Hermocrates, whilst yet the assembly were sitting, by the connivance of some of their guards, they were enabled to put an end to themselves. Their bodies, however, were thrown out before the gates and offered for a public spectacle. And I have heard that to this day in a temple at Syracuse is shown a shield, said to have been Nicias's, curiously wrought and embroidered with gold and purple intermixed.

CHAPTER XII

ATHENS AFTER THE SICILIAN DISASTER

The effect on Athens — The Decelean War — Spartan activity — The Samian democracy — Alcibiades — His recall from Sicily — Negotiations with Tissaphernes — His recall to Athens — Personal characteristics — Tendency toward oligarchy — Removal of opponents — Pisander and Antiphon — The Four Hundred — Phrynichus — The fall of Athens — Arginusæ and the condemnation of the generals — Ægospotami and its results — Terms of the treaty — The Thirty — Theramenes and Critias — Fall and amnesty — Conditions under the Four Hundred and the Thirty — Unconstitutional measures — Treatment of the metics — Destruction of property

I. The Effect on Athens

The Athenians did not at first believe this terrible news of the disaster, but when the truth of it was finally forced on them they became desperate and resolved to go on with the war and resist to the bitter end.

Thucydides, VIII, 1–2

Such were the events in Sicily. When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omen-mongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed at all points and in all quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had

not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of salvation. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piræus, inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates. Nevertheless, with such means as they had, it was determined to resist to the last, and to provide timber and money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take steps to secure their confederates and above all Eubœa, to reform things in the city upon a more economical footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon the state of affairs as occasion should arise. In short, as is the way of a democracy, in the panic of the moment they were ready to be as prudent as possible.

These resolves were at once carried into effect. Summer was now over. The winter ensuing saw all Hellas stirring under the impression of the great Athenian disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt that even if uninvited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, who as they severally reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded. Besides, they considered that the war would now be short, and that it would be creditable for them to take part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedæmonians felt all more anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labours. But above all, the subjects of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond their ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and refusing even to hear of the Athenians being able to last out the coming summer. Beyond all this, Lacedæmon was encouraged by the near prospect of being joined in great force in the spring by her allies in Sicily, lately forced by events to acquire their navy. With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedæmonians now resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war, considering that, once it was happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such dangers as that which would have threatened them from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas.

II. The Decelean War

1. SPARTAN ACTIVITY

Sparta gained a strong ally in Alcibiades, who had traitorously abandoned his own country and was pointing out to the Lacedæmonians the most vulnerable points of Athens. Decelea, a valuable strategic point, was seized and fortified by them to serve as a base while the Spartan armies plundered the lands of the Athenians.

Thucydides, VI, 91

[Alcibiades to the Spartans] "Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that the Syracusans seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the only one that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points and fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens, and see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed with which all this shall be done depends, Lacedæmonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility, I am quite confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken."

Thucydides, VII, 19

In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than usual, the Lacedæmonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the

Lacedæmonians. They began by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and next proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the different cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of Athens, and the same distance or not much further from Bœotia; and the fort was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the country, being in sight of Athens. While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of fortification, their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily.

Thucydides, VII, 27–28

This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers, Thracian swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes. Since they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come; to keep them for the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the pay of each man was a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then occupied for the annoyance of the country by the garrisons from the cities relieving each other at stated intervals it had been doing great mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the destruction of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the principal causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions were short, and did not prevent their enjoying their land during the rest of the time: the enemy was now permanently fixed in Attica; at one time it was an attack in force, at another it was the regular garrison overrunning the country and making forays for its subsistence, and the Lacedæmonian king, Agis, was in the field and diligently prosecuting the war; great mischief was therefore done to the Athenians. They were deprived of their whole country: more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans, and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry rode out daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country, their horses were either lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the enemy.

Besides, the transport of provisions from Eubœa, which had before been carried on so much more quickly over land by Decelea from Oropus, was now effected at great cost by sea round Sunium; everything the city required had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a city it became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were worn out by having to keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by turns, by night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different military posts or upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would have believed possible if he had heard of it before it had come to pass. For could any one have imagined that even when besieged by the Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still, instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like manner Syracuse, a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to Athens, or would so thoroughly upset the Hellenic estimate of their strength and audacity, as to give the spectacle of a people which, at the beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one year, some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now seventeen years after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all the evils of war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing inferior to that which they already had with the Peloponnesians? These causes, the great losses from Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, produced their financial embarrassment; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead of the tribute, the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea, which they thought would bring them in more money; their expenditure being now not the same as at first, but having grown with the war while their revenues decayed.

Thucydides, VIII, 69–70

On account of the enemy at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day the persons not in the secret were allowed to go home as usual, while orders were given to the accomplices of the conspirators to hang about, without making any demonstration, at

some little distance from the posts, and in case of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the settlers in Ægina come with their own arms for this very purpose, who had received similar instructions. These dispositions completed, the Four Hundred went, each with a dagger concealed about his person, accompanied by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber, and told them to take their pay and be gone; themselves bringing it for the whole of the residue of their term of office, and giving it to them as they went out.

Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without venturing any objection, and the rest of the citizens making no movement, the Four Hundred entered the council chamber, and for the present contented themselves with drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their prayers and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but afterwards departed widely from the democratic system of government, and except that on account of Alcibiades they did not recall the exiles, ruled the city by force; putting to death some men, though not many, whom they thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedæmonian king, at Decelea, to say that they desired to make peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed to treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the inconstant commons.

2. THE SAMIAN DEMOCRACY

It was very difficult to keep the allies in hand, and frequent revolutions took place on the islands. The strong factional feeling, democrats against oligarchs, ran very high in a great number of these places as well as at Athens.

Thucydides, VIII, 21

About this time took place the rising of the commons at Samos against the upper classes, in concert with some Athenians, who were there in three vessels. The Samian commons put to death

some two hundred in all of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more, and themselves took their land and houses; after which the Athenians decreed their independence, being now sure of their fidelity, and the commons henceforth governed the city, excluding the landholders from all share in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to give his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife from them in future.

III. Alcibiades

1. His recall from Sicily

Alcibiades had not been brought to trial before the ships set out for Sicily, but when further evidence had been produced he was sent for by a government vessel. He went instead to Sparta, where he aided the Lacedæmonians as above stated.

Thucydides, VI, 53

There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of the Hermæ. For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermæ, and, instead of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of the informer.

2. Negotiations with Tissaphernes

It is no easy task to follow the movements of Alcibiades, whom we find one day at Sparta, the next with Tissaphernes in Asia Minor, then in Samos.

His recall was strongly advocated by some who regarded him as the one man capable of setting the state in order, for at this time

the utmost confusion prevailed. He was accordingly escorted back and returned in triumph as the leader of one party, though bitterly hated by others. His eloquence, persuasiveness, and magnetic personality soon won over the assembly, which made him their leader.

Whatever we may think of his statesmanship, there is no doubt of his fascination and almost irresistible charm.

Thucydides, VIII, 45–47

After the death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus received from Lacedæmon an order from them to put him to death, he being the personal enemy of Agis, and in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alcibiades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and immediately began to do all he could with him to injure the Peloponnesian cause. . . .

Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in too great a hurry to end the war, or to let himself be persuaded to bring up the Phœnician fleet which he was equipping, or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and thus put the power by land and sea into the same hands; but to leave each of the contending parties in possession of one element, thus enabling the king when he found one troublesome to call in the other. For if the command of the sea and land were united in one hand, he would not know where to turn for help to overthrow the dominant power; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard. The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk to himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians the most convenient partners in empire as they did not aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon principles and with a practice most advantageous to the king; being prepared to combine to conquer the sea for Athens, and for the king all the Hellenes inhabiting his country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary, had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the Lacedæmonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic Athenians, without freeing them also from the barbarian Mede, unless overthrown by

him in the meanwhile. Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out at first, and after docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians. . . .

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, with whom he then was, not merely because he thought it really the best, but because he was studying means to effect his restoration to his country, well knowing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking that his best chance of persuading them lay in letting them see that he possessed the favour of Tissaphernes. The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians at Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes, principally of their own motion (though partly also through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief men to tell the best men in the army, that if there were only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy that had banished him, he would be glad to return to his country and to make Tissaphernes their friend), the captains and chief men in the armament at once embraced the idea of subverting the democracy.

The design was first mooted in the camp, and afterwards from thence reached the city. Some persons crossed over from Samos and had an interview with Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first Tissaphernes, and afterwards the king, their friend, if they would give up the democracy, and make it possible for the king to trust them. The higher class, who also suffered most severely from the war, now conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands, and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return to Samos the emissaries formed their partisans into a club, and openly told the mass of the armament that the king would be their friend, and would provide them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and the democracy abolished.

3. HIS RECALL TO ATHENS

Thucydides, VIII, 53

While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissaphernes with an earnestness proportioned to the greatness of the issue, the Athenian envoys who had been despatched from Samos with Pisander

arrived at Athens, and made a speech before the people, giving a brief summary of their views, and particularly insisting that if Alcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitution changed, they could have the king as their ally, and would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A number of speakers opposed them on the question of the democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against the scandal of a restoration to be effected by a violation of the constitution, and the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces protested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall; when Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, came forward, and taking each of his opponents aside asked him the following question :— In the face of the fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with them, and the king and Tissaphernes to supply them with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had he any hope of saving the state, unless some one could induce the king to come over to their side? Upon their replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them: "This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate form of government, and put the offices into fewer hands, and so gain the king's confidence, and forthwith restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring this about. The safety of the state, not the form of its government, is for the moment the most pressing question, as we can always change afterwards whatever we do not like."

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, I, iv, 11–23

Meanwhile Alcibiades, with the moneys lately collected and his fleet of twenty ships, left Samos and visited Paros. From Paros he stood out to sea across to Gytheum, to keep an eye on the thirty ships of war which, as he was informed, the Lacedæmonians were equipping in that arsenal. Gytheum would also be a favourable point of observation from which to gauge the disposition of his fellow-countrymen and the prospects of his recall. When at length their good disposition seemed to him established, not only by his election as general, but by the messages of invitation which he received in private from his friends, he sailed home, and entered

Piræus on the very day of the festival of the Plunteria, when the statue of Athena is veiled and screened from public gaze. This was a coincidence, as some thought, of evil omen, and unpropitious alike to himself and the State, for no Athenian would transact serious business on such a day.

As he sailed into the harbour, two great crowds — one from the Piræus, the other from the city — flocked to meet the vessels. Wonderment, mixed with a desire to see Alcibiades, was the prevailing sentiment of the multitude. Of him they spoke: some asserting that he was the best of citizens, and that in his sole instance banishment had been ill-deserved. He had been the victim of plots, hatched in the brains of people less able than himself, however much they might excel in pestilent speech; men whose one principle of statecraft was to look to their private gains; whereas this man's policy had ever been to uphold the common weal, as much by his private means as by all the power of the State. His own choice, eight years ago, when the charge of impiety in the matter of the mysteries was still fresh, would have been to submit to trial at once. It was his personal foes, who had succeeded in postponing that undeniably just procedure; who waited till his back was turned, and then robbed him of his fatherland. Then it was that, being made the very slave of circumstance, he was driven to court the men he hated most; and at a time when his own life was in daily peril, he must see his dearest friends and fellow-citizens, nay, the very State itself, bent on a suicidal course, and yet, in the exclusion of exile, be unable to lend a helping hand. "It is not men of this stamp," they averred, "who desire changes in affairs and revolution: had he not already guaranteed to him by the Democracy a position higher than that of his equals in age, and scarcely if at all inferior to his seniors? How different was the position of his enemies. It had been the fortune of these, though they were known to be the same men they had always been, to use their lately acquired power for the destruction in the first instance of the better classes; and then, being alone left surviving, to be accepted by their fellow-citizens in the absence of better men."

Others, however, insisted that for all their past miseries and misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: "If more trials were still in store for the State, here was the master mischief-maker ready at his post to precipitate them."

When the vessels came to their moorings, close to the land, Alcibiades, from fear of his enemies, was unwilling to disembark at once. Mounting on the quarterdeck, he scanned the multitude, anxious to make certain of the presence of his friends. Presently his eyes lit upon Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, who was his cousin, and then on the rest of his relations and other friends. Upon this he landed, and so, in the midst of an escort ready to put down any attempt upon his person, made his way to the city.

In the Senate and Public Assembly he made speeches, defending himself against the charge of impiety, and asserting that he had been the victim of injustice, with other like topics, which in the present temper of the assembly no one ventured to gainsay.

He was then formally declared leader and chief of the State, with irresponsible powers, as being the sole individual capable of recovering the ancient power and prestige of Athens. Armed with this authority, his first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis; for of late years, owing to the war, the Athenians had been forced to conduct the mysteries by sea. Now, at the head of the troops, he caused them to be conducted once again by land. This done, his next step was to muster an armament of one thousand five hundred heavy infantry, one hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred ships; and lastly, within three months of his return, he set sail for Andros, which had revolted from Athens.

The generals chosen to co-operate with him on land were Aristocrates and Adeimantus, the son of Leucolophides. He disembarked his troops on the island of Andros at Gaurium, and routed the Andrian citizens who sallied out from the town to resist the invader; forcing them to return and keep close within their walls, though the number who fell was not large. This defeat was shared by some Lacedæmonians who were in the place. Alcibiades erected a trophy, and after a few days set sail himself for Samos, which became his base of operations in the future conduct of the war.

4. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

PLUTARCH, *Alcibiades*, 11–12, 16

His expenses in horses kept for the public games, and in the number of his chariots, were matter of great observation; never did any one but he, either private person or king, send seven chariots to the Olympic games. And to have carried away at once the first, the second, and the fourth prize, as Thucydides says, or the third, as Euripides relates it, outdoes far away every distinction that ever was known or thought of in that kind. Euripides celebrates his success in this manner:—

> —But my song to you,
> Son of Clinias, is due.
> Victory is noble; how much more
> To do as never Greek before;
> To obtain in the great chariot-race
> The first, the second, and third place;
> With easy step advanced to fame
> To bid the herald three times claim
> The olive for one victor's name.

The emulation displayed by the deputations of various states in the presents which they made to him rendered this success yet more illustrious. The Ephesians erected a tent for him, adorned magnificently; the city of Chios furnished him with provender for his horses and with great numbers of beasts for sacrifice; and the Lesbians sent him wine and other provisions for the many great entertainments which he made. Yet in the midst of all this he escaped not without censure, occasioned either by the ill-nature of his enemies or by his own misconduct. For it is said, that one Diomedes, an Athenian, a worthy man and a friend to Alcibiades, passionately desiring to obtain the victory at the Olympic games, and having heard much of a chariot which belonged to the state at Argos, where he knew that Alcibiades had great power and many friends, prevailed with him to undertake to buy the chariot. Alcibiades did indeed buy it, but then claimed it for his own, leaving Diomedes to rage at him, and to call upon the gods and men to bear witness to the injustice. It would seem there was a suit at law commenced upon this occasion, and there is yet extant an oration concerning the

chariot, written by Isocrates in defence of the son of Alcibiades. But the plaintiff in this action is named Tisias, and not Diomedes. . . .

But with all these words and deeds, and with all this sagacity and eloquence, he intermingled exorbitant luxury and wantonness, in his eating and drinking and dissolute living; wore long purple robes like a woman, which dragged after him as he went through the market-place; caused the planks of his galley to be cut away, that so he might lie the softer, his bed not being placed on the boards, but hanging upon girths. His shield, again, which was richly gilded, had not the usual ensigns of the Athenians, but a Cupid, holding a thunderbolt in his hand, was painted upon it. The sight of all this made the people of good repute in the city feel disgust and abhorrence, and apprehension also, at his free living, and his contempt of law, as things monstrous in themselves, and indicating designs of usurpation. Aristophanes has well expressed the people's feeling towards him —

> They love, and hate, and cannot do without him.

And still more strongly, under a figurative expression, —

> Best rear no lion in your state, 't is true;
> But treat him like a lion if you do.

The truth is, his liberalities, his public shows, and other munificence to the people, which were such as nothing could exceed, the glory of his ancestors, the force of his eloquence, the grace of his person, his strength of body, joined with his great courage and knowledge in military affairs, prevailed upon the Athenians to endure patiently his excesses, to indulge many things to him, and, according to their habit, to give the softest names to his faults, attributing them to youth and good nature.

IV. Tendency toward Oligarchy

Party feeling now ran high. The oligarchs, who in the early part of the war had not played a very conspicuous part, preferring to let the extreme and the moderate democrats fight it out, now became a factor to be reckoned with; and the people were finally persuaded that this form of government alone could save the state.

According to Thucydides, Pisander was responsible for proposing the change of government, but the orator Antiphon became the scapegoat. The following decree shows what punishment was meted out to those guilty of treason.

Thucydides, VIII, 54

The people were at first highly irritated at the mention of an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from Pisander that this was the only resource left, they took counsel of their fears, and promised themselves some day to change the government again, and gave way. They accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten others and make the best arrangement that they could with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time the people, upon a false accusation of Pisander, dismissed Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them in the command of the fleet. The accusation was that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges; and Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander also went the round of all the clubs already existing in the city for help in law-suits and elections, and urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other measures required by the circumstances, so that no time might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

1. REMOVAL OF OPPONENTS

Thucydides, VIII, 66

Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; or if any ventured to rise in opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there was neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralised the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding

out what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for any one to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another.

2. PISANDER AND ANTIPHON

Thucydides, VIII, 68

The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who was throughout the chief ostensible agent in putting down the democracy. But he who concerted the whole affair, and prepared the way for the catastrophe, and who had given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon, one of the best men of his day in Athens; who, with a head to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend them, did not willingly come forward in the assembly or upon any public scene, being ill-looked upon by the multitude owing to his reputation for talent; and who yet was the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before the assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed, when he was afterwards himself tried for his life on the charge of having been concerned in setting up this very government, when the Four Hundred were overthrown and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what would seem to be the best defence of any known up to my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured that he was no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at Samos, he held that no oligarchy was ever likely to restore him, and once embarked in the enterprise, proved, where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of the foremost of the subverters of the democracy — a man as able in counsel as in debate. Conducted by so many and by such sagacious

heads, the enterprise, great as it was, not unnaturally went forward; although it was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, when it had been not only not subject to any during the whole of that period, but accustomed during more than half of it to rule over subjects of its own.

PLUTARCH (pseudo), *Vitae Decem Oratorum*

DECREE AGAINST ANTIPHON[1]

"Found guilty of treason — Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus, of Agryle, being present: Antiphon son of Sophilus, of Rhamnus, being present. The award on these two men was — That they be delivered to the Eleven: that their property be confiscated and the goddess have the tithe: that their houses be razed and boundary-stones put on the sites, with the inscription, 'the houses of Archeptolemus and Antiphon the traitors': that the two demarchs [of Agryle and Rhamnus] shall point out their houses. And it shall not be lawful to bury Archeptolemus and Antiphon at Athens or in any land of which the Athenians are masters. That Archeptolemus and Antiphon and their descendants, bastard or true-born, shall be infamous; and if a man adopt any one of the race of Archeptolemus or Antiphon, let the adopter be infamous. That this decree be written on a brazen column and put in the same place where the decrees about Phrynichus are set up."

V. THE FOUR HUNDRED

The first oligarchical government was the Four Hundred. Thucydides and Aristotle describe its origin and policy.

Thucydides, VIII, 89–90, 97

While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward straight for Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the Four Hundred to Samos arrived at Athens. Upon their delivering the message from Alcibiades, telling them to hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and saying that he had great hopes of reconciling

[1] Jebb, "Attic Orators," Vol. I, p. 13.

them with the army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority of the members of the oligarchy, who were already discontented and only too much inclined to be quit of the business in any safe way that they could, were at once greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded together and strongly criticised the administration, their leaders being some of the principal generals and men in office under the oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellius, and others; who, although among the most prominent members of the government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at Samos, and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedæmon might do the state some harm without the authority of the people), without insisting on objections to the excessive concentration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the Five Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but in reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis. But this was merely their political cry; most of them being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies. For all at once pretend to be not only equals but each the chief and master of his fellows; while under a democracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten by his equals. But what most clearly encouraged the malcontents was the power of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own disbelief in the stability of the oligarchy; and it was now a race between them as to which should first become the leader of the commons.

Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hundred most opposed to a democratic form of government — Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with Alcibiades during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and Antiphon and others of the chiefs who already as soon as they entered upon power, and again when the army at Samos seceded from them and declared for a democracy, had sent envoys from their own body to Lacedæmon and made every effort for peace, and had built the wall in Eetionia, — now redoubled their exertions when their envoys returned from Samos, and they saw not only the people but their own most trusted associates turning against them. . . .

Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians manned twenty ships and called immediately a first assembly in the Pnyx, where they had been used to meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and voted to hand over the government to the Five Thousand, of which body all who furnished a suit of armour were to be members, decreeing also that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did should be held accursed.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXIX

So long, then, as successes in the war were evenly balanced, they preserved the democracy. But after the reverse in Sicily, when the Lacedæmonians became very powerful by their alliance with the king of Persia, they were compelled to change the democracy and establish the government of the four hundred, on the proposal of Melobius before the decree and Pythodorus moving . . . the masses being influenced, beyond all other considerations, by the idea that the king would gladly take part with them in the war if they made the government oligarchical. Now, the decree of Pythodorus was as follows: that the people should choose, in conjunction with the standing committee of ten, twenty others from such as were above forty years of age, and that they, after swearing solemnly to pass such measures as they might think best for the state, should so legislate for its safety; and that it should be lawful for anyone else who wished to bring forward any bill, that so, out of all, they might choose what was best. And Kleitophon spoke to the same effect as Pythodorus, but moved further that those who were elected should examine the long-established laws which Kleisthenes passed when he established the democracy, that by listening to them also they might decide on what was best, for they argued that Kleisthenes' constitution was not democratic, but on the same lines as that of Solon. After their election they first moved that it should be compulsory on the presidents of the Council to put to the vote all proposals about the safety of the state; then they did away with indictments for proposing unconstitutional measures, and abolished state prosecutions and legal challenges, so that any Athenian who wished might assist in the deliberations about the matters before them. They proposed, further, that if

anyone, on account of these proceedings, should fine or summon anyone, or bring a case into court, an information should be laid against him, and he should be brought before the generals, and the generals should hand him over to the Eleven to be punished with death. After this they drew up the constitution as follows: that it should not be lawful to expend the incoming moneys for any other purpose than the war, and that all offices should be held without pay so long as the war might last, with the exception of the nine archons and the presidents of the Council for the time being, but that these should receive three obols a day each. They proposed further, to vest all the rest of the administration in such of the Athenians as were best able both in person and means to perform the public services, to the number of not less than five thousand, so long as the war might last; that they should have the power also of making treaties with whomever they liked; and that the committee should choose ten men from each tribe over forty years of age to enrol the five thousand, after having taken an oath on perfect sacrifices.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXXI

. . . but for the immediate present its provisions were as follows: That the Council should consist of four hundred as instituted by their fathers, forty from each tribe, from such candidates as the tribesmen might select above thirty years of age. That they should appoint the officers of state, draw up the form of oath to be taken, and do whatever they judged expedient concerning the laws and audits of accounts and everything else. That they should govern by the established laws regarding matters of state, and should not have the right of altering them or passing different ones. For the present they should make choice of the generals out of the whole body of the five thousand, and the Council, after its appointment, should hold a review under arms, and should choose ten men and a secretary for them; these on their election were to hold office for the coming year with full powers, and as occasion might require, concert measures in common with the Council. That they should choose one commander of cavalry and ten chiefs of tribes; but for the future the Council was to make choice of them in

conformity with the written law. In respect of all other offices, except the Council and the generals, it should not be lawful for them or anyone else to hold the same office more than once. And for the remainder of the time the four hundred should be distributed into the four lots. . . .

So the hundred who were chosen by the five hundred drew up this constitution.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXXII–XXXIII

The oligarchy then was established in this way in the archonship of Kallias, about a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, its establishment being mainly due to Peisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes, men of good antecedents, and with a character for intelligence and prudence. On the introduction of this form of government the five thousand were only nominally appointed, but the four hundred, in conjunction with the ten who were invested with full powers, entering the council-chamber, assumed the management of affairs. Sending an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, they proposed putting an end to the war on the terms that each side should retain what they held, but withdrew from further negotiation when the Lacedæmonians refused to listen to any proposal which did not include the surrender of their maritime supremacy.

The government of the four hundred lasted about four months, and of this body Mnasilochus was archon for the space of two months during the archonship of Theopompus, who held office the remaining two months. But after the defeat in the sea-fight at Eretria, and the revolt of the whole of Eubœa except Oreus, being more incensed at this calamity than at any that had ever hitherto befallen them (for Eubœa was of greater advantage to them than Attica), the Athenians put down the four hundred, and gave the management of affairs to the five thousand under arms (referred to above), after passing a vote that anyone who received pay should be ineligible for offices of state. The overthrow of the four hundred was mainly due to Aristokrates and Theramenes, who did not approve of their doings, for they managed everything themselves, without ever referring to the five thousand. But the

administration seems to have been good at this time, considering that a war was being carried on, and that the form of government was a military one.

PHRYNICHUS

Phrynichus, though one of the generals, was not in entire sympathy with the policy of this new government, and his opposition made him very unpopular. He was assassinated, and little was done in the way of trying to discover or prosecute the culprit. On the contrary a decree was passed under the democracy conferring high honours on various men who are known to have had a hand in the murder. We find Lysias taking pains to prove that a certain Agoratus is unfairly claiming to have been rewarded with citizenship for his share in the deed.

Thucydides, VIII, 48, 51

Unlike the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy, Phrynichus, who was still general, by no means approved of the proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only sought to change the institutions of his country in order to get himself recalled by his associates ; while for themselves their one object should be to avoid civil discord. It was not the king's interest, when the Peloponnesians were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of the chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might make friends of the Peloponnesians who had never injured him. And as for the allied states to whom oligarchy was now offered, because the democracy was to be put down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in their allegiance ; as the allies would never prefer servitude with an oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the constitution which they actually enjoyed, to whichever type it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the so-called better classes would prove just as oppressive as the commons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for the most part benefited from the acts of the commons

injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on the better classes, the confederates would be put to death without trial and with violence; while the commons were their refuge and the chastiser of these men. This he positively knew that the cities had learned by experience, and that such was their opinion. The propositions of Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress, could therefore never meet with his approval. . . .

Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that he was playing him false, and that a letter on the subject was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades, himself anticipated the news, and told the army that the enemy, seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not all stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp; that he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they must fortify Samos as quickly as possible, and generally look to their defences. It will be remembered that he was general, and had himself authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner than it would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy about to attack it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it being thought that he was in the secret of the enemy's designs, and had tried to fasten them upon Phrynichus, and to make out that he was their accomplice, out of hatred; and consequently far from hurting him he rather bore witness to what he had said by this intelligence.

Thucydides, VIII, 90, 92

Alarmed at the state of things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off in haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with injunctions to make peace with Lacedæmon upon any terms, no matter what, that should be at all tolerable. Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall, according to Theramenes and his supporters, was not so much to keep out the army of Samos in case of its trying to force its way into Piræus as to be able to let in, at pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For Eetionia is a mole of Piræus, close alongside of the entrance of the harbour, and was

now fortified in connexion with the wall already existing on the land side, so that a few men placed in it might be able to command the entrance; the old wall on the land side and the new one now being built within on the side of the sea, both ending in one of the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the harbour. They also walled off the largest porch in Piræus which was in immediate connexion with this wall, and kept it in their own hands, compelling all to unload there the corn that came into the harbour, and what they had in stock, and to take it out from thence when they sold it. . . .

Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at first confined to a few persons and went on in secret, until Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was laid wait for and stabbed in full market by one of the *Peripoli*, falling down dead before he had gone far from the council chamber. The assassin escaped; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and put to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their being able to extract from him the name of his employer, or anything further than that he knew of many men who used to assemble at the house of the commander of the *Peripoli* and at other houses. Here the matter was allowed to drop.

Hicks and Hill, 74

ASSASSINS OF PHRYNICHUS, B.C. 410–409

In the archonship of Glaucippus.
Lobon from Cedi was secretary.

Voted by the senate and the people. Hippothontis was the prytanizing tribe, Lobon secretary, Philistides was president, Glaucippus was archon. Erasinides moved: — That Thrasybulus be praised as being a benefactor to the Athenians, and zealous to do what good he can, and that in return for the service he has rendered the senate and people of Athens he be crowned with a golden crown. And the crown shall be worth a thousand drachmas, and the Hellenotamiæ shall give the money. And that it be announced at the festival of Dionysus in the city why the people have crowned him.

Diocles moved the following amendment: — That Thrasybulus be registered as an Athenian of whatever tribe and deme and phratry he wishes, and that all the other matters voted by the people be valid for Thrasybulus and that there be procured for him any other benefit he wishes on account of his good deeds toward the Athenians, and that the decisions be written on a stone stele. That men be chosen at once to determine the share which falls to Thrasybulus. And the other benefactors of Athens . . . and Agoratus and Comon . . . and Simon and Philinus . . . be inscribed as such on a stone stele on the Acropolis by the secretary of the senate. And that they have the right of property-holding as Athenians and a plot of land and houses, and a house at Athens. The senate in office and the presiding officers are to see to it that they are not wronged. The contractors in the senate are to let out the contract for the stele and the Hellenotamiæ to pay the money. And if it seems best for them to have further honors the senate is to consider it and refer it to the people.

Eudicus moved the further amendment: That as to those who took bribes about the decree which was voted for Apollodorus, the senate take counsel in the first session in the senate-house, and voting charges against them chastise those guilty, and take them to court, however seems best to them. Those judges who are now here are to give an account of what was the verdict and whatever other matters any of them knows about the accused. And if any private citizen wishes to, he also may give evidence.

LYSIAS, XIII (*Against Agoratus*), 70–71

THE MURDER OF PHRYNICHUS

He will say, gentlemen of the jury, and thereby he will try to deceive you, that under the Four Hundred he killed Phrynichus, and he says that in return for this deed the people made him an Athenian citizen. But this is false, gentlemen; for neither did he kill Phrynichus, nor did the people grant him citizenship.

Now Thrasybulus of Calydon and Apollodorus of Megara both had designs on Phrynichus, and when they met him on the street,

Thrasybulus fell upon Phrynichus and struck him down, but Apollodorus did not touch him. At this a cry was raised and they ran away. But Agoratus here was neither called in nor was he present nor does he know anything about the affair. The decree itself will make it clear to you that I am speaking the truth.

VI. The Fall of Athens

1. Arginusæ and the Condemnation of the Generals

In the confused events of this time the two which stand out vividly are the battles of Arginusæ and Ægospotami. The people of Athens seem to have lost their heads completely after the first battle, and wasted much time and effort in a formal trial of their generals on the grounds that they failed to pick up the ship-wrecked. Unity and patriotism, not party bickerings, were most needed for the desperate struggle at this time.

Xenophon, *Hellenica*, I, vi, 26–38

Callicratidas, hearing that the relief squadron had already reached Samos, left fifty ships, under command of Eteonicus, in the harbour of Mitylene, and setting sail with the other one hundred and twenty, hove to for the evening meal off Cape Malea in Lesbos, opposite Mitylene. It so happened that the Athenians on this day were supping on the islands of Arginusæ, which lie opposite Lesbos. In the night the Spartan not only saw their watch-fires, but received positive information that "these were the Athenians;" and about midnight he got under weigh, intending to fall upon them suddenly. But a violent downpour of rain with thunder and lightning prevented him putting out to sea. By daybreak it had cleared, and he sailed towards Arginusæ. On their side, the Athenian squadron stood out to meet him, with their left wing facing towards the open sea, and drawn up in the following order:—Aristocrates, in command of the left wing, with fifteen ships, led the van; next came Diomedon with fifteen others, and immediately in rear of Aristocrates and Diomedon respectively, as their supports, came Pericles and Erasinides. Parallel with Diomedon were the Samians, with

their ten ships drawn up in single line, under the command of a Samian officer named Hippeus. Next to these came the ten vessels of the taxiarchs, also in single line, and supporting them, the three ships of the navarchs, with any other allied vessels in the squadron. The right wing was entrusted to Protomachus with fifteen ships, and next to him (on the extreme right) was Thrasyllus with another division of fifteen. Protomachus was supported by Lysias with an equal number of ships, and Thrasyllus by Aristogenes. The object of this formation was to prevent the enemy from manœuvring so as to break their line by striking them amidships, since they were inferior in sailing power.

The Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, trusting to their superior seamanship, were formed opposite with their ships all in single line, with the special object of manœuvring so as either to break the enemy's line or to wheel round them. Callicratidas commanded the right wing in person. Before the battle the officer who acted as his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, suggested that it might be well to withdraw the fleet as the Athenian ships were far more numerous. But Callicratidas replied that Sparta would be no worse off even if he personally should perish, but to flee would be disgraceful. And now the fleets approached, and for a long space the battle endured. At first the vessels were engaged in crowded masses, and later on in scattered groups. At length Callicratidas, as his vessel dashed her beak into her antagonist, was hurled off into the sea and disappeared. At the same instant Protomachus, with his division on the right, had defeated the enemy's left, and then the flight of the Peloponnesians began towards Chios, though a very considerable body of them made for Phocæa, whilst the Athenians sailed back again to Arginusæ. The losses on the side of the Athenians were twenty-five ships, crews and all, with the exception of the few who contrived to reach dry land. On the Peloponnesian side, nine out of the ten Lacedæmonian ships, and more than sixty belonging to the rest of the allied squadron, were lost.

After consultation the Athenian generals agreed that two captains of triremes, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, accompanied by some of the taxiarchs, should take forty-seven ships and sail to the assistance of the disabled fleet and of the men on board, while the

rest of the squadron proceeded to attack the enemy's blockading squadron under Eteonicus at Mitylene. In spite of their desire to carry out this resolution, the wind and a violent storm which arose prevented them. So they set up a trophy, and took up their quarters for the night. As to Eteonicus, the details of the engagement were faithfully reported to him by the express despatch-boat in attendance. On receipt of the news, however, he sent the despatch-boat out again the way she came, with an injunction to those on board of her to sail off quickly without exchanging a word with any one. Then on a sudden they were to return garlanded with wreaths of victory and shouting, "Callicratidas has won a great sea fight, and the whole Athenian squadron is destroyed." This they did, and Eteonicus, on his side, as soon as the despatch-boat came sailing in, proceeded to offer sacrifice of thanksgiving in honour of the good news. Meanwhile he gave orders that the troops were to take their evening meal, and that the masters of the trading ships were silently to stow away their goods on board the merchant ships and make sail as fast as the favourable breeze could speed them to Chios. The ships of war were to follow suit with what speed they might. This done, he set fire to his camp, and led off the land forces to Methymna. Conon, finding the enemy had made off, and the wind had grown comparatively mild, got his ships afloat, and so fell in with the Athenian squadron, which had by this time set out from Arginusæ. To these he explained the proceedings of Eteonicus. The squadron put into Mitylene, and from Mitylene stood across to Chios, and thence, without effecting anything further, sailed back to Samos.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, I, vii, 1–10

All the above-named generals, with the exception of Conon, were presently deposed by the home authorities. In addition to Conon two new generals were chosen, Adeimantus and Philocles. Of those concerned in the late victory two never returned to Athens: these were Protomachus and Aristogenes. The other six sailed home. Their names were Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides. On their arrival Archidemus, the leader of the democracy at that date, who had charge of the two obol fund, inflicted a fine on Erasinides, and accused him before the Dicastery

of having appropriated money derived from the Hellespont, which belonged to the people. He brought a further charge against him of misconduct while acting as general, and the court sentenced him to imprisonment.

These proceedings in the law court were followed by the statement of the generals before the senate touching the late victory and the magnitude of the storm. Timocrates then proposed that the other five generals should be put in custody and handed over to the public assembly. Whereupon the senate committed them all to prison. Then came the meeting of the public assembly, in which others, and more particularly Theramenes, formally accused the generals. He insisted that they ought to show cause why they had not picked up the shipwrecked crews. To prove that there had been no attempt on their parts to attach blame to others, he might point, as conclusive testimony, to the despatch sent by the generals themselves to the senate and the people, in which they attributed the whole disaster to the storm, and nothing else. After this the generals each in turn made a defence, which was necessarily limited to a few words, since no right of addressing the assembly at length was allowed by law. Their explanation of the occurrences was that, in order to be free to sail against the enemy themselves, they had devolved the duty of picking up the shipwrecked crews upon certain competent captains of men-of-war, who had themselves been generals in their time, to wit Theramenes and Thrasybulus, and others of like stamp. If blame could attach to any one at all with regard to the duty in question, those to whom their orders had been given were the sole persons they could hold responsible. "But," they went on to say, "we will not, because these very persons have denounced us, invent a lie, and say that Theramenes and Thrasybulus are to blame, when the truth of the matter is that the magnitude of the storm alone prevented the burial of the dead and the rescue of the living." In proof of their contention, they produced the pilots and numerous other witnesses from among those present at the engagement. By these arguments they were in a fair way to persuade the people of their innocence. Indeed many private citizens rose wishing to become bail for the accused, but it was resolved to defer decision till another meeting

of the assembly. It was indeed already so late that it would have been impossible to see to count the show of hands. It was further resolved that the senate meanwhile should prepare a measure, to be introduced at the next assembly, as to the mode in which the accused should take their trial.

Then came the festival of the Apaturia, with its family gatherings of fathers and kinsfolk. Accordingly the party of Theramenes procured numbers of people clad in black apparel, and close-shaven, who were to go in and present themselves before the public assembly in the middle of the festival, as relatives, presumably, of the men who had perished; and they persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate. The next step was to convoke the assembly, when the senate laid before it the proposal just passed by their body, at the instance of Callixenus, which ran as follows: "Seeing that both the parties to this case, to wit, the prosecutors of the generals on the one hand, and the accused themselves in their defence on the other, have been heard in the late meeting of the assembly; we propose that the people of Athens now record their votes, one and all, by their tribes; that a couple of voting urns be placed for the convenience of each several tribe; and the public crier in the hearing of each several tribe proclaim the mode of voting as follows: 'Let every one who finds the generals guilty of not rescuing the heroes of the late sea fight deposit his vote in urn No. 1. Let him who is of the contrary opinion deposit his vote in urn No. 2. Further, in the event of the aforesaid generals being found guilty, let death be the penalty. Let the guilty persons be delivered over to the eleven. Let their property be confiscated to the State, with the exception of one tithe, which falls to the goddess.'"

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, I, vii, 34–35

At the conclusion of his speech Euryptolemus proposed, as an amendment, that the prisoners should, in accordance with the decree of Cannonus, be tried each separately, as against the proposal of the senate to try them all by a single vote.

At the show of hands the tellers gave the majority in favour of Euryptolemus's amendment, but upon the application of Menecles,

who took formal exception to this decision, the show of hands was gone through again, and now the verdict was in favour of the resolution of the senate. At a later date the balloting was made, and by the votes recorded the eight generals were condemned, and the six who were in Athens were put to death.

Not long after, repentance seized the Athenians, and they passed a decree authorizing the public prosecution of those who had deceived the people, and the appointment of proper securities for their persons until the trial was over. Callixenus was one of these committed for trial. There were, besides Callixenus, four others against whom true bills were declared, and they were all five imprisoned by their sureties. But all subsequently effected their escape before the trial, at the time of the sedition in which Cleophon was killed. Callixenus eventually came back when the party in Piræus returned to the city, at the date of the amnesty, but only to die of hunger, an object of universal detestation.

2. ÆGOSPOTAMI AND ITS RESULTS

The final defeat of Athens, the dramatic presentation of the effect of the disaster upon the state, and the terms agreed to with Sparta all follow. Athens was forced to submit or starve.

The walls and fortifications and the fleet — Athens's dearest possessions — had to be sacrificed and the headship of Sparta acknowledged. Sparta undoubtedly regarded it as magnanimous treatment, for she might have destroyed the city utterly. However, in that case she would have lost more than she gained, for she had many friends among the oligarchs in Athens, and before long they came into power again.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, i, 16–21

The Athenians meanwhile, using Samos as their base of operations, were employed in devastating the king's territory, or in swooping down upon Chios and Ephesus, and in general were preparing for a naval battle, having but lately chosen three new generals in addition to those already in office, whose names were Menander,

Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. Now Lysander, leaving Rhodes, and coasting along Ionia, made his way to the Hellespont, having an eye to the passage of vessels through the Straits, and, in a more hostile sense, on the cities which had revolted from Sparta. The Athenians also set sail from Chios, but stood out to the open sea, since the seaboard of Asia was hostile to them.

Lysander was again on the move ; leaving Abydos, he passed up channel to Lampsacus, which town was allied with Athens ; the men of Abydos and the rest of the troops advancing by land, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Thorax. They then attacked and took by storm the town, which was wealthy, and with its stores of wine and wheat and other commodities was pillaged by the soldiery. All freeborn persons, however, were without exception released by Lysander. And now the Athenian fleet, following close on his heels, came to moorings at Elæus, in the Chersonesus, one hundred and eighty sail in all. It was not until they had reached this place, and were getting their early meal, that the news of what had happened at Lampsacus reached them. Then they instantly set sail again to Sestos, and, having halted long enough merely to take in stores, sailed on further to Ægospotami, a point facing Lampsacus, where the Hellespont is not quite two miles broad. Here they took their evening meal.

The night following, or rather early next morning, with the first streak of dawn, Lysander gave the signal for the men to take their breakfasts and get on board their vessels ; and so, having got all ready for a naval engagement, with his ports closed and movable bulwarks attached, he issued the order that no one was to stir from his post or put out to sea. As the sun rose the Athenians drew up their vessels facing the harbour, in line of battle ready for action ; but Lysander declining to come out to meet them, as the day advanced they retired again to Ægospotami. Then Lysander ordered the swiftest of his ships to follow the Athenians, and as soon as the crews had disembarked, to watch what they did, sail back, and report to him. Until these look-outs returned he would permit no disembarkation from his ships. This performance he repeated for four successive days, and each day the Athenians put out to sea and challenged an engagement.

But now Alcibiades, from one of his fortresses, could espy the position of his fellow-countrymen, moored on an open beach beyond reach of any city, and forced to send for supplies to Sestos, which was nearly two miles distant, while their enemies were safely lodged in a harbour, with a city adjoining, and everything within reach. The situation did not please him, and he advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos, where they would have the advantage of a harbour and a city. "Once there," he concluded, "you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you." But the generals, and more particularly Tydeus and Menander, bade him go about his business. "We are generals now — not you," they said; and so he went away. And now for five days in succession the Athenians had sailed out to offer battle, and for the fifth time retired, followed by the same swift sailers of the enemy. But this time Lysander's orders to the vessels so sent in pursuit were, that as soon as they saw the enemy's crew fairly disembarked and dispersed along the shores of the Chersonesus (a practice, it should be mentioned, which had grown upon them from day to day owing to the distance at which eatables had to be purchased, and out of sheer contempt, no doubt, of Lysander, who refused to accept battle), they were to begin their return voyage, and when in mid-channel to hoist a shield. The orders were punctually carried out, and Lysander at once signalled to his whole squadron to put across with all speed, while Thorax, with the land forces, was to march parallel with the fleet along the coast. Aware of the enemy's fleet, which he could see bearing down upon him, Conon had only time to signal to the crews to join their ships and rally to the rescue with all their might. But the men were scattered far and wide, and some of the vessels had only two out of their three banks of rowers, some only a single one, while others again were completely empty. Conon's own ship, with seven others in attendance on him and the *Paralus*, put out to sea, a little cluster of nine vessels, with their full complement of men; but every one of the remaining one hundred and seventy-one vessels were captured by Lysander on the beach. As to the men themselves, the large majority of them were easily made prisoners on shore, a few only escaping to the small fortresses of the neighbourhood. Meanwhile Conon and his

nine vessels made good their escape. For himself, knowing that the fortune of Athens was ruined, he put into Abarnis, the promontory of Lampsacus, and there picked up the great sails of Lysander's ships, and then with eight ships set sail himself to seek refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, while the *Paralus* started for Athens with tidings of what had taken place.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, ii, 3–4

It was night when the *Paralus* reached Athens with her evil tidings, on receipt of which a bitter wail of woe broke forth. From Piræus, following the line of the long walls up to the heart of the city, it swept and swelled, as each man to his neighbour passed on the news. On that night no man slept. There was mourning and sorrow for those that were lost, but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper sorrow for themselves, as they pictured the evils they were about to suffer, the like of which they had themselves inflicted upon the men of Melos, who were colonists of the Lacedæmonians, when they mastered them by siege. Or on the men of Histiæa; on Scione and Torone; on the Æginetans, and many another Hellene city. On the following day the public assembly met, and, after debate, it was resolved to block up all the harbours save one, to put the walls in a state of defence, to post guards at various points, and to make all other necessary preparation for a siege. Such were the concerns of the men of Athens.

3. TERMS OF THE TREATY

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, ii, 19–23

Theramenes and his companions presently reached Sellasis, and being here questioned as to the reason of their visit, replied that they had full powers to treat of peace. After which the ephors ordered them to be summoned to their presence. On their arrival a general assembly was convened, in which the Corinthians and Thebans more particularly, though their views were shared by many other Hellenes also, urged the meeting not to come to terms with the Athenians, but to destroy them. The Lacedæmonians replied that they would never reduce to slavery a city which was itself an integral portion of Hellas, and had performed a great and

noble service to Hellas in the most perilous of emergencies. On the contrary, they were willing to offer peace on the terms now specified — namely, "That the long walls and the fortifications of Piræus should be destroyed; that the Athenian fleet, with the exception of twelve vessels, should be surrendered; that the exiles should be restored; and lastly, that the Athenians should acknowledge the headship of Sparta in peace and war, leaving to her the choice of friends and foes, and following her lead by land and sea." Such were the terms which Theramenes and the rest who acted with him were able to report on their return to Athens. As they entered the city, a vast crowd met them, trembling lest their mission should have proved fruitless. For indeed delay was no longer possible, so long already was the list of victims daily perishing from starvation. On the day following, the ambassadors delivered their report, stating the terms upon which the Lacedæmonians were willing to make peace. Theramenes acted as spokesman, insisting that they ought to obey the Lacedæmonians and pull down the walls. A small minority raised their voice in opposition, but the majority were strongly in favour of the proposition, and the resolution was passed to accept the peace. After that, Lysander sailed into the Piræus, and the exiles were readmitted. And so they fell to levelling the fortifications and walls with much enthusiasm, to the accompaniment of female flute-players, deeming that day the beginning of liberty to Greece.

VII. The Thirty

The rule of the Thirty, moderate at first, soon became synonymous with a reign of terror. Not only was the government in the hands of a few, but no one had the slightest guarantee of security of life or property. Murder, proscription, confiscation, putting a person out of the way on any pretext — all these things were rife at this time. Soon even the Thirty did not hesitate to seek victims among their own number, and a violent quarrel broke out between Critias and Theramenes, both members of the Thirty, who headed the extreme and the moderate factions respectively.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXXIV–XXXVIII[1]

. . . for in the following year, in the archonship of Alexias, befell the disastrous sea-fight at Ægospotami, the result of which was that Lysander made himself master of the government, and established the Thirty in the following manner. When they had made peace on the condition that they should live under the form of government which they had inherited from their fathers, on the one hand the popular side was trying to preserve the democracy; while on the other, of the upper classes such as belonged to the political clubs, and the exiles who had returned after the peace, were desirous of an oligarchy, and those who were not members of any club, but otherwise had the character of being inferior to none of their fellow-citizens, were seeking for the form of government inherited from their fathers. Amongst this number were Archinus, Anytus, Kleitophon, Phormisius, and several others, and at the head of them Theramenes was conspicuous. When Lysander attached himself to the oligarchs, the people were terror-stricken and compelled to vote for the oligarchy. Drakontides of Aphidnæ proposed the vote.

So the Thirty were established in this way in the archonship of Pythodorus. Being now masters of the state, they neglected all the other provisions regarding the government, and appointed only the five hundred members of the Council, and the other magistrates from selected candidates out of the thousand; and taking to themselves ten governors of Piræus, and eleven guards of the prison, and three hundred attendants furnished with scourges, they kept the government in their own hands. At first they behaved with moderation to their fellow-citizens, and affected to administer the government as inherited from their fathers. They annulled in the Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus regarding the Areopagitæ, and such of Solon's laws as were of doubtful interpretation, and put down the supreme authority vested in the jurors, as if they were going to restore the constitution, and remove all doubts in its interpretation. For example, in the matter of a man's giving his own property to whom he likes, they gave him full authority once for all; and they removed the existing limitations in cases of

[1] This translation has been modified to agree with Kenyon's in some points.

mental aberration, old age, or undue female influence, so that no door might be left open to common informers. In all other cases they proceeded in like manner and with the same object. At first then such was their line of action, and they made away with the common informers and such as associated themselves with the people to do its pleasure in opposition to its true interests, and were mischievous and bad. And men rejoiced at these doings, thinking that they were actuated by the best motives. But when they had got a firmer grip of power, not a single individual did they spare, but killed alike such as were distinguished for their wealth, birth, or rank, getting rid in this underhand way of those whom they were afraid of, and whose property, at the same time, they wished to plunder. By such means they had succeeded within a short period in making away with not less than fifteen hundred persons.

When the state was drifting in this way, Theramenes, indignant at their proceedings, exhorted them to put a stop to such outrages and give a share of the administration to the best men. They at first resisted, but when reports spread among the people, who were for the most part well disposed to Theramenes, then, fearing that he might constitute himself the champion of the people and put an end to their power, they drew up a list of three thousand citizens, declaring that they would give them a share in the government. Theramenes again found fault with this arrangement, on the following grounds: first, that although they professed a desire to give a share of their power to respectable citizens, they proposed to do so with three thousand only, just as if worth were limited to that number; secondly, that they were acting in a way which was in the highest degree inconsistent, by establishing a government which was a government of force and yet inferior in power to the governed. But they made light of these objections, and for a long time held back the list of three thousand, keeping their names a secret; and when they did think good to publish them, they cancelled some on the list and substituted others who had not been originally included.

When winter had now set in, and Thrasybulus and the exiles had seized Phyle, the Thirty, having fared badly with the army which they had led out against them, determined to strip everybody

else of their arms and destroy Theramenes after the following manner: They brought forward two measures in the Council and ordered it to pass them; one was to invest the Thirty with full powers to put to death any citizen whose name was not on the list of the three thousand; the other to deprive of their political rights all who had taken part in the destruction of the fort in Eetionia, or had in any way acted in opposition to the four hundred, or the founders of the former oligarchy. Now the fact was that Theramenes had had a share in both, with the consequence that when these proposals had been passed he was put in the position of an outlaw, and the Thirty had the power of putting him to death. So, after making away with Theramenes, they stripped every one of his arms except the three thousand, and in every way indulged freely in cruelty and evil-doing. Sending ambassadors to Lacedæmon, they brought accusations against Theramenes, and asked for help, in compliance with which the Lacedæmonians despatched Kallibius as governor (Harmost), with about seven hundred men, who on their arrival garrisoned the Acropolis.

1. THERAMENES AND CRITIAS

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, iii, 15–16

These were early days; as yet Critias was of one mind with Theramenes, and the two were friends. But the time came when, in proportion as Critias was ready to rush headlong into wholesale carnage, like one who thirsted for the blood of the democracy, which had banished him, Theramenes balked and thwarted him. It was barely reasonable, he argued, to put people to death who had never done a wrong to respectable people in their lives, simply because they had enjoyed influence and honour under the democracy. "Why, you and I, Critias," he would add, "have said and done many things ere now for the sake of popularity." To which the other (for the terms of friendly intimacy still subsisted) would retort, "There is no choice left to us, since we intend to take the lion's share, but to get rid of those who are best able to hinder us. If you imagine, because we are thirty instead of one, our government requires one whit the less careful guarding than an actual tyranny, you must be very innocent."

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, iii, 46–56

"Then he threw in my teeth the nickname 'Buskin,' as descriptive of an endeavour on my part to fit both parties. But what of the man who pleases neither? What in heaven's name are we to call him? Yes! you — Critias! Under the democracy you were looked upon as the most arrant hater of the people, and under the aristocracy you have proved yourself the bitterest foe of everything respectable. Yes! Critias, I am, and ever have been, a foe of those who think that a democracy cannot reach perfection until slaves and those who, from poverty, would sell the city for a drachma, can get their drachma a day. But not less am I, and ever have been, a pronounced opponent of those who do not think there can possibly exist a perfect oligarchy until the State is subjected to the despotism of a few. On the contrary, my own ambition has been to combine with those who are rich enough to possess a horse and shield, and to use them for the benefit of the State. That was my ideal in old days, and I hold to it without a shadow of turning still. If you can mention when and where, in conjunction with despots or demagogues, I have set to my hand to deprive honest gentlefolk of their citizenship, pray speak. If you can convict me of such crimes at present, or can prove my perpetration of them in the past, I admit that I deserve to die, and by the worst of deaths."

With these words he ceased, and the loud murmur of applause which followed marked the favourable impression produced upon the senate. It was plain to Critias, that if he allowed his adversary's fate to be decided by formal voting, Theramenes would escape, and life to himself would become intolerable. Accordingly he stepped forward and spoke a word or two in the ears of the Thirty. This done, he went out and gave an order to the attendants with the daggers to stand close to the bar in full view of the senators. Again he entered and addressed the senate thus: "I hold it to be the duty of a good president, when he sees the friends about him being made the dupes of some delusion, to intervene. That at any rate is what I propose to do. Indeed our friends here standing by the bar say that if we propose to acquit a man so openly bent upon the ruin of the oligarchy, they do not mean to let us do so. Now there

is a clause in the new code forbidding any of the Three Thousand to be put to death without your vote; but the Thirty have power of life and death over all outside that list. Accordingly," he proceeded, "I herewith strike this man, Theramenes, off the list; and this with the concurrence of my colleagues. And now," he continued, "we condemn him to death."

Hearing these words Theramenes sprang upon the altar of Hestia, exclaiming: "And I, sirs, supplicate you for the barest forms of law and justice. Let it not be in the power of Critias to strike off either me, or any one of you whom he will. But in my case, in what may be your case, if we are tried, let our trial be in accordance with the law they have made concerning those on the list. I know," he added, "but too well, that this altar will not protect me; but I will make it plain that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. Yet I do marvel, good sirs and honest gentlemen, for so you are, that you will not help yourselves, and that too when you must see that the name of every one of you is as easily erased as mine."

But when he had got so far, the voice of the herald was heard giving the order to the Eleven to seize Theramenes. They at that instant entered with their satellites, — at their head Satyrus, the boldest and most shameless of the body, — and Critias exclaimed, addressing the Eleven, "We deliver over to you Theramenes yonder, who has been condemned according to the law. Do you take him and lead him away to the proper place, and do there with him what remains to do." As Critias uttered the words, Satyrus laid hold upon Theramenes to drag him from the altar, and the attendants lent their aid. But he, as was natural, called upon gods and men to witness what was happening. The senators the while kept silence, seeing the companions of Satyrus at the bar, and the whole front of the senate house crowded with the foreign guards, nor did they need to be told that there were daggers in reserve among those present.

And so Theramenes was dragged through the Agora, in vehement and loud tones proclaiming the wrongs that he was suffering. One word, which is said to have fallen from his lips, I cite. It is this: Satyrus, bade him "Be silent, or he would rue the day;" to

which he made answer, "And if I be silent, shall I not rue it?" Also, when they brought him the hemlock, and the time was come to drink the fatal draught, they tell how he playfully jerked out the dregs from the bottom of the cup, like one who plays "Cottabus," with the words, "This to the lovely Critias." These are but "apophthegms" too trivial, it may be thought, to find a place in history. Yet I must deem it an admirable trait in this man's character, if at such a moment, when death confronted him, neither his wits forsook him, nor could the childlike sportiveness vanish from his soul.

2. FALL AND AMNESTY

The democratic party, known as "the exiles," were in the meantime at Phyle awaiting developments. When the time came they seized Munychia and the Piræus, and overthrew the Thirty.

A reconciliation then took place. There was a general amnesty, past sins were to be forgotten, and the government was to be reorganized on the old democratic lines.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXXVIII

After this, when the exiles from Phyle had seized Munychia and had been victorious in an engagement over the force that had come to its help with the Thirty, the citizens, retiring after the attempt, and assembling on the morrow in the market-place, put down the Thirty, and appointed ten of the citizens, with full powers, to bring the war to an end. Now they, after taking over the government, did not enter into the negotiations for which they had been appointed, but sent an embassy to Lacedæmon, asking for help and borrowing money. When those who had a voice in the government were displeased at this, fearing that they might be deposed from power, and wishing to strike terror into the rest — as, indeed, they did — they seized and put to death Demaretus, a man second to none of the citizens, and, with the help of Kallibius and his Peloponnesians, and besides them some of the knights, got a firm hold of the government. Now some of the knights were more anxious than any of their fellow-citizens that the exiles at Phyle should not return. When, however, the forces which held

the Piræus and Munychia, to which all the popular party had withdrawn, were getting the better in the war, then they put down the ten who were first appointed and chose ten others of the highest character, during whose government was accomplished both the reconciliation and the return of the popular party with their zealous co-operation.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XXXIX

Now, the reconciliation was effected in the archonship of Eukleides on the following terms: Such Athenians as had remained in the city and wished to leave it might live at Eleusis without forfeiting their rights, and with full authority and powers in all their affairs and the enjoyment of their property. The temple should be common to both, and under the charge of the heralds and Eumolpidæ in conformity with the ancient customs. It should not be lawful for such as were at Eleusis to go to the city, nor for those in the city to go to Eleusis, except for the mysteries. They should contribute from their incomes to the alliance just like the other Athenians. And if any of these who went away took a house at Eleusis, they should get the assent of the owner; and if they failed to agree about terms, they should choose three appraisers on either side, and he should take the price which they fixed. Any Eleusinians they liked might live with them. The registry for those who wanted to live away should be as follows: for such as were at home from the day they took the oath, a space of seven days and twenty days for the departure, and for those who were away after they had come back again, the same conditions. It should not be lawful for anyone living at Eleusis to hold any office in the city before he was registered again as living in the city. Trials for murder should be according to the ancient customs; if anyone killed another with his own hand he should pay the penalty, after making his offering. The act of amnesty should be binding on everyone, except as against the Thirty and the Ten[1] and the Eleven[2] and the late magistrates of Piraeus, and that not even these should

[1] This means those mentioned on p. 456; not the board spoken of at the top of this page, against whom there was no ground of complaint.

[2] Special police, or public executioners, to whom condemned men were handed over. See pp. 451, 455.

be excluded if they submitted their accounts. The magistrates of Piræus should render accounts of matters done in Piræus, and the city magistrates in matters concerned with rateable valuations. When affairs were arranged in this way, such as wished should live away. Lastly, each side should repay separately the money they had borrowed for the war.

For the decree concerning the return of the exiles from Phyle, see Hicks and Hill, 80 and note. It is too fragmentary to be of help here.

VIII. Conditions under the Four Hundred and the Thirty

The following passages illustrate some of the methods which prevailed under the Thirty.

The orator Lysias had good reason to hate them. As rich metics of Piræus he and his family were regarded as fair objects for plunder. Lysias himself escaped with his life, but his brother, Polemarchus, was most inhumanly treated and then put to death.

The oration "Against Nicomachus" illustrates some of the illegal methods employed during the Thirty's régime — holding office long after the term had expired, failing to hand in accounts, tampering with the laws, and unearthing laws that never existed.

An inscription concerning the revision of the laws is still extant in part. Provision is made for revising some of the laws of Draco. The remaining part has to do with murder in different degrees.[1]

1. Unconstitutional Measures

Lysias, XXX (*Against Nicomachus*), 2–5

But when he was made copyist of the laws, who does not know how he outraged the city? Whereas he was ordered to copy out Solon's laws within four months, in place of Solon he set himself up as lawgiver, and in place of four months he held office for six

[1] See Hicks and Hill, 78 and note.

years, and drawing daily pay he recorded some laws and erased others. We came to such a pass that we had the laws dealt out to us from his hand, and the parties to suits in the courts cited contradictory laws, both saying that they had got them from Nicomachus, and though the archons inflicted summary fines on him, and brought his case before the court, he would not hand over the laws. But the city was involved in the greatest troubles before he gave up his office and submitted accounts of his conduct. And, gentlemen of the jury, since he paid no penalty for his misdeeds, what kind of an office has he set up now, as well? In the first place he was secretary four years, when he ought to have retired after thirty days; he then gave himself full control of all laws, though it had been stated definitely from what documents he was to copy, and he alone of all the magistrates has submitted no accounts, though he had the control of so much. Now the other officials who have charge of these matters hand in their reports every month, but you, Nicomachus, did not deign to enter your account in four years, but you think that you are the only man in the city who can hold office a long time and never render accounts, or obey the decrees, or consider the laws; some of which you write down and others you leave out, and you have reached such a pitch of insolence that you think the property of the State yours, while all the time you are the property of the State yourself.

LYSIAS, XXX (*Against Nicomachus*), 10–14

After the loss of the ships, when the change of government was secretly under way, Cleophon abused the senate, — saying that it had gone into the conspiracy and was not acting for the good of the state. Satyrus of Cephisia, a senator, persuaded the senate to put him in chains and hand him over to stand trial. But those who wished to compass his destruction and feared that the court might not condemn him to death, persuaded Nicomachus to produce a law to the effect that it was necessary for the senate to be party to the judgment. And this utterly corrupt villain so openly joined the revolutionary plot that on the day on which the trial took place he produced the law. Against Cleophon, indeed, there might be other grounds for accusation, but every one agrees

that those who were destroying the democracy wished him above all the citizens to be put out of the way, and that Satyrus and Chremon, members of the Thirty, were bringing accusation against Cleophon, not because they were aroused in your interest, but in order that they might injure you by having him put to death. This they accomplished by virtue of the law which Nicomachus produced. It is, however, fitting, gentlemen of the jury, that even those of you who thought Cleophon a bad citizen, should remember that whereas some of those who were killed by the oligarchy were bad citizens, yet their death aroused your wrath against the Thirty because they were slain not because of their misdeeds but for purely party reasons. If, therefore, he shall defend himself on these grounds, remember that he produced the law at a critical moment, when the government was being overthrown, and that as a favor to those who destroyed the democracy, he made party to the judges the then existing senate in which Satyrus and Chremon were especially influential, while Strombichides and Calliades and many other good citizens were put to death.

LYSIAS, XXX (*Against Nicomachus*), 27–30

And instead of a slave he has become a citizen, instead of poor rich, instead of an under-clerk a lawgiver. Anyone might well criticize you on the grounds that our ancestors chose as lawgivers Solon and Themistocles and Pericles, thinking that the laws would be exactly in harmony with the character of those who made them, but you choose Tisamenus, son of Mechanion, and Nicomachus and other under-clerks like these fellows, and you think the magistracies are degraded by such men, but you trust them none the less. And this is the worst of all: — although it is illegal for a man to be even an under-clerk twice during the same magistracy, you allow the same men to have control over most important matters for a long time. And to cap the climax you appointed to publish our ancestral laws Nicomachus, who has no ancestral rights in the city on his father's side; and so the man who ought to have been put on public trial notoriously helped to put down the democracy. Now, however, you should repent of what you have done, and put an end to your sufferings at the hands of

these men, neither should you as private individuals reprehend wrong-doers and then acquit them when it is possible for you to inflict punishment.

The oration "Against Agoratus" gives a vivid picture of the unjust and illegal way in which trials were conducted, as well as a summary of some of the misdeeds of the Thirty.

LYSIAS, XIII (*Against Agoratus*) 36–38

If they had been tried in the regular courts they would easily have been saved,— for you all had realized in what an evil plight the city was, when you were not able to render any assistance. However they actually brought them before the senate of the year of the Thirty. The trial was conducted in the manner which you know so well. The Thirty sat on the benches where the presiding officers now sit, and two tables were placed in front of them, and the vote had to be placed not in a ballot-box but openly on these tables, the adverse vote on the farther table . . . . Under the conditions how could any one of them expect acquittal? In a word, all those who were brought for trial to the court under the Thirty were condemned to death, and not one was spared except Agoratus here; they let him off on the score of his being a benefactor to the state. To have you know how many fell victims to his activity, I should like to read over the list of their names to you.

LYSIAS, XIII (*Against Agoratus*) 46–48

DEEDS OF THE THIRTY

Further, you know how the walls were razed, the ships handed over to the enemy, the dockyards pulled down, the Lacedæmonians held your acropolis, and the whole strength of the city was paralysed, so that it was no stronger than the weakest of cities.

In addition, you lost your private property, and finally, all of you together were driven out of your country by the Thirty. When those patriots saw this, judges, they refused to allow peace to be made; and these men who wished to help the city were killed by you, Agoratus, on the charge that they were plotting treason; and indeed you are responsible for all the misfortunes which have befallen the state.

2. TREATMENT OF THE METICS

The most horrible instance of brutality and greed is narrated by Lysias in the oration "Against Eratosthenes." This is the only case where the orator's speech is on his own behalf. Eratosthenes had been a member of the Thirty, and as such was liable to impeachment, since they were expressly excluded by the terms of the amnesty.

LYSIAS, XII (*Against Eratosthenes*), 4–23

My father Cephalus was persuaded by Pericles to come to this country, he lived here thirty years, and we were never prosecutors or defendants in any suit, but we lived under the democracy in such a way that we never brought a charge against others and never were accused. But when the Thirty got into power, — base men and sycophants who alleged that it was necessary to clear the city of wrong-doers and to incline the rest of the citizens to virtue and justice, — though they used arguments of this kind, they acted in quite a different spirit, as I shall endeavor to remind you, speaking first of my own case and then of yours. Theognis and Piso spoke in the meetings of the Thirty about the metics, saying that some of them were disaffected towards the government, and that therefore they had the best possible excuse for pretending to punish them but really for getting money; at any rate that the city was poor and the government in need of funds. With small difficulty they persuaded their hearers, who thought it a trivial matter to put men to death, but highly important to get money. They decided, therefore, to arrest ten, two of them poor men, in order that they might have the defense that their action was taken not for money, but for the good of the state, — a plausible statement such as might have been made in defense of right measures.

After assigning the houses to be visited, they started forth and arrested me as I was dining with guests. These they drove out and handed me over to Piso. The others went to the factory and had a list made of the slaves. So I asked Piso whether he was willing to save me for a consideration, and he said, Yes, if it were large enough. I said that I was prepared to give him a talent of

silver, and he agreed. I knew then that he had no regard for either gods or men. However, under the circumstances, it seemed to me absolutely necessary for me to take a guarantee of faith from him. And when he invoked destruction on himself and his children if he broke his word, and promised to save me if he got the talent, I went into an inner room and opened my money chest. Piso noticed this and came in, and after seeing the contents he summoned two of the servants and told them to take what was in the box. And when, gentlemen of the jury, he took not only what I had agreed on, but three talents of silver and four hundred Cyzicene staters and one hundred Darics, and four silver bowls, I asked him to let me have enough for travelling expenses, but he said I would be in great luck if I escaped with my life.

And as Piso and I were going out, we fell in with Melobius and Mnesithides leaving the factory, who met us just at the doors and asked where we were going. He said to my brother's to see what he had in his house. So they said for him to go ahead, but for me to follow along with them to the house of Damnippus. But Piso coming up to me told me to keep silence and not to lose heart, as he would come there too. We there found Theognis guarding another group of metics, and handing me over to him, they went off again. Under the circumstances it seemed best for me to take a risk, as I was likely to die anyway. So I called Damnippus and said to him, "You happen to be my friend, I have come to your house, I have done no wrong, but I am being destroyed on account of my money. Do you therefore give all the help you can for my safety since I am in such a predicament." This he promised to do. But he thought it better to speak of it to Theognis, for he thought he would do anything for money. And while he was discussing with Theognis, I thought I would better try to save myself by the back door (I happened to be acquainted with the house and knew that it had a back door as well as a front door), thinking that if I escaped I should be safe, but if I were to be taken I argued that if Theognis were persuaded by Damnippus to take a bribe, none the less I should get off, but if not I should have to die anyway. After considering these points, I made the attempt to escape, they in the meanwhile keeping guard at the court door; and all three doors

which I had to pass through chanced to be open. Going to the house of Archeneus the ship-captain, I sent him to the city to make inquiries about my brother. On his return he said that Eratosthenes had seized him on the street and haled him off to prison. After hearing such news, I sailed for Megara that night. The Thirty gave their usual order to Polemarchus, namely:—to drink poison, without even telling him the charge on which he was to die; so far was he from having a trial or chance to defend himself. And when they took him out of prison, dead, they did not allow the funeral to take place from any of our houses (though we had three), but they hired a little room and laid him out there. And though he had many garments, they did not give any of them to those that asked them for the burial, but of his friends one gave a cloak, another a pillow, a third whatever he chanced to have for the funeral. And though they had seven hundred shields of ours, and so much gold and silver, and copper and ornaments and furniture and women's clothes as they never expected to get, and a hundred and twenty slaves (of which they took the best and gave over the others to the state), they reached such a pitch of greed and shamelessness and made such an exhibition of themselves that as soon as Melobius went into the house he snatched from the ears of Polemarchus's wife the gold ear-rings which she happened to be wearing.

We were not spared by them in the smallest trifle of our property, but for the sake of our money they wronged us as no others would have wronged those against whom they were enraged for the worst sins; though indeed we did not deserve such things at the hands of the city, for we always furnished our choruses and paid many taxes, and were always orderly and obedient to the laws, and had no personal enemies, but (on the contrary) had ransomed many Athenians from captivity. Yet they thought us worthy of such treatment, though we were better as metics than they as citizens.

For they drove out many of the citizens to the enemy, many others they killed unjustly and left unburied, many others who were in good standing they deprived of their political rights, and they made it impossible for many of them to give their daughters in marriage. And they have reached such a pitch of effrontery that they have come here to defend themselves, and say that they have done

nothing bad or shameful. Would that their statements were the fact! For then I should benefit largely by that! But as a matter of fact, they have not treated either the city or me as they say; for, as I have already stated, Eratosthenes killed my brother, not because he had a private charge against him, or knew that Polemarchus was guilty of any offense against the city, but because he followed to the utmost the prompting of his own lawlessness.

3. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

In the oration "On the Olive Stump" Lysias defends a man accused of having cut down a sacred olive, the property of Athena and guarded by the state. His point is that during the time of the Thirty everything was in such confusion and disorder that it was impossible for any one to protect his own property. Confiscation, wanton destruction, plunder by the enemy, all happened with great frequency.

LYSIAS, VII (*On the Olive Stump*), 6–7

For you all know that the war was responsible for many evils, and that property at a distance was destroyed by the Lacedæmonians, while that near the city was plundered by our own people. How then would it be just to punish me for the misfortunes which befell the city? particularly since this vineyard was confiscated during the war and abandoned for more than three years. It is no wonder that they cut down sacred olive trees at that time during which we were not able to protect even our own property.

You know, senators, especially those of you who act as inspectors of such properties, that at that time there were many estates thick with olive trees, either of private ownership or belonging to the state, most of which now have been cut down so that the land has become bare. In cases where possession did not change during peace and war, you do not think it right to punish the owners, if someone else cut down the trees. And so if you absolve from blame those who farmed the land continuously, how much more ought you to exempt those who bought it after peace was declared?

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CHAPTER XIII

SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES

Sparta — Lysander and his policy — Agesilaus — War with Thebes and Athens. — Selfish policy of Sparta; her climax — The rise of Thebes — The peace of B.C. 371 — Leuctra and its consequences — Founding of Megalopolis and of Messene — The battle of Mantinæa — Epaminondas — His career — Death and statues — Estimates of his ability

I. Sparta

The close of the fifth century had left Sparta in a dominant position. Having humbled her old rival in the dust and dictated terms to her and put her own oligarchical friends into power, she now set about building up a great empire. In addition to temperamental unfitness for such an undertaking and the mistake of trying to apply provincial or even parochial standards to a great dominion, two things contributed largely to her failure in the attempt. The first was her tactless and high-handed way of dealing with her allies; her haughty attitude and dictatorial tone made her thoroughly detested by them, and many broke loose when they dared. The second reason was the rivalry between the two great generals, Lysander and King Agesilaus, who advocated diametrically opposed policies, though there was never an open breach between them.

1. LYSANDER AND HIS POLICY

The aggressive, domineering policy of Lysander is well seen in the passages which follow.

The allies revolted, and Lysander was slain in battle before the arrival of his colleague Pausanias, who was coming from the other direction to meet him.

PLUTARCH, *Lysander*, 5, 13

Lysander, meanwhile, invited to Ephesus such persons in the various cities as he saw to be bolder and haughtier-spirited than the rest, proceeded to lay the foundations of that government by bodies of ten, and those revolutions which afterwards came to pass, stirring up and urging them to unite in clubs and apply themselves to public affairs, since as soon as ever the Athenians should be put down, the popular government, he said, should be suppressed and they should become supreme in their several countries. And he made them believe these things by present deeds, promoting those who were his friends already to great employments, honours, and offices, and, to gratify their covetousness, making himself a partner in injustice and wickedness. So much so, that all flocked to him, and courted and desired him, hoping, if he remained in power, that the highest wishes they could form would all be gratified. . . .

After this Lysander, sailing about to the various cities, bade all the Athenians he met go into Athens, declaring that he would spare none, but kill every man whom he found out of the city, intending thus to cause immediate famine and scarcity there, that they might not make the siege laborious to him, having provisions sufficient to endure it. And suppressing the popular governments and all other constitutions, he left one Lacedæmonian chief officer in every city, with ten rulers to act with him, selected out of the societies which he had previously formed in the different towns. And doing thus as well in the cities of his enemies as of his associates, he sailed leisurely on, establishing, in a manner, for himself supremacy over the whole of Greece. Neither did he make choice of rulers by birth or by wealth, but bestowed the offices on his own friends and partisans, doing everything to please them, and putting absolute power of reward and punishment into their hands. And thus, personally appearing on many occasions of bloodshed and massacre, and aiding his friends to expel their opponents, he did not give the Greeks a favourable specimen of the Lacedæmonian government.

PLUTARCH, *Lysander*, 17

But the wisest of the Spartans, very much on account of this occurrence, dreading the influence of money, as being what had corrupted the greatest citizens, exclaimed against Lysander's conduct, and declared to the Ephors that all the silver and gold should be sent away, as mere "alien mischiefs." These consulted about it; and Theopompus says it was Sciraphidas, but Ephorus that it was Phlogidas, who declared they ought not to receive any gold or silver into the city; but to use their own country coin, which was iron, and was first of all dipped in vinegar when it was red-hot, that it might not be worked up anew, but because of the dipping might be hard and unpliable. It was also, of course, very heavy and troublesome to carry, and a great deal of it in quantity and weight was but a little in value. And perhaps all the old money was so, coin consisting of iron, or, in some countries, copper skewers, whence it comes that we still find a great number of small pieces of money retain the name of *obolus*, and the drachma is six of these, because so much may be grasped in one's hand. But Lysander's friends being against it, and endeavouring to keep the money in the city, it was resolved to bring in this sort of money to be used publicly, enacting, at the same time, that if any one was found in possession of any privately, he should be put to death, as if Lycurgus had feared the coin, and not the covetousness resulting from it, which they did not repress by letting no private man keep any, so much as they encouraged it, by allowing the state to possess it; attaching thereby a sort of dignity to it, over and above its ordinary utility.

PLUTARCH, *Lysander*, 19, 23

This ambitious temper was indeed only burdensome to the highest personages and to his equals, but through having so many people devoted to serve him, an extreme haughtiness and contemptuousness grew up, together with ambition, in his character. He observed no sort of moderation, such as befitted a private man, either in rewarding or in punishing; the recompense of his friends and guests was absolute power over cities, and irresponsible authority, and the only satisfaction of

his wrath was the destruction of his enemy; banishment would not suffice. . . .

Immediately, therefore, Lysander spurred him [Agesilaus] on to make an expedition into Asia, putting him in hopes that he might destroy the Persians, and attain the height of greatness. And he wrote to his friends in Asia, bidding them request to have Agesilaus appointed to command them in the war against the barbarians; which they were persuaded to, and sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon to entreat it. And this would seem to be a second favour done Agesilaus by Lysander, not inferior to his first in obtaining him the kingdom. But with ambitious natures, otherwise not ill qualified for command, the feeling of jealousy of those near them in reputation continually stands in the way of the performance of noble actions; they make those their rivals in virtue, whom they ought to use as their helpers to it. Agesilaus took Lysander, among the thirty counsellors that accompanied him, with intentions of using him as his especial friend; but when they were come into Asia, the inhabitants there, to whom he was but little known, addressed themselves to him but little and seldom; whereas Lysander, because of their frequent previous intercourse, was visited and attended by large numbers, by his friends out of observance, and by others out of fear; and just as in tragedies it not uncommonly is the case with the actors, the person who represents a messenger or servant is much taken notice of, and plays the chief part, while he who wears the crown and sceptre is hardly heard to speak, even so was it about the counsellor, he had all the real honours of the government, and to the king was left the empty name of power. This disproportionate ambition ought very likely to have been in some way softened down, and Lysander should have been reduced to his proper second place, but wholly to cast off and to insult and affront for glory's sake one who was his benefactor and friend was not worthy Agesilaus to allow in himself. For, first of all, he gave him no opportunity for any action, and never set him in any place of command; then, for whomsoever he perceived him exerting his interest, these persons he always sent away with a refusal, and with less attention than any ordinary suitors, thus silently undoing and weakening his influence.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, III, iv, 2

These reports threw the Lacedæmonians into a flutter of expectation and anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the allies, and began to deliberate as to what ought to be done. Lysander, convinced of the enormous superiority of the Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing an obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of the troops with Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus to undertake a campaign into Asia, provided the authorities would furnish him with thirty Spartans, two thousand of the enfranchised, and contingents of the allies amounting to six thousand men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander had a personal object: he wished to accompany the king himself, and by his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by himself in the different cities, but at a later date expelled through the action of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re-establishing the old order of constitution.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, III, v, 17–25

And now the Lacedæmonians no longer hesitated. Pausanias the king advanced into Bœotia with the home army and the whole of the Peloponnesian contingents, saving only the Corinthians, who declined to serve. Lysander, at the head of the army supplied by the Phocians and Orchomenus and the other strong places in those parts, had already reached Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedæmon, but at once marched with what troops he had against the walls of Haliartus; and in the first instance he tried to persuade the citizens to detach themselves from Thebes and to assume autonomy, but the intention was cut short by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware, and hurried to the rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, whether it was that the army of relief fell upon Lysander unawares, or that with clear knowledge of his approach he preferred to await the enemy, with intent to crush him, is uncertain. This only is clear: a battle was fought beside the walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the townsfolk before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was

slain, and the rest fled to the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. But when the pursuit had led them to some considerable height, and they were fairly environed and hemmed in by difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and missiles. First two or three men dropped who had been foremost of the pursuers, and then upon the rest they poured volleys of stones down the precipitous incline, and pressed on their late pursuers with much zeal, until the Thebans turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving behind them more than a couple of hundred corpses.

On this day, therefore, the hearts of the Thebans failed them as they counted their losses and found them equal to their gains; but the next day they discovered that during the night the Phocians and the rest of them had made off to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming themselves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias appeared at the head of the Lacedæmonian army, and once more their dangers seemed to thicken round them. Deep, we are told, was the silence and abasement which reigned in their host. It was not until the third day, when the Athenians arrived, and were duly drawn up beside them, whilst Pausanias neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the confidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his side, having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties, deliberated whether to give battle or to content himself with picking up the bodies of Lysander and of those who fell with him, under cover of a truce.

The considerations which weighed on the minds of Pausanias and the other high officers of the Lacedæmonians seem to have been that Lysander was dead and his defeated army in retreat; while, as far as they themselves were concerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely wanting, and the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb. They further reasoned that the enemy's cavalry was numerous and theirs the reverse; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead right under the walls, so that if they had been ever so much stronger it would have been no easy task to pick up the bodies within range of the towers of Haliartus. On all these grounds they determined to ask for a flag of truce, in order

to pick up the bodies of the slain. These, however, the Thebans were not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lacedæmonians, who at once picked up the corpses of the slain, and prepared to quit the territory of Bœotia. The preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat commenced. Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedæmonians, in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, who visited the slightest attempt to trespass on their private estates with blows and chased the offenders back on to the high roads unflinchingly. Such was the conclusion of the campaign of the Lacedæmonians.

As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on the capital charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he had failed to reach Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of his undertaking to be there on the same day: that, instead of using any endeavour to pick up the bodies of the slain by force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce: that at an earlier date, when he had got the popular government of Athens fairly in his grip at Piræus, he had suffered it to slip through his fingers and escape. Besides this, he failed to present himself at the trial, and a sentence of death was passed upon him. He escaped to Tegea and there died of an illness whilst still in exile. Thus closes the chapter of events enacted on the soil of Hellas.

Isocrates, the orator, who was always anti-Spartan in spite of his dream of Pan-Hellenic unity, gives scathing criticisms of Lacedæmonian character and policy.

Isocrates, IV (*Panegyricus*), 111–116

For what form of oppression escaped them? Or what deed of shame or cruelty did they not perpetrate? They deemed the most lawless to be most faithful, they courted traitors as benefactors, and chose to be slaves to one of the Helots, so as to outrage their own country; they honoured the assassins and murderers of their fellow-citizens more than their own parents, and brought us all to such a pitch of savagery, that whereas in former times, on account of the prevailing happiness, each of us found many to sympathize with us even in small misfortunes, under their rule, owing to the

multitude of our own peculiar ills, we left off pitying each other; for they left no one sufficient leisure to share another's sorrow. Whom did these tyrants not reach? Or who was so remote from public life that he was not compelled to come into close contact with the calamities into which such creatures plunged us? Then, they are not ashamed of their lawless treatment of their own states or of their unjust accusations against ours, but in addition to their other offenses they even venture to speak of the lawsuits and indictments which at times have occurred amongst us, when they themselves put to death more men untried in three months than our state brought to trial during the whole time of its supremacy. The banishments and seditions, the confounding of laws and political revolutions, nay more, the outrages upon children, the insults to women, the confiscations — who could recount them? Only I can say this much on the whole matter, that the acts of wrong committed in our time might easily have been abolished by a single decree of the assembly, but the massacres and the lawlessness which took place under them cannot be repaired by anyone. Indeed, even the present peace and the independence which is inscribed in treaties, but is not to be found in the states, are not preferable to our empire. For who would desire a condition of things in which pirates hold the sea and targeteers occupy the cities, and, instead of making war against strangers in defence of their country, the citizens fight with each other inside the walls; more cities have been taken in war than before we concluded the peace, and on account of the frequency of revolutions the inhabitants of the cities live in greater despondency than those who have been punished with exile; for the former dread the future, while the latter are continually expecting to return home.

Isocrates, IV, 122–128

Bearing all this in mind, it is but right to be indignant at the existing condition of things, and to mourn the loss of our leadership, and to censure the Lacedæmonians in that, although in the beginning they undertook the war as if with the purpose of liberating the Hellenes, at the close they have visited so many of them with betrayal, and have caused the Ionians to revolt from our state,

from which they emigrated and by whose influence they were often saved from danger, and have given them over to the barbarians, against whose will they possess their territory, and with whom they have never ceased fighting. In former days the Lacedæmonians were indignant when we desired to rule over some people in a lawful manner; now, on the contrary, they take no heed of these states, when reduced to such slavery, that it is not enough for them to be subject to tribute and to see their citadels occupied by their enemies, but in addition to the public calamities they suffer in their own persons harsher treatment than our bought slaves; for no one of us illtreats his servants in such fashion as they chastise free men. But the greatest of their miseries is the being compelled to carry arms in the very cause of slavery, and to fight against those who claim to be free, when the perils they undergo are of such a nature that if defeated they will be immediately destroyed, and if successful will be more deeply enslaved for all future time. Whom should we consider responsible for these things but the Lacedæmonians, who, great as is their strength, suffer their own allies to be brought to such a depth of misery, and the barbarian to establish his own sway by the aid of the might of the Hellenes? Again, though in former times they used to expel tyrants, and give support to the people, they have now changed so completely that they go to war with constitutional governments and help to establish monarchies. Mantinea, for instance, after peace was concluded, they laid in ruins, they seized the Cadmea of Thebes, and are now besieging the Olynthians and the Phliasians, and they are assisting Amyntas, the king of the Macedonians, and Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, and the barbarian who is master of Asia, to extend their power as widely as possible. Yet is it not strange that the leaders of Hellas should establish one man as master of human beings so numerous that it is not even easy to ascertain their number, and yet should not allow the greatest states to have control even of themselves, but should compel them to suffer slavery or to incur the greatest calamities? But the most monstrous thing of all is to see those who claim to have the leadership fighting every day against the Hellenes, and united in alliance for all time with the barbarians.

2. AGESILAUS

In the meantime Agesilaus was away on an expedition in Asia helping the Greek cities in a revolt against Persian rule. He was in the midst of great success when, much to his regret, he was recalled to Greece to help the Spartan cause there.

PLUTARCH, *Agesilaus*, 15

Many parts of Asia now revolting from the Persians, Agesilaus restored order in the cities, and without bloodshed or banishment of any of their members re-established the proper constitution in the governments, and now resolved to carry away the war from the seaside, and to march further up into the country, and to attack the King of Persia himself in his own home in Susa and Ecbatana; not willing to let the monarch sit idle in his chair, playing umpire in the conflicts of the Greeks, and bribing their popular leaders. But these great thoughts were interrupted by unhappy news from Sparta; Epicydidas is from thence sent to remand him home, to assist his own country, which was then involved in a great war:—

> Greece to herself doth a barbarian grow,
> Others could not, she doth herself o'erthrow.

What better can we say of those jealousies, and that league and conspiracy of the Greeks for their own mischief, which arrested fortune in full career, and turned back arms that were already uplifted against the barbarians, to be used upon themselves, and recalled into Greece the war which had been banished out of her? . . .

Nothing was greater or nobler than the behaviour of Agesilaus on this occasion, nor can a nobler instance be found in story of a ready obedience and just deference to orders. Hannibal, though in a bad condition himself, and, almost driven out of Italy, could scarcely be induced to obey when he was called home to serve his country. Alexander made a jest of the battle between Agis and Antipater, laughing and saying, "So, whilst we were conquering Darius in Asia, it seems there was a battle of mice in Arcadia." Happy Sparta, meanwhile, in the justice and modesty of Agesilaus,

and in the deference he paid to the laws of his country; who, immediately upon receipt of his orders, though in the midst of his high fortune and power, and in full hope of great and glorious success, gave all up and instantly departed, "his object unachieved," leaving many regrets behind him among his allies in Asia, and proving by his example the falseness of that saying of Demostratus, the son of Phæax, "that the Lacedæmonians were better in public, but the Athenians in private." For while approving himself an excellent king and general, he likewise showed himself in private an excellent friend and a most agreeable companion.

The coin of Persia was stamped with the figure of an archer; Agesilaus said, that a thousand Persian archers had driven him out of Asia; meaning the money that had been laid out in bribing the demagogues and the orators in Thebes and Athens, and thus inciting those two states to hostility against Sparta.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, IV, i, 41–ii, 4

B.C. 394. But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once marched out of the territory of Pharnabazus. The season verged on spring. Reaching the plain of Thebe, he encamped in the neighbourhood of the temple of Artemis of Astyra, and there employed himself in collecting troops from every side, in addition to those which he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating as far as possible into the interior. He was persuaded that every tribe or nation placed in his rear might be considered as alienated from the king.

Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians at home were quite alive to the fact that moneys had been sent into Hellas, and that the bigger states were leagued together to declare war against them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Sparta herself was in actual danger and that a campaign was inevitable. While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost no time in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That officer, on his arrival, explained the position of affairs, and concluded by delivering a peremptory summons of the state recalling him to the assistance of the fatherland without delay.

The announcement could not but come as a grievous blow to Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and the honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the allies and announced to them the contents of the despatch from home. "To aid our fatherland," he added, "is an imperative duty. If, however, matters turn out well on the other side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will not forget you, but I shall be back anon to carry out your wishes." When they heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolution, one and all, to join Agesilaus in assisting Lacedæmon; if matters turned out well there, they undertook to take him as their leader and come back again to Asia; and so they fell to making preparations to follow him.

XENOPHON, *Agesilaus*, I, 35–38

It was then that the Persian king, believing that Tissaphernes was to blame for the ill success of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and cut off the satrap's head. After this the fortunes of the barbarians grew still more desperate, whilst those of Agesilaus assumed a bolder front. On all sides embassies from the surrounding nations came to make terms of friendship, and numbers even came over to him, stretching out eager arms to grasp at freedom. So that Agesilaus was now no longer the chosen captain of the Hellenes only, but of many Asiatics.

And here we may pause and consider what a weight of admiration is due to one who, being now ruler over countless cities of the continent, and islands also (since the state had further entrusted her navy to his hands), just when he had reached this pinnacle of renown and power, and might look to turn to account his thronging fortunes; when, too, which overtops all else, he was cherishing fond hopes to dissolve that empire which in former days had dared to march on Hellas; — at such a moment suffered himself not to be overmastered by these promptings, but on receipt of a summons of the home authorities to come to the assistance of the fatherland, obeyed the mandate of his state as readily as though he had stood confronted face to face with the Five in the hall of ephors; and thus gave clear proof that he would not accept the whole earth in exchange for the land of his fathers, nor newly-acquired in place

of ancient friends, nor base gains ingloriously purchased rather than the perilous pursuit of honor and uprightness.

And, indeed, glancing back at the whole period during which he remained in the exercise of his authority, no act of deeper significance in proof of his kingly qualities need be named than this. He found the cities which he was sent out to govern each and all a prey to factions, the result of constitutional disturbances consequent on the cessation of the Athenian empire, and without resort to exile or sanguinary measures he so disposed them by his healing presence that civil concord and material prosperity were permanently maintained. Therefore it was that the Hellenes in Asia deplored his departure as though they had lost, not simply a ruler, but a father or bosom friend, and in the end they showed that their friendship was of no fictitious character. At any rate, they voluntarily helped him to succour Lacedæmon, though it involved, as they knew, the need of doing battle with combatants of equal prowess with themselves. So the tale of his achievements in Asia has an end.

3. WAR WITH THEBES AND ATHENS

Thebes at this time was urging Athens, with all eloquence, to form an alliance with her against Sparta. It was voted to do so, and the text of the treaty of alliance still remains in part.

The battle of Corinth was the most important engagement.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, III, v, 9–16

"But to pass on — we all know, men of Athens, that you would like to recover the empire which you formerly possessed; and how can you compass your object better than by coming to the aid yourselves of the victims of Lacedæmonian injustice? Is it their wide empire of which you are afraid? Let not that make cowards of you — much rather let it embolden you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. When your empire was widest then the crop of your enemies was thickest. Only so long as they found no opportunity to revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark; but no sooner had they found a champion in Lacedæmon than they

at once showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let us show plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder embattled against the Lacedæmonians; and haters enough of them — whole armies — never fear, will be forthcoming. To prove the truth of this assertion you need only to count upon your fingers. How many friends have they left to them to-day? The Argives have been, are, and ever will be, hostile to them. Of course. But the Eleians? Why, the Eleians have quite lately been robbed of so much territory and so many cities that their friendship is converted into hatred. And what shall we say of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the Achæans? In the war which Sparta waged against you, there was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those peoples did not share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings and persuasions of that power. The Lacedæmonians gained what they wanted, and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth did these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. They have no scruple in appointing their helots as governors, and on the free necks of their allies, in the day of their good fortune, they have planted the tyrant's heel.

"Take again the case of those whom they have detached from yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled and cheated them; in place of freedom they have presented them with a two-fold slavery. The allies are tyrannised over by the governor and tyrannised over by the ten commissioners set up by Lysander over every subject city. And to come lastly to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the lord of Asia one whit better off to-day than if he had taken exactly the opposite course and joined you in reducing them?

"Is it not clear that you have only to step forward once again as the champions of this crowd of sufferers from injustice, and you will attain to a pinnacle of power quite unprecedented? In the days of your old empire you were leaders of the maritime powers merely — that is clear; but your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and the Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty power which is his. We do not deny that we were

serviceable allies enough to Lacedæmon, as you will bear us witness; but this we say: — If we helped the Lacedæmonians vigorously in the past, everything tends to show that we shall help you still more vigorously to-day; for our swords will be unsheathed, not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien stock, as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under a sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which you ought to realise: this selfish system of organised greed which is Sparta's will fall more readily to pieces than your own late empire. Yours was the proud assertion of naval empire over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs is the selfish sway of a minority asserting dominion over states equally well armed with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that as far as we can understand the matter, the field to which we invite you is destined to prove far richer in blessings to your own state of Athens than to ours, Thebes."

With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, speaker after speaker spoke in favour of the proposition, and finally a unanimous resolution was passed voting assistance to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in an answer communicating the resolution, pointed out with pride that in spite of the unfortified condition of Piræus, Athens would not shrink from repaying her debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest. "You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; we are prepared to fight your battles with you against the enemy, if he attacks you." Thus the Thebans returned home and made preparations to defend themselves, whilst the Athenians made ready to assist them.

Hicks and Hill, 84

ALLIANCE BETWEEN BŒOTIA AND ATHENS, B.C. 395–394

The Gods

Alliance of the Bœotians and Athenians for all time.

If anyone begins war against the Athenians by land or by sea, the Bœotians are to help them to the best of their ability with all their might just as the Athenians may demand; and if anyone begins war against the Bœotians by land or by sea, the Athenians are to help.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, IV, ii, 15–22

And here I may state the numbers on either side. The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six thousand men. Of Eleians, Triphylians, Acroreians, and Lasionians, there must have been nearly three thousand, with fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, and Halieis contributed at least another three thousand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hundred Lacedæmonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about three hundred strong, besides another force of slingers, at least four hundred in all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians. The men of Phlius were not represented. Their plea was they were keeping "holy truce." That was the total of the forces on the Lacedæmonian side. There were collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian heavy infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand Argives, and in the absence of the men of Orchomenus something like five thousand Bœotians. There were besides three thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole of Eubœa at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry. Of cavalry the Bœotians, again in the absence of the Orchomenians, furnished eight hundred, the Athenians six hundred, the Chalcidians of Eubœa one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians fifty. Their light troops, including those of the Corinthians, were more numerous, as the Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, and Acarnanians helped to swell their numbers.

Such was the strength of the two armies. The Bœotians, as long as they occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to join battle, but after a rearrangement which gave them the right, placing the Athenians opposite to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves opposite the Achæans, at once, we are told, the victims proved favourable, and the order was passed along the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Bœotians, in the first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to give their division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, kept veering more and more to their right, with the intention of overlapping their opponents' flank. The consequence was that the Athenians, to avoid being absolutely severed, were forced to follow suit, and edged towards the right, though they recognised the risk they ran of

having their flank turned. For a while the Lacedæmonians had no idea of the advance of the enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground, but the notes of the pæan at length announced to them the fact, and without an instant's delay the answering order "prepare for battle" ran along the different sections of their army. As soon as their troops were drawn up, according to the tactical disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades, the order was passed to "follow the lead," and then the Lacedæmonians on their side also began edging to their right, and eventually stretched out their wing so far that only six out of the ten regimental divisions of the Athenians confronted the Lacedæmonians, the other four finding themselves face to face with the men of Tegea. And now when they were less than a furlong apart, the Lacedæmonians sacrificed in customary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess, and advanced upon their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns to outflank his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lacedæmon were as a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. The men of Pellene alone, steadily confronting the Thespiæans, held their ground, and the dead of either side strewed the position. As to the Lacedæmonians themselves: crushing that portion of the Athenian troops which lay immediately in front of them, and at the same time encircling them with their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them; and, absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns continued their march, and so passed behind the four remaining divisions of the Athenians before these latter had returned from their own victorious pursuit. Whereby the four divisions in question also emerged from battle intact, except for the casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the first clash of the engagement. The troops next encountered by the Lacedæmonians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul of, and the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing with them "breast to breast" when some one, it is said, shouted, "Let their front ranks pass." This was done, and as the Argives raced past, their enemies thrust at their unprotected sides, and killed many of them. The Corinthians were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their turn had passed, once more the Lacedæmonians lit upon a portion of the Theban division retiring from the pursuit,

and strewed the field with their dead. The end of it all was that the defeated troops in the first instance made for safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians within closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once again in their old encampment. The Lacedæmonians on their side withdrew to the point at which they first closed with the enemy, and there set up a trophy of victory. So the battle ended.

In the oration "For Mantitheus" the young soldier testifies that he fought in the battle of Corinth in the front rank and remained as long as Thrasybulus himself.

Lysias, XVI (*For Mantitheus*), 15

And after this, senators, when the expedition to Corinth took place and all knew that there would be danger, while the others were hesitating I managed so that I fought against the enemy from a place in the front rank, and though our tribe especially was suffering many misfortunes, most of them falling in battle, I at least retreated after this fine gentleman of Steiria, who has been reproaching all the world with cowardice.

Two inscriptions are still to be seen on handsome monuments in the Ceramicus, or State Cemetery of Athens. They commemorate those who fell in the battles of Corinth and Coronea. The second is on the famous stele with the beautiful relief of the young horseman, Dexileus.[1]

Hicks and Hill, 87

Battle of Corinth and Battle of Coronea: July–August, B.C. 394

These knights fell at Corinth: Antiphanes, phylarch, Melesias, Onetorides, Lysitheus, Pandius, Nicomachus, Theangelus, Phanes, Democles, Dexileus, Endelus.

At Coronea: Neoclides.

[1] See Pausanias, I, xxix, 11.

Hicks and Hill, 88

BATTLE OF CORINTH, B.C. 394

Dexileus son of Lysanias of Thoricus,
Born in the archonship of Tisander,
Fell at Corinth in the archonship of Eubulides,
One of the five knights.

4. SELFISH POLICY OF SPARTA; HER CLIMAX

In spite of her unpopularity Sparta continued to be so successful in war that she quite lost her head and entered on a career of mad infatuation. The outrageous treatment of the Mantineans and the Thebans shows that she had neither restraint nor decency left.

This policy naturally terrified the other states, who became so anxious for peace that they submitted to the humiliation of allowing the Persian king to dictate the terms.

Sparta had now reached the climax of her power. The statement of Xenophon sounds as if there were no question of her further success, yet within a few years she succumbed before the power of Thebes.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, V, ii, 1–8

B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in conformity with the wishes of the Lacedæmonians, that they determined to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves less favourable to Lacedæmon than to her enemies. Chastisement was not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as should render the like disloyalty impossible again. As the first step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the Mantineans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole ground that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their enemies. Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to time, had not escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn to the Argives while at war with Lacedæmon; at other times their refusal to furnish contingents

during a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or other; or if they did reluctantly take the field — the miserable inefficiency of their service. "But, more than that," they added, "we note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may betide our state; the extravagant pleasure you exhibit at the sudden descent of some disaster."

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said, saw the expiration, as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce, consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore, to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them. Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to his father in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the expedition — in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a large supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city of Lacedæmon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. By erecting a barrier at its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls. Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and refused their support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread lest the fall at some point or other of

the circular wall might deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they signified their consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedæmonians now steadily refused any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages. They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy, thought that their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son, Pausanias with Agesipolis, in their behalf, and obtained immunity for them — sixty in number — on condition that they should quit the city. The Lacedæmonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classes themselves — a weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts, assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants. The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down their present houses and building others, yet when the owners found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of "those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn which affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them not one commander of contingents, but four, one for each village; and the zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished from the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was taught mankind — not to conduct a river through a fortress town.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, V, ii, 28–37

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the Thesmophoria. It was noon of a hot summer's day; scarcely a soul was stirring in the streets. This was the moment

for Leontiades. He mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phœbidas. He turned him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having posted Phœbidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to the senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs, the Lacedæmonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers the polemarch to apprehend all persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and lead him away to the place appointed."

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest, albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the views of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about three hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedæmon. There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly incensed against Phœbidas, "who had failed to execute the orders assigned him by the state." Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus protested. If mischief had been wrought to Lacedæmon by this deed, it was just that the doer of it should be punished; but, if good, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for impromptu acts of this character. "The sole point you have to look to," he urged, "is whether what has been done is good or evil." After this, however, Leontiades

presented himself to the assembly and addressed the members as follows: "Sirs, Lacedæmonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards you, before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness her friendly bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your friends. Can it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in the campaign against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piræus; and balanced that lukewarmness by an onslaught on the Phocians, whose sole crime was cordiality to yourselves? Nor is that all. In full knowledge that you were likely to be engaged in war with Olynthus, she proceeded at once to make an alliance with that city. So that up to the last moment you were in constant expectation of hearing some day that the whole of Bœotia was laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all is changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief despatch in cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience to your every wish in that quarter, provided only you will take as kindly an interest in us as we in you."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedæmonians resolved formally, now that the citadel had been taken, to keep it, and to put Ismenias on his trial. In consequence of this resolution a body of commissioners was despatched, three Lacedæmonians and one for each of the allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was preferred against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the hands of the barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persian to the detriment of Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes from the king; and, finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, the prime cause of the whole intestine trouble to which Hellas was a prey. Each of these charges was met by the defendant, but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse the court of their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only equalled by their wickedness. The verdict was given against him, and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus possessed the city; and went beyond the injunctions given them in the eager performance of their services.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, V, i, 28–36

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture. To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote possibility, now that the Lacedæmonians had procured an ally in the person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Ægina. On all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace. The Lacedæmonians were equally out of humour with the war for various reasons — what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechæum and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance of which Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for peace; they knew that the ban had been called out against them, and, it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent down by the king to present themselves, the invitation was promptly accepted. At the opening of the conclave Tiribazus pointed to the king's seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the contents, which ran as follows:

"The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money."

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the several states proceeded to report the same to their respective governments. One and all of these took the oaths to ratify and confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans,

who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Bœotians. This claim Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise conformity with the words of the king's edict, which insisted on "the future autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit them. To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that the instructions they had received were different. "Pray go, then," Agesilaus retorted, "and ask the question; and you may inform your countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the treaty." The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was yielded, they would suffer the states to be independent. Under these circumstances the Lacedæmonians returned home, and the Thebans were forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the autonomy of the Bœotian cities. But now the Corinthians were by no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, "if they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives," and to the latter "if they did not instantly quit Corinth," he would march an army into their territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; whereupon the "butchers" and their accomplices in the deed of blood determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed back their late exiles voluntarily.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, V, iii, 26

On every side the affairs of Lacedæmon had signally prospered: — Thebes and the rest of the Bœotian states lay absolutely at her feet; Corinth had become her most faithful ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself of the subterfuge of a movable calendar, was

humbled to the dust; Athens was isolated; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a hostile feeling towards her had been punished; so that, to all outward appearance, the foundations of her empire were at length absolutely well and firmly laid.

II. The Rise of Thebes

Thebes now took the lead in affairs. The treaty with Athens, which both had thought would prove so advantageous, had only temporarily checked the fundamental unfriendliness of these states. Moreover, the way in which Thebes treated some of Athens's allies in Bœotia made Athens anxious for peace to be declared and some agreement to be entered into with Sparta. Thebes was the only state which refused to sign.

1. PEACE OF B.C. 371

Xenophon, *Hellenica*, VI, iii, 17–20

The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedæmonians passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the withdrawal of the governors from the cities, the disbanding of armaments naval and military, and the guarantee of independence to the states. "If any state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will." On these terms the oaths were administered and accepted by the Lacedæmonians on behalf of themselves and their allies, and by the Athenians and their allies separately state by state. The Thebans had entered their individual name among the states which accepted the oaths, but their ambassadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name of the signatories, substituting for Thebans Bœotians. But Agesilaus answered to this demand that he would alter nothing of what they had in the first instance sworn to and subscribed. If they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he was willing to erase their name at their bidding. So it came to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the sole point of dispute being confined to the Thebans; and the

Athenians came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the Thebans being now literally decimated. As to the Thebans themselves, they retired from Sparta in utter despondency.

2. LEUCTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, VI, iv, 8–16

Both sides were now arming, and there were the unmistakable signs of approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the Bœotian lines a long train bent on departure — these were the furnishers of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in general such people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under Hiero, who got round them by a circular movement. The mercenaries were supported by the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pursuing them and driving them into the camp of the Bœotians. The immediate effect was to make the Bœotian portion of the army more numerous and closer packed than before. The next feature of the combat was that in consequence of the flat space of plain between the opposing armies, the Lacedæmonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit. Only there was this difference, — the Theban cavalry was in a high state of training and efficiency, owing to their war with the Orchomenians and again their war with Thespiæ, whilst the cavalry of the Lacedæmonians was at its worst at this period. The horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest members of the state; but whenever the ban was called out, an appointed trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms which might be presented to him, and set off on the expedition at a moment's notice. Moreover, these troopers were the least able-bodied of the men: raw recruits set simply astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly ambition. Such was the cavalry of either antagonist.

The heavy infantry of the Lacedæmonians, it is said, advanced by sections three files abreast, allowing a total depth to the whole line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close

order of not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained over the king's division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest.

Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedæmonians was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence exists for supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, in the first instance, victorious in the battle, if we consider the fact that they could never have picked him up and brought him back alive unless his vanguard had been masters of the situation for the moment.

When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the king's council, with his son Cleonymus, had fallen, then it was that the cavalry and the polemarch's adjutants, as they are called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedæmonians, seeing the right borne down in this way, also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the spot whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne in mind, did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a somewhat steep incline. At this juncture there were some of the Lacedæmonians who, looking upon such a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought to prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the dead not under a flag of truce but by another battle. The polemarchs, however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of the total Lacedæmonian troops were slain; seeing also that of the seven hundred Spartans themselves who were on the field something like four hundred lay dead; aware, further, of the despondency which reigned among the allies, and the general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a frame of mind not far removed in some instances from positive satisfaction at what had taken place) — under the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs called a council of the ablest

representatives of the shattered army and deliberated as to what should be done. Finally the unanimous opinion was to pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a herald to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under a truce.

After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedæmon with news of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the gymnopædiæ, just when the chorus of grown men had entered the theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did not dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not to make any loud lamentation but to bear their sorrow in silence; and the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and radiant looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be living barely a man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered heads and scowling brows, as if in humiliation.

3. FOUNDING OF MEGALOPOLIS AND MESSENE

Thebes now adopted an aggressive policy. She founded two cities in the Peloponnesus, both of which were to be a menace to the Spartans,—Megalopolis in Arcadia and Messene in the district of the same name.

Megalopolis was an experiment, since it was most uncommon to gather the people of a district into a large new city founded for the express purpose of defense or of aggression.

Pausanias, VIII, xxvii, 1–3

Megalopolis is the newest city not only in Arcadia, but in Greece, if we except the case of cities whose inhabitants, under the Roman Empire, have chanced to be transferred to new sites. The Arcadians gathered into Megalopolis for the sake of security; for they knew that the Argives of old had stood in almost daily danger of

being conquered by the Lacedæmonians, but that after they had swelled the population of Argos by destroying Tiryns, Hysiæ, Orneæ, Mycenæ, Midea, and the other petty towns of Argolis, they had had less to fear from the Lacedæmonians, and had at the same time gained a firmer hold over the outlying subject population. Such were the views with which the Arcadians united in a single city. Of that city Epaminondas, the Theban, may justly be called the founder; for he it was who collected the Arcadians to found the united city, and sent a thousand picked Thebans under Pammenes to stand by the Arcadians in case the Lacedæmonians should attempt to hinder the founding of the city. The Arcadians also chose as founders Timon and Proxenus, both from Tegea; Lycomedes and Hopoleas from Mantinea; Cleolaus and Acriphius from Clitor; Eucampidas and Hieronymus from Mænalus; and two Parrhasians, Possicrates, and Theoxenus.

Pausanias, VIII, xxvii, 6–10

Megalopolis was founded in the year in which the defeat of the Lacedæmonians took place at Leuctra, a few months after the battle, in the archonship of Phrasiclides at Athens, in the second year of the hundred and second Olympiad, in which Damon, a Thurian, won the foot-race. Enrolled among the allies of Thebes, the Megalopolitans had nothing to fear from the Lacedæmonians. But when the Thebans became involved in the war known as the Sacred War, and were hard put to it by the Phocians, whose territory adjoins Bœotia, and who were well supplied with money, seeing they had laid hands on the Delphic sanctuary, then, to be sure, the Lacedæmonians would have turned all the Arcadians, and especially the Megalopolitans, out of house and home, if wishing could have done it. However, as the Arcadians defended themselves with courage, and their neighbours staunchly supported them, neither side effected anything worth speaking of. But the hatred that the Arcadians bore to the Lacedæmonians contributed not a little to the growth of the power of Philip, son of Amyntas, and to the spread of the Macedonian Empire; and the Arcadians did not stand side by side with the Greeks at Chæronea nor again on the battlefield in Thessaly.

Having collected the Arcadians into a great capital city, the Thebans proceeded to do the same for the Messenians, who were scattered over the Greek world.

Pausanias, IV, xxvi, 5–8

So after their victory at Leuctra the Thebans sent messengers to Italy, Sicily, and the Euesperitæ, inviting all Messenians in any part of the world whither they had strayed to return to Peloponnese. They assembled faster than could have been expected, for they yearned towards the land of their fathers, and hatred of Sparta still rankled in their breasts. But to Epaminondas it did not seem easy to found a city that would be a match for Lacedæmon; and where to build it he could not think; for the Messenians refused to settle again in Andania and Oechalia, the scenes of their calamities in days gone by. In his perplexity they say that an old man, much like a high priest of the mysteries, stood by him in the night and said, "On thee I bestow power to conquer whomsoever thou mayest turn thine arms against; and if thou art taken from the world, I will look to it, O Theban, that thou art neither nameless nor inglorious. But do thou give back to the Messenians their fatherland and their cities, for the wrath of the Dioscuri against them is at an end." So spake the vision to Epaminondas; and it made the following revelation to Epiteles, son of Aeschines, who had been elected general by the Argives and charged to found Messene anew. The dream commanded him, wherever he found a yew-tree and a myrtle growing on Mount Ithome, to dig up the ground between them and save the old woman, for she was worn out and fainting by reason of her long confinement in the bronze chamber. When day dawned Epiteles went to the spot indicated, dug, and found a bronze urn. Straightway he took it to Epaminondas, told the dream, and bade him take off the lid and see what was in it. After sacrificing and praying to the dream, Epaminondas opened the urn and found a very thin sheet of tin rolled up like a scroll. On it the mysteries of the Great Goddesses were engraved, and this it was that had been deposited by Aristomenes. They say that the man who appeared to Epiteles and Epaminondas in sleep was Caucon, who came from Athens to Messene, daughter of Triopas, at Andania.

Pausanias, IV, xxvii, 5–9

To Epaminondas the site on which the city of Messene now stands appeared the most suitable, and he accordingly desired the seers to inquire whether the gods would be willing to take up their abode there. Being informed by them that the omens were propitious he prepared to found the city. He ordered stones to be brought, and he sent for men who were skilled in laying out streets, building houses and sanctuaries, and erecting city walls. When all was ready, the victims being furnished by the Arcadians, Epaminondas and the Thebans sacrificed to Dionysus and Ismenian Apollo in the customary way; the Argives sacrificed to Argive Hera and Nemean Zeus; and the Messenians sacrificed to Zeus of Ithome and to the Dioscuri, while their priests sacrificed to the Great Goddesses and Caucon. They also joined in calling upon the heroes to come and dwell with them, chiefly Messene, daughter of Triopas, and next to her Eurytus and Aphareus and his children, and of the Heraclids they invited Cresphontes and Aepytus; but loudest of all was the cry for Aristomenes, and the whole people joined in it. Thus the day was spent in sacrifice and prayer. But on the following days they proceeded to rear the circuit wall, and to build houses and sanctuaries within it. They worked to the music of Bœotian and Argive flutes alone; and keen was the competition between the melodies of Sacadas and Pronomus. To the capital they gave the name of Messene, but they founded other towns also. The Nauplians were not expelled from Mothone, and the Asinæans were also suffered to remain where they were, the Messenians remembering the former kindness of the Asinæans in refusing to fight on the Lacedæmonian side against Messenia. When the Messenians were returning to Peloponnese, the Nauplians brought them such gifts as they had to offer; and while they put up ceaseless prayers to God for the restoration of the Messenians, they at the same time besought the Messenians to leave them in peace.

The Messenians returned to Peloponnese and recovered their country two hundred and ninety-seven years after the capture of Ira, when Dyscinetus was archon at Athens, in the third year of the hundred and second Olympiad, in which Damon of Thurii was victorious for the second time.

Pausanias, IV, xxvii, 11

But the Messenians wandered for nearly three hundred years far from Peloponnese, and in all that time they are known to have dropped none of their native customs, nor did they unlearn their Doric tongue; indeed, they speak it to this day with greater purity than any other of the Peloponnesians.

Pausanias, IV, xxviii, 1–3

After their return the Messenians had at first nothing to fear from the Lacedæmonians, who, restrained by dread of the Thebans, submitted to the foundation of Messene and to the union of the Arcadians in a single city. But when the Thebans were diverted from Peloponnese by the Phocian or Sacred War, the Lacedæmonians plucked up courage, and could no longer keep their hands off the Messenians. The latter, backed by the Argives and Arcadians, maintained the struggle, and called on the Athenians to help them. The Athenians replied that they would never join the Messenians in invading Laconia, but if the Lacedæmonians began the war and marched against Messenia, the Athenians promised to stand by the Messenians. At last the Messenians formed an alliance with Philip, son of Amyntas, and the Macedonians; and they say it was this which prevented them from taking part in the battle of Chæronea. But, on the other hand, they would not draw sword against Greece. When after the death of Alexander the Greeks took up arms against Macedonia for the second time, the Messenians shared in the war, as I showed in my description of Attica. They did not, however, join with the Greeks in fighting the Gauls, because Cleonymus and the Lacedæmonians declined to conclude a truce with them.

4. THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA

Thebes had invaded Peloponnesus in more warlike guise than that of founder of cities. Epaminondas, to whom Thebes owed everything, decided that a battle must be forced on.

The victory was claimed by both sides. The Thebans had been faring better than the Spartans, but the death of Epaminondas left them without a great leader, and Sparta claimed a victory as well.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, VII, v, 17–27

The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas were such as these: that within a few days he would be forced to retire, as the period of the campaign was drawing to a close; if it ended in his leaving in the lurch those allies whom he came out to assist, they would be besieged by their antagonists. What a blow would that be to his own fair fame, already somewhat tarnished! Had he not been defeated in Lacedæmon, with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? defeated again at Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and himself the main cause finally of a coalition between five great powers — that is to say, the Lacedæmonians, the Arcadians, the Achæans, the Eleians, and the Athenians? On all grounds it seemed to him impossible to steal past without a battle. And the more so as he computed the alternatives of victory or death. If the former were his fortune, it would resolve all his perplexities; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious a thing to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his last legacy to his fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus! That such thoughts should pass through his brain strikes me as by no means wonderful, since these are thoughts distinctive of all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to my mind was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army. There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either by night or by day; there was no danger they would flinch from; and, with the scantiest provisions, their discipline never failed them.

And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare for impending battle, they obeyed with alacrity. He gave the word; the cavalry fell to whitening their helmets, the heavy infantry of the Arcadians began inscribing clubs as the crest on their shield, as though they were Thebans, and all were engaged in sharpening their lances and swords and polishing their heavy shields. When the preparations were complete and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy of attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed to their formation, and in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he intended battle; but no sooner was the army drawn up in the formation which he preferred, than he advanced, not by the shortest route to meet the enemy, but towards the westward-lying

mountains which face Tegea, and by this movement created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do battle on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon as he arrived at the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping. The effect of this manœuvre on the enemy in general was to relax the prepared bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were marching in column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the beak-like attack which he proposed to lead himself, at the same instant he gave the order, "Shoulder arms, forward," and led the way, the troops following.

When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them was able to maintain tranquillity: some began running to their divisions, some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's host to pieces. With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers interspersed among the horses. Epaminondas again differed in strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will care to keep their ground when once they see any of their own side flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who were on the enemy's left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on certain

hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an apprehension that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes. He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the whole of the enemy's troops to take to flight.

But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans were not able any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. Though the main battle line of their opponents had given way, not a single man afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay, not an inch forward did they advance from the ground on which the collision took place. Though the cavalry had fled before them, there was no pursuit; not a man, horseman or hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down; but, like men who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken they slipped back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the footmen fighting amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who had together shared in the victory of the cavalry, found their way round to the left wing as masters of the field, but it cost them dear; here they encountered the Athenians, and most of them were cut down.

The effective result of these achievements was the very opposite of that which the world at large anticipated. Here, where well-nigh the whole of Hellas was met together in one field, and the combatants stood rank against rank confronted, there was no one who doubted that, in the event of battle, the conquerors this day would rule; and that those who lost would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both belligerents alike set up trophies as claiming victory, and neither interfered with the other in the act. Both parties alike gave back their enemy's dead under a truce, and in right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat, under a truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to have won the day, neither could show that he had thereby gained any accession of territory, or state, or empire, or was better situated than before the battle. Uncertainty and confusion, indeed, had gained ground, being tenfold greater throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the battle than before.

The alliance of Athens with several other states may have been entered into before or after the battle of Mantinea. A good part of the text of the treaty survives.

Hicks and Hill, 119

ALLIANCE OF FIVE STATES, B.C. 362–361

In the archonship of Molon

Alliance of the Athenians and Arcadians and Achæans and Eleans and Phliasians:

Voted by the senate and people, Œneis was prytanizing tribe, Agatharchus son of Agatharchus of Oa was secretary, Xanthippus of Hermus was president, Periander moved:

That if the decision concerning the alliance shall turn out favorably for the Athenian people, the herald straightway offer a vow to Olympian Zeus and Athena Polias and Demeter and Core and the Twelve Gods and the Revered Goddesses, and that sacrifice and solemn procession take place, the expenses being met as the people decide; that this vow be offered; and that inasmuch as the allies have reported their decision to the senate, namely: to accept the alliance as suggested by the Arcadians and Achæans and Eleans and Phliasians, and as the senate has passed a resolution to the same effect: That the people resolve that the Athenians and their allies be allies for the good fortune of the people for all time with the Arcadians and Achæans and Eleans and Phliasians. . . .

. . . on this stele. If anyone go against Attica, or attempt to destroy the democracy of the Athenians, or establish a tyranny or an oligarchy, the Arcadians and Achæans and Eleans and Phliasians are to help the Athenians to the best of their ability according to the demands of Athens; and if anyone go against the Peloponnesus, or try to destroy the democracy of the Phliasians or destroy or disturb the constitution of the Achæans or Arcadians or Eleans, or exile any, the Athenians shall help them with all strength according to the demands of those who are being wronged, as best they can. Each is to have hegemony in its own territory; and if it seems best to all the cities to add anything else, this addition is to be considered no breach of the oath.

And in each city of the Peloponnesus the highest authority shall take the oath; for the Athenians the generals and taxiarchs and hipparchs and phylarchs and knights; on behalf of the Arcadians and Achæans and Eleans and Phliasians the envoys resident in Athens shall take it.

III. Epaminondas

1. His career

Pausanias, IX, xiii, 1–2

Epaminondas was of illustrious descent, but his father's means were less than those of an ordinary Theban gentleman. He was not only thoroughly trained in the usual education of his countrymen, but also studied as a youth under Lysis, a native of Tarentum, and an adept in the doctrines of Pythagoras, the Samian. In the war between Lacedæmon and Mantinea, Epaminondas is said to have been one of a Theban contingent sent to aid the Lacedæmonians. In the battle Pelopidas was wounded, and Epaminondas saved him at extreme personal hazard. Afterwards, when the Lacedæmonians professed to be concluding the peace known as the peace of Antalcidas with the rest of the Greeks, Epaminondas was sent to Sparta on an embassy. On this occasion, being asked by Agesilaus whether the Thebans would allow the Bœotian cities to ratify the peace separately, he answered, "Not, Spartans, till we see your subjects also ratifying it separately, city by city."

Pausanias, IX, xiii, 11–12

The victory achieved by the Thebans was the most famous that ever Greeks gained over Greeks. On the morrow the Lacedæmonians purposed to bury their dead, and sent a herald to the Thebans. But Epaminondas, aware that the Lacedæmonians were always inclined to conceal their losses, said he would allow their allies to take up their dead first, and only after they had done so did he consent that the Lacedæmonians should bury their dead. So when it had appeared that some of the allies had no bodies to take up, because none of them had fallen, while of others the loss was found to be trifling, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to bury

their dead, and then the fact was revealed that the fallen were Spartans. The Thebans and the Bœotians who stood by them lost forty-seven men; but of the Lacedæmonians themselves there fell more than a thousand.

2. DEATH AND STATUES

Pausanias, IX, xv, 5–6

When he led his army to Mantinea he was still victorious, but even in the hour of victory he fell by the hand of an Athenian. In the picture of the cavalry fight at Athens this man is depicted in the act of killing Epaminondas: he was Grylus, son of that Xenophon who marched with Cyrus against King Artaxerxes, and led the Greeks back to the sea.

On the statue of Epaminondas is an inscription in elegiac verse in which, among other things, it is mentioned that he was the founder of Messene, and that Greece attained freedom through him. The verses run thus: —

> By my counsels Sparta was shorn of her glory,
> And sacred Messene received her children at last,
> And, thanks to Thebe's weapons, Megalopolis was girt with walls,
> And all Greece became independent and free.

So many were his titles to fame.[1]

3. ESTIMATES OF HIS ABILITY

Polybius attributes the success of Thebes almost entirely to the ability of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. He has no admiration for the Theban constitution, which he couples with the Athenian, as characterized by abnormal growth, brief zenith, and violent changes.

Polybius, VI, 43

The Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedæmonians,

[1] The cavalry fight at Athens is described in I, iii, 4, Frazer's note on which says that many claimed the honor of being his slayer.

See also Frazer's notes on "Pausanias," VIII, xi, 5.

There was another statue of Epaminondas at Messene, "Pausanias," IV, xxxi, 8.

and the hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it then enjoyed.

CHAPTER XIV

THE REVIVAL OF ATHENS

Conditions during the early part of the fourth century — Relations with the Samians — Activity of Conon — Contrast of patriotic and dishonest officials — The peace of 391–390 — Advocates of Pan-Hellenic unity — The second Athenian confederacy — Formation and list of allies — Alliance with Corcyra — Foreign relations — The Athenian constitution — Contrast with the "good old days." — The constitution in the fourth century

I. Conditions during the Early Fourth Century

1. RELATIONS WITH THE SAMIANS

In spite of the power of Sparta and Thebes, Athens soon began to recover herself. Before many years she had laid the foundations for a second confederacy, in which she attempted to avoid the mistakes she had made in the empire.

The following inscriptions show the friendly relations between the newly restored Athenian democracy and the Samians, who had rendered such good assistance during the time of civil strife.

Hicks and Hill, 81

Honors to the Samian Demus for their Fidelity, B.C. 405–403

Cephisophon of Pæania was secretary.

For the Samians as many as joined themselves with the people of the Athenians.

Voted by the senate and people. Cecropis was prytanizing tribe, Polymnis of Euonymia was secretary, Alexias was archon, Nicophon of Athmone presided. Motion of Clisophus and his fellow-presiding officers:

To commend the Samian ambassadors, both those who came before and those now here, and the senate and the generals and the rest of the Samians, inasmuch as they are excellent men and eager

to do all possible good, and as to their former deeds that they seem to have done excellently for the Athenians and Samians.

And in return for the kindnesses done the Athenians and the present benefits which they are conferring and proposing, be it voted by senate and assembly, that the Samians be made Athenian citizens, adopting any constitution they please, and that these terms may be as advantageous as possible to both parties, let them when peace is made take counsel in common about other matters as the Samians propose; that they be independent and make use of their own laws, and act in other respects in accordance with the oaths and the agreements just as has been established between the Athenians and the Samians; and with reference to complaints that may arise against each other, the suits be submitted to a peaceful settlement in accordance with the existing agreement.

If any necessity arise through the war or formerly about the government, let them, as the ambassadors themselves suggest, take counsel and act as seems best in regard to the cases that arise; if [any necessity] arise concerning peace, the same course shall be followed, just as is now the case with the Athenians and those now dwelling in Samos; but if war is unavoidable, they themselves shall prepare for it acting to the best of their ability with the generals. If, however, the Athenians send an embassy anywhere, those from Samos shall join in sending it if they wish to name an ambassador, and shall help with whatever good advice they may have to give.

That they be given permission to use the triremes now at Samos, fitting them out as they like. The names of the trierarchs who had these ships shall be recorded by the ambassadors for the secretary of the senate and the generals; and if it is recorded anywhere in the treasury that these are responsible for the triremes, let the superintendents of the dockyard erase it in every place; and they shall demand the immediate return of the equipment to the state, and compel those who have any of it in good condition to hand it over at once.

Motion of Clisophus and his fellow presidents: The following addition is proposed: — That the citizenship be granted now to those who have come, as they ask, and that they immediately be distributed by lot into the tribes in ten divisions; that the generals prepare the passage for the ambassadors as soon as possible, and

that a vote of thanks be given to Eumachus and all the other Samians who came with him as good friends of the Athenians; and that Eumachus be invited to dinner in the town-hall to-morrow. That the secretary of the senate and the generals inscribe the decree on a marble slab and set it up on the Acropolis, and the Hellenotamiæ pay for it. That it be likewise inscribed in Samos at the expense of the Samians.

Second Decree

Voted by the senate and people. Pandionis was the prytanizing tribe, Agyrrhius of Collyte was secretary, Euclides was archon, Callias of Oa was in the chair, Cephisophon moved: —

To commend the Samians that they are good friends of the Athenians and that all the things which the Athenian people voted for the Samians be still valid.

That the Samians send, as they themselves advise, to Sparta anyone that they please; but inasmuch as they ask the Athenians to help them, that we choose additional ambassadors and that these act with the Samians as best they can and decide on a policy in common with them.

The Athenians praise the people of Ephesus and Notium for readily receiving exiles from Samos.

That the embassy of the Samians be introduced to the assembly to transact business if they desire anything, and that the embassy of Samos be invited to dinner in the town-hall to-morrow.

Cephisophon moved: — In regard to the other matters to agree with the senate; but that it be voted by the Athenian people, that the former resolutions about the Samians be in force, just as the previous senate had reported them to the people; that the embassy of the Samians be invited to dinner to-morrow in the town-hall.

Third Decree

Voted by the Senate and people. Erechtheis was the presiding tribe, Cephisophon of Pæania was secretary, Euclides was archon, Python from Cedi presided, Eu . . . . moved: —

To commend Poses the Samian as a good man towards the Athenians, and that in return for his services to the people they

give him a present of five hundred drachmas for the purchase of a crown, and the treasurers are to pay over the money; that he should be formally introduced to the people and should receive at their hands all possible kindness. The secretary of the senate is to hand over to him at once the text of the decree, and the Samians present are to be invited to dinner at the town-hall to-morrow.

. . . moved to amend the motion of the senate as follows:

That Poses the Samian and his sons be commended as good friends to the Athenian people, and that the former decrees of the Athenians be in force; that the secretary have this decree inscribed on a marble stele and the treasurers furnish money for it; and that the people give Poses a present of a thousand drachmas on account of his excellence towards the Athenians, and out of the thousand drachmas a crown is to be made and an inscription put on it that the people crowned him on account of his courageous honesty and good will towards the Athenians.

The Samians also are to be commended for their good will to Athens, and if they desire anything from the people, the presiding officers are to introduce them into the first assembly directly after the sacrifices; they are to take also the sons of Poses to the assembly to a front seat; and they are to summon to a banquet . . . and those of the Samians who are now at Athens.

2. ACTIVITY OF CONON

An important step toward the recovery of Athenian prestige was taken by Conon, who gained several brilliant naval victories, notably that at Cnidus.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, IV, iii, 11–12

The engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus. Pharnabazus, the Persian admiral, was present with the Phœnician fleet, and in front of him were ranged the ships of the Hellenic squadron under Conon. Peisander had ventured to draw out his squadron to meet the combined fleets, though the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the Hellenic navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortification of seeing the allies who

formed his left wing take to flight immediately. He himself came to close quarters with the enemy, and was driven on shore, on board his trireme, under pressure of the hostile rams. The rest, as many as were driven to shore, deserted their ships and sought safety as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The admiral alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, IV, viii, 1–3

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the Lacedæmonians in the naval engagement off Cnidus, commenced a tour of inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan governors. Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they had no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls, or in any way interfering with their self-government. Such words fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they were addressed; the proposals were courteously accepted; all were eager to present Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and hospitality. The satrap, indeed, was only applying the instructions of his master Conon on these matters — who had taught him that if he acted thus all the states would be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them, the smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing a world of trouble, and the chances were, if apprehensions were once excited, he would find himself face to face with a coalition of united Hellas. To these admonitions Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, IV, viii, 7–11

B.C. 393. The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but with the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet fully manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way through the islands to Melos. This island was to serve as a base of operations against Lacedæmon. And in the first instance he sailed down to Pheræ and ravaged that district, after which he made successive descents at various other points on the seaboard, and did what injury he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless character of the coast, coupled

with the enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity of supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until finally he came to moorings in the harbour of Phœnicus in Cythera. The occupants of the city of the Cytherians, in terror of being taken by storm, evacuated the walls. To dismiss these under a flag of truce across to Laconia was his first step; his second was to repair the fortress in question and to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian governor — Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to prosecute the war vigorously and to show themselves faithful to the Great King; and so, having left them all the moneys he had with him, set off on his voyage home.

But Conon had a proposal to make: — If Pharnabazus would allow him to keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first place, to support it free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild their long walls and the fortifications round Piræus. No heavier blow, he insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedæmon. "In this way, I can assure you," he added, "you will win the eternal gratitude of the Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedæmonians, since at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they have bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so far weighed with Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a large portion of the walls — partly by lending his own crews, and partly by giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the Athenians and Bœotians and other states raised as a joint voluntary undertaking.

The inscription in honor of Conon, passed by the Erythræans, was in appreciation of the fair and courteous treatment of the islands and coast cities during the expedition of Conon and Pharnabazus.

Hicks and Hill, 89

HONORS TO CONON, AT ERYTHRÆ IN IONIA, B.C. 394

Voted by the senate and people: — That Conon be recorded as a benefactor and proxenus of the Erythræans, and have the privilege of a front seat among the Erythræans and be free from all taxes, both import and export, in war and peace; and that he be an Erythræan citizen if he choose; and these things are to be for him and his descendants; and that there be made a gilt bronze statue of him and set up wherever he likes. . . .

3. CONTRAST OF PATRIOTIC AND DISHONEST OFFICIALS

This selection from an oration of Lysias, in defense of a certain Aristophanes, shows the generosity and public spirit of the best citizens, and is particularly interesting because of its references to Conon.

LYSIAS, XIX (*On the Property of Aristophanes*), 19–23

You will know that I am telling the truth if you consider his actions. In the first place, when Conon wanted to send someone to Sicily, he volunteered and went with Eunomus, Dionysius being a personal and official friend who had done many good deeds for your democracy, as I heard from those in Piræus who were in his company. The hopes of the undertaking were to persuade Dionysius to marry the sister of Evagoras, an enemy to the Lacedæmonians and a friend and ally to your city. They were attempting this in the face of many dangers, both from the sea and from the enemy; and they persuaded Dionysius not to send the triremes which he had then secured for Sparta. Afterwards, when the ambassadors came from Cyprus to ask help, he spared no effort. You gave them ships and voted other supplies, but they were in need of funds for the expedition. They came with a little money and asked for much more, not only for ships, but also for light-armed troops which they proceeded to hire and weapons which they purchased. Aristophanes, however, furnished most of the money himself. When his own funds gave out, he secured money from his

friends by begging and borrowing; and even spent forty minæ of his half-brother's which had been deposited at his house. The day before he sailed he went to my father and asked him to lend what money he had. He said he needed this in addition to pay the mercenaries. We had seven minæ in the house; these too he took and spent. Do you think, gentlemen, that a man who was eager for distinction, on receipt of letters from his father assuring him that he would be well supplied in Cyprus, who, moreover, had been chosen ambassador, and was on the point of sailing to Evagoras, — do you think, I repeat, that such a man would leave anything behind and not rather gratify that monarch, if he could, by contributing everything he had and so make a handsome profit?

An equally interesting though less pleasing picture is given in the oration against one Ergocles on the charge of bribery and corruption and other forms of dishonesty by which he had enriched himself at the expense of the state.

Lysias, XXVIII (*Against Ergocles*)

The charges are so many and so grave, men of Athens, that I do not feel that Ergocles could pay a fitting penalty to you all if condemned to die many times for each one of his misdeeds. For he has manifestly betrayed cities, and wronged your proxenoi and citizens, and from poverty has made himself rich at your expense. In truth, why should you feel any compassion for these men when you see the ships that they commanded dispersed through lack of funds and become few instead of many, while the men who were poor and needy when they went on the expedition have so quickly got possession of more property than that which the rest of the citizens possess? It is your part now, Athenians, to vent your wrath on men of this stamp. For surely it would be a strange condition of affairs if now you who are burdened with heavy taxes should pardon thieves and bribe takers, when in former days, at a time when your private property and the revenues were large, you punished with death those who cast longing eyes upon your possessions. I think you will all agree that if Thrasybulus had stated definitely to you that he was going to sail out with the ships and

was going to return them to you old instead of new, and that the risks would be yours and the benefits his and his friends', and that you would be made poorer on account of taxes while he would make Ergocles and those flattering friends of his the richest of the citizens, no one of you would have allowed him to take the ships and sail out. Particularly in view of the fact that as soon as you passed a vote that he was to make a statement of the money taken from the cities, and that his fellow commanders were to sail home to stand their audit, Ergocles said that you were slandering them and trying to reinstate the old laws, and he advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzantium and keep the ships and marry the daughter of Seuthes. "That you may stop their slanderous mouths," he said, "and you will make them afraid for their own possessions instead of sitting there at home plotting against you and your friends." And so, Athenians, as soon as they had their fill and had a taste of your property, they regarded themselves as aliens to the state. They grow rich and despise you at the same time, and make preparations to obey you no longer, but to rule you, and through fear on account of the money they have filched they are ready to seize the fortified places and reëstablish an oligarchy and go to any extreme, that you may daily be in the direst dangers; for they believe that you will now pay no attention to their wrong-doing but in dread for yourselves and the state will hold your peace towards men of this sort. Now Thrasybulus (for there is no need to say more about him) did well to die as he did, for it was not right that he should live planning further acts of that sort, nor yet that he be put to death by you after having rendered good service, but rather that in this way he should end his connection with the state. And yet I see them on account of the proceedings in the assembly of day before yesterday no longer sparing of their money, but trying to buy their safety from the prosecutors and from their enemies and from the presiding officers and trying to corrupt many of the Athenians with silver. Wherefore it is right for you to clear yourselves from any such imputation by punishing this man, and to show everyone that not all the money in the world would persuade you not to punish wrong-doers. Remember, Athenians, that it is not only Ergocles but the whole city that is on

trial. You are going to show your officers whether they must be honest or whether, when they have stolen most of your property, they must secure safety for themselves by the methods which these men are now essaying. But you ought to keep in mind, Athenians, that a man who in a time of such poverty for your fortunes either betrays cities or thinks it right to take bribes is really betraying your fortifications and ships to the enemy and is establishing an oligarchy instead of a democracy. And so it is not right for you to be worsted by their schemes, but you ought to make them an example to all and not make gain or pity or anything else of more importance than their punishment.

Now, Athenians, I think Ergocles will not attempt to defend himself about Halicarnassus or his command or his acts, but will say that he came back with the Phyle party and that he is a democrat and shared all your perils with you. I do not agree with him on this point; indeed I hold that not even in the case of men who shared your perils, through desire of freedom and justice, and wished the laws to be effective and hated wrong-doers should their exile be reckoned up to their credit for unjust ends; and as for those who returned under the democracy and are now wronging the people, and making their own estates large at your expense, such men merit your anger even more than the Thirty. For the Thirty were appointed for this very purpose, namely, that they might harm you by fair means or foul; but you entrusted yourselves to these men that they might make the city great and free. None of this has fallen to your lot, but as far as they were concerned you got into very dreadful dangers; so that you might much better pity yourselves and your wives and children, because you have been outraged by such wretches, than pity them. For just when we have made up our minds that we are really safe, we suffer worse things from our own officials than from the enemy. However, you all know there is no hope of safety for us if any disaster comes. And so you ought, encouraging each other, to inflict the severest punishment on these men, and show the other Greeks that you take vengeance on wrong-doers, and thus you will improve the character of your staff of officials. I therefore advise you to take this course; but you ought to see for yourselves that if you follow

my advice you will be looking out for your own best interests, otherwise you will find your citizens degenerating. Furthermore, Athenians, if you acquit these men they will not thank you, but the money they have spent in bribes and the money which they have embezzled; and so you will leave their hatred of you unchanged, but they will thank money for their safety. And indeed, if you inflict severest punishment on these men, the Halicarnassians and the others who have been wronged by them will think that when they were ruined by these men you have come to their rescue; but if you save these men they will think that you have become the accomplices of their betrayers. And so it is only right that you, bearing all these facts in mind, should pay your debt of gratitude to your allies and punish the offenders.

4. THE PEACE OF B.C. 391–390

Early in the century, when both Athens and Sparta were trying to get the support of Persia, some were anxious that peace should be made with Sparta.

An earnest advocate of this policy was Andocides, who claimed that the Athenians were too grasping, and that, as Sparta was willing to make certain concessions, Athens would do well to accept them and that ships and walls, which Sparta was willing to grant, had always been the basis of Athens's power.[1]

ANDOCIDES, *De Pace*, 13–16

Some say that we must needs wage war now. Therefore let us consider in the first place, men of Athens, for what reason we should fight. I think everyone would agree that necessary causes of war are the following:—the fact of suffering wrong or the desire to assist those who have been wronged. Now we ourselves were injured and we helped the Bœotians when they had been wronged. If, however, we have the assurance that our injuries from Sparta are at an end, and if the Bœotians have decided to make peace, leaving Orchomenus independent, what reason have we for fighting?

[1] The negotiations for peace are not mentioned by Xenophon in "Hellenica" (see note on "Hellenica," in Vol. II, p. 64 of Dakyns's translation).

In order that our city may be free? But freedom is already hers. Is it that we may have walls? Those too are provided for in the treaty. Then is it that we may have a chance to build ships and fit out those we have and keep them? This too is possible, for the agreements make the cities independent. Then is it to acquire the islands, Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros? Has it not been expressly stated that they belong to Athens? Again, is it to get back Chersonese and the colonies, our property and our investments? But neither the King nor the allies are at one with us, and it is with their help that we have to fight for the possession of all this. Well then, by Zeus, shall we fight until we have beaten the Lacedæmonians and their allies? I do not think our resources are adequate for that. If, indeed, we should be successful, what do we think will be our own fate at the hands of the barbarians when we have accomplished our aim? If, however, it were necessary to fight about this, and we had enough money and sufficient troops, not even under those conditions would it be right to go to war. But since we have neither motive nor resources nor occasion for fighting, why then, from every point of view, should not peace be made by us?

ANDOCIDES, *De Pace*, 35–41

Now, Athenians, when we serve as your ambassadors we must look not only to the letter of the terms, but also consider your disposition. For it is your habit to feel misgivings and to raise objections in regard to what is at your disposal, and invent non-existent conditions as if they were ready at hand; so that if war is necessary you long for peace, but if anyone makes peace on your behalf, you consider how many benefits the war accomplished for you. Wherefore even now there are some who say they do not understand what the truce means, if the city is to get only walls and ships, for they say they do not get back their private possessions on foreign soil, and stone walls do not give them bread. And so, of necessity, something must be said in answer to that.

There was once a time, Athenians, when we had no walls and ships, but when we did get them we gained a foundation of our fortunes. If now too you desire wealth, you must acquire ships

and walls. With these resources as a starting-point our fathers gained for the city power greater than other city had ever had, acquiring some things by persuasion, some by strategy, some by purchase, some by coercion; by persuasion Athens became treasurer of the funds of the confederacy, we controlled the mustering of the ships, we furnished them to those of the cities that had no triremes; by evading the Lacedæmonians we rebuilt the walls; by paying the price to Sparta we escaped paying the penalty for it; by coercing those opposed to us we acquired rule over the Greeks. And we enjoyed this strong position for eighty-five years. But when we were defeated in the war we lost everything, and the Lacedæmonians deprived us of both walls and ships, as pledges of maintaining peace, taking over the former and destroying the latter, to prevent us from making the city strong again with these as our resource to start with. And yet, won over by us, Spartan envoys are present with full power, offering to restore these pledges to us, and to let us have our walls and ships and dominion over the islands. Some, however, say this peace is not worth accepting although we get the same foundation for prosperity as our ancestors had.

Therefore let these orators come forward and show you (we have given them the opportunity, since we allowed forty days for consideration), first, whether any clause of the agreement has anything disadvantageous about it, for, in that case, it is possible to delete that; secondly, if anyone wishes to add anything, let him convince you and then put it as an amendment. There is peace for everyone who adopts the terms proposed, but if these are not satisfactory, war. And the whole responsibility rests with you, Athenians. Choose whichever course you wish.

5. ADVOCATES OF PAN-HELLENIC UNITY

There were always advocates of Pan-Hellenic unity. We find it advised in a fragment of Lysias's "Olympiacus," but its most ardent and constant advocate was Isocrates, who in his long life of nearly a hundred years, from the time of Pericles to that of Demosthenes, had many opportunities to express his views.

Isocrates, IV, 75–85

Now I think that the greatest services have been rendered and the greatest praises deserved by those who exposed their persons in the forefront of danger for the sake of Hellas; yet it is not fair either to forget those who lived before this war and held power in these two states respectively. For they it was who trained beforehand those coming after them, inclined the multitude to virtue, and created formidable antagonists for the barbarians. For they did not despise the public interests, nor enjoy the resources of the state as their own, while neglecting her interests as no concern of theirs; but they were as solicitous for the common welfare as for their own domestic happiness, and at the same time properly stood aloof from matters which did not affect them. They did not estimate happiness by the standard of money, but they thought that the surest and best wealth was possessed by the man who pursued such conduct as would enable him to gain the best reputation for himself and leave behind the greatest fame for his children. They did not emulate one another's shameless audacity, nor cultivate effrontery in their own persons, but deemed it more terrible to be ill-spoken of by their fellow-citizens than to die nobly for the state, and were more ashamed of public errors than they are now of their own personal faults. The reason of this was that they took care that their laws should be exact and good, those concerned with the relations of every-day life even more than those that had to do with private contracts. For they knew that good men and true will have no need of many written documents, but, whether on private or public matters, will easily come to an agreement by the aid of a few recognized principles. Such was their public spirit, that the object of their political parties was to dispute, not which should destroy the other and rule over the rest, but which should be first in doing some service to the state; and they organized their clubs, not for their private interests, but for the benefit of the people. They pursued the same method in their dealings with other states, treating the Hellenes with deference and not with insolence, considering that their rule over them should be that of a general, not of a despot, and desiring to be addressed as leaders rather than masters, and to be entitled saviours and not reviled as destroyers;

they won over states by kindness instead of overthrowing them by force; they made their word more trustworthy than their oath is now, and thought it their duty to abide by treaties as by the decrees of necessity; not proud of their power as ambitious to live in self-restraint, they thought it right to have the same feelings towards their inferiors as they expected their superiors to have towards them, and they considered their own cities as merely private towns, while they looked upon Hellas as their common fatherland. Possessed of such ideas, and educating the younger generation in such manners, they brought to light such valiant men in those who fought against the barbarians from Asia, that no one, either poet or sophist, has ever yet been able to speak in a manner worthy of their achievements. And I can readily excuse them; for it is just as hard to praise those who have surpassed the virtues of other men as those who have never done anything good; for whereas the latter have no deeds to support them, the former have no language befitting them. For what language could be commensurate with the deeds of men who were so far superior to those who made the expedition against Troy, that, while they spent ten years against one city, those men in a short time defeated the whole might of Asia, and not only saved their own countries but also liberated the whole of Hellas? And what deeds or toils or dangers would they have shrunk from attempting in order to win living reputations, when they were so readily willing to lose their lives for the sake of a posthumous fame? And I even think that the war must have been contrived by one of the gods in admiration of their valour, that men of such quality should not remain in obscurity nor end their lives ingloriously, but should be thought worthy of the same rewards as those children of the gods who are called demi-gods; for even *their* bodies the gods rendered up to the inflexible laws of nature, but made immortal the memory of their valour.

Now, continuous as was the jealousy between our ancestors and the Lacedæmonians, yet in those times they exercised their rivalry for the highest objects, considering themselves to be not enemies but competitors, and not courting the barbarian with a view to the servitude of Hellas, but having one aim in the common safety, their only rivalry being which of them should achieve it.

II. The Second Athenian Confederacy

1. formation and list of allies

It was in 377 that the new Athenian confederacy was formed. A large slab made up of many fragments contains the text and an incomplete list of the allies.

Hicks and Hill, 101

New Athenian Confederacy, b.c. 377

In the archonship of Nausinicus.
Callibius son of Cephisophon of Pæania was secretary.

In the seventh prytany, of Hippothontis, voted by the senate and people. Charinus of Athmone was president, Aristoteles moved: — To the Good Fortune of the Athenians and the allies of Athens: In order that the Spartans may allow the Greeks free and autonomous, holding their lands in fixity of tenure. . .

Voted by the people: If any of the Hellenes or the barbarians inhabiting the coasts, or the islanders, (whichever are not subjects of the Great King), wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, it shall be permitted him, if he be free and autonomous, to live under whatever form of constitution he wishes, neither receiving any garrison there nor placed under any magistrate nor contributing any tribute, on the same terms as the Chians and the Thebans and the other allies.

To those who made an alliance with Athens and her allies the people are to hand over the settlements whatever they chance to be, whether private ones or those of the Athenian state, in the country of those who make the alliance, and about these the Athenians are to give a pledge; but if there happen to be at Athens any stelæ concerning the states entering into alliance with Athens, that are inappropriate [i.e., uncomplimentary], the existing senate shall have power to take them down. After the archonship of Nausinicus it shall not be permitted either to an individual or to the Athenian people to acquire property in the lands of the allies, either house or estate, either by purchase or mortgage or in any

other way; and if anyone buys or gets or takes on mortgage in any way whatsoever, it shall be possible for anyone of the allies that wishes, to report it to the councillors of the allies; and the councillors shall sell the property, give over half the proceeds to the informer, and the other half shall go to the common fund of the allies.

But if anyone wage war by land or by sea against those who have made the alliance, the Athenians shall help to the best of their ability both on land and sea.

If anyone, magistrate or private citizen, move or put a motion to vote against this decree, that any of its provisions should be broken, he shall lose his civil rights and his property be confiscated and a tithe be given to the Goddess, and he shall be tried by the Athenians and allies on the charge of breaking the alliance, and they shall condemn him to death or exile from the lands held by Athens and her allies; but if he be condemned to death, he shall not be buried in Attica or the allies' lands.

The secretary of the senate shall have this decree inscribed on a stone stele and set up by the Zeus of Freedom; the treasurers of the Goddess are to give for the inscription of the stele sixty drachmas out of the ten talents.

And on this stele shall be written the name of those cities now forming the alliance and any other one that may become an ally.

These matters are to be inscribed; and the people are to choose at once three ambassadors to go to Thebes to persuade the Thebans to whatever favorable action they may.

These were chosen:

Aristoteles of Marathon
Pyrrhander of Anaphlystus
Thrasybulus of Collytus

These cities are allies of the Athenians: Chians, Tenedians, Mitylenians, Methymnæans, Rhodians, Pœëssians, Byzantines, Perinthians, Peparethians, Sciathians, Maronitæ, Dians, Parians, . . . , Athenitans, P——, Thebans, Chalcidians, Eretrians, Arethusians, Carystians, Icians, Pall——. . .

The people of the Corcyræans, Abderitans, Thasians, Chalcidians from Thrace, Ænians, Samothracians, Dicæopolitans, Acarnanians, Pronni of the Cephallenians, Alcetas, Neoptolemus, Iason, the Andrians, Tenians, Hestiæans, Myconians, Antissæans, Eresians, Astræusians, Iulietæ of Ceos, Carthæans, Coresians, Elæusians, Amorgans, Selymbrians, Siphnians, Sicinetans, Dians from Thrace, Neopolitans, the people of Zacynthus in the Nellus.

A separate alliance was made the same year with Chalcis in Eubœa. It is interesting to compare the tone of this with the decree of 446. (See above, pp. 270–272.)

Hicks and Hill, 102

ATHENS AND CHALCIS, B.C. 377

Aristoteles son of Euphiletus of Acharnæ was secretary.
In the archonship of Nausinicus.

Voted by the senate and people. Leontis was the prytanizing tribe, Aristoteles secretary, Pantaretus one of the presidents put it to vote, Pyrrhander moved:

Concerning the matters which the Chalcidians mention, that they be brought before the assembly at the next meeting and be made acquainted with the decision of the senate, namely: That the senate has decided to accept the alliance of the Chalcidians for good fortune in accordance with the terms offered by Chalcis; and that the city swear an oath to the Chalcidians and the Chalcidians to the Athenians, and that the oath and the terms be inscribed on a stone stele and set up in Athens on the Acropolis and in Chalcis in the precinct of Athene, and that these be the agreements between Athens and Chalcis:

Alliance of the Chalcidians in Eubœa and the Athenians:

That the Chalcidians being free and independent retain possession of their own (territory ?) . . . having no garrison from Athens and paying no tribute and receiving no governor contrary to the decision of the allies. And if anyone begin a war against the country. . . .

Even earlier than this some advances had been made, notably the negotiations with Clazomenæ and the treaty with Chios. Hicks and Hill say that this latter alliance was the first step toward the new confederacy.

Hicks and Hill, 96

ATHENS AND CLAZOMENÆ, B.C. 387

Theodotus was archon, Paramythus son of Philager of Erchia was secretary.

Voted by the people. Theodotus was archon, Cecropis the prytanizing tribe, Paramythus secretary, Daiphron in the chair. Poliager moved:

That the people of Clazomenæ be commended, because of their good will to the city of Athens both now and in former time. And concerning the matters under discussion, that it be voted, that if the Clazomenians pay the five per cent tax levied in the time of Thrasybulus, they shall have full power about the treaties or lack of treaties as regards those from Chyton, and over the hostages which the Clazomenians have from Chyton; and that the Athenians shall neither restore any exiles without the consent of the Clazomenians nor drive out any of those who remain.

Regarding administration and a garrison: the [present] assembly is to decide at once by show of hands whether they shall place one in Clazomenæ or whether the Clazomenians shall have power to decide whether they will have a garrison or not.

Regarding those cities whence Clazomenæ gets its supply of corn . . . Smyrna, the treaty shall allow them to sail into the harbors, and the generals . . . are to see that the treaties shall be the same for the Clazomenians and the Athenians against the enemy.

The assembly voted that Clazomenæ should not pay taxes or receive a garrison or governor, but be free in relation to Athens.

Hicks and Hill, 98

TREATY WITH CHIOS, B.C. 388

. . . these things . . . of the common agreements . . . to the Greeks, remember to keep, just as the Athenians kept it, the peace and friendship and oaths and existing agreements which the King

and the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians and the other Hellenes swore to, and have come promising benefits to the Athenians and to all Hellas and to the King; be it voted by the people: To commend the people of Chios and the ambassadors who have come, and that the peace and the oaths and the agreements now existing continue, and that the Chians be made allies, free and autonomous, if they do not overstep any of the provisions about the peace inscribed on the steles and to the best of their ability refuse to be persuaded, even if any other break them; and that a stele be set up on the Acropolis in front of the statue and on it inscribed "If anyone attack the Athenians the Chians shall help them to the best of their ability, and if anyone attack the Chians the Athenians shall do the same," and that the senate and the generals and the taxiarchs administer the oath to the Chians who have come, but in Chios let the senate and the other magistrates give it; and five men shall be chosen to go to Chios and put the city under oath. The alliance is to last to all time. The embassy of the Chians shall be entertained in the prytaneum to-morrow.

These ambassadors were chosen: Cephalus of Collytus, ——— of Alopece, Æsimus ———, ——— of Phrearrhii, Democlides ———.

These were the Chian ambassadors: Bryon, Ape——, ——critus, Archelas.

2. ALLIANCE WITH CORCYRA

Two other inscriptions add Corcyra and some of her neighbors to the federation.

Hicks and Hill, 105

THE ALLIANCE, B.C. 375

Philocles . . . was secretary.

In the archonship of Hippodamas, in the second prytany, of Antiochis, in which Philocles . . . was secretary:

Voted by the senate and people. Critius moved: —

With reference to the matters which the ambassadors of the Corcyræans and the Acarnanians and the Cephallenians reported in the senate, That we commend the ambassadors of the Corcyræans

and Acarnanians and Cephallenians, in that they have deserved well of the Athenians and their allies both now and in former time; and in order that that which they ask may be done, that they be taken before the assembly, and that the decision of the senate be reported to them, to the effect that it has decreed to have the secretary inscribe the names of those cities which have come, upon the common stele of the allies, and that the senate and the generals and the knights give their oath to the cities present, and that the allies take the same oath.

And when this has been done . . . in accordance with what seems best to the allies in common, to send men to administer the oaths . . . for the purpose of inscribing [them?] on the common stele[1] where the allies have been enrolled; and that each of the cities send representatives to the council of allies in accordance with the decrees of the allies and the Athenians. About the Acarnanians they are to consult in common with Æschylus and Evarchus and Eury——.

Epitaph in *Hicks and Hill*, p. 211, may refer to this.

Here the earth received in a grave Thersander and Simylon, men longed-for by their native land Corcyra: they came as ambassadors and the chance of death having overcome them, the sons of Athens buried them with due honor at public expense.

Hicks and Hill, 106

ATHENS AND CORCYRA, B.C. 375–374

Alliance of the Corcyræans and Athenians for all time.

If anyone wage war upon the land of the Corcyræans or upon the people of Corcyra, the Athenians shall help them by all means in their power, in accordance with what the Corcyræans demand; and if anyone wage war on the people of Athens or their country by land or sea, the Corcyræans shall help them to the best of their ability in accordance with the demands of the Athenians. The Corcyræans shall not make war or peace without the Athenians and the majority of the allies; they shall act in other matters too in accord with the will of the allies.

[1] Another restoration of the badly broken text of this line and the three preceding is given in Hicks and Hill, p. 210.

OATH OF ATHENIANS

I will help the people of Corcyra with all my might and main if anyone makes war on their country by land or sea, according to the demands of the Corcyræans; and in the matter of war and peace I shall act in accordance with the decision of the majority of the allies, and also in other matters.

This I shall do, by Zeus and Apollo and Demeter; and may I have many blessings if I keep my oath: otherwise, the opposite.

OATH OF CORCYRÆANS

(The same, except in Doric dialect.)

Xenophon describes the expedition to Corcyra under the able leadership of Timotheus, son of Conon.

XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, V, iv, 64–66

Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at a blow. That done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor drove them into exile, nor changed their laws. And of this conduct he reaped the benefit in the increased cordiality of all the cities of those parts. The Lacedæmonians thereupon fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with Nicolochus in command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral no sooner caught sight of Timotheus's fleet than without hesitation, and in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels which formed part of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty-five ships to the enemy's sixty. The result was a defeat at the moment, and Timotheus set up a trophy at Alyzia. But as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels had reinforced him — the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and undergoing repairs — he bore down upon Alyzia in search of the Athenian, and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet him, the Lacedæmonian in his turn set up a trophy on the nearest group of islands.

B.C. 374. Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron and manning more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at the head of more than seventy ships. His naval superiority was undisputed, but he was forced to send to Athens for moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants not trifling.

3. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Besides undertaking an expedition to Corcyra, Timotheus was busily occupied in the north, about Chalcidice and the Macedonian coast. Menelaus, one of the local chiefs, seems to have given him valuable assistance.

Hicks and Hill, 117

MENELAUS HELPS TIMOTHEUS IN CHALCIDICE, B.C. 363–362

Menelaus the Pelagonian, Benefactor.

In the archonship of Chariclides, in the sixth prytany, of Œneis. Voted by the senate and people. Œneis was the prytanizing tribe, Nicostratus secretary, Charicles of Leuconoe was president, Satyrus moved:

Whereas Timotheus the general has shown that Menelaus the Pelagonian personally helped him in the war and furnished money for the war against Chalcidice and Amphipolis, be it voted by the senate to introduce him to the people at the next meeting and to communicate to the people the decision of the senate, namely: — To praise him since he is a good man and benefits the people of Athens to the best of his ability; and the generals who are around Macedonia shall look out for him, that in case he wants anything he shall have it; and that he may also find at the hands of the people whatever other benefit he desires; and that Menelaus be invited to the prytaneum to-morrow as a guest of the state.

Satyrus moved the following amendment: Whereas the ancestors of Menelaus were benefactors of the Athenian people, Menelaus shall be declared a benefactor too.

It was a distinct triumph for the Athenians to win over to their side Dionysius I of Syracuse, Sparta's ally.

Two decrees, friendly and cordial in tone, bear witness to this.

Hicks and Hill, 108

HONORS FROM ATHENS TO DIONYSIUS I OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 369–368

In the archonship of Lysistratus, in the tenth prytany, of Erechtheis in which Execestus son of Pæonides of Azenia was secretary, Evangelus was president. . . .

Pandius moved: About the matters which the embassy from Dionysius came to discuss, be it decreed by the senate as follows: — That the allies report to the people the decision, whatever may seem to be best to them on due consideration, about the letters which Dionysius sent concerning the rebuilding of the temple and about the peace: the presidents are to summon and invite the envoys and the allies before the people at the next assembly and confer about the matter and communicate the decision of the senate to the people: To commend Dionysius the ruler of Sicily and his sons, Dionysius and Hermocritus, since they have deserved well of the Athenians and their allies and help maintain the King's peace which the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians and the other Greeks have made; and to send to Dionysius the crown which the people voted him, and to crown each of the sons of Dionysius with a golden crown worth a thousand drachmas on account of their good-will and friendship; and Dionysius and his sons and their descendants shall be Athenian citizens of whatever tribe and deme and phratry they wish. And that the presiding officers of the tribe Erechtheis give the vote about these matters. . . .

Hicks and Hill, 112

ALLIANCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND DIONYSIUS, B.C. 368–367

In the archonship of Nausigenes, in the seventh prytany, of Æantis, Moschus of Cydathenæum was secretary, on the thirty-second day of the prytany, ——— son of Halippus was the president putting it to vote . . . voted by the people, ——dius moved: —

To the good fortune of Athens, Be it decreed by the people to praise Dionysius ruler of Sicily for his goodness toward the Athenians and their allies; and that he and his descendants be allies of the Athenians for all time on the following conditions: If anyone wage war on the territory of Athens by land or sea, Dionysius and his family are to help by land or sea with all strength to the best of their ability in accordance with the demands of the Athenians; and if anyone attack Dionysius or his family or any part of his kingdom by land or sea, the Athenians are to help with all

strength to the best of their ability as may be demanded; and Dionysius and his family are not to bear arms against Athens to its detriment either by land or sea, nor shall Athens bear arms against Dionysius or his family or any of his domains to their detriment by land or sea.

The ambassadors from Dionysius are to receive the oath about the alliance and the senators and generals and hipparchs and taxiarchs are to swear; Dionysius and his sons and the Syracusan senate and . . . and the commandants are to swear to it; these oaths are to be renewed annually (?) by both sides, and the Athenian envoys sent to Sicily shall administer it. The secretary of the senate shall have the decree inscribed. . . .

Friendly relations had already been reëstablished between Athens and Sparta in 369, and the following inscription shows that the *entente cordiale* continued.

Hicks and Hill, 113

ATHENS AND SPARTA, B.C. 367

In the archonship of Nausigenes, in the seventh prytany, of Æantis, Moschus son of Thestius of Cydathenæum was secretary.

Voted by the senate and people. Æantis was prytanizing tribe, Paramythus of Otryne presided, Moschus son of Thestius of Cydathenæum was secretary.

Diophantus moved: About the matters on which the ambassadors coming from Sparta report; Be it voted by the senate, That the proedri who happen to be in office in the assembly consult about these matters, and report what the senate voted, namely: That since Corrœbus the Spartan has deserved well of the Athenian people, both now and formerly, he be made proxenos and benefactor of the Athenian people, both himself and his descendants; and that the secretary of the senate inscribe this decree on a stone stele and set it up on the Acropolis. And for the cost of the inscription let the treasurer of the people give twenty drachmas from the fund set apart for the inscribing of decrees.

III. The Athenian Constitution

1. CONTRAST WITH THE "GOOD OLD DAYS"

When we turn to the constitution of Athens at this time, we find that some lamented the "good old days" and contrasted them with existing conditions, much to the disadvantage of the latter.

Isocrates, VII (*Areopagiticus*), 20–27

Those who conducted the affairs of the city at that time established a constitution that was not merely in name most mild and impartial, while in reality it did not show itself such to those who lived under it, — a constitution that did not train its citizens in such a manner that they considered license democracy, lawlessness liberty, insolence of speech equality, and the power of acting in this manner happiness, but which, by hating and punishing men of such character, made all the citizens better and more modest. And what chiefly assisted them in managing the state aright was this: of the two recognized principles of equality, the one assigning the same to all, the other their due to individuals, they were not ignorant which was the more useful, but rejected as unjust that which considered that good and bad had equal claims, and preferred that which honoured and punished each man according to his deserts; and governed the state on these principles, not appointing magistrates from the general body of citizens by lot, but selecting the best and most capable to fill each office. For they hoped that the rest of the citizens would behave themselves like those at the head of affairs. In the next place, they thought that this method of appointing to office was more to the advantage of the people than appointment by lot; since, in appointing by lot chance would have the decision, and supporters of oligarchy would often obtain offices, while, in selecting the most respectable citizens, the people would be able to choose those who were most favourably disposed towards the established constitution. And the reason why the majority were contented with this arrangement and why public offices were not objects of contention was, that they had learnt to work and economize, and not to neglect their own property while entertaining designs on that of others, nor again to supply

their own needs at the expense of the public funds, but rather to assist the treasury, if necessary, out of their own means, and not to have a more accurate knowledge of the income arising from public offices than of that produced by their own property. So severely did they keep their hands off the state revenues, that during those times it was harder to find men willing to undertake office than it is now to find men who have no desire for office at all; for they regarded the care of public affairs not as a lucrative business but as a public charge, and they did not from the very day they took office consider whether the former holders of office had left anything to be gained, but rather whether they had neglected anything that pressed for a settlement. In short, they had made up their minds that the people, like an absolute master, ought to control the public offices, punish offenders and settle disputed points, and that those who were able to enjoy ease and possessed sufficient means should attend to public affairs like servants, and, if they acted justly, should be praised and rest contented with this recognition of their services, while, if they managed affairs badly, they should meet with no mercy, but should be visited with the severest penalties. And how would it be possible to find a democracy more just or more secure than one which set the most influential citizens at the head of public affairs, and at the same time invested the people with sovereign control over these same officials?

2. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FOURTH CENTURY

Selections from Aristotle's "Constitution of Athens" describe the constitution as it was when he knew it. On the whole, the close resemblance to the fifth-century democracy is strongly marked.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XLII

The present constitution is as follows: Political rights belong to those whose parents are citizens on both sides. When they are eighteen years old they are enrolled as members of their deme. . . . When they have passed as Ephebi [i.e. arrived at man's estate], their fathers assemble in their tribes, and on oath select three of their tribesmen above forty years of age, whom they consider to

be most worthy and suitable to have charge of the Ephebi, and from them the people votes one of each tribe, selected as their moderator, together with a superintendent, from the general body of Athenians, to control the whole. And, taking charge of the Ephebi, first they make a circuit of the sacred places, then they proceed to Piræus, and some of the Ephebi garrison Munychia, and the rest the shore. The people votes them also two gymnastic-masters and teachers, who instruct them in the use of arms, shooting, hurling, and working the catapult. It gives for maintenance to the moderators a drachma a day each, and to the Ephebi four obols each. And each moderator, taking the money for his own tribesmen, buys what is necessary for all in common (for they take their meals together by their tribes), and provides for everything else. They pass their first year in this way. The next, at a meeting of the Assembly in the theatre, they display before the people their drill-practice, and receiving a spear and shield from the state, patrol the country and live in garrisons. They act as guards for their two years, wearing cloaks, and have immunity from all public burdens. They are not allowed either to bring or defend an action, to prevent their being connected in any way with business, except in cases of inheritance and of an only daughter and heiress, or where a question of family priesthood arises. On the expiry of the two years they at once rank with the rest. Such, then, are the regulations regarding the enrolment of citizens and the Ephebi.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XLIII–XLVI

They appoint by lot to all the offices belonging to the ordinary routine of administration, except the military treasurer, and those who have charge of the funds for seats in the theatre and the superintendent of the springs. For these they vote, and those who are appointed hold office from Panathenæa to Panathenæa. They vote also all the offices of the war department. And the Council is elected by lot to the number of five hundred, fifty from each tribe. And each of the tribes presides in turn as lot may assign, the first four thirty-six days each, and the six last thirty-five days each; for they reckon the year by the moon. The presidents first dine together in the Rotunda, at the expense of the state, then

they assemble the Council and the people; the Council every day, unless there is a holiday, and the people four times during each presidency. They give public notice of all matters to be transacted by the Council, and what is to be taken each day, and what is not their business.[1] They give public notice also of the meetings of the Assembly; one is called the "sovereign" Assembly to confirm by vote magistrates if they are thought to discharge their duties efficiently, and to arrange about food and the protection of the country; and for such as want to prefer indictments to bring in such bills on this day, and to read out the registers of confiscations as well as the applications to the archon to be put in possession in cases of inheritance and of only daughters and heiresses, so that no case may go by default. At the sixth presidency, in addition to what has just been stated, the opportunity is given of voting whether to hold a vote of ostracism or not, and of proceeding with the public prosecutions of common informers, both Athenians and resident-aliens up to three of each, as well as cases where a promise has been made to the people and not performed. Another Assembly is assigned for supplications, so that anyone who wants may propose a supplication for anything he likes, either public or private, and discuss it with the people. The other two Assemblies attend to all other matters, and the laws ordain that at these meetings proposals should be considered to the number of three respectively regarding things sacred (or sacred moneys), heralds and embassies, and things profane (or public moneys). They sometimes deliberate even without any preliminary voting. The heralds and ambassadors come first before the presidents, and the bearers of letters deliver them into their hands.

Now, there is one chief president, elected by lot; he holds office a day and a night, and it is not lawful for the same man to be appointed for a longer time, or to be appointed twice. He keeps the keys of the temples, in which are deposited the public moneys and records, as well as the state seal, and is obliged to remain in the Rotunda, as is also the third part of the presidents whom he may order to do so. When the presidents summon the Council or people, he appoints by lot nine chairmen (proedri), one from each tribe, except the tribe that presides; and from them again one as

[1] Kenyon reads "and where it is to sit."

chief president, and he passes over to them the order of business. On receipt of it they preserve order, propose the matters to be deliberated on, decide the votings, and arrange things generally. They have power also to break up the meeting. It is not lawful to be chief president more than once in the year, while it is lawful to be a chairman (proedrus) once in each presidency. Boards of ten of generals and commanders of cavalry and of the other military officers of state are elected in the Assembly, as the people may determine; these elections are made by the presidency after the sixth, when the omens are favourable, but a preliminary ordinance must be passed about these elections also.

Now the Council formerly had power to punish by fines, to imprison, and to put to death. But on one occasion, as it was conducting Lysimachus to the executioner, who was awaiting him, Eukleides of Alopeke took him out of their hands, declaring that it was not right for any citizen to be put to death without the verdict of a court of law. On a trial being held in court, Lysimachus was acquitted, and got the surname of "the man who escaped the cudgel." Then the people deprived the Council of its power of putting to death and imprisoning and punishing by fines, and carried a law that in cases where the Council passed sentences or punished, the Thesmothetæ should bring the sentences and punishments before the court of justice, and that the vote of the jurors should be final. Now, the Council can try most of the officers of state, particularly such as have the management of money; but their decision is not final, and there is an appeal to the court of justice. Private individuals also have the right of indicting any officers of state they like for violating the laws, while such as are so indicted have also an appeal to the court of justice, if the Council finds them guilty. It examines also the members who are to compose the Council for the following year, and the nine archons. Formerly it had the power of rejection, but now in such cases there is an appeal to the court of justice. In the above matters then the Council does not possess final authority. However, it submits preliminary ordinances to the people, and it is not lawful for the people to pass any measure which has not been thus submitted, or of which the presidents have not previously given public notice. For

it is on these very grounds that the successful mover of a bill makes himself liable to an indictment for proposing unconstitutional measures.

It superintends also the triremes, their equipment and their docks, and has new ships built, triremes or quadriremes, whichever the people votes, and equipment for them and docks. But the people votes designers for the vessels. And if they fail to hand over these quite complete to the new Council, the old Council cannot get the customary present, which they normally get during the following Council. It builds the triremes, choosing ten constructors out of the whole body. It examines also all public buildings, and if it decides that any wrong has been committed, it makes a presentment to the people against the offender, and if it finds him guilty, hands him over to a court of justice.

It assists also in the management of all the remaining offices for the most part.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, XLIX

Further, the Council holds a muster of the horses, and if anyone having the means is found to keep his horse badly, it fines him in its keep.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, L

Ten officers are appointed by lot to keep the temples in repair, and they expend the thirty minæ assigned by the receivers in repairing such as most require it. Ten city magistrates are similarly appointed, of whom five exercise their office in Piræus and five in the city.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LI

Clerks of the market are also appointed by lot, five for Piræus and five for the city. Their duty, as prescribed by law, is to see that commodities of all descriptions are sold pure and unadulterated. Appointed by lot also are the inspectors of weights and measures, five for the city and five for Piræus; they look after measures and weights of all kinds, that sellers may use just ones. The corn-watchers appointed by lot used to be five for Piræus and five for the city, but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen

for Piræus. They take measures to ensure, first, that the white (unprepared) corn in the market shall be offered for sale on fair terms, then that the millers shall sell their meal at prices based on the cost of the barley, and bakers their bread at prices based on the cost of the wheat, and of the weight that they fix; for the law commands them to fix it. They appoint by lot ten superintendents of the market, and their duty is to superintend the markets, and of the corn that is imported into the corn-market to compel the merchants to bring two-thirds into the city.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LII

They appoint the Eleven also by lot to look after prisoners, and in the case of thieves and kidnappers and footpads who are committed to prison, if they confess, to punish them with death; but if they demand a trial, to bring them before the court of justice, and if they are acquitted to let them go, but if not, to put them to death at once. They also have to produce before the court the inventories of the lands and houses claimed as state-property, and to deliver over to the government-sellers what is decided to be confiscated, and to prefer the indictments; for this last is the duty of the Eleven, except that in some cases it devolves on the Thesmothetæ.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LIII

They appoint by lot also forty, four from each tribe, before whom parties bring all other suits. . . . Cases up to ten drachmæ they have full power to decide, but such as are above this amount they pass over to the arbitrators.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LIV

They appoint also by lot the following officers: Five surveyors of roads, who have public workmen assigned to them, and whose duty it is to keep the roads in repair; and ten auditors with ten advocates to assist them. . . . They appoint also by lot an officer who is called the secretary for the presidency, and has charge of all public documents, and keeps the decrees that are passed, and checks all official papers, and sits with the Council. Now, in former times he was elected by vote, and men of the highest distinction

and character used to be appointed to the office; for his name is inscribed on pillars, attached to treaties of alliance and grants of consulship, and citizenship; but now the election is made by lot.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LV

. . . Now as to those who have the title of the nine archons, an account has been already given of how they were appointed at first. But now they appoint by lot six Thesmothetæ and a secretary for them, and further, an archon and king and commander-in-chief severally from each tribe.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LVI

The archon and king and commander-in-chief take assessors, two each, whomever they like; these are examined in the court before they can act, and after appointment are responsible for their official conduct.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LIX

To the Thesmothetæ belongs first the right of publicly notifying on what days the courts of law are to sit, and then of assigning them to the magistrates; for as they assign, the magistrates must use them. Further, they bring before the people all bills of indictment and condemnations by show of hands, and votes directing public prosecutions, and indictments for proposing unconstitutional measures and bad laws, and the audits of the chairmen (proedri) and chief president of the Council, and of the generals. . . . They introduce also the examinations for all offices of state, and the rejected candidates for membership in the deme, and condemnations by the Council. They introduce also private suits, concerned with trade and mines, or where a slave has slandered a freeman. They assign by lot to the magistrates all their courts, both public and private. They ratify international contracts with the subject cities, and bring in the suits arising from them; they also bring up cases of false evidence in the Areopagus. And the nine archons, together with the secretary of the Thesmothetæ, appoint by lot all the jurors, each those of his own tribe. Such then are the duties of the nine archons.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LX

They appoint also by lot ten directors of games, one from each tribe.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LXI

They elect by vote also to all offices, without exception, connected with the war department, the generals in former times being elected one from each tribe, but now from all. They assign them their duties by vote, appointing one to the command of the hoplites, who leads the members of his deme if they go on foreign service; one in defense of the country, who protects it, and, if war breaks out in it, takes part in the war; two in command of Piræus, the one for Munychia, the other for the shore, who have charge of the defense and matters in the Piræus; and one to the command of the symmoriæ [companies, consisting of sixty members each, of the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens], who makes out the list of those who have to fit out a trireme for the public service, and allows them challenges, and brings into court their cases for adjudication; the rest they commission according to circumstances.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LXII

Now the officers of state appointed by lot were in former times those so appointed, together with the nine archons, from the whole tribe, and the election of the officers now appointed in the Theseum was distributed among the demes; but since the demes used to sell these offices, they have elected them also by lot from the whole tribe, except the members of the Council and the guards, who are still left to the demes. They receive pay first for the ordinary assemblies a drachma, but for the "sovereign" assembly a drachma and a half; then in the courts three obols; then the Council five obols. The presidents receive an allowance of an obol for their maintenance. The nine archons receive for maintenance four obols each, and maintain besides a herald and a flute-player, while the governor of Salamis receives a drachma a day. The directors of games dine in the Prytaneum during the month of Hecatombæon, in which the Panathenæa are celebrated, beginning on the fourth

of the month. The Amphictyones who are sent to Delos receive a drachma a day from the funds of Delos; and the magistrates who are commissioned to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros receive in every case money for their maintenance. It is allowable to hold military offices several times, but not a single other one, except that you may be twice a member of the Council.

ARISTOTLE, *Constitution of Athens*, LXIII

The nine archons elect by lot the jurors for the courts by tribes, while the secretary to the Thesmothetæ elects from the tenth tribe. The entrances into the courts are ten, one for each tribe; the balloting-urns twenty, two for each tribe; and the boxes a hundred, ten for each tribe; there are ten other boxes besides, in which are cast the tablets of the jurors on whom the lot falls. And two balloting-urns and staves are placed at each entrance for each juror, and tickets are put in the urn to the number of the staves, and on them are written the letters of the alphabet, beginning from the eleventh (*l*), corresponding in number to the courts that are to be supplied with jurors. Anyone above thirty years of age may serve, who is not a debtor to the state and has not suffered deprivation of political rights; but if anyone serves who has not the right to do so he is indicted in the court, and if found guilty, the jurors inflict upon him such punishment or penalty as he seems to deserve. If he is fined, he must remain in prison till he has paid the former debt on account of which he was indicted, and any additional fine that the court may impose. Each juror has a tablet made of boxwood, on which is inscribed his own name, with his father's and his deme, and one of the letters of the alphabet up to *k*; for the jurors are distributed by tribes into ten groups, and are about equal in number for each letter. After the Thesmothetes has drawn lots assigning the letters to the courts, the attendant puts up on each court the letter which has been drawn.

One of the most delicious comedies ever written is Aristophanes's "Ecclesiazusæ," or "The Women in Parliament."

The women do not find the government of Athens to their liking, so they form a plan of dressing up like men, stealing their

husbands' clothes while they are asleep, putting on false beards, and stealing out to the assembly, which meets at daybreak. Their purpose is to introduce a new lot of laws embodying the reforms they are so anxious to bring in. The modernity of the whole thing and the types represented — the "woman's rights" advocate, the suffragette, the socialist, the unpractical reformer — render the satire easily comprehensible to us of the present day.[1]

The play opens with a street scene in front of Praxagora's house, out of which she steals.

The apostrophe to the lamp is a parody of some of the prologues of Euripides.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 1–50

PRAXAGORA. O glowing visage of the earthen lamp,
On this conspicuous eminence well-hung, —
(For through thy fates and lineage will we go,
Thou, who, by whirling wheel of potter moulded,
Dost with thy nozzle do the sun's bright duty) —
Awake the appointed signal of the flame!
Thou only knowest it, and rightly thou,
For thou alone, within our chambers standing,
Watchest unblamed the mysteries of love.
Thine eye, inspector of our amorous sports,
Beholdeth all, and no one saith *Begone!*
Thou comest, singeing, purifying all
The dim recesses which none else may see;
And when the garners, stored with corn and wine,
By stealth we open, thou dost stand beside us.
And though thou knowest all this, thou dost not peach.
Therefore our plans will we confide to thee,
What at the Scira we resolved to do.
Ah, but there 's no one here who should be here.

[1] Those who can avail themselves of the excellent notes in Rogers's edition are advised to do so.

Yet doth it draw towards daybreak; and the Assembly
Full soon will meet; and we frail womankind
Must take the seats Phyromachus assigned us
(You don't forget?) and not attract attention.
What can the matter be? Perchance their beards
Are not stitched on, as our decree commanded,
Perchance they found it difficult to steal
Their husband's garments. Stay! I see a lamp
Moving this way. I will retire and watch,
Lest it should haply be some MAN approaching!

FIRST WOMAN. It is the hour to start. As I was coming
I heard the herald give his second — crow.

PRAX. I have been waiting, watching for you all
The whole night long; and now I 'll summon forth
My neighbour here, scratching her door so gently
As not to rouse her husband.

SECOND WOMAN. Yea I heard
(For I was up and putting on my shoes)
The stealthy creeping of thy finger-nail.
My husband, dear — a Salaminian he —
Has all night long been tossing in his bed;
Wherefore I could not steal his garb till now.

FIRST WOMAN. O now they are coming! Here 's Cleinareté,
Here 's Sostrata, and here 's Philænité.

SEMICHORUS. Come, hurry up: for Glyce vowed a vow
That whosoever comes the last shall pay
One quart of chickpease and nine quarts of wine.

FIRST WOMAN. And look! Melistiché, Smicythion's wife,
Wearing her husband's shoes. She, only she,
Has come away, methinks, at ease, unflurried.

SECOND WOMAN. And look! Geusistrata, the tapster's wife,
In her right hand the torch.

PRAX. And now the wives
Of Philodoretus and Chæretades,
And many another, hurrying on I see,
All that is best and worthiest in the town.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 82–101

PRAX. But now to finish what remains to do
While yet the stars are lingering in the sky;
For this Assembly, as you know, whereto
We all are bound, commences with the dawn.
FIRST WOMAN. And so it does: and we 're to seat ourselves
Facing the prytanes, just below the speakers.
SECOND WOMAN. See what I 've brought, dear heart: I mean to do
A little spinning while the Assembly fills.
PRAX. Fills? miserable woman!
SECOND WOMAN. Yes, why not?
O I can spin and listen just as well.
Besides, my little chicks have got no clothes.
PRAX. Fancy you SPINNING! when you must not have
The tiniest morsel of your person seen.
'T were a fine scrape, if when the Assembly 's full,
Some woman clambering o'er the seats, and throwing
Her cloke awry, should show that she 's a woman.
No, if we sit in front and gather round us
Our husbands' garments, none will find us out.
Why, when we 've got our flowing beards on there,
Who that beholds us will suppose we 're women?

Praxagora takes the lead and opens the discussion, in which she also takes a lively part afterwards.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 106–245

PRAX. . . . We women dare this daring deed to do,
If we can seize upon the helm of state
And trim the ship to weather through the storm;
For neither sails nor oars avail it now.
FIRST WOMAN. How can the female soul of womankind
Address the Assembly?
PRAX. Admirably well.
Youths that are most effeminate, they say,

Are always strongest in the speaking line;
And we 've got that by nature.
FIRST WOMAN. Maybe so.
Still inexperience is a serious matter.
PRAX. And is not that the very reason why
We 've met together to rehearse the scene?
Now do make haste and fasten on your beards,
And all you others who have practised talking.
FIRST WOMAN. Practised, indeed! can't every woman talk?
PRAX. Come, fasten on your beard, and be a man.
I 'll lay these chaplets down, and do the same.
Maybe I 'll make a little speech myself.
SECOND WOMAN. O, here, sweet love, Praxagora: look, child!
O what a merry joke this seems to me!
PRAX. Joke! where 's the joke?
SECOND WOMAN. 'T is just as if we tied
A shaggy beard to toasting cuttlefish.
PRAX. Now, Purifier, carry round the — cat.
Come in! Ariphrades, don't chatter so.
Come in, sit down. Who will address the meeting?
FIRST WOMAN. I.
PRAX. Wear this chaplet then, and luck be with you.
FIRST WOMAN. There.
PRAX. Speak away.
FIRST WOMAN. What speak before I drink?
PRAX. Just listen. DRINK!
FIRST WOMAN. Then what 's this chaplet for?
PRAX. O get away. Is this what you 'd have done
Amongst the men?
FIRST WOMAN. What, don't men drink at meetings?
PRAX. Drink, fool?
FIRST WOMAN. By Artemis, I know they do,
And strong drink too. Look at the Acts they pass.
Do you mean to tell me that they 'd pass such nonsense
If they were n't drunk? Besides, they pour libations.
Or what 's the meaning of those tedious prayers
Unless they 'd got some wine, I 'd like to know.

Besides, they quarrel just like drunken men,
And when one drinks too much, and gets too noisy,
In come the Archer-boys, and run him out.

PRAX. Begone and sit you down, for you 're no good.

FIRST WOMAN. Good lack, I wish I 'd never worn a beard;
I 'm parched to death with thirst, I really am.

PRAX. Would any other like to speak?

SECOND WOMAN. Yes, I.

PRAX. Put on this chaplet and be quick. Time presses.
Now lean your weight upon your walking-stick,
And speak your words out manfully and well.

SECOND WOMAN. I could have wished some more experienced man
Had risen to speak, while I sat still and listened.
But now I say I 'll not permit, for one,
That in their taverns men should make them tanks
Of water. 'T is not proper, by the Twain.

PRAX. How! by the Twain? Girl, have you lost your wits?

SECOND WOMAN. Why, what 's amiss? *I* never asked for drink.

PRAX. You are a man, and yet invoked the Twain.
All else you said was excellently right.

SECOND WOMAN. O yes, by Apollo!

PRAX. Mind then, I won't move
Another step in this Assembly business
Unless you are strict and accurate in this.

SECOND WOMAN. Give me the chaplet, and I 'll try again.
I 've thought of something very good to say.
In my opinion, O assembled women,

PRAX. O monstrous! WOMEN, idiot, when they 're MEN?

SECOND WOMAN. 'T was all Epigonus: he caught my eye
And so, methought 't was women I harangued.

PRAX. You, too, retire and sit you down again,
For I myself will wear the chaplet now
Your cause to further: and I pray the gods
That I may haply prosper our design.
I have, my friends, an equal stake with you
In this our country, and I grieve to note

The sad condition of the state's affairs.
I see the state employing evermore
Unworthy ministers; if one do well
A single day, he 'll act amiss for ten.
You trust another: he 'll be ten times worse.
Hard, hard it is to counsel wayward men,
Always mistrusting those who love you best,
And paying court to those who love you not.
There was a time, my friends, we never came
To these Assemblies; then we knew full well
Agyrrhius was a rogue: we come here now,
And he who gets the cash applauds the man,
And he who gets it not, protests that they
Who come for payment ought to die the death.

FIRST WOMAN. By Aphrodite now, but that 's well said!

PRAX. Heavens! Aphrodite! 'T were a pleasant jest,
If in the Assembly you should praise me so!

FIRST WOMAN. Ah, but I won't.

PRAX. Then don't acquire the habit.
This League again, when first we talked it over,
It seemed the only thing to save the state,
Yet when they 'd got it, they disliked it. He
Who pushed it through was forced to cut and run.
Ships must be launched; the poor men all approve,
The wealthy men and farmers disapprove.
You used to hate Corinthians, and they you;
They are friendly now: do you be friendly too.
Argeius was a fool: now Jerome 's wise.
Safety just showed her face: but Thrasybulus,
No more called in, is quite excluded now.

FIRST WOMAN. Here 's a shrewd man!

PRAX. Ah, now you praise me rightly.
Ye are to blame for this, Athenian people,
Ye draw your wages from the public purse,
Yet each man seeks his private gain alone.
So the state reels, like any Æsimus.
Still, if ye trust me, ye shall yet be saved.

I move that now the womankind be asked
To rule the state. In our own homes, ye know,
They are the managers and rule the house.

FIRST WOMAN. O good, good, good! speak on, speak on, dear man.

PRAX. That they are better in their ways than we
I 'll soon convince you. First, they dye their wools
With boiling tinctures, in the ancient style.
You won't find *them*, I warrant, in a hurry
Trying new plans. And would it not have saved
The Athenian city had she let alone
Things that worked well, nor idly sought things new?
They roast their barley, sitting, as of old:
They on their heads bear burdens, as of old:
They keep their Thesmophoria, as of old:
They bake their honied cheesecakes, as of old:
They victimize their husbands, as of old:
They still secrete their lovers, as of old:
They buy themselves sly dainties, as of old:
They love their wine unwatered, as of old:
They like a woman's pleasures, as of old:
Then let us, gentlemen, give up to them
The helm of state, and not concern ourselves,
Nor pry, nor question what they mean to do;
But let them really govern, knowing this,
The statesman-mothers never will neglect
Their soldier-sons. And then a soldier's rations,
Who will supply as well as she who bare him?
For ways and means none can excel a woman.
And there 's no fear at all that they 'll be cheated
When they 're in power, for they 're the cheats themselves.
Much I omit. But if you pass my motion,
You 'll lead the happiest lives that e'er you dreamed of.

FIRST WOMAN. O, good! Praxagora. Well done, sweet wench.
However did you learn to speak so finely?

PRAX. I and my husband in the general flight
Lodged in the Pnyx, and there I heard the speakers.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 285–310

SEMICHORUS. Time to be moving, gentlemen! 't is best we keep repeating
This name of ours, lest we forget to use it at the Meeting.
For terrible the risk would be, if any man detected
The great and daring scheme which we in darkness have projected.

SONG OF THE TOWN SEMICHORUS

On to the Meeting, worthy sirs: for now the magistrate avers
That whoever shall fail to
Arrive while the dusk of the
Morning is gray,
All dusty and smacking of
Pickle and acid, that
Man shall assuredly
Forfeit his pay.
Now Charitimides,
Draces, and Smicythus,
Hasten along:
See that there fall from you
Never a word or a
Note that is wrong.
Get we our tickets, and
Sit we together, and
Choose the front rows.
Vote we whatever our
Sisters propose.
Our *sisters!* My wits are gone gleaning!
Our "brothers," of course, was my meaning.

SONG OF THE COUNTRY SEMICHORUS

We 'll thrust aside this bothering throng which from the city crowds along,
These men, who aforetime
When only an obol they
Got for their pay
Would sit in the wreath-market,

Chatting away.
Ah well, in the days of our
Noble Myronides
None would have stooped
Money to take for
Attending the Meetings, but
Hither they trooped,
Each with his own little
Goatskin of wine,
Each with three olives, two
Onions, one loaf, in his
Wallet, to dine.
But now they are set
The three-obol to get,
And whene'er the state business engages,
They clamour, like hodmen, for wages.

The husbands are now awake and out in the street. One has been to the meeting and describes it to his friend, who is utterly at a loss to know what has happened.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 383–397

CHREMES. There gathered such a crowd
About the Pnyx, you never saw the like;
Such pale-faced fellows; just like shoemakers
We all declared; and strange it was to see
How pallid-packed the whole Assembly looked.
So I and lots of us could get no pay.
BLEPYRUS. Shall I get any if I run?
CHR. Not you!
Not had you been there when the cock was giving
Its second crow.
BLEP. O weep, Antilochus,
Rather for me, the living, than for him,
The loved and lost — three-obol. All is gone!
Whatever was it though that brought together
So vast a crowd so early?

CHR. 'T was determined
To put this question to the assembled people,
"How best to save the state."

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 427–476

CHR. Then, after him, there bounded up to speak
A spruce and pale-faced youth, like Nicias.
And *he* declared we ought to place the state
Into the hands of (whom do you think?) the women!
Then the whole mob of shoemakers began
To cheer like mad; whilst all the country folk
Hooted and hissed.
BLEP. They showed their sense, by Zeus.
CHR. But less their numbers; so the lad went on,
Speaking all good of women, but of you
Everything bad.
BLEP. What?
CHR. First of all he called you
An arrant rogue.
BLEP. And you?
CHR. Let be, awhile.
Also a thief.
BLEP. Me only?
CHR. And by Zeus,
A sycophant.
BLEP. Me only?
CHR. And by Zeus,
All our friends here.
BLEP. Well, who says nay to that?
CHR. And then the woman is, he said, a thing
Stuffed full of wit and moneymaking ways.
They don't betray their Thesmophorian secrets,
But you and I blab all state secrets out.
BLEP. By Hermes, there at least he told no lie.
CHR. And women lend each other, said the lad,
Their dresses, trinkets, money, drinking-cups,
Though quite alone, with never a witness there.

And all restore the loan, and none withhold it.
But men, he said, are always doing this.
BLEP. Aye to be sure: though witnesses were there.
CHR. *They* don't inform, or prosecute, or put
The people down: but everything that 's right.
And much, besides, he praised the womankind.
BLEP. What was determined?
CHR. You 're to put the state
Into their hands. This was the one reform
Not yet attempted.
BLEP. 'T was decreed?
CHR. It was.
BLEP. So then the women now must undertake
All manly duties?
CHR. So I understand.
BLEP. Then I shan't be a dicast, but my wife?
CHR. Nor you support your household, but your wife.
BLEP. Nor I get grumbling up in early morn.
CHR. No: for the future that 's your wife's affair.
You 'll lie abed: no grumbling any more.
BLEP. But hark ye, 't would be rough on us old men
If, when the women hold the reins of state,
They should perforce compel us to —
CHR. Do what?
BLEP. Make love to them.
CHR. But if we 're not prepared?
BLEP. They 'll dock our breakfasts.
CHR. Therefore learn the way
How to make love, and eat your breakfast too.
BLEP. Upon compulsion! Faugh!
CHR. If that is for
The public good, we needs must all obey.
There is a legend of the olden time,
That all our foolish plans and vain conceits
Are overruled to work the public good.
So be it now, high Pallas and ye gods!
But I must go. Farewell.

Blepyrus tells his wife about what he has seen. Praxagora has now come home and made an excuse to her husband for running away with his clothes. He fairly revels in the choice bit of news he has for her.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 555–570

BLEP. The state, they say, is handed over to YOU!
PRAX. What for? To weave?
BLEP. No, govern.
PRAX. Govern what?
BLEP. All the whole work and business of the state.
PRAX. O here 's a lucky state, by Aphrodite,
We 're going to have!
BLEP. How so?
PRAX. For many reasons.
For now no longer shall bold men be free
To shame the city: no more witnessing,
No false informing —
BLEP. Hang it, don't do that.
Don't take away my only means of living!
CHR. Pray, sir, be still, and let the lady speak.
PRAX. No thefts of overclokes, no envyings now,
None to be poor and naked any more.
No wranglings, no distraining on your goods.
CHR. Now, by Poseidon, wondrous news if true.
PRAX. Aye, and I 'll prove it, so that you 'll support me,
And he himself have nought to say against it.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 588–618

PRAX. Then all to the speaker in silence attend,
And don't interrupt till I come to the end,
And weigh and perpend, till you quite comprehend,
The drift and intent of the scheme I present.
The rule which I dare to enact and declare,
Is that all shall be equal, and equally share
All wealth and enjoyments, nor longer endure
That one should be rich, and another be poor,

That one should have acres, far-stretching and wide,
And another not even enough to provide
Himself with a grave: that this at his call
Should have hundreds of servants, and that none at all.
All this I intend to correct and amend:
Now all of all blessings shall freely partake,
One life and one system for all men I make.

BLEP. And how will you manage it?

PRAX. First, I 'll provide
That the silver, and land, and whatever beside
Each man shall possess, shall be common and free,
One fund for the public; then out of it we
Will feed and maintain you, like housekeepers true,
Dispensing, and sparing, and caring for you.

BLEP. With regard to the land, I can quite understand,
But how, if a man have his money in hand,
Not farms, which you see, and he cannot withhold,
But talents of silver and Darics of gold?

PRAX. All this to the stores he must bring.

BLEP. But suppose
He choose to retain it, and nobody knows;
Rank perjury doubtless; but what if it be?
'T was by that he acquired it at first.

PRAX. I agree.
But now 't will be useless; he 'll need it no more.

BLEP. How mean you?

PRAX. All pressure from want will be o'er.
Now each will have all that a man can desire,
Cakes, barley-loaves, chestnuts, abundant attire,
Wine, garlands and fish: then why should he wish
The wealth he has gotten by fraud to retain?
If you know any reason, I hope you 'll explain.

BLEP. 'T is those that have most of these goods, I believe,
That are always the worst and the keenest to thieve.

PRAX. I grant you, my friend, in the days that are past,
In your old-fashioned system, abolished at last;
But what he 's to gain, though his wealth he retain,

When all things are common, I 'd have you explain.
BLEP. If a youth to a girl his devotion would show,
He surely must woo her with presents.
PRAX. O no.
All women and men will be common and free,
No marriage or other restraint there will be.
BLEP. But if all should aspire to the favours of one,
To the girl that is fairest, what then will be done?
PRAX. By the side of the beauty, so stately and grand,
The dwarf, the deformed, and the ugly will stand;
And before you 're entitled the beauty to woo,
Your court you must pay to the hag and the shrew.

ARISTOPHANES, *The Women in Parliament*, 652–693

BLEP. But who will attend to the work of the farm?
PRAX. All labour and toil to your slaves you will leave;
Your business 't will be, when the shadows of eve
Ten feet on the face of the dial are cast,
To scurry away to your evening repast.
BLEP. Our clothes, what of them?
PRAX. You have plenty in store,
When these are worn out, we will weave you some more.
BLEP. Just one other thing. If an action they bring,
What funds will be mine for discharging the fine?
You won't pay it out of the stores, I opine.
PRAX. A fine to be paid when an action they bring!
Why bless you, our people won't know such a thing
As an action.
BLEP. No actions! I feel a misgiving.
Pray what are "our people" to do for a living?
CHR. You are right: there are many will rue it.
PRAX. No doubt.
But what can one then bring an action about?
BLEP. There are reasons in plenty; I 'll just mention one.
If a debtor won't pay you, pray what 's to be done?
PRAX. If a debtor won't pay! Nay, but tell me, my friend,
How the creditor came by the money to lend?

All money, I thought, to the stores had been brought.
I 've got a suspicion, I say it with grief,
Your creditor 's surely a bit of a thief.
BLEP. Now that is an answer acute and befitting.
But what if a man should be fined for committing
Some common assault, when elated with wine;
Pray what are his means for discharging that fine?
I have posed you, I think.
PRAX. Why his victuals and drink
Will be stopped by command for awhile; and I guess
That he will not again in a hurry transgress,
When he pays with his stomach.
BLEP. Will thieves be unknown?
PRAX. Why how should they steal what is partly their own?
BLEP. No chance then to meet at night in the street
Some highwayman coming our clokes to abstract?
PRAX. No, not if you 're sleeping at home; nor, in fact,
Though you choose to go out. That trade, why pursue it?
There 's plenty for all: but suppose him to do it,
Don't fight and resist him; what need of a pother?
You can go to the stores, and they 'll give you another.
BLEP. Shall we gambling forsake?
PRAX. Why, what could you stake?
BLEP. But what is the style of our living to be?
PRAX. One common to all, independent and free,
All bars and partitions for ever undone,
All private establishments fused into one.
BLEP. Then where, may I ask, will our dinners be laid?
PRAX. Each court and arcade of the law shall be made
A banqueting hall for the citizens.
BLEP. Right.
But what will you do with the desk for the speakers?
PRAX. I 'll make it a stand for the cups and the beakers;
And there shall the striplings be ranged to recite
The deeds of the brave, and the joys of the fight,
And the cowards' disgrace; till out of the place
Each coward shall slink with a very red face,

Not stopping to dine.
BLEP. O but that will be fine
And what of the balloting booths?
PRAX. They shall go
To the head of the market-place, all in a row,
And there by Harmodius taking my station,
I 'll tickets dispense to the whole of the nation,
Till each one has got his particular lot,
And manfully bustles along to the sign
Of the letter whereat he 's empanelled to dine.
The man who has A shall be ushered away
To the Royal Arcade; to the next will go B;
And C to the Cornmarket.
BLEP. Merely to *see?*
PRAX. No, fool, but to dine.
BLEP. 'T is an excellent plan.
Then he who gets never a letter, poor man,
Gets never a dinner.
PRAX. But 't will not be so.
There 'll be plenty for all, and to spare.
No stint and no grudging our system will know,
But each will away from the revelry go,
Elated and grand, with a torch in his hand
And a garland of flowers in his hair.

EXPLANATION OF WORDS

Scira: a woman's festival in which parasols were carried in the procession (probably for religious and not for decorative purposes). — **herald . . . crow**: the herald blew a signal on his trumpet. — **chickpease**, etc.: a fine for lateness. — **cuttlefish**: pale skin (?). — **cat**: a pig was the usual sacrifice. — **Archer-boys**: Scythian bowmen served as police. — **I could have wished**: a conventional opening of a speech in court, etc. — **Twain**: a woman's oath, by female divinities. — **Epigonus**: an effeminate person. — **Æsimus**: a noted drunkard. — **Thesmophoria**: a woman's festival. — **Pnyx**: the regular place of assembly. — **three-obol**: all were greedy for the increased pay for court fees. — **No false informing**: the common informers were the bane of Athens. — **No actions**: the Athenians were notorious for lawsuits (see "Wasps"). — **Harmodius**: a group of the tyrannicides stood near the agora. — **tickets**: lettered like theater or court tickets.

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CHAPTER XV

THE RISE OF MACEDON

Early conditions in Macedon — Philip — Summary of his deeds — Success in the north — Activity against Athens — Plans for the invasion of Asia — Demosthenes — His policy of resistance — Aggressive action urged — Failure of the embassy; Æschines blamed — Alliance with Thebes — Chæronea and its results — The attack of Æschines on Demosthenes — Demosthenes defends his own policy

I. Early Conditions in Macedon

It is of course not surprising that we have no contemporary records of the Macedonians written by themselves. For many centuries their warlike mode of life and tribal rivalries left little time for chronicling their deeds; nor was their social organization such that legislation or decrees, which form such a valuable source of information in the case of Greek cities, played any part.

Even before this time Greeks and Macedonians each visited the country of the other, and, during the half century or more after the death of Thucydides, Macedonia was becoming more fully imbued with Greek civilization.

Greek writers went to the courts of Perdiccas and Amyntas; Macedonians sometimes sent their children to Greece to be educated, and the influence of Greek art is most apparent on the Macedonian coinage of this time. But as yet this civilization had not penetrated very deeply, and life at the Macedonian courts has sometimes been likened to that among the Homeric chieftains.

A brief summary of Macedonian conditions to his own time is given by Thucydides.

Thucydides, II, 99–100

Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the Lyncestæ, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland,

though Macedonians by blood and allies and dependents of their kindred, still have their own separate governments. The country on the sea coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount Pangæus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pangæus and the sea is still called the Pierian gulf); of the Bottiæans, at present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the acquisition in Pæonia of a narrow strip along the river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the district of Mygdonia, between the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom perished, though a few of them still live round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs — Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia Proper. The whole is now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning king.

These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of those now found in the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him.

Amyntas had already formed relations with the Chalcidians, since the territory around them was a most valuable source of timber. Athens and the other great naval powers got much of their supply from this district, and a commercial treaty like the following was of great value to Macedon. When Macedon controlled these regions the Athenians were at a loss for timber.

Hicks and Hill, 95

AMYNTAS AND THE CHALCIDIANS, B.C. 389–383

Agreements between Amyntas son of Errhidæus and the Chalcidians:—To be allies to each other against all others for fifty years.

If anyone wage war on the land of Amyntas or of the Chalcidians, the Chalcidians are to help Amyntas, and Amyntas to help the Chalcidians.

There shall be export of pitch and all kinds of timber for building purposes, and for shipbuilding except pine, whatever is not needed by the league; the league can export these too if they inform Amyntas beforehand and pay the duty as written; and there is to be export and transport of other products on payment of the duties by Chalcis from Macedonia and by Macedonia from Chalcis.

Regarding the Amphipolitans, Bottiæans, Acanthians, Mendæans: neither Amyntas nor Chalcis is to make friendly relations independently, but with common consent if it seems to both parties to be of common advantage to admit them to alliance.

(Formula of oath, very fragmentary.)

II. PHILIP

1. SUMMARY OF HIS DEEDS

It was under Philip II that Macedon became a real political force. Hitherto the disunion and bitter jealousy of the tribes, the many claimants for the throne, and the lack of a well-organized army had prevented this.

Philip's sensible plan was to secure affairs at home by uniting the tribes and by training a most efficient fighting machine, and then to extend his conquests farther.

Such a method of expansion was bound to bring him into conflict with the Greek cities, particularly those in Thrace and Chalcidice. This district was especially desirable for him to secure, both because of its nearness to Macedonia and its great wealth of gold mines.

Diodorus, XVI, i, 3–6 (tr. Booth, Vol. II, p. 77)

Since, therefore, we are come to the affairs of Philip, son of Amyntas, we shall, according to the former rule, endeavour to comprehend in this book all the actions of this king. For he reigned as king of Macedon two-and-thirty years, and, making use at first but of small means, at length advanced his kingdom to the greatest in Europe; and made Macedon, which at the time of his coming to the crown was under the servile yoke of the Illyrians, mistress of many potent cities and countries. And through his valour the Grecian cities voluntarily submitted themselves to him, and made him general of all Greece. And having subdued those that robbed and spoiled the temple at Delphos, coming in aid of the god there, he was made a member of the senate of the Amphictyons; and as a reward of his zeal to the gods, the right of voting in the senate which belonged to the Phocians, whom he had overcome, was allotted to him.

After he overcame the Illyrians, Pæones, Thracians, Scythians, and the countries adjoining them, his thoughts were wholly employed how to destroy the Persian monarchy. But, after he had freed all the Grecian cities, and was promised forces to be raised for the expedition into Asia, in the midst of all his preparations he was prevented by death: but he left those, and so many more forces behind him, that his son Alexander had no occasion to make use of the assistance of his confederates in overturning the Persian empire. And all those things he did not so much by the favour of fortune, as by the greatness of his own valour: for this king excelled most in the art of a general, stoutness of spirit, and clearness of judgment and apprehension. But that we may not in a preface set forth his actions beforehand, we shall proceed to the orderly course of the history, making some short remarks on the times that went before.

2. SUCCESS IN THE NORTH

Diodorus, XVI, viii, 1–7 (tr. Booth, Vol. II, pp. 84–85)

About the same time, Philip king of Macedon, after his victory over the Illyrians in that great battle, having subdued all them that dwelt as far as to the marches of Lychnitis, and made an honourable

peace with them, returned into Macedonia. And having thus by his valour raised up and supported the tottering state and condition of the Macedonians, his name became great and famous among them. Afterwards, being provoked by the many injuries of them of Amphipolis, he marched against them with a great army, and applying his engines of battery to the walls, made fierce and continual assaults, and by the battering rams threw down part of the wall, and entered into the city through the ruins, with the slaughter of many that opposed him; and forthwith banished his chief enemies, and graciously spared the rest.

This city, by reason of its commodious situation in Thrace, and its neighbourhood to other places, was of great advantage to Philip; for he presently after took Pydna; but made a league with the Olynthians, and promised to give up Potidea to them, which they had a long time before much coveted. For since the city of the Olynthians was rich, potent, and populous, and upon that account was a place of great advantage in time of war, therefore those that were ambitious to enlarge their dominion, strove always to gain it: so that both the Athenians and Philip earnestly contended which of them should prevail in having them for their confederates. But however, Philip having taken Potidea, drew out the Athenian garrison, and treated them with great civility, and suffered them to return to Athens; for he bore a great respect to the people of Athens, because that city was eminent and famous for its power and grandeur.

He likewise delivered up Pydna (which he had subdued) to the Olynthians, and gave them all the grounds and territories belonging to it. Thence he marched to Cremides, which he enlarged, and made more populous, and called it after his own name, Philippi. Besides, he so improved the gold mines that were in those parts (which before were but inconsiderable and obscure), that by building work-houses he advanced them to bring in a yearly revenue of above a thousand talents. So that heaping up abundance of riches, in a short time, by the confluence of his wealth, he advanced the kingdom of Macedonia to a higher degree of majesty and glory than ever it was before: for he coined pieces of gold (called from him Philippics), and by the help thereof, raised a great army of mercenaries, and bribed many of the Grecians to betray their country.

Diodorus, XVI, liii, 2–liv, 4 (tr. Booth, Vol. II, p. 125)

At the same time Philip made an expedition against the cities of the Hellespont, of which Mecyberna and Torone were betrayed into his hands. Then he made against Olynthus (the greatest city of those parts) with a very numerous army, and having first routed the Olynthians in two battles, he laid siege to the town; upon which he made many assaults, and lost a great number of his men in their approaches to the walls. At length, by bribing Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the chief magistrates of Olynthus, he entered the city by treachery, and plundered it, and sold all the citizens for slaves, and exposed to sale all the prey and plunder under the spear. Whereby he furnished himself with abundance of money for carrying on the war, and put all the rest of the cities into a terrible fright.

Then he bountifully rewarded such as had behaved themselves with courage and valour, and having exacted vast sums of money from the richest of the citizens of the surrounding cities, he made use of it to corrupt many to betray their country; so that he himself often boasted that he had enlarged his dominion more by his gold than by his sword.

In the meantime, the Athenians being jealous of the growing greatness of Philip, ever after sent aid to them whom he invaded by his arms, and despatched ambassadors to all the cities to desire them to look to their liberties, and to put to death such of their citizens as should be discovered to go about to betray them, promising withal to join with them on all occasions. At length they proclaimed open war against Philip.

Demosthenes the orator (at that time the most eminent in politics and eloquence of all the Grecians) was the chief instrument that incited the Athenians to take upon them the defence of all Greece: but the city could not cure that desire of treason that infected many of the citizens; so many traitors there were at that time all over Greece. And therefore it is reported, that Philip having an earnest desire to gain that once strong and eminent city, and one of the inhabitants of the place telling him it could never be taken by force, he asked him whether it were not possible that gold might mount the walls; for he had learnt by experience, that

those who could not be subdued by force, were easily overcome by gold. To this end he had, by means of his bribes, procured traitors in every city; and such as would receive his money, he called his friends and guests. And thus with evil communications he corrupted men's manners.

3. ACTIVITY AGAINST ATHENS

Diodorus, XVI, lxxxiv, 1–lxxxvii, 3 (tr. Booth, Vol. II, pp. 149–152)

When Charondas executed the office of lord-chancellor of Athens, and Lucius Æmilius, and Caius Plotius, were Roman consuls, Philip king of Macedon being in amity with many of the Grecians, made it his chief business to bring under the Athenians, thereby with more ease to gain the sovereignty of Greece. To that end, he presently possessed himself of Elatea, and brought all his forces thither, with a design to fall upon the Athenians, hoping easily to overcome them, since they were not (as he conceived) prepared for war, by reason of the peace lately made with them; which fell out accordingly. For after the taking of Elatea, some hastened in the night to Athens, informing them that Elatea was taken by the Macedonians, and that Philip was designing to invade Attica with all his forces. The Athenian commanders, surprised with the suddenness of the thing, sent for all the trumpeters, and commanded an alarm to be sounded all night: upon which, the report flew through all parts of the city, and fear roused up the courage of the citizens. As soon as day appeared, the people, without any summons from the magistrate (as the custom was), all flocked to the theatre. To which place, as soon as the commanders came, with the messenger that brought the news, and had declared to them the business, fear and silence filled the theatre, and none who were used to influence the people had a heart to give any advice. And although a crier called out to such as ought to declare their minds, what was to be done for their common security, yet none appeared who offered any thing of advice in the present exigency. The people therefore, in great terror and amazement, cast their eyes upon Demosthenes, who stood up and bid them be courageous, and advised them forthwith to send ambassadors to Thebes, to treat with the Bœotians to join with them in defence of the common

liberty; for the shortness of time (he said) would not admit of an embassy of aid from the other confederates, for that the king would probably invade Attica within two days; and seeing that he must march through Bœotia, the main and only assistance was to be expected from them. And it was not to be doubted, but that Philip, who was in league with the Bœotians, would in his march solicit them to make war upon the Athenians. The people approved of his advice, and a decree was forthwith recorded, that an embassy should be despatched as Demosthenes had advised. But then it was debated, who was the most eloquent person, and so most fit to undertake this affair. Whereupon, Demosthenes being pitched on to be the man, he readily complied, forthwith hastened away, prevailed with the Bœotians, and returned to Athens. The Athenians therefore, having now doubled their forces by the accession of the Bœotians, began again to be in good heart; and presently made Chares and Lysicles generals, with command to march with the whole army into Bœotia. All the youth readily offered themselves to be enlisted, and therefore the army with a swift march came suddenly to Chæronea in Bœotia. The Bœotians wondered at the quickness of their approach, and were thereupon as diligent themselves, and hastening to their arms, marched away to meet the Athenians; and being joined, they there expected the enemy.

Philip indeed had first sent ambassadors to the council of the Bœotians, amongst whom the most famous was Python; for he was so eminent for eloquence, that in the senate he was set up to encounter Demosthenes in the business relating to the confederacy, excelling indeed the rest by far, but judged inferior to Demosthenes. Demosthenes himself, in one of his orations, glories (as if he had done some mighty thing) in a speech of his against this orator, in these words: — "Then I yielded not a jot to Python, strutting in his confidence, as if he would have overwhelmed me with a torrent of words." However, though Philip could not prevail with the Bœotians to be his confederates, yet he resolved to fight with them both. To this end (after a stay for some time for those forces that were to join him), he marched into Bœotia with an army of at least thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse. Both armies were now ready to engage, for courage and valour neither giving

place to the other; but as to number of men, and skill in martial affairs, the king was far superior. For, having fought very many battles, and for the most part coming off a conqueror, he had gained much experience in matters of war; on the other hand, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus (the Athenians' best commanders), were now dead; and Chares, the chief of them that were left, differed but little from a common soldier, as to the wisdom and conduct of a general. About sun-rising, the armies on both sides drew up in battalia. The king ordered his son Alexander (who was then newly come to man's estate, and had even at that time given evident demonstration of his valour, and the sprightliness of his spirit in managing affairs) to command one wing, joining with him some of the best of his commanders. He himself, with a choice body of men, commanded the other wing, and placed and disposed the regiments and brigades in such posts and stations as the present occasion required. The Athenians marshalled their army according to the several nations, and committed one part to the Bœotians, and commanded the rest themselves. At length the armies engaged, and a fierce and bloody battle was fought, which continued a long time with great slaughter on both sides, uncertain which way victory would incline, until Alexander, earnest to give an indication of his valour to his father, charged with a more than ordinary heat and vigour, and, being assisted by many stout and brave men, was the first that broke through the main body of the enemy next to him, with the slaughter of many, and bore down all before him; and, when those that seconded him did the like, then the regiments next to the former were broke to pieces. At length, the earth being strewed with heaps of dead carcases, those with Alexander first put the wing opposed to them to flight. The king himself, likewise, at the head of this regiment, fought with no less courage and resolution; and, that the glory of the victory might not be attributed to his son, he forced the enemy opposed to him to give ground, and at length totally routed them, and so was the chief instrument of the victory. There were above a thousand Athenians killed in this battle, and no fewer than two thousand taken prisoners. A great number likewise of the Bœotians were slain, and many fell into the hands of the enemy.

After the battle, Philip set up a trophy, and, having given liberty for the burying of the dead, he sacrificed to the gods for the victory, and distributed rewards to the soldiers who had signalised their valour, according as every one had deserved.

Some report, that Philip, having appointed a wanton and luxurious banquet with his friends, in ostentation of his victory, in his cups passing through the throng of the prisoners, most contumeliously taunted the miserable wretches with their misfortune. Whereupon Demades the orator, one of the captives, spoke boldly to him, and framed a discourse, in order to curb the pride and petulance of the king, in words to this effect—"Since Fortune, O king, has represented thee like Agamemnon, art thou not ashamed to act the part of Thersites?" With this sharp reproof, they say, Philip was so startled, that he wholly changed his former course, and not only laid aside the coronets, and all other badges of pride and wantonness that attended his festivals, but, with admiration, released the man that had reprehended him, and advanced him to places of honour. In conclusion, he became so far complaisant, and moulded into the civilities of Athens, through his converse with Demades, that he released all the captives without ransom; and, remitting his pride and haughtiness (the constant attendant upon victory), he sent ambassadors to Athens, and renewed the peace with them; and, placing a garrison in Thebes, made peace likewise with the Bœotians.

4. PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF ASIA

Diodorus, XVI, lxxxix, 1–3 (tr. Booth, Vol. II, pp. 152–153)

Phrynichus bore the office of chief magistrate of Athens, and Titus Manlius Torquatus, and Publius Decius, were invested with the consular dignity at Rome, when Philip, bearing himself very haughtily, on account of his victory at Chæronea, and having struck a terror into the most eminent cities of Greece, made it his great business to be chosen generalissimo of all Greece. It being therefore noised abroad, that he would make war upon the Persians, for the advantage of the Grecians, and that he would revenge the impiety by them committed against things sacred to the gods, he presently won the hearts of the Grecians.

He was very liberal and courteous likewise to all, both private men and communities, and published to the cities, that he had a desire to consult with them concerning matters relating to the public good. Whereupon a general council was called, and held at Corinth, where he declared his design to make war upon the Persians, and what probable grounds there were of success, and therefore desired the council to join with him as confederates in the war.

At length he was created general of all Greece, with absolute power, and thereupon he made mighty preparations for that expedition; and, having ordered what quota of men every city should send forth, he returned into Macedonia. And thus stood the affairs and concerns of Philip.

The following passages will suggest how Philip's plan seemed to the Greeks, some of whom by compulsion or because of sympathy with the plan became his allies. The Greek states were as usual divided not only among themselves but also within themselves.

In Athens, for instance, there were those who looked at Philip's policy in a broad way and thought that it stood for a fine large idea; others in a craven spirit advocated alliance because of Philip's great strength; while on the other hand men like Demosthenes, who regarded Philip as a mere barbarian and outsider, advocated resistance to the last ditch.

Isocrates was one of the first group. He felt that in Philip there had at last come the man who was fitted to carry out the dream of pan-Hellenic unity which he never tired of reiterating. He believed that the leadership of Philip was consistent with Greek independence, and as far as we can see it was only when Philip needed to make a special point or to make an example of a rebellious city that he adopted unnecessary severity. Certainly he had a great admiration for Athens, and his highest ambition was to be regarded as a Greek among Greeks and so be chosen as president of the Amphictionic Council.

When it was impossible for him with honor to keep out of war with Athens, as well as after Chæronea, he treated his conquered enemy with great moderation.

ISOCRATES, *Philippus*, V, 14–16

Knowing these things, I elected to address my discourse to you, not making this choice to win your favour, although it is true, I should consider it of great importance to speak in a manner acceptable to you, but it was not to this end that I directed my thoughts. But I saw that all the other men of repute were living under the rule of states and laws, without power to do anything but obey orders, and besides were far too weak for the enterprise which I shall propose, while to you alone had fortune given full power to send ambassadors to whomsoever you chose and to receive them from whomsoever you pleased, and to say whatever you should deem it expedient to say, and besides this, that you were the possessor to a greater degree than any man in Hellas of wealth and power, the only two things in existence which can both persuade and compel; things, too, which I think will be required by the enterprise which I am going to propose. For my intention is to advise you to take the lead both in securing the harmony of Hellas and in conducting the expedition against the barbarians; and persuasion is expedient with the Greeks, and force useful with the barbarians. Such, then, is the general scope of my discourse.

ISOCRATES, *Philippus*, V, 30–31

I will now direct my remarks to my subject itself. I say that, while neglecting none of your private interests, you ought to try to effect a reconciliation between Argos, Sparta, Thebes, and our state; for if you are able to bring these together, you will have no difficulty in causing the other states to agree; for they are all under the influence of those which I have mentioned, and when in fear take refuge with one or other of those states, and draw their succours from thence. So that if you can persuade four states only to be wise, you will release the rest also from many evils.

Isocrates, *Philippus*, V, 68–71

Now consider the fitness of devoting yourself mainly to enterprises of that kind, in which by success you will place your reputation in competition with the first and foremost, and if you fail in your expectation you will at least win the goodwill of Hellas, the acquisition of which is a far nobler thing than the forcible capture of many Greek cities. For such achievements bring envy and ill-will and much evil speaking, but the course which I have advised involves none of these things. Nay, if some god should give you the choice of the kind of pursuit and occupation in which you would long to pass your life, you would choose no other, if you took my advice, in preference to this. For not only will you be deemed happy by others, but you will recognize your own bliss. For what could surpass the happiness of your position, when from the greatest states the men of most renown are come as ambassadors to your throne, and you take counsel with them about the common welfare, for which no other man will appear to have taken such thought: when, further, you perceive that the whole of Hellas is on tiptoe in regard to the proposals you may make, and no one is indifferent to what is decided upon at your court, but some make inquiries concerning the state of affairs, others pray to Heaven that you may not fail to obtain the object of your desires, while others are afraid that something may happen to you before you have accomplished your undertaking? If you should succeed, you would have a right to be proud, and could not help feeling highly delighted all your life in the knowledge that you had been at the head of so great an undertaking. Who of the number of those who are endowed with even moderate reasoning powers would not exhort you to give the preference to such actions as are able to produce at the same time the fruits of surpassing pleasure and imperishable honour?

Isocrates, *Philippus*, V, 83–86

In regard to myself and the course of action you ought to pursue in reference to the Hellenes, you have heard nearly all I have to say; concerning the expedition to Asia, I will give my advice to the cities, which I said it should be your task to reconcile, as to the proper manner of carrying on war against the barbarians, when I

see them united; at present, I will address myself to you, although not with the same feelings as at the time when I wrote on the same subject. For then I invited my hearers to cover me with laughter and contempt, if I should appear to have spoken in a manner unworthy of the position of affairs, of my own reputation, and of the time spent on the composition of my speech, whereas now I am afraid that perhaps my discourse may fall far short of the claims I have advanced. Besides, the speech I delivered at the festival, which has afforded abundant material to those who devote themselves to the study of practical philosophy, has greatly crippled my own resources. For I neither wish to repeat what I have already written, nor can I find anything new to say. However, I must not on that account shrink from the duty, but must say whatever presents itself as likely to assist in persuading you to undertake the task which is the subject of my speech. For even should I fall short in any respect, and prove unable to write after the style of my former publications, yet I think that I shall at least be able to give an interesting outline to those who are able to fill in and complete it.

I think that I have commenced my whole discourse in such a manner as befits those who recommend a campaign against Asia. For nothing ought to be done until one finds the Hellenes doing one of two things: either rendering actual assistance, or showing themselves decidedly favourable to the undertaking. Agesilaus, although he had the reputation of being the most prudent amongst the Lacedæmonians, neglected this, not from feebleness of intellect, but from ambition.

Isocrates, *Philippus*, V, 127–131

For these reasons I think that it is to your interest, when everyone else is so cowardly minded, to put yourself at the head of the expedition against the King. And while it is the duty of the others, who are descendants of Heracles, and are united by polity and laws, to love *that* state in which they happen to dwell, it behoves you, as one who has been released from individual obligations, to look upon the whole of Hellas as your fatherland, in the same manner as the father of your race, and to be ready to face danger on its behalf as readily as on behalf of those who are your especial care.

Perhaps some of those who are fit to do nothing else may venture to blame me, because I have chosen to exhort you to undertake the campaign against the barbarians and the care of all the Hellenes, and have passed over my own city. Now, if I were undertaking to address myself on these points to others rather than to my own native city, which has thrice freed Hellas, twice from the barbarians, and once from the rule of Lacedæmon, I would allow that I was wrong; but, as it is, it will be seen that I have exhorted Athens before all other cities, with the greatest earnestness of which I was capable, to undertake the task, but, when I perceived that she thought less of what I said than of those who rave upon the platform, I left her alone, but, notwithstanding, did not abandon my efforts. Wherefore all might fitly praise me because, as far as the powers I possess permitted me, I have persistently waged war against the barbarians, accused those who did not hold the same opinion as myself, and endeavoured to induce those, whom I hope will be best able to do so, to render some service to the Hellenes, and to deprive the barbarians of their present prosperity. For this reason I now address my words to you, well aware that many will be jealous of them when uttered by me, but that all will rejoice alike at the same undertakings when accomplished by you. For, although no one has taken part in what I have proposed, everyone will think that he is entitled to a share in the advantages that will result from it.

Isocrates, *Philippus*, V, 154–155

It remains to summarize what I have said before, that, in as few words as possible, you may understand the chief point of my advice. I say that you ought to be the benefactor of the Hellenes, the king of Macedonia, and the ruler over as many barbarians as possible. If you succeed in this, all will be grateful to you, the Hellenes by reason of advantages enjoyed, the Macedonians, if you govern them like a king and not like a despot, and the rest of mankind, if they are freed by you from barbarian sway and gain the protection of Hellas. How far my composition is duly proportioned and accurate in expression, I may reasonably expect to learn from you my hearers; but that no one could give you advice that is better than this, or more adapted to present circumstances, of that I feel convinced.

III. Demosthenes

1. His policy of resistance

Demosthenes, however, was Philip's inveterate foe and strongest adversary. Diodorus speaks of Demosthenes as the most eminent in policy and eloquence of all the Greeks. Sober critics are inclined to believe that the brilliance of his oratory blinds us to the unsoundness of his political views, but no one can fail to be thrilled by the gallant spirit with which he fought a losing cause.

Plutarch, *Demosthenes*, 12–13

His first entering into public business was much about the time of the Phocian war, as he himself affirms, and may be collected from his Philippic orations. For of these, some were made after that action was over, and the earliest of them refer to its concluding events. It is certain that he engaged in the accusation of Midias when he was but two-and-thirty years old, having as yet no interest or reputation as a politician. And this it was, I consider, that induced him to withdraw the action, and accept a sum of money as a compromise. For of himself —

> He was no easy or good-natured man,

but of a determined disposition, and resolute to see himself righted; however, finding it a hard matter and above his strength to deal with Midias, a man so well secured on all sides with money, eloquence, and friends, he yielded to the entreaties of those who interceded for him. But had he seen any hopes or possibility of prevailing, I cannot believe that three thousand drachmas could have taken off the edge of his revenge. The object which he chose for himself in the commonwealth was noble and just, the defence of the Grecians against Philip; and in this he behaved himself so worthily that he soon grew famous, and excited attention everywhere for his eloquence and courage in speaking. He was admired through all Greece, the King of Persia courted him, and by Philip himself he was more esteemed than all the other orators. His very enemies were forced to confess that

they had to do with a man of mark; for such a character even Æschines and Hyperides give him, where they accuse and speak against him.

So that I cannot imagine what ground Theopompus had to say that Demosthenes was of a fickle, unsettled disposition, and could not long continue firm either to the same men or the same affairs; whereas the contrary is most apparent, for the same party and post in politics which he held from the beginning, to these he kept constant to the end; and was so far from leaving them while he lived that he chose rather to forsake his life than his purpose. He was never heard to apologise for shifting sides like Demades, who would say he often spoke against himself, but never against the city; nor as Melanopus, who, being generally against Callistratus, but being often bribed off with money, was wont to tell the people, "The man indeed is my enemy, but we must submit for the good of our country"; nor again as Nicodemus, the Messenian, who having first appeared on Cassander's side, and afterwards taken part with Demetrius, said the two things were not in themselves contrary, it being always most advisable to obey the conqueror. We have nothing of this kind to say against Demosthenes, as one who would turn aside or prevaricate, either in word or deed. There could not have been less variation in his public acts if they had all been played, so to say, from first to last, from the same score. Panætius, the philosopher, said that most of his orations are so written as if they were to prove this one conclusion, that what is honest and virtuous is for itself only to be chosen; as that of the Crown, that against Aristocrates, that for the Immunities, and the Philippics; in all which he persuades his fellow-citizens to pursue not that which seems most pleasant, easy, or profitable; but declares, over and over again, that they ought in the first place to prefer that which is just and honourable before their own safety and preservation. So that if he had kept his hands clean, if his courage for the wars had been answerable to the generosity of his principles, and the dignity of his orations, he might deservedly have his name placed, not in the number of such orators as Mœrocles, Polyeuctus, and Hyperides, but in the highest rank with Cimon, Thucydides, and Pericles.

PLUTARCH, *Demosthenes*, 17–18

But when things came at last to war, Philip on the one side being not able to live in peace, and the Athenians, on the other side, being stirred up by Demosthenes, the first action he put them upon was the reducing of Eubœa, which, by the treachery of the tyrants, was brought under subjection to Philip. And on his proposition, the decree was voted, and they crossed over thither and chased the Macedonians out of the island. The next was the relief of the Byzantines and Perinthians, whom the Macedonians at that time were attacking. He persuaded the people to lay aside their enmity against these cities, to forget the offences committed by them in the Confederate War, and to send them such succours as eventually saved and secured them. Not long after, he undertook an embassy through the states of Greece, which he solicited and so far incensed against Philip that, a few only excepted, he brought them all into a general league. So that, besides the forces composed of the citizens themselves, there was an army consisting of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, and the money to pay these strangers was levied and brought in with great cheerfulness. On which occasion it was, says Theophrastus, on the allies requesting that their contributions for the war might be ascertained and stated, Crobylus, the orator, made use of the saying, "War can't be fed at so much a day." Now was all Greece up in arms, and in great expectation what would be the event. The Eubœans, the Achæans, the Corinthians, the Megarians, the Leucadians, and Corcyræans, their people and their cities, were all joined together in a league. But the hardest task was yet behind, left for Demosthenes, to draw the Thebans into this confederacy with the rest. Their country bordered next upon Attica, they had great forces for the war, and at that time they were accounted the best soldiers of all Greece, but it was no easy matter to make them break with Philip, who, by many good offices, had so lately obliged them in the Phocian war; especially considering how the subjects of dispute and variance between the two cities were continually renewed and exasperated by petty quarrels, arising out of the proximity of their frontiers.

But after Philip, being now grown high and puffed up with his good success at Amphissa, on a sudden surprised Elatea and

possessed himself of Phocis, and the Athenians were in a great consternation, none durst venture to rise up to speak, no one knew what to say, all were at a loss, and the whole assembly in silence and perplexity, in this extremity of affairs Demosthenes was the only man who appeared, his counsel to them being alliance with the Thebans. And having in other ways encouraged the people, and, as his manner was, raised their spirits up with hopes, he, with some others, was sent ambassador to Thebes. To oppose him, as Marsyas says, Philip also sent thither his envoys, Amyntas and Clearchus, two Macedonians, besides Daochus, a Thessalian, and Thrasydæus. Now the Thebans, in their consultations, were well enough aware what suited best with their own interest, but every one had before his eyes the terrors of war, and their losses in the Phocian troubles were still recent: but such was the force and power of the orator, fanning up, as Theopompus says, their courage, and firing their emulation, that, casting away every thought of prudence, fear, or obligation, in a sort of divine possession, they chose the path of honour, to which his words invited them. And this success, thus accomplished by an orator, was thought to be so glorious and of such consequence, that Philip immediately sent heralds to treat and petition for a peace: all Greece was aroused, and up in arms to help. And the commanders-in-chief, not only of Attica, but of Bœotia, applied themselves to Demosthenes, and observed his directions. He managed all the assemblies of the Thebans, no less than those of the Athenians; he was beloved both by the one and by the other, and exercised the same supreme authority with both; and that not by unfair means, or without just cause, as Theopompus professes, but indeed it was no more than was due to his merit.

2. AGGRESSIVE ACTION URGED

The public speeches of Demosthenes are of course the best expression of his own policy. He claimed to see farther ahead than most of his fellow citizens, and reproached them for their apathy in having allowed Philip to get such a good start in his aggressive policy before they woke up to the fact. Remissness, tardiness,

indifference, negligence — these, according to him, are the true causes and not Macedonian strength as contrasted with Athenian weakness. He urges Athens to take immediate action and prepare a fleet and troops, to adopt some definite policy, and to be ready for what may occur instead of wasting endless time in fruitless discussion.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Philippic*, 2–7

First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the same, there would be no hope of amendment.

Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember; how vast a power the Lacedæmonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples the strength of the Lacedæmonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidæa and Methone and all the region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion. But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of war, that the possessions of

the absent naturally belong to the present, those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such principle, he has won everything and keeps it, either by way of conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side with and respect those whom they see prepared and willing to make proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now, though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give his service to the state, be ready to give it without excuse, the wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing himself, while his neighbour does everything for him, you shall then with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been frittered away, and chastise Philip.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Philippic*, 8–12

Do not imagine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are those who hate and fear and envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has advanced who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and, whilst we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then, Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now? Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one another: — Is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should anything befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his own strength as by our negligence. And again; should

anything happen to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them as you pleased; but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis, you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor counsels at hand.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Philippic*, 16–27

First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships, and hold ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require also an equipment of transports for half the cavalry and sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden marches from his own country to Thermopylæ, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to Eubœa, and formerly (they say) to Haliartus, and very lately to Thermopylæ. And although you should not pursue just the course I would advise, it is no slight matter that Philip, knowing you to be in readiness — know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own people who report everything to him — may either keep quiet from apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard, there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in hand some force that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper, but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend — and beware of doing what has often been injurious — thinking all measures below the occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish the least — rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it afterwards, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers in all, five hundred

to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right, serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so as to relieve one another: the rest should be mercenaries. And with them two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.

Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force, therefore, must not be over-large (for there is not pay or subsistence) nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary troops at Corinth, commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others, and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told that these mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the Lacedæmonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves, they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go off to Artabazus or anywhere rather, and the general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses both of general and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as inspectors of the general's conduct. The way we manage things now is a mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed, you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians, should there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own commanders, that the force might really be the state's? Or

should your general of horse sail to Lemnos, while Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting for your possessions? I speak not as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the person be.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Philippic*, 31–33

I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and the whole arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of the hostile country, and consider that Philip by the winds and seasons of the year gets the start in most of his operations, watching for the trade-winds or the winter to commence them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On this account, we must carry on the war not with hasty levies (or we shall be too late for everything) but with a permanent force and power. You may use as winter quarters for your troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Sciathus, and the islands in that neighbourhood, which have harbours and corn and all necessaries for an army. In the season of the year, when it is easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they will easily take their station off the coast itself and at the entrances of the seaports.

How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed by you will determine as occasion requires. What you must find is stated in my bill. If, men of Athens, you will furnish the supplies which I mention, and then, after completing your preparations of soldiers, ships, cavalry, will oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service, and, while you become your own paymasters and commissaries, demand from your general an account of his conduct, you will cease to be always discussing the same questions without forwarding them in the least, and besides, Athenians, you will cut off his greatest revenue.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Philippic*, 41–46

Yet you, Athenians, with larger means than any people — ships, infantry, cavalry, and revenue — have never up to this day made proper use of any of them; and your war with Philip differs in no respect from the boxing of barbarians. For among them the party struck feels always for the blow; strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look in the face he cannot nor

will. So you, if you hear of Philip in the Chersonese, vote to send relief there, if at Thermopylæ, the same; if anywhere else, you run after his heels up and down, and are commanded by him; no plan have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see beforehand, only when you learn that something is done, or about to be done. Formerly perhaps this was allowable: now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our proceedings, has put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of things, which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that none of you, Athenians, notices with concern and anger, that the beginning of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will not stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for this? And if you despatch empty galleys and hopes from this or that person, think ye all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not make a descent upon his coast? Where, then, shall we land? some one asks. The war itself, men of Athens, will discover the rotten parts of his empire, if we make a trial; but if we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse and malign one another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, where a portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with the rest, Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but where you send out a general and an empty decree and hopes from the hustings, nothing that you desire is done; your enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of such an armament. For it is impossible — aye, impossible, for one man to execute all your wishes: to promise, and assert, and accuse this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are ruined. The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here are persons easily found, who tell you lies of his conduct; you vote at random from what you hear: what then can be expected?

In particular Demosthenes advises helping the Olynthians, and securing control in the Chersonese.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Olynthiac*, 8–16

You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when we returned from succouring the Eubœans, and Hierax and Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform, urging us to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of Eubœa, you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna, Potidæa, Methone, Pagasæ, and the other places (not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt and reasonable succour, we should have found Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king of Macedon ever was. Here then is come a crisis, this of Olynthus, self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks, men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our acceptance, I must regard as manifestations of divine favour. It is much the same as in money matters. If a man keep what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if he lose it by imprudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation. So in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even the good which the gods send them; for every prior event is judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athenians, we must be exceedingly careful of our future measures, that by amendment therein we may efface the shame of the past. Should we abandon these men too, and Philip reduce Olynthus, let any one tell me what is to prevent him marching where he pleases? Does any one of you Athenians compute or consider the

means by which Philip, originally weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidæa next, Methone afterwards, he invaded Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pheræ, Pagasæ, Magnesia, everywhere exactly as he pleased, he departed for Thrace; where, after displacing some kings and establishing others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Pæonia, that against Arymbas, and some others.

Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you, Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one thing after another, and the activity which forms part of Philip's habit and existence, which makes it impossible for him to rest content with his achievements. If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has done, and yours, to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what the end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple as not to know that the war yonder will soon be here, if we are careless? And should this happen, I fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so will it be with us: found to have paid dear for our idleness and self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts, and struggle for the salvation of our country.

DEMOSTHENES, *First Olynthiac*, 17–20

I say then, you must give a two-fold assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns, and send out troops for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the expedition will be fruitless. For should he, suffering your incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will easily march to the defence of his kingdom; or, should you only throw succour into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time prevail over the besieged. Your assistance therefore must be effective, and two-fold.

Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund than any people; and you receive it just as you please. If ye will assign

this to your troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or rather ye have none at all. How then? some man may exclaim: do you move that this be a military fund? Verily, not I. My opinion indeed is, that there should be soldiers raised, and a military fund, and one and the same regulation for receiving and performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that all must contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little. Money must be had; without it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other ways and means. Choose which ye think expedient; and put hands to the work, while it is yet time.

After Amphipolis was taken by Philip in 358 a decree was passed, exiling friends of Athens from the city. There had been a pro-Athenian as well as a pro-Macedonian party, but henceforth Athenian influence was to be made as slight as possible.

Philon and Stratocles are the two men from Amphipolis to whom Demosthenes refers.

Hicks and Hill, 125

FRIENDS OF ATHENS BANISHED FROM AMPHIPOLIS, B.C. 358–357

Voted by the people:

That Philon and Stratocles and their sons be exiled forever from Amphipolis and the land of the Amphipolitans, and if they are captured anywhere they shall be treated as enemies and put to death without penalty. And their property is to be confiscated by the state and one tenth to be sacred to Apollo and the Strymon.

The presidents shall inscribe their names on a stone stele. And if anyone moves to reconsider this question or receives them (i.e. Philon and Stratocles and their sons) back again by any craft or scheme whatsoever, his property is to be confiscated and he too is to be exiled from Amphipolis forever.

In answer to those who object to war on the grounds that Philip has not been fighting against Athens, — that he has only been aggressive toward the northern cities, — Demosthenes gives a brilliant character study of Philip and his methods.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Chersonese*, 44–51

None of you surely is so foolish as to suppose that Philip covets those miseries in Thrace (for what else can one call Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and the places which he is taking and conquering now?) and to get them endures toils and winters and the extreme of danger, but covets not the Athenian harbours, and docks, and galleys, and silver-mines, and revenues of such value; and that he will suffer you to keep them, while for the sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he winters in the midst of horrors. Impossible. The object of that and every other enterprise is to become master here. What then is the duty of wise men? With these assurances and convictions, to lay aside an indolence which is becoming outrageous and incurable, to pay contributions and to call upon your allies, see to and provide for the continuance of the present force, that, as Philip has a power ready to injure and enslave all the Greeks, so you may have one ready to save and to succour all. It is not possible with hasty levies to perform any effective service. You must have an army on foot, provide maintenance for it, and paymasters and commissaries, so ordering it that the strictest care shall be taken of your funds, and demand from those officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of the campaign. If ye so act and so resolve in earnest, you will compel Philip to observe a just peace and abide in his own country (the greatest of all blessings), or you will fight him on equal terms.

It may be thought, and truly enough, that these are affairs of great expense and toil and trouble: yet only consider what the consequences to us must be, if we decline these measures, and you will find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose some god would be your surety — for certainly no mortal could guarantee such an event — that, notwithstanding you kept quiet and abandoned everything, Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Zeus and all the gods, it were disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the character of Athens and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish ease to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my own part, I would rather die than have given such counsel; though, if another man advises it, and you are satisfied,

well and good; make no resistance, abandon all. If, however, no man holds this opinion, if, on the contrary, we all foresee, that the more we let Philip conquer the more ruthless and powerful an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what excuse for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to perform our duty? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be called the necessity of freemen is not only come but past long ago; and surely you must deprecate that of slaves. What is the difference? To a freeman, the greatest necessity is shame for his proceedings; I know not what greater you can suggest: to a slave, stripes and bodily chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to mention!

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Chersonese*, 61–67

You must therefore be convinced that this is a struggle for existence: these men who have sold themselves to Philip you must execrate and cudgel to death; for it is impossible, impossible to overcome your enemies abroad, until you have punished your enemies (his ministers) at home. They will be the stumbling-blocks that prevent your reaching the others. Why do you suppose Philip now insults you (for to this, in my opinion, his conduct amounts), and while to other people, though he deceives them, he at least renders services, he is already threatening you? For example, the Thessalians by many benefits he seduced into their present servitude: how he cheated the wretched Olynthians, first giving them Potidæa and divers other things, no man can describe: now he is enticing the Thebans by giving up to them Bœotia, and delivering them from a toilsome and vexatious war. Thus did each of these people grasp a certain advantage, but some of them have suffered what all the world know, others will suffer what may hereafter befall them. From you — all that has been taken I recount not: but in the very making of the peace, how have you been abused! how despoiled! Of Phocis, Thermopylæ, places in Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes himself! Does he not now possess the city of Cardia and avow it? Wherefore, I say, deals he thus with other people, and not in the same manner with you? Because yours is the only state in which a privilege is allowed of speaking for the enemy, and an individual taking a bribe may safely address the

assembly, though you have been robbed of your dominions. It was not safe at Olynthus to be Philip's advocate, unless the Olynthian commonly had shared the advantage by possession of Potidæa: it was not safe in Thessaly to be Philip's advocate, unless the people of Thessaly had shared the advantage, by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylæan synod: it was not safe in Thebes, until he gave up Bœotia to them and destroyed the Phocians. Yet at Athens, though Philip has deprived you of Amphipolis and the Cardian territory, nay, is even making Eubœa a fortress to curb us, and advancing to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip's behalf. Therefore of these men, some, from being poor, have become rapidly rich, from nameless and obscure, have become honoured and distinguished; you have done the reverse, fallen from honour to obscurity, from wealth to poverty; for I deem the riches of a state, allies, confidence, attachment, of all which you are destitute. And from your neglecting these matters and suffering them to be lost, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the Greeks and barbarians, whilst you are abject and forlorn, magnificent in the abundance of your market, but in provision for actual need ridiculous. I observe, however, that some of our orators take different thought for you and for themselves. You, they say, should be quiet even under injustice; they cannot live in quiet among you themselves, though no man injures them.

DEMOSTHENES, *Third Philippic*, 6–14

If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war, one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or advises a measure of defence is in danger of being accused afterwards as author of the war.

I will first then examine and determine this point, whether it be in our power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if it depends on us (to begin with this), I say we ought

to maintain peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace, while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a madman, or he talks of a peace observed towards him by you, not towards you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.

If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with us, we are the simplest of mortals: for he would not declare that, though he marched even against Attica and Piræus, at least if we may judge from his conduct to others. For example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he was forty furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though before that time, whenever he was accused of such an intent, he took it ill and sent ambassadors to justify himself. Again, he marched towards the Phocians as if they were allies, and there were Phocian envoys who accompanied his march, and many among you contended that his advance would not benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late as a friend and ally, yet he has taken possession of Pheræ: and lastly he told these wretched people of Oreus, that he had sent his soldiers out of good-will to visit them, as he heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it was the part of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such occasions. People who would never have harmed him, though they might have adopted measures of defence, he chose to deceive rather than warn them of his attack; and think ye he would declare war against you before he began it, and that while you are willing to be deceived? Impossible. He would be the silliest of mankind, if, whilst you the injured parties make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own countrymen, he should terminate your intestine strife and jealousies, warn you to turn against him, and remove the pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to amuse you, that he makes no war upon Athens.

DEMOSTHENES, *Third Philippic*, 19–28

From the day that he destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend yourselves instantly, and I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may wish in vain to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other counsellors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion about Chersonesus or Byzantium out of place. Succour them — I advise that — watch that no harm befalls them, send all necessary supplies to your troops in that quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as being in the utmost peril. I must tell you why I am so alarmed at the state of our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct, you may share them, and make some provision at least for yourselves, however disinclined to do so for others: but if, in your judgment, I talk nonsense and absurdity, you may treat me as crazed, and not listen to me, either now or in future.

That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown mighty, that the Greeks are jealous and quarrelling among themselves, that it was far more wonderful for him to rise from that insignificance than it would now be, after so many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I observe that all people, beginning with you, have conceded to him a right, which in former times has been the subject of contest in every Grecian war. And what is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing and pillaging the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three years, the Lacedæmonians for twenty-nine; and the Thebans had some power in these latter times after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you, my countrymen, nor Thebans, nor Lacedæmonians, were ever licensed by the Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise. When you, or rather the Athenians of that time, appeared to be dealing harshly with certain people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens, thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her. So, when the Lacedæmonians became masters and succeeded to your empire, on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations, a general war was declared against them, even by such as had no cause of complaint. But wherefore

mention other people? We ourselves and the Lacedæmonians, although at the outset we could not allege any mutual injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done to our neighbours. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of Athens, than the wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip has been uppermost, he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay they are scarcely a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in a few words. Olynthus and Methone and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all which he has so cruelly destroyed that a visitor could hardly tell if they were ever inhabited: and of the Phocians, so considerable a people exterminated, I say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to parcel her out, not only by cities, but also by provinces, for subjection? Are not the Eubœan states governed now by despots, and that in an island near to Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Nor does he write so and not act accordingly. He is gone to the Hellespont; he marched formerly against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he possesses; he plotted lately to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains the man's ambition. And we, the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending embassies to one another about it, and expressing indignation, are in such a miserable state, so intrenched in our separate towns, that to this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we cannot combine, or form any association for succour and alliance; we look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving (methinks) to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or striving for the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant that Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is coming even on those that yet seem very far removed.

DEMOSTHENES, *Third Philippic*, 32–35

What is wanting to make his insolence complete? Besides his destruction of Grecian cities, does he not hold the Pythian games,

the common festival of Greece, and, if he comes not himself, send his vassals to preside? Is he not master of Thermopylæ and the passes into Greece, and holds he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole Amphictyonic body, and got preaudience of the oracle, to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Does he not write to the Thessalians what form of government to adopt? send mercenaries to Porthmus, to expel the Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler? Yet the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as they would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on himself, none trying to prevent it. And not only are the outrages which he does to Greece submitted to, but even the private wrongs of every people: nothing can go beyond this! Has he not wronged the Corinthians by attacking Ambracia and Leucas? the Achaians, by swearing to give Naupactus to the Ætolians? from the Thebans taken Echinus? Is he not marching against the Byzantines his allies? From us — I omit the rest — but keeps he not Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese? Still under these indignities we are all slack and disheartened, and look towards our neighbours, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And how think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how will he act when he gets each separately under his control?

DEMOSTHENES, *Third Philippic*, 36–44

But what has caused the mischief? There must be some cause, some good reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are eager for servitude. There was something, men of Athens, something in the hearts of the multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof has ruined all, and thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this? Nothing subtle or clever: simply that whoever took money from the aspirants for power or the corruptors of Greece were universally detested: it was dreadful to be convicted of bribery; the severest punishment was inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The favourable

moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against those that discharge all their duty, could not be bought from orators or generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor anything of the kind. But now all such principles have been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange, by which Greece is ruined and diseased. What are they? Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter if he confesses it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those that denounce the crime: all the usual attendants upon corruption. For as to ships and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be reckoned as constituting national strength — assuredly the Greeks of our day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless, unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these traffickers.

For meeting some of the expenses of the war Demosthenes had proposed the use of the theoric fund, or money given the citizens for theater tickets. This caused a great hue and cry, but Demosthenes defended the suggestion on the ground that it was better to give up amusements than to levy extra taxes.

DEMOSTHENES, *Third Olynthiac*, 19–32

But if anyone can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it may be asked. I grant it, if this were possible: but I wonder if any man ever was or will be able, after wasting his means in useless expenses, to find means for useful. The wishes of men are indeed a great help to such arguments, and therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit, for every man believes what he wishes, though the reality is often different. See then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and you will be able to serve and have pay. It becomes not a wise or magnanimous people to neglect military operations for want of money, and bear disgraces like these; or, while you snatch up arms to march against Corinthians and Megarians, to let Philip enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your troops.

I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offence: I am not so foolish or perverse as to provoke your displeasure without intending your good: but I think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement of the commonwealth to the gratification of his audience. And I hear, as perhaps you do, that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians after this form and fashion; — Aristides, Nicias, my namesake, Pericles. But since these orators have appeared who ask, What is your pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige you? the public welfare is complimented away for a moment's popularity, and these are the results; the orators thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what a summary contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours. It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you may still be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at home. Our forefathers, whom the speakers humoured not nor caressed, as these men caress you, for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks by general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious trophies they erected for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and consecrated furniture, that posterity have no power to surpass them. In private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our constitution, that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had, or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no grander than those of the neighbours. Their politics were not for money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth. By a conduct honourable towards the Greeks, pious to the gods, brotherlike among themselves they justly attained a high prosperity.

So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How fare they with you under the worthies of our time?

Is there any likéness or resemblance? I pass over other topics on which I could expatiate; but observe: in this utter absence of competitors (Lacedæmonians depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the supremacy with us) when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory, and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come forward and tell me, by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? Look at the men of whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from obscurity to honour; some have made their private houses more splendid than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined, their fortunes have been exalted.

What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously then, and now goes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his share of honour, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen dispose of emoluments; through them everything is done; you the people, enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you paltry beeves; and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be similar. By Demeter, I should not wonder, if I, for mentioning these things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects; I marvel indeed you have allowed it here.

3. FAILURE OF THE EMBASSY

While the question of war was still an open one, an embassy of which Demosthenes and Æschines were members was sent to Philip to see if any arrangement acceptable to the Athenians could be made. This embassy proved a signal failure and could only get terms of a most unfortunate peace. Demosthenes laid the blame on Æschines, whom he accused of taking a bribe from Philip, who was always glad to buy favors.

This speech, "On the Embassy," and the answer of Æschines are instances of the kind of abuse that was permitted in the Athenian courts.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Embassy*, 9–16

Many grievous things can I lay to his charge besides those which I have mentioned, O Athenians — enough to make every one detest him — but before I enter upon other topics, I will remind you (though nearly all indeed must remember) what character Æschines first assumed in politics, and what language he thought proper to address to the people against Philip, that you may see, his own early acts and speeches will most surely convict him of taking bribes.

He is the first Athenian (as he declared in his speech) who discovered that Philip was plotting against the Greeks, and corrupting certain of the leading men in Arcadia. He it is who, having Ischander, son of Neoptolemus, to play second part to him, applied to the council on this matter, and also to the people, and persuaded you to send ambassadors everywhere to assemble a congress at Athens for consulting about war with Philip; who afterwards, on his return from Arcadia, reported those fine long speeches, which he said he had delivered on your behalf before the ten thousand at Megalopolis, in answer to Philip's advocate Hieronymus, and dwelt on the enormous injury done, not only to their own countries, but to the whole of Greece, by the men who took presents and money from Philip. Such being his politics then, such the specimen which he had given of himself, when Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon, and the rest, who brought reports from Macedonia

without a word of truth, prevailed on you to send ambassadors to Philip for peace, this man is put into the embassy, not as one of a party who would sell your interests, not as one of those who trusted Philip, but as one who would help to watch the others; for, on account of his former speeches and hostility to Philip, you all naturally held that opinion of him. He came then to me, and arranged that we should act in the embassy together; and strongly urged, that we should both watch that impudent profligate Philocrates. And until his return home from the first embassy, men of Athens, I certainly never discovered that he was corrupted and had sold himself; for, besides the speeches which, as I said, he had made before, he rose in the first of the assemblies in which you debated on the peace, and began — I think I can repeat his opening to you in the very same words which he used — "Had Philocrates been meditating ever so long, men of Athens, upon the best means of opposing the peace, he could not, methinks, have found a better way than a motion like the present. Never will I, while a single Athenian is left, advise the commonwealth to make a peace like this: peace, however, I do advise" — and to such purport briefly and fairly he expressed himself. Yet the same man who had thus spoken on the first day in the hearing of you all, on the next, when the peace was to be ratified, when I supported the resolution of our allies, and exerted myself to make the peace equitable and just, and you were of my opinion, and would not even hear the voice of the despicable Philocrates, — he then got up and addressed the people in support of Philocrates, and said what (O heavens!) deserved a thousand deaths — that you ought not to remember your ancestors, nor put up with persons that talked about trophies and sea-fights, and that he would propose and pass a law to prevent your succouring any Greeks who had not previously succoured you. All which this impudent wretch dared to utter in the presence and hearing of the ambassadors, whom you sent for out of Greece at his persuasion before he had sold himself.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Embassy*, 142–146

Such advantages have the Thebans gained by the peace: greater they could not wish for, I imagine: but what have the Theban ambassadors gained? The advantage of having done so much

for their country—that is all; but that is honourable and glorious, O Athenians, in regard to praise and renown, which these men bartered away for gold.

Now let me contrast what the Athenian commonwealth has gained by the peace, and what the Athenian ambassadors; and see if the commonwealth and these men themselves have fared alike. To the commonwealth the result has been, that she has relinquished all her possessions and all her allies, and has sworn to Philip, that, should any one else interfere ever to preserve them, you will prevent it, and will regard the person who wishes to restore them to you as an adversary and a foe, the person who has deprived you of them as an ally and a friend. These are the terms which Æschines the defendant supported, and his coadjutor Philocrates proposed; and when I prevailed on the first day and had persuaded you to confirm the resolution of your allies, and to summon Philip's ambassadors, the defendant drove it off to the following day, and persuaded you to adopt the decree of Philocrates, in which these clauses, and many others yet more shameful, are contained. To the state then such consequences have resulted from the peace: — consequences more disgraceful could not easily be found: but what to the ambassadors who caused them? I pass by all the other matters which you have seen — houses — timber — grain; but in the territory of our ruined allies they have estates and farms of large extent, bringing in to Philocrates an income of a talent, to Æschines here thirty minas. Is it not shocking and dreadful, O Athenians, that the misfortunes of your allies have become a source of revenue to your ambassadors; that the same peace has to the country which sent them proved to be destruction of allies, cession of dominions, disgrace instead of honour, while to the ambassadors, who wrought these mischiefs to the country, it has produced revenues, resources, estates, riches, in exchange for extreme indigence? To prove the truth of my statements, call me the Olynthian witnesses.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Embassy*, 298–310

You hear, O Athenians, what the gods admonish you. If now they have given you this response during a time of war, they mean that you should beware of your generals; for the generals are

conductors of war: but if after the conclusion of peace, they mean your chief statesmen; for they have the lead, their counsels you follow, by them are you in danger of being deceived.

And you are told by the oracle to hold the commonwealth together, so that all may have one mind, and not cause gratification to the enemy. Think ye now, O Athenians, that the preserving, or the punishing, of a man who has done all this mischief would cause gratification to Philip? I think the preserving. The oracle however says, you should do your best to prevent the enemy rejoicing. So it exhorts all with one mind to punish those who have in any way been subservient to the enemy: Zeus, Dione, all the gods. They that intend you evil are outside, their supporters are inside; the business of the former is to give bribes, of the latter to receive, and get off those who have received them.

Besides, even by human reasoning one may see, that the most mischievous and dangerous of all things is, to suffer a leading statesman to become attached to those who have not the same objects with the people. Consider by what means Philip has become master of everything, and by what means he has achieved the greatest of his works. By purchasing success from those who would sell it; by corrupting and exciting the ambition of leading statesmen: by such means. Both these however it is in your power, if you please, to render ineffective to-day: if to one class of men you will not listen, when they plead for people of this kind, but show that they have no authority with you, (for now they say they have authority:) and if you will punish him that has sold himself, and this shall be seen by all.

With any man you might well be wroth, O Athenians, who had done such deeds, and sacrificed allies and friends and opportunities, which make or mar the fortunes of every people, but with none more strongly or more justly than the defendant. A man who took his place with the mistrusters of Philip — who first and singly discovered him to be the common enemy of all the Greeks, and then deserted and turned traitor, and has suddenly become a supporter of Philip — can it be doubted that such a man deserves a thousand deaths? The truth of these statements he himself will not be able to gainsay. Who is it that brought Ischander to you

in the beginning, whom he represented to have come here from the country's friends in Arcadia? Who cried out, that Philip was packing Greece and Peloponnesus, whilst you were sleeping? Who was it that made those fine long orations before the assembly, and read the decree of Miltiades and Themistocles, and the young men's oath in the temple of Aglauros? Was it not this man? Who persuaded you to send embassies almost to the Red Sea, urging that Greece was plotted against by Philip, and that it became you to foresee it and not abandon the interests of the Greeks? Was not the mover of the decree Eubulus, and the envoy to Peloponnesus the defendant Æschines? What he may have talked and harangued about when he got there, is best known to himself; but what he reported to you I am sure you all remember. Several times in his speech he called Philip a barbarian and a pest, and told you the Arcadians were delighted that the Athenian commonwealth was now attending to her affairs and rousing herself. But what most of all had made him indignant, he said, — coming home he met Atrestidas on his way from Philip's court, and there were about thirty women and children walking with him; and he was astonished, and asked one of the travellers who the man was, and who the crowd that followed him; but when he heard that these were Olynthian captives, whom Atrestidas was bringing away as a present from Philip, he thought it shocking, and wept, and bewailed the miserable condition of Greece, that she should regard such calamitous events with indifference. And he advised you to send persons to Arcadia to denounce the agents of Philip; for he heard, he said, from his friends, that if the commonwealth would turn their attention to it and send an embassy, they would be punished. Such was then his language, honourable indeed, O Athenians, and worthy of the state. But after he had gone to Macedonia, and beheld this Philip, the enemy of himself and the Greeks, was it like or similar? Very far from it. He said you were not to remember your ancestors, not to talk of trophies or succour any one; and he was surprised at the men who advised you to consult with the Greeks about peace with Philip, as if any one else had to be persuaded on a question that concerned you alone; and that Philip himself was (O Hercules!) a thorough Greek, an eloquent speaker, a warm

friend of Athens, and that there were some men in the city so unreasonable and perverse, as not to be ashamed of abusing him and calling him a barbarian.

Is it possible that the same man, after having made the former speeches, could have ventured to make these, without having been corrupted? But further; is there a man who, after having then execrated Atrestidas on account of the women and children of the Olynthians, could have endured now to co-operate with Philocrates, who brought free-born Olynthian women hither for dishonour, and is so notorious for his abominable life, that I have no need to say anything scandalous or offensive about him, but let me only say that Philocrates brought women, you and the bystanders know all the rest, and feel pity, I am sure, for those poor unhappy creatures, whom Æschines pitied not, nor wept for Greece on their account, that among an allied people they should be outraged by the ambassadors.

4. ALLIANCE WITH THEBES

Philip was now advancing southward into Greece, and the capture of Elatea inflamed the other cities and made them fear for their own safety. An alliance was hastily formed between Thebes and Athens, due largely to the influence of Demosthenes, who moved the decree in the assembly.

Later, after the defeat at Chæronea, Demosthenes was severely blamed for the alliance, but he defended his action, saying that it was the only thing to be done in such a crisis.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown*, 168–187

Philip having thus disposed the states towards each other by his contrivances, and being elated by these decrees and answers, came with his army and seized Elatea, confident that, happen what might, you and the Thebans could never again unite. What commotion there was in the city you all know; but let me just mention the most striking circumstances.

It was evening. A person came with a message to the presidents that Elatea was taken. They rose from supper immediately,

drove off the people from their market-stalls, and set fire to the wicker-frames; others sent for the generals and called the trumpeter; and the city was full of commotion. The next morning at daybreak the presidents summoned the council to their hall, and you went to the assembly, and before they could introduce or prepare the question, the whole people were up in their seats. When the council had entered, and the presidents had reported their intelligence and presented the courier, and he had made his statement, the crier asked, "Who wishes to speak?" and no one came forward. The crier put the question repeatedly — still no man rose, though all the generals were present and all the orators, and our country with her common voice called for some one to speak and save her — for when the crier raises his voice according to law, it may justly be deemed the common voice of our country. If those who desired the salvation of Athens were the proper parties to come forward, all of you and the other Athenians would have risen and mounted the platform; for I am sure you all desired her salvation — if those of greatest wealth, the three hundred — if those who were both friendly to the state and wealthy, the men who afterwards gave such ample donations, for patriotism and wealth produced the gift. But that occasion, that day, as it seems, called not only for a patriot and wealthy man, but for one who had closely followed the proceedings from their commencement, and rightly calculated for what object and purpose Philip carried them on. A man who was ignorant of these matters, or had not long and carefully studied them, let him be ever so patriotic or wealthy, would neither see what measures were needful, nor be competent to advise you.

Well then — I was the man called for upon that day. I came forward and addressed you. What I said, I beg you for two reasons attentively to hear — first, to be convinced, that of all your orators and statesmen I alone deserted not the patriot's post in the hour of danger, but was found in the very moment of panic speaking and moving what your necessities required — secondly, because at the expense of a little time you will gain large experience for the future in all your political concerns.

I said — those who were in such alarm under the idea that Philip had got the Thebans with him did not, in my opinion,

understand the position of affairs; for I was sure had that really been so, we should have heard not of his being at Elatea, but upon our frontiers: he was come, however, I knew for certain, to make all right for himself in Thebes. "Let me inform you," said I, "how the matter stands. — All the Thebans whom it was possible either to bribe or deceive he has at his command; those who have resisted him from the first and still oppose him he can in no way prevail upon: what then is his meaning, and why has he seized upon Elatea? He means, by displaying a force in the neighbourhood, and bringing up his troops, to encourage and embolden his friends, to intimidate his adversaries, that they may either concede from fear what they now refuse, or be compelled. Now" — said I — "if we determine on the present occasion to remember any unkindness which the Thebans have done us, and to regard them in the character of enemies with distrust, in the first place, we shall be doing just what Philip would desire; in the next place, I fear, his present adversaries embracing his friendship and all Philippising with one consent, they will both march against Attica. But if you will hearken to me, and be pleased to examine (not cavil at) what I say, I believe it will meet your approval, and I shall dispel the danger impending over Athens. What then do I advise? — First, away with your present fear; and rather fear all of ye for the Thebans — they are nearer harm than we are — to them the peril is more immediate: — next I say, march to Eleusis all the fighting-men and the cavalry, and show yourselves to the world in arms, that your partisans in Thebes may have equal liberty to speak up for the good cause, knowing that, as the faction who sell their country to Philip have an army to support them at Elatea, so the party that will contend for freedom have your assistance at hand if they are assailed. Further I recommend you to elect ten ambassadors, and empower them in conjunction with the generals to fix the time for going there and for the out-march. When the ambassadors have arrived at Thebes, how do I advise that you should treat the matter? Pray attend particularly to this — Ask nothing of the Thebans (it would be dishonourable at this time); but offer to assist them if they require it, on the plea that they are in extreme danger, and we see the future better than they do. If they

accept this offer and hearken to our counsels, so shall we have accomplished what we desire, and our conduct will look worthy of the state: should we miscarry, they will have themselves to blame for any error committed now, and we shall have done nothing dishonourable or mean."

This and more to the like effect I spoke, and left the platform. It was approved by all: not a word was said against me. Nor did I make the speech without moving, nor make the motion without undertaking the embassy, nor undertake the embassy without prevailing on the Thebans. From the beginning to the end I went through it all; I gave myself entirely to your service, to meet the dangers which encompassed Athens.

Produce me the decree which then passed. Now, Æschines, how would you have me describe you, and how myself, upon that day? Shall I call myself Batalus, your nickname of reproach, and you not even a hero of the common sort, but one of those upon the stage, Cresphontes or Creon, or the Œnomaus whom you execrably murdered once at Collytus? Well; upon that occasion I the Batalus of Pæania was more serviceable to the state than you the Œnomaus of Cothocidæ. You were of no earthly use; I did everything which became a good citizen. Read the decree.

The Decree of Demosthenes

In the archonship of Nausicles, in the presidency of the Æantian tribe, on the sixteenth of Scirophorion, Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Pæania moved: Whereas Philip king of Macedon hath in time past been violating the treaty of peace made between him and the Athenian people, in contempt of his oath and those laws of justice which are recognised among all the Greeks, and hath been annexing unto himself cities that no way belong to him, and hath besieged and taken some which belong to the Athenians without any provocation by the people of Athens, and at the present time he is making great advances in cruelty and violence, forasmuch as in certain Greek cities he puts garrisons and overturns their constitution, some he razes to the ground and sells the inhabitants for slaves, in some he replaces a Greek population with

barbarians, giving them possession of the temples and sepulchres, acting in no way foreign to his own country or character, making an insolent use of his present fortune, and forgetting that from a petty and insignificant person he has come to be unexpectedly great: and the people of Athens, so long as they saw him annexing barbarian or private cities of their own, less seriously regarded the offence given to themselves, but now that they see Greek cities outraged and some destroyed, they think it would be monstrous and unworthy of their ancestral glory to look on while the Greeks are enslaved: Therefore it is resolved by the Council and People of Athens, that having prayed and sacrificed to the gods and heroes who protect the Athenian city and territory, bearing in mind the virtue of their ancestors, who deemed it of greater moment to preserve the liberty of Greece than their own country, they will put two hundred ships to sea, and their admiral shall sail up into the straits of Thermopylæ, and their general and commander of horse shall march with the infantry and cavalry to Eleusis, and ambassadors shall be sent to the other Greeks, and first of all to the Thebans, because Philip is nearest their territory, and shall exhort them without dread of Philip to maintain their own independence and that of Greece at large, and assure them that the Athenian people, not remembering any variance which has formerly arisen between the countries, will assist them with troops and money and weapons and arms, feeling that for them (being Greeks) to contend among themselves for the leadership is honourable, but to be commanded and deprived of the leadership by a man of foreign extraction is derogatory to the renown of the Greeks and the virtue of their ancestors: further, the people of Athens do not regard the people of Thebes as aliens either in blood or race; they remember also the benefits conferred by their ancestors upon the ancestors of the Thebans; for they restored the children of Hercules who were kept by the Peloponnesians out of their hereditary dominion, defeating in battle those who attempted to resist the descendants of Hercules; and we gave shelter to Œdipus and his comrades in exile; and many other kind and generous acts have been done by us to the Thebans: wherefore now also the people of Athens will not desert the interests of the Thebans and the other Greeks: and

let a treaty be entered into with them for alliance and intermarriage, and oaths be mutually exchanged. Ambassadors: Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Pæania, Hyperides son of Cleander of Sphettus, Mnesithides son of Antiphanes of Phrearrhii, Democrates son of Sophilus of Phlya, Callæschrus son of Diotimus of Cothocidæ.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown*, 66–72

But I return to the question — What should the commonwealth, Æschines, have done, when she saw Philip establishing an empire and dominion over Greece? Or what was your statesman to advise or move? — I, a statesman at Athens? — for this is most material — I who knew that from the earliest time, until the day of my own mounting the platform, our country had ever striven for precedency and honour and renown, and expended more blood and treasure for the sake of glory and the general weal than the rest of the Greeks had expended on their several interests? — who saw that Philip himself, with whom we were contending, had, in the strife for power and empire, had his eye cut out, his collar-bone fractured, his hand and leg mutilated, and was ready and willing to sacrifice any part of his body that fortune chose to take, provided he could live with the remainder in honour and glory? Hardly will any one venture to say this — that it became a man bred at Pella, then an obscure and inconsiderable place, to possess such inborn magnanimity, as to aspire to the mastery of Greece and form the project in his mind, whilst you, who were Athenians, day after day in speeches and in dramas reminded of the virtue of your ancestors, should have been so naturally base, as of your own free-will and accord to surrender to Philip the liberty of Greece. No man will say this!

The only course then that remained was a just resistance to all his attacks upon you. Such course you took from the beginning, properly and becomingly; and I assisted by motions and counsels during the period of my political life: — I acknowledge it. But what should I have done? I put this question to you, dismissing all else: Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Halonnesus — I mention none of them: Serrium, Doriscus, the ravaging of Peparethus,

and any similar wrongs which the country has suffered — I know not even of their occurrence. You indeed said, that by talking of these I had brought the people into a quarrel, although the resolutions respecting them were moved by Eubulus and Aristophon and Diopithes — not by me, you ready utterer of what suits your purpose! Neither will I speak of these now. But I ask — the man who was appropriating to himself Eubœa, and making it a fortress against Attica, and attempting Megara, and seizing Oreus, and razing Porthmus, and setting up Philistides as tyrant in Oreus, Clitarchus in Eretria, and subjugating the Hellespont, and besieging Byzantium, and destroying some of the Greek cities, restoring exiles to others, — was he by all these proceedings committing injustice, breaking the truce, violating the peace, or not? Was it meet that any of the Greeks should rise up to prevent these proceedings, or not? If not — if Greece was to present the spectacle (as it is called) of a Mysian prey, whilst Athenians had life and being, then I have exceeded my duty in speaking on the subject — the commonwealth has exceeded her duty, which followed my counsels — I admit that every measure has been a misdeed, a blunder of mine. But if some one ought to have arisen to prevent these things, who but the Athenian people should it have been? Such then was the policy which I espoused. I saw him reducing all men to subjection, and I opposed him: I continued warning and exhorting you not to make these sacrifices to Philip.

It was he that infringed the peace by taking our ships: it was not the state Æschines.

5. CHÆRONEA AND ITS RESULTS

We have a very meager narrative of the battle of Chæronea (in Diodorus), but it is interesting to read Plutarch's remark on the presence of the young Alexander in the battle.

PLUTARCH, *Alexander*, 9

At the battle of Chæronea, which his father fought against the Grecians, he is said to have been the first man that charged the Thebans' sacred band. And even in my remembrance, there stood an old oak near the river Cephisus, which people called Alexander's

oak, because his tent was pitched under it. And not far off are to be seen the graves of the Macedonians who fell in that battle. This early bravery made Philip so fond of him, that nothing pleased him more than to hear his subjects call himself their general and Alexander their king.

As was customary, a public funeral was held for those who had fallen in action. The oration was delivered by Demosthenes, but it has not been found.

The epitaph which he quotes is now regarded as a forgery, but the one which follows is considered genuine.[1]

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown*, 285–290

Many great and glorious enterprises has the commonwealth, Æschines, undertaken and succeeded in through me; and she did not forget them. Here is the proof — On the election of a person to speak the funeral oration immediately after the event, you were proposed, but the people would not have you, notwithstanding your fine voice, nor Demades, though he had just made the peace, nor Hegemon, nor any other of your party — but me. And when you and Pythocles came forward in a brutal and shameful manner (O merciful heaven!) and urged the same accusations against me which you now do, and abused me, they elected me all the more. The reason — you are not ignorant of it — yet I will tell you. The Athenians knew as well the loyalty and zeal with which I conducted their affairs as the dishonesty of you and your party; for what you denied upon oath in our prosperity you confessed in the misfortunes of the republic. They considered, therefore, that men who got security for their politics by the public disasters had been their enemies long before, and were then avowedly such. They thought it right also that the person who was to speak in honour of the fallen and celebrate their valour should not have sat under the same roof or at the same table with their antagonists; that he should not revel there and sing a pæan over the calamities of Greece in company with their murderers, and then come here and receive distinction; that he should not with his voice act the mourner of their

[1] See note, § 289, in Goodwin, "De Corona," short edition.

fate, but that he should lament over them with his heart. This they perceived in themselves and in me, but not in any of you: therefore they elected me, and not you. Nor, while the people felt thus, did the fathers and brothers of the deceased, who were chosen by the people to perform their obsequies, feel differently. For having to order the funeral banquet (according to custom) at the house of the nearest relative to the deceased, they ordered it at mine. And with reason: because, though each to his own was nearer of kin than I was, none was so near to them all collectively. He that had the deepest interest in their safety and success had upon their mournful disaster the largest share of sorrow for them all.

Read him this epitaph, which the state chose to inscribe on their monument, that you may see even by this, Æschines, what a heartless and malignant wretch you are. Read.

THE EPITAPH

These are the patriot brave, who side by side
Stood to their arms, and dash'd the foeman's pride:
Firm in their valour, prodigal of life,
Hades they chose the arbiter of strife;
That Greeks might ne'er to haughty victors bow,
Nor thraldom's yoke, nor dire oppression know;
They fought, they bled, and on their country's breast
(Such was the doom of heaven) these warriors rest.
Gods never lack success, nor strive in vain,
But man must suffer what the fates ordain.

Do you hear, Æschines, in this very inscription, that "Gods never lack success, nor strive in vain?" Not to the statesman does it ascribe the power of giving victory in battle, but to the Gods. Wherefore, then, execrable man, do you reproach me with these things? Wherefore utter such language? I pray that it may fall upon the heads of you and yours.

Palatine Anthology, VII, 245

EPITAPH OVER THOSE WHO FELL AT CHÆRONEA

O time, all-surveying spirit of all things for mortals,
Bear thou the tidings to all men of our fate,
That trying to save the holy land of Hellas
We perished in the famed meadows of Bœotia.

The following pathetic little word-picture is taken from an oration of Lycurgus.

LYCURGUS, *Against Leocrates*, 39–42 (in Jebb, "Attic Orators," Vol. II, pp. 378–379)

In those days, Athenians, who would not have pitied the city — what citizen, ay, or what stranger that had visited it formerly? Who was then so bitter against the democracy or against Athens that he could have endured to find himself without a place in the ranks of defenders, when the news came of the defeat and the disaster that had befallen the people, when the city was all excitement at the tidings, when the hopes of public safety had come to rest on the men past fifty, when you might see free-born women crouching in terror at the house-doors, asking *if he is alive* — the husband, the father, or the brother — a sight humiliating for the city and for her daughters; while men decrepit of frame, well stricken in years, released by the laws from service under arms, men on the threshold that leads from age to death, might be seen hurrying helplessly through the city, with their mantles pinned in double folds around them? But, many as were the miseries in the city, great as was the ruin that had come on all the citizens, the keenest grief, the bitterest tears, were due to the fortunes of the city itself — when the edict, declaring slaves to be free men, aliens to be Athenians, the disfranchised to be reinstated, was read by any man who once, perhaps, had prided himself on being a free-born son of the Attic soil. The reverse that had befallen the city was even this: formerly she had vindicated the freedom of the Greeks — *then* she thought it enough if she could successfully defend her own existence; formerly she had ruled far and wide over the land of barbarians — *then* she was battling with Macedonians for her own; and the people whose aid was once invoked by Lacedæmonians, by Peloponnesians and by the Greeks of Asia was driven to seek succour for itself from the men of Andros, of Ceos, of Trœzen, of Epidaurus.

6. THE ATTACK OF ÆSCHINES ON DEMOSTHENES

Even the common calamity at Chæronea did not succeed in putting to rest the strong party feeling and, above all, the personal enmities.

When Ctesiphon proposed a decree to grant a crown to Demosthenes for services rendered in the war, Æschines opposed it most strenuously and heaped abuse on Demosthenes, accusing him of blundering mismanagement, corruptibility, conceit, and self-advertisement. This oration has the sound of an overpayment in kind for the oration, "On the Embassy."

PLUTARCH, *Demosthenes*, 21–22

At this time, however, upon the ill-success which now happened to the Grecians, those of the contrary faction in the commonwealth fell foul upon Demosthenes and took the opportunity to frame several informations and indictments against him. But the people not only acquitted him of these accusations, but continued towards him their former respect, and still invited him, as a man that meant well, to take a part in public affairs. Insomuch that when the bones of those who had been slain at Chæronea were brought home to be solemnly interred, Demosthenes was the man they chose to make the funeral oration. They did not show, under the misfortunes which befell them, a base or ignoble mind, as Theopompus writes in his exaggerated style, but on the contrary, by the honour and respect paid to their counsellor, they made it appear that they were noway dissatisfied with the counsels he had given them. The speech, therefore, was spoken by Demosthenes. But the subsequent decrees he would not allow to be passed in his own name, but made use of those of his friends, one after another, looking upon his own as unfortunate and inauspicious; till at length he took courage again after the death of Philip, who did not long outlive his victory at Chæronea. And this, it seems, was that which was foretold in the last verse of the oracle —

Conquered shall weep, and conqueror perish there.

Demosthenes had secret intelligence of the death of Philip, and laying hold of this opportunity to prepossess the people with courage and better hopes for the future, he came into the assembly with a cheerful countenance, pretending to have had a dream that presaged some great good fortune for Athens; and, not long after,

arrived the messengers who brought the news of Philip's death. No sooner had the people received it, but immediately they offered sacrifice to the gods, and decreed that Pausanias should be presented with a crown. Demosthenes appeared publicly in a rich dress, with a chaplet on his head, though it were but the seventh day since the death of his daughter, as is said by Æschines, who upbraids him upon this account, and rails at him as one void of natural affection towards his children. Whereas, indeed, he rather betrays himself to be of a poor, low spirit, and effeminate mind, if he really means to make wailings and lamentation the only signs of a gentle and affectionate nature, and to condemn those who bear such accidents with more temper and less passion. For my own part, I cannot say that the behaviour of the Athenians on this occasion was wise or honourable, to crown themselves with garlands and to sacrifice to the gods for the death of a prince who, in the midst of his success and victories, when they were a conquered people, had used them with so much clemency and humanity. For besides provoking fortune, it was a base thing, and unworthy in itself, to make him a citizen of Athens, and pay him honours while he lived, and yet as soon as he fell by another's hand, to set no bounds to their jollity, to insult over him dead, and to sing triumphant songs of victory, as if by their own valour they had vanquished him. I must at the same time commend the behaviour of Demosthenes, who, leaving tears and lamentations and domestic sorrows to the women, made it his business to attend to the interests of the commonwealth.

ÆSCHINES, *Against Ctesiphon*, 148–151

And of the three previously mentioned crimes, the third (of which I am now going to speak) is the greatest. Philip did not despise the Greeks, and he knew, for he was not a fool, that within a fraction of a day he was to fight for all he had, and therefore wished to make the peace, and was at the point of sending ambassadors to that end; the archons in Thebes were afraid of the impending danger, with very good reason too; for it was no orator who had never seen service and a deserter from his post, who admonished them, but the Phocian war by ten years of teaching had stamped

the lesson on their memories. Demosthenes, perceiving the condition of things and suspecting that the Bœotarchs were going to make peace on their own account and to get money from Philip without a share for him, thinking that life was intolerable if he was to miss the chance of a bribe, started up in the assembly, (though no one was urging that peace ought to be made or that it ought not, but with the idea of proclaiming publicly to the Bœotarchs to give him a share of the spoils), and he solemnly swore by Athena (very likely the one which Phidias made that Demosthenes might make his profits and swear his false oaths by), that if anyone should venture to say that peace should be made with Philip he would seize him by the hair and drag him off to prison, thereby emulating the statesmanship of Cleophon, who, as they say, proved the ruin of the city in the time of the war with Sparta. And as the Bœotarchs paid no attention to him, but turned back your troops which had started, in order that you might confer about the peace, straightway he went quite mad and mounting the platform branded the Bœotians as the betrayers of Hellas, and said he would frame a decree — he who never looked a foe in the face — to send you as ambassadors to Thebes to ask a passage through to Philip. And the Theban magistrates were filled with shame at the thought of being regarded as really the betrayers of Greece and turned from the peace and plunged into preparations for war.

ÆSCHINES, *Against Ctesiphon*, 178–188

If anyone should ask you whether the city seems more famous now or in the days of our ancestors, you would say in the days of our ancestors. Were men better then or now? Then they were distinguished, but now we have degenerated. And were rewards and crowns and proclamations and banquets in the town-hall more frequent then or now? Then such things were rare and the name of virtue was honored; but now the thing has lost its lustre and now you grant crowns as a matter of course, not for a real purpose. And is it not absurd, when we think of it, that though there are more rewards now the fortunes of the city were higher then, and that men are worse now but were better then? I will try to explain this to you.

Would you think, Athenians, that anyone would ever have attempted to train for the pancratium or some other hard event in the Olympic games or one of the other festivals if the crown was given not to the strongest but to the man who cheated his way through? Everyone would have refused to enter. As it is, I think some wish to be victors because it is a rare distinction and one much sought after and honorable and ever to be remembered, and so they hazard their lives and endure risking the greatest physical hardship. Suppose now that you yourselves are judges of a contest of political excellence, and consider this, — that if you give rewards to a few and to those who deserve it and in accordance with the rules you will have many contestants for the prize of excellence, but if you confer it as a favor at random on the first that comes and on dishonest winners, you will destroy even the best characters. And to prove that I am right, I desire to argue more fully for a moment longer.

Which seems to you the better man, Themistocles who was general when you conquered the Persians in the sea-fight at Salamis, or Demosthenes who deserted his place in battle? — Miltiades the victor in the battle of Marathon or Demosthenes? Those from Phyle who restored the exiled democracy? or Aristides who had a nickname so unlike that of Demosthenes? No, by the Olympian gods, I do not think it right to speak of this savage in the same day as those men. However, let Demosthenes show in his own speech if there is any record that any of these men should have a crown. Then the democracy was ungrateful? No indeed, but high-minded; and these men who were not honored were worthy of the city, for they thought they should be honored not in decrees but in the memory of those they had served, the memory which from that day to this remains immortal. And yet, they did receive certain rewards and we must recall them.

There were some men, Athenians, in those days who endured great hardship and many dangers at the river Strymon and conquered the Medes in battle, and on their return they asked a reward of the people. And the people gave them great honors, as it seemed then, — to set up three stone Hermæ in the colonnade of the Hermæ, but on condition that the names of the men should

not be inscribed on them, in order that the inscription should appear to belong to the state and not to the generals.

From the poems themselves you will see that I am speaking the truth.

On the first of the Hermæ is inscribed:

> With the Atridæ of old, from this our city, Menestheus
> Led his men to the plain Trojan called and divine.
> He, once Homer asserted, among well-armored Achæans,
> Marshaller was of the fight, best of them all who had come.
> Thus there is naught unseemly in giving that name to Athenians;
> Marshallers they both of war and of the vigor of men;

and on the second: —

> Valorous-hearted as well were they who at Eïon fighting,
> Facing the sons of the Medes, Strymon's current beside,
> Fiery famine arrayed, and gore-flecked Ares, against them,
> Thus first finding for foes that grim exit, — despair;

and on the third: —

> Unto their leaders reward by Athenians thus hath been given;
> Benefits won such return, valorous deeds of the brave.
> All the more strong at the sight will the men of the future be eager,
> Fighting for commonwealth, war's dread strife to maintain.[1]

Are the names of the generals anywhere? No, only that of the people.

Enter now, in imagination, the Painted Colonnade, for memorials of all your splendid deeds are dedicated in the agora. What is it, men of Athens, that I mean? There is painted the battle of Marathon. Who then was the general? If asked this you would all answer Miltiades, but his name is not written there. How was that? Did he not ask that honor? He asked it but the people did not grant it; instead of his name they agreed that he should be painted exhorting the soldiers. In the Metroön, however, is to be seen the reward which you gave those from Phyle who restored the exiled democracy.

The one who proposed and carried the decree was Archinus from Coile, one of those who restored the democrats. He proposed

[1] Epigrams (tr. Perrin), Plutarch's "Cimon and Pericles," p. 79.

first: to give them a thousand drachmæ for sacrifices and offerings, and that is less than ten drachmæ a man; then it orders each of them to be crowned with a wreath of olive, not of gold; for then the green crown was held in honor, but now even the gold one is regarded slightly.

And not even this reward was to be given rashly, but the senate was to investigate exactly how many were besieged at Phyle, when the Lacedæmonians and the Thirty attacked them, not how many fled from their posts on the field at the approach of the enemy!

ÆSCHINES, *Against Ctesiphon*, 237–241

If you pass to the second part of the decree in which you have dared to insert the statement that he is an excellent man and never fails to give the people of the Athenians good advice and good service, lay aside the false pretense and boastfulness of the decree and come down to facts; show us what you mean. The acceptance of bribes in regard to Amphissa and Eubœa I pass over, but when you attribute the responsibility for the alliance with Thebes to Demosthenes, you deceive the uninformed, and insult those who know and understand the case. For by leaving out of the question the nature of the crisis and the reputation of these men because of whom the alliance was made, you think you can cheat us in conferring on Demosthenes the prestige belonging to the city. The enormity of this bragging I shall try to show you by a striking example. The king of Persia, not long before Alexander crossed to Asia, sent down to our people a very insulting and barbaric letter, in which many things were said in a very boorish way, and at the end he wrote: — "I will not give you gold, do not ask me; you will not get it." This same king, however, embarrassed by the present dangers which threaten him, voluntarily (for the Athenians did not ask it), sent three hundred talents to the people, who were too wise to take it. But what got the money was the emergency and his fear and need of allies. And it was the same thing that brought to pass the alliance with Thebes. You bore us with your incessant talk about Thebes and that unfortunate alliance, but you are very quiet about the seven hundred talents you took and reserved for yourself out of the king's gold. Was it not for want of

money, for a matter of five talents that the foreign garrison failed to surrender the Cadmea? Was it not for lack of ten talents of silver, at a time when all the Arcadians were in readiness and their leaders were prepared to help, that the undertaking has come to naught? But you are rich and minister to your own pleasures. And in fine, — Ctesiphon has the king's gold and we have all the peril.

It is worth the trouble to observe their lack of good breeding. For if Ctesiphon has the nerve to summon Demosthenes and he rises to sing his own praises, the recital will be a more bitter experience than all the misfortunes we have suffered at his hands. For we do not put up with really good men whose excellencies are matters of knowledge to us when they sing their own praise. Who then could control himself to listen when a creature who has been a disgrace to the state lauds himself?

7. DEMOSTHENES DEFENDS HIS OWN POLICY

The answer of Demosthenes is no less scathing in parts; it has, about it, however, a dignity and true patriotism.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown*, 297–305

Then do you ask me, Æschines, for what merit I claim to be honored? I will tell you. Because, while all the statesmen in Greece, beginning with yourself, have been corrupted formerly by Philip and now by Alexander, me neither opportunity, nor fair speeches, nor large promises, nor hope, nor fear, nor anything else could tempt or induce to betray ought that I considered just and beneficial to my country. Whatever I have advised my fellow-citizens, I have never advised like you men, leaning as in a balance to the side of profit: all my proceedings have been those of a soul upright, honest, and incorrupt: entrusted with affairs of greater magnitude than any of my contemporaries, I have administered them all honestly and faithfully. Therefore do I claim to be honoured.

As to this fortification, for which you ridiculed me, of the wall and fosse, I regard them as deserving of thanks and praise, and so they are; but I place them nowhere near my acts of administration. Not with stones nor with bricks did I fortify Athens: nor

is this the ministry on which I most pride myself. Would you view my fortifications aright, you will find arms, and states, and posts, and harbours, and galleys, and horses, and men for their defence. These are the bulwarks with which I protected Attica, as far as was possible by human wisdom; with these I fortified our territory, not the circle of Piræus or the city. Nay more; I was not beaten by Philip in estimates or preparations; far from it; but the generals and forces of the allies were overcome by his fortune. Where are the proofs of this? They are plain and evident. Consider.

What was the course becoming a loyal citizen — a statesman serving his country with all possible forethought and zeal and fidelity? Should he not have covered Attica on the seaboard with Eubœa, on the midland frontier with Bœotia, on the Peloponnesian with the people of that confine? Should he not have provided for the conveyance of corn along a friendly coast all the way to Piræus? preserved certain places that belonged to us by sending off succours, and by advising and moving accordingly, — Proconnesus, Chersonesus, Tenedos? brought others into alliance and confederacy with us, — Byzantium, Abydus, Eubœa? — cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and supplied what the commonwealth was deficient in? All this has been accomplished by my decrees and measures; and whoever will examine them without prejudice, men of Athens, will find they were rightly planned and faithfully executed; that none of the proper seasons were lost or missed or thrown away by me, nothing which depended on one man's ability and prudence was neglected. But if the power of some deity or of fortune, or the worthlessness of commanders, or the wickedness of you that betrayed your countries, or all these things together, injured and eventually ruined our cause, of what is Demosthenes guilty? Had there in each of the Greek cities been one such man as I was in my station among you; or rather, had Thessaly possessed one single man, and Arcadia one, of the same sentiments as myself, none of the Greeks either beyond or within Thermopylæ would have suffered their present calamities: all would have been free and independent, living prosperously in their own countries with perfect safety and security, thankful to you and the rest of the Athenians for such manifold blessings through me.

To show you that I greatly understate my services for fear of giving offence, here — read me this — the list of auxiliaries procured by my decrees.

DEMOSTHENES, *On the Crown*, 314–324

You mention the good men of olden times; and you are right so to do. Yet it is hardly fair, O Athenians, that he should get the advantage of that respect which you have for the dead, to compare and contrast me with them — me who am living among you; for what mortal is ignorant, that towards the living there exists always more or less of illwill, whereas the dead are no longer hated even by an enemy? Such being human nature, am I to be tried and judged by the standard of my predecessors? Heaven forbid! It is not just or equitable, Æschines. Let me be compared with you, or any persons you like of your party who are still alive. And consider this — whether it is more honourable and better for the state, that because of the services of a former age, prodigious though they are beyond all power of expression, those of the present generation should be unrequited and spurned, or that all who give proof of their good intentions should have their share of honour and regard from the people? Yet indeed — if I must say so much — my politics and principles, if considered fairly, will be found to resemble those of the illustrious ancients, and to have had the same objects in view, while yours resemble those of their calumniators: for it is certain there were persons in those times who ran down the living and praised people dead and gone with a malignant purpose like yourself.

You say that I am nothing like the ancients. Are you like them, Æschines? Is your brother, or any of our speakers? I assert that none is. But pray, my good fellow (that I may give you no other name), try the living with the living and with his competitors, as you would in all cases — poets, dancers, athletes. Philammon did not, because he was inferior to Glaucus of Carystus and some other champions of a bygone age, depart uncrowned from Olympia, but, because he beat all who entered the ring against him, was crowned and proclaimed conqueror. So I ask you to compare me with the orators of the day, with yourself, with any one you like: I yield to none. When the commonwealth was at liberty to choose for her

advantage, and patriotism was a matter of emulation, I showed myself a better counsellor than any, and every act of state was pursuant to my decrees and laws and negotiations: none of your party was to be seen, unless you had to do the Athenians a mischief. After that lamentable occurrence, when there was a call no longer for advisers, but for persons obedient to command, persons ready to be hired against their country and willing to flatter strangers, then all of you were in occupation, grand people with splendid equipages; I was powerless, I confess, though more attached to my countrymen than you.

Two things, men of Athens, are characteristic of a well-disposed citizen — so may I speak of myself and give the least offence — In authority, his constant aim should be the dignity and pre-eminence of the commonwealth; in all times and circumstances his spirit should be loyal. This depends upon nature; power and might upon other things. Such a spirit, you will find, I have ever sincerely cherished. Only see. When my person was demanded — when they brought Amphictyonic suits against me — when they menaced — when they promised — when they set these miscreants like wild beasts upon me — never in any way have I abandoned my affection for you. From the very beginning I chose an honest and straightforward course in politics, to support the honour, the power, the glory of my fatherland, these to exalt, in these to have my being. I do not walk about the market-place gay and cheerful because the stranger has prospered, holding out my right hand and congratulating those who I think will report it yonder, and on any news of our own success shudder and groan and stoop to the earth, like these impious men who rail at Athens, as if in so doing they did not rail at themselves; who look abroad, and if the foreigner thrives by the distresses of Greece, are thankful for it, and say we should keep him so thriving to all time.

Never, O ye Gods, may those wishes be confirmed by you! If possible, inspire even in these men a better sense and feeling! But if they are indeed incurable, destroy them by themselves; exterminate them on land and sea; and for the rest of us, grant that we may speedily be released from our present fears, and enjoy a lasting deliverance!

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